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"As intellectual property and technology have 
gained importance over the past two decades, 
the philosophical debates have melded with 
broader social and political discourse bearing 
upon the very foundation of modern society. 
We can expect that intellectual property will 
continue to press these frontiers as the 
iniforntation age progresses. " 
Peter S. Menell (2000: 164) 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines firms' perception of the importance and use of patents as a 
means of appropriating the returns from innovation. Scholars and practitioners alike 
have increasingly attributed importance to knowledge assets. On the one hand, the 
literature has recognised the importance of appropriability mechanisms, such as 
patents, to protect and to capture value from those assets, though the importance of 
patents may vary across industrial sectors. On the other hand, the literature says little 
about how firms build their patent portfolio upon the knowledge they create, 
especially with respect to UK-based firms. Therefore, the present research extends the 
existing literature in at least three aspects. Firstly, it looks at what makes firms perceive 
patents as more or less important. Secondly, it examines how patents do (if at all) 
interact with other appropriability mechanisms. Finally, it looks at how firms act with 
respect to why, where, what and when to patent. 
Despite the relevance of the services industry, the manufacturing industry is 
still the major source of patent applications. Thus, a firm-level study in manufacturing 
was chosen. The data were collected mostly from questionnaires, though a few 
interviews were also conducted. The adopted methodology consists of i) a series of 
interviews with decision-makers on patents in six pharmaceuticals firms, using a semi- 
structured questionnaire, and ii) two postal surveys of firms in UK manufacturing, 
conducted through structured questionnaires. One survey, also known as the 
Community Innovation Survey, was undertaken by the UK Office for National 
Statistics on behalf of the UK Department of Trade industry. Its purpose was to collect 
information on innovation-related issues. Another survey, encompassing particular 
aspects of patenting activities, was administered by the researcher to firms listed in the 
UK R&D Scoreboard. 
Various findings were revealed, from which we here pick up a few of particular 
interest. Firstly, contrary to our suspicions patent numbers may be a good 171ot-y for 
evaluating the importance of patents as a mechanism of protection, but not necessarily 
for measuring the level of innovativeness of a firm, although more innovative firms 
were found to be more likely to rank patents of higher importance. Secondly, our 
findings suggest that some mechanisms of appropriability are more correlated to 
patents than others but, overall, they lead to the same sort of conclusion: these 
mechanisms are more likely to work as complements than as substitutes, and this is 
contrary to a common assumption made in the literature. Finally, we found that i) 
firms seek patents mainly as a protective device against copying; ii) patents tend to be 
filed early in the innovation process when the prospects may still be uncertain, but 
appropriability can be enhanced using other patent applications, making changes to 
the first application and/ or making use of other appropriability mechanisms; iii) in 
general a broader patent scope is sought but a narrow scope can also be valuable; and 
iv) the attractiveness of the market is central when firms decide to pursue cross-border 
proprietary control of the knowledge they create. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge and its applications are pivotal to economic growth. Structural 
changes (e. g., globalisation, and the IT revolution) occurring in the last century 
have altered the perception of what is strategic (Teece 1998), so that, for 
example, the ratio of market to book value (Tobin's q) of many firms has 
increased' as intangible assets become more and more valuable compared to 
tangible assets (Lev 2001). As a consequence more academic attention has been 
devoted to understanding the nature and management of knowledge assets. 
One way firms generate knowledge is via experimentation, and in 
particular by that set of activities labelled research and development (R&D). 
Although investments in R&D enhance firms' knowledge, any gains from such 
innovative effort will be discounted if the knowledge can easily be copied by 
competitors. Insofar as competitive advantage derives from the creation, 
ownership, protection and use of assets that are difficult to imitate (Barney 
1991), it is in firms' best interests to avoid imitation of these assets. To this end, 
firms can use mechanisms that are impediments to the imitative dissipation of 
rents (Rumelt 1987). Those mechanisms are known as isolating mechanisms, 
and analogous to them are appropriability mechanisms (Teece 1986), which 
focus on avoiding replication and capturing value from knowledge assets. 
One mechanism that helps firms in reaping the benefits from knowledge 
assets, and which is central to this research, is the patent. Patent systems 
2 
operate by providing a legal framework within which, for a fue and for a 
specified geographical area, inventors own and are able to enforce property 
rights over the knowledge embodied in their patent grant. Although the patent 
system dates back to 1474 in Venice it is only in the last twenty years or so, with 
the increasing recognition of the importance of intangibles, that more academic 
attention has been devoted to patents'-. Indeed it is now not uncommon to come 
across specialised literature advocating that patent strategy has become central 
for firms competitiveness 3 (e. g., Glazier 2000; Rivette & Kline 2000), even 
though there is no common ground yet, at least in academic circles, as to what a 
patent strategy really is. 
Although the business and economics literatures have made huge 
progress over the past twenty years in extending our understanding of how 
firms use the patent system, we argue that there are still gaps in knowledge that 
need to be filled and several issues that still need to be consolidated. Merrill & 
Smith (2001: 398) argue that "without an accurate understanding of the base, our 
conceptions of what happens in the refined atmosphere of the apex will often be 
distorted, or at least incomplete". It is therefore the base with which this 
empirical study is mainly concerned. 
The median of market-to-book ratio has doubled for American companies from 1973 to 1993 (The 
Economist 1999). 
2 Quite a few important academic studies (e. g., Taylor & Silberston 1973; Schmookler 1965; Gilfillan 1935; 
Plant 1934h) predate that period, though it is fair to say that a boom of studies on patents, or perhaps on 
intellectual property in general, has appeared in recent days. 
3 See also the special report published in the Financial Times (2004). 
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The section that follows presents the objectives of this research. The third 
section outlines the scope of this empirical work. Then, the fourth section ' etS 
the boundaries of the research and puts the way ahead into context by 
providing definitions and explaining how patents differ from other forms of 
intellectual property rights. After exploring the basics of intellectual property, 
an introduction to the history of the patent system is given in the fifth section. 
The sixth section describes how a patent can be obtained. Finally, the seventh 
section gives an overview of how this thesis is organised. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The prime objective of this research is to explore how firms in UK 
manufacturing industry use patents. The theoretical literature on the economics 
of patents has made various assumptions as to: the way firms use patents; the 
characteristics of patents that make them valuable; and about the importance of 
the patent system. The empirical literature has also provided insights into these 
issues, but these do not always reconcile with the theory (see chapter 2). 
It would not be feasible to cover all aspects of firms' use of patents, and 
hence this thesis concentrates on a limited agenda. Based upon a review of gaps 
in current literature, this thesis empirically investigates what makes firms 
perceive patents as more or less important; how patents do (if at all) interact 
with other appropriability mechanisms; and how firms act with respect to four 
basic questions - why patent?, where to patent?, what to patent?, and when to 
patent?. 
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1.3 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is further limited in four main directions relating to: i) socio- 
economic factors, ii) sector of activity, iii) level of aggregation and iv) patents 
encompassed. The UK was the geographic area chosen to develop this study as 
it has a tradition of research on patent-related issues and exhibits an intensive 
use of patents. According to statistics from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO 2003) the UK Patent Office was the fourth largest receiver 
in the world of patent applications in 2003 (284,910 in total). It lagged behind 
only Japan, the United States, and Germany. Also the UK is still one of the 
major sources of technology in the world. The research thus considers UK firms, 
although those firms may patent outside the UK. However, the geographic area 
is not used to delimit the ownership of our unit of analysis (the firm). It is only 
used for the purpose of geographical location. Therefore, subsidiaries of foreign 
firms are considered in our study as long as they operate in the UK. 
This study is restricted to the manufacturing sector. Despite the 
increasing economic importance of the services industry the output of its 
innovative activities is generally not patentable, and thus there is no tradition of 
the use of patents. The manufacturing industry is where patents are most 
extensively used. 
In our research the firm is the unit of analysis. However, the term 'firm' 
is used loosely in this thesis. Although the degree of centralisation of patent 
activities can vary, we did not envisage any additional benefits from making a 
5 
distinction between the corporate, firm and enterprise level use of patents, at 
least for the research objectives of this thesis. 
Finally, not all patent transactions are within the target of the present 
research. The focus is on the firms' own produced patent portfolio, that is, on 
the patents they hold as a result of their own innovative effort (as opposed to 
purchased patents). 
1.4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS): BASICS 
1.4.1 PROPERTY 
According to Bouckaert (1990) the notion of property was first elaborated by 
legal science, and benefited, to a large extent, from the legal dogmatics tradition, 
which put a stronger emphasis on definitions and general principles in order to 
develop an intellectual framework within which legal problems ought to be 
solved4. The author argues that simplicity and complexity go hand-in-hand 
when it comes to defining property. It is simple because there exists a general 
idea that property is "something that belongs to somebody in a legitimate way" 
(ibid.: 775). It is complex because when that general notion is applied to, for 
example, "the types of objects that can be owned and the legitimate methods for 
property-acquisition" (ibid. ), other issues emerge (i. e., economic, ethical, legal, 
and political aspects). The academic debate, for example, barely refers to that 
general idea. In fact, it is argued that "someone who believes that property is a 
right to a thing is assumed to suffer from a childlike lack of sophistication" 
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(Merrill & Smith 2001: 357). The conventional definition amongst scholars is that 
property is a "bundle of rights" 5 (Merrill & Smith 2001; Granstranc. i 1999; 
Munzer 1990). 
The modern economics literature, in turn, has been driven by a slightly 
different approach. According to Merrill & Smith (2001: 358) modern economists 
have assumed that property is "an ad hoc collection of rights in resources", and, 
according to the authors, this assumption has largely come into play due to 
Coase's seminal work (i. e., Coase 1960), although Coase himself did not 
explicitly define what property is. Merril & Smith (2001) argue that despite the 
lack of a clear definition by Coase he assumed that property is a bundle of 
rights to make use of resources, rather than rights to a thing that put others 
aside at the proprietor's discretion. Later works by, for instance, Barzel (1997) 
and Posner (1998) have followed a similar argument to Coase's. The former 
defines property as "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the 
good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through 
exchange" (Barzel 1997: 3). The latter asserts that property is seen as "virtually 
every device (... ) by which divergences between private and social costs or 
benefits are reduced" (Posner 1998: 53). Merrill & Smith (2001) oppose to these 
views because, according to them, such a 'list-of-use' approach (as they label 
those definitions) departs from the central characteristic of property: its in rem 
nature. This means that it is not only the relationship to a thing that matters but 
4 The author elaborates further and provides a historical account of the development of the concept of 
property. 
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also the right to exclude others from that thing. According to the authors, this 
particular feature of property rights was recognized by William Blackstone and 
Adam Smith, for example, but it has been addressed to a lesser degree 
nowadays. By systematically abstracting from that feature certain aspects of 
property regimes may not be taken into account, the authors say, and our 
understanding of the subject will remain incomplete. 
Munzer (1990) recognizes that there are different ways in defining 
property from less to more sophisticated concepts. He also adds that another 
point of view is that the use of property is so fragmented that a theory is 
impossible to be formulated, though the author himself does not favour such 
arguments. On the contrary, his contribution is exactly a formulation of a theory 
of property, which, he believes, can make use of the concepts in their various 
degrees of sophistication as long as the context makes clear which concept is 
meant. Following his advice, we believe that a definition of property as above 
suggested by Barzel (1997) will suffice for the purposes of this thesis. In 
particular, because, contrary to Merrill & Smith (2001), it is our understanding 
that it is implicit in Barzel's definition that the proper consumption of the 
services of an asset also depends upon agents' abilities to exclude other agents 
from the same consumption or, at least, upon their abilities to control the extent 
other agents may benefit from that consumption (e. g., licensing, contract-based 
co-operation). 
5 Lawyers certainly see property as a right to a thing but so do accountants and management people. 
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1.4.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Intellectual property rights can be defined as the legal rights over intellectual 
activities concerned with the industrial, scientific, artistic and literary fields 
(Cornish 1999). It is expected to a certain degree that the notion of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) is a 'natural'6 evolution from property rights on land, 
capital and labour (Andersen 2003). The basic notion of property has to do with 
the exercise of control over a particular resource by precluding others at will 
from the underlying resource. This basic idea derives mainly from tangible 
things. Intellectual property, however, stems from ideas, which by their very 
nature are non-physical 7. Despite this intangible character of intellectual 
property, there is a degree of tangibility with respect to the various forms of 
intellectual property because 'ideas' must be expressed and embedded in a 
tangible form for the rights to be claimed. 
However, if the concept of property is strictly extended from a material 
good to an immaterial one, there might be a misinterpretation of the 
characteristics of intellectual property. Both material and immaterial goods are 
possessed (or perhaps dispossessed) in different ways. In the particular case of 
intangibles there is what is called dispossession impossibility (Granstrand 1999). 
To exemplify, we can think in terms of what happens if a physical object and a 
piece of information are stolen. A material good may be returned to its owners 
6 The evolution of the intellectual property concept, however, has followed a different trajectory from the 
concept of property. The former has its roots in deliberate interventions by political authorities whereas 
the latter emerged from a dialogue among jurists (Bouckaert 1990). 
7 It has also some novelty embodied, which does not necessarily have to be absolute (Hughes 1988). 
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in the sense that it will enable them to become again the unique proprietors of 
that particular good. This does not apply to information. The latter has an 
irreversible character which does not permit original owners to reach the same 
status of sole possession. Even if an idea is stolen its owner has not fully lost its 
possession, and if the idea is returned to its owner it is not disposed from its 
thief. In Rentzsch's words: "He who complains about the theft of his idea 
complains that something has been stolen which he still possesses, and he 
wants back something which, if given to him a thousand times, would add 
nothing to his possession" (apud. Machlup & Penrose 1950: 12). These 
arguments may be strong for intellectual activities which are easy to reproduce. 
Many of them, however, rely upon particular resources and capabilities that per 
se preclude those who copy from any (economic) benefit. Therefore, even if a 
piece of information is stolen the thief may not be able to fully exploit what was 
stolen (Lamberton 1994). Moreover, a stolen idea, if 'returned', may add a lot to 
the owner's possession if followed by compensation. 
Nevertheless, even being internationally accepted, this generic term, 
'intellectual property rights', may not be adequate to represent the complexity 
and range of matter it comprises (Cornish 1999). Such a term encompasses an 
array of artistic and scientific manifestations of human beings, and not 
surprisingly we tend to associate the term 'property' to physical goods over 
which we can exercise a certain control. On the top of that, IPRs are also 
referred to in the literature (mainly economics) as monopoly privileges, in 
particular when the subject is concerned with the patent system. Such rights, or 
10 
privileges, are ruled by a legal system at national level, though there are various 
international agreements that extend the rules across borders. 
1.4.3 JURISPRUDENCE 
The jurisprudence underlying intellectual property rights permits creators to 
have a certain time-limited right to control the use of their intellectual goods 
(WIPO 1997). The term during which IPRs can be enforced depends both on the 
type of intellectual property and the country's (or region's) legislation. For 
example, in the United Kingdom copyright regarding literary, dramatic, 
musical, and artistic works have a term of protection that is the life of the 
author plus fifty years. If the copyright is concerned with either film or sound 
recording it lasts fifty years from the year they were made. The term of 
protection for a patent is 20 years in the UK, but it may be extended by the 
means of Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) to up 5 years in case of 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical patents (Cornish 1999). In contrast, Pakistan 
patent protection is given for a period of sixteen years but may also be extended 
to ten more years (Gutterman & Anderson 1997). 
The legal framework governing IPRs is particular for each country, but 
discussion around this matter has gone beyond territorial frontiers. And this is 
not a recent event. It dates back to at least the second half of the 19th century, 
when international treaties seeking a more homogeneous framework across 
countries started to be established. One of the most famous agreements is the 
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International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (so called 
Paris Convention), enacted in 1883 and supplemented in 1978 by the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Another one is the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) which came into force in 1977. The Madrid Agreement, regarding 
trademarks, in 1892, and the Berne Convention, regarding copyrights, in 1886, 
are also examples of international treaties (WIPO 1997). However, as expected, 
harmonisation between countries is not easy. Despite several steps towards a 
common agreement, IPRs have much to do with each country's own interest 
and bargaining power. For example, developing countries may not wish to 
enforce properly IPRs to enable the development of a native industry by 
copying what other firms in the same industry but in a different country have 
done. In turn, more developed countries wish less developed ones to enforce 
IPRs more strictly to increase returns for those firms originally set up in 
wealthier economies. 
The acceleration of the globalisation process as of the 1980s led to an 
increase in conflicts regarding differences in intellectual property regimes. The 
increasing scope of the use of IPRs by firms originally from developed countries 
would demand a change in the international legal environment if international 
trade was to be sustained. A movement initiated in the United States in the 
early 1980s in order to link trade policy to intellectual property standards 
would reach a larger scale in the near future. In fact, the United States, the 
8 This is not a given right. It applies only when inventions have to satisfy stringent regulatory 
requirements prior to obtaining market authorisation. 
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country-members of the European Union and Japan played a crucial role in 
setting up a new agenda for IP protection worldwide throughout the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the period 
between 1986 and 19949. That round led to the creation of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which replaced the GATT'° and which has as one of its 
founding components the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). That agreement has sought to strengthen intellectual 
property regimes and to harmonise them across countries (Maskus 2000). An 
objective also targeted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
which is a non-government institution responsible for promoting intellectual 
property worldwide (WIPO 1997). Nevertheless, it does not seem that TRIPs 
has fully met the expectations of developed countries since they are still seeking 
to extend intellectual property protections offered under TRIPs. This new stage, 
also known as TRIPs-plus, is characterized by developed countries establishing 
bilateral agreements with developing countries, essentially to strengthen both 
legislation and enforcement at levels above TRIPs demands. The United States, 
for example, by means of The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), undertake a comprehensive examination of the commitment to and 
effectiveness of intellectual property protection in various foreign territories 
which enjoy trading privileges with the US (this process is also known as 
"Special 301"). 
9 Especially the US in its dealings with China, which resulted in both countries entering initially into a 
Memorandum of Understanding and later into several bilateral agreements. 
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1.4.4 CATEGORIES OF IPRS 
Although the scope of intellectual property rights depends on the subject matter, 
all types of intellectual property share a common characteristic that can be 
considered essentially negative: "they are rights to stop others from doing 
certain things" (Cornish 1999: 6). At the same time, they aim to stimulate 
creative activities by conferring creators a particular right on their intellectual 
output. On the one hand, IPRs are not a requisite for owners to exploit the 
result of their intellectual activity. On the other hand, IPRs of others cannot he 
ignored when one exploits ones own. 
Intellectual property rights are grouped into areas according to the 
primarily subject matter involved. Traditionally there are two principal areas: i) 
industrial propertyl1 and ii) artistic and literary property. The former comprises 
the following categories of IPRs: patents, utility models, industrial designs, 
trademarks, and geographical indications. The latter comprises copyrights and 
neighbouring rights. Adding to these, there are also trade secrets and other sui 
generis areas 12 . 
Each area, and more specifically each category of IPRs, is 
governed by a legal framework to assure property rights over the related 
subject matter upon fulfilment of certain criteria. 
Trade secrets refer to confidential information that may enable its owner 
a gain in terms of competitive advantage over its competitors that do not have 
10 The replacement was at organisational level only. The General Agreement still exists as the WTO's 
umbrella treaty for trade in goods. 
I This is not the same as a movable or immovable property used for industrial production. 
12 This is not a definite categorisation of the areas of IPRs since there might be overlaps. 
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access to the same information (Gutterman & Anderson 1997). Trade secret law%- 
covers any item of information not generally known or available that the 
possessor wants to conceal from competitors for an unlimited time (Besen & 
Raskind 1991). According to Merges et al. (1997) its legal framework derives 
from common law property, contract and tort doctrines (plus state statutes, if 
applicable). The role of trade secrets as an incentive to produce valuable 
information is due to the limitation of i) use and ii) spread of information 
between contracting parties (Friedman et al. 1991). Trade secret law aims to 
foster the production of information that is not patentable or sometimes is too 
expensive to be patented (Friedman 1998). Moreover, in granting legal 
protection to the generator of information, as long as some effort is made to 
avoid disclosure, it may reduce the costs of keeping that information 
proprietary (Kitch 1980a). However, trade secrets do not preclude others from 
benefiting from the information if it is legally appropriated (e. g., reverse 
engineering). 
Trade secret law is not present in many countries, and even in those 
countries where there exits a jurisprudence the framework is not homogeneous. 
For example, some countries do not confer protection for non-industrial 
information, whilst other countries do. Further, trade secrets may be governed 
at state level, such as in the US. This heterogeneity, however, is likely to 
disappear in due course as a result of the TRIPs agreement (Maskus 2000). 
Patents (or invention patents) concern technology-based inventions and 
give holders the right to maintain some control over the utilisation of the 
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invention for a period of time (20 years, in general). The concept of invention is 
an idea which permits to solve, in a practical way, a technical problem (WIPO 
1997). Specifically, a patent is a legal title issued upon application which enables 
its holder (so called patentee) to enforce, for a limited time and geographical 
area, exclusive rights over an invention by excluding others from making, using 
or selling it without his/ her authorisation. The scope of the patentable subject 
matter, however, is bounded by morality, public health, and national security. 
Patents are granted insofar as inventions meet the requisites for patentability: i) 
novelty (i. e., previously unknown), ii) inventive step (i. e., non-obvious to 
someone with ordinary skills in the technology area the invention fits in), and 
iii) industrial applicability. 
Originally established to incentivise individual inventors the patent 
system is now broadly used by corporations. But the recent 'technology 
revolution' may increase the participation of individual inventors in the patent 
arena if patent scope is to be broadened elsewhere to computer programs, as 
the US patent system already embraces. However, the extent that patents 
should include computer programs is still disputed and a lot of debate is going 
on. A particular issue of concern is whether computer programs can be 
considered inventions. Although computer programs aim to solve technical 
problems, and this is the concept of invention, they are instructions provided by 
human beings, and do not involve necessarily the scientific principles of natural 
sciences (i. e., physics, chemistry and biology). To date (apart from the US), the 
prevailing understanding is that for computer programs to be considered 
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inventions, and hence to be patentable, they have to form an integral part of a 
process in one of scientific fields above. If this does not apply, property rights 
over computer programs need to be pursued in a different category. N lost 
countries initially placed the matter related to computer programs in the scope 
of copyright. However, computer programs do not comfortably fall into this 
category. Moreover, copyright does not confer protection against execution of 
the work in private13. Amendments to copyright legislation have been made in 
many countries but to date, as far as we know, only the US have 'fully' 
incorporated computer programs into patent coverage (Graham & Somaya 
2004). 
There exists another form of property rights (the utility model) similar to 
patents but that embraces less stringent standards of non-obviousness. Overall, 
utility models (also known as 'petty patents') are awarded to mechanical 
inventions and for a period of time shorter than for patents (WIPO 1997). 
However, they are not granted in the UK (Cornish 1999). 
Another form of industrial property is the industrial design. Industrial 
designs are concerned with the ornamental or aesthetic aspect, such as shape, 
pattern, or colour, of a useful article. They must be reproducible by industrial 
means. Otherwise, they would be considered an artistic expression and, 
therefore, should be protected by the copyright law. The term of protection is 25 
years, at most, in the UK (ibid. ). 
13 Samuelson et al. (1994) argue that a more suitable category of IPRs for protection of computer software 
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In addition to natural names, labels became necessary in order to 
facilitate consumers distinguishing one good (or service) from another. The 
principle that underlies marks is the creation of a relationship between goods/ 
services and their maker/ provider. Trademarks and service marks can be 
represented by a word, a name, a symbol, a device or combinations. They may 
consist of drawings, symbols, three- dimensional signs such as the shape and 
packaging of goods, audible signs such as music or vocal sounds, fragrances, or 
colours used as distinguishing features. They enable their owners not only to 
call the attention of consumers, but also to hold their attention. A firm may 
acquire reputation and may have its image associated to that good or service by 
the brand it creates. In a similar way trade names are used, but, in this case, 
they are names, terms or designations which represent an enterprise business as 
a whole, not only its goods or services14. Typically, marks can be renewed 
indefinitely upon payment of proper fees. 
A related right to trademarks is geographical indication (e. g., 
champagne). By the same token, they are used to differentiate one good from 
others but, as the expression suggests, the differentiation is on the grounds of 
location. Geographical indications represent inherent characteristics of goods 
concerned with the place where they come from. Both trademarks and 
is needed. And Reichman (1994) recommends a hybrid form that combines both aspects of patents (for 
functional aspects) and copyrights (for the textual expression). 
14 Trademarks are not restricted to firms. They can be issued to any organisation intending to associate its 
image to its goods or services (e. g., non-governmental organisations). An association whose members 
use their image to identify themselves (e. g., CIPA - The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents) can seek 
trademarks, more specifically 'collective marks'. There are also 'certification marks' given for 
compliance with defined standards, but not confined to any membership (e. g., ISO 9000). 
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geographical indications aim to lower consumers' search costs (Carter 19905). 
But unlike patents and copyrights, they do not protect the creation of additional 
knowledge (Maskus 2000). Port (1993) advocates that trademarks should not be 
a property right, but rather a narrow body of tort law. Perhaps the prevailing 
view that sustains trademarks within the property scope is that they are an 
efficient means of providing information in the market (P'ng & Reitman 1995). 
Copyright, also known as author's rights, is related to literary and artistic 
works (e. g., books, novels, cinematographic productions) and it refers, as the 
name suggests, to the act of making copies that can only be made by the authors 
or with their authorisation. It is a legal instrument available to authors to 
prevent distorted reproduction (e. g., performance, recording, broadcast, 
translation, adaptation) of their works since these intellectual creations 
generally aim to be available to the public. The rights last the lifetime of the 
creator plus about 50 to 70 years, and even after these rights are sold creators 
may fight against damage to their works. Copyright embraces the way a work 
is expressed, that is, the tangible form in which the author's creation is available 
rather than the ideas or thoughts that have originated in it. A copyrightable 
work has to be original, though novelty is not a requisite. In order for someone 
to hold a copyright there is no need for registration as long as the work is 
available in any tangible form. However, it is useful to do so for the purposes of 
litigation (Cornish 1999). Although the purpose of copyright is to promote 
literary and artistic creativity and their diffusion, it is argued that such a 
property right is not needed for it is in authors' best interest to have their works 
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and ideas widely disseminated (Plant 1934a). On the other hand, Johnson (1985) 
shows that limitations on copying enhance consumer welfare. 
The 'fair-use' doctrine entails an exception to copyright in some 
countries. Under this doctrine, copyrighted material can be copied for 
educational and non-commercial research purposes. In this case, copies are 
allowed up to a certain limit, and the source must be cited (Maskus 2000). This 
uncompensated use of copyrighted material is argued to be an effective means 
through which transfers take place because in its absence transaction costs of 
licensing would prevent them (Gordon 1982). 
There are also some rights which surround copyright and they are called 
neighbouring rights. Many characteristics of copyright are shared by these 
neighbouring rights, and therefore they are seen as an extension of copyright. 
This extension, however, depends on the type of work produced. For instance, a 
film to be communicated needs not only the author himself but also actors, 
whose interests are also to be taken into account (within the neighbouring 
rights framework). In essence, this category relates to those who disseminate 
authors' work. They comprise the rights of artists in their performances, the 
rights of broadcasting organisations in their broadcasts programs and the rights 
of sound-recording producers in the phonograms they produce (WIPO 1997). 
Needless to say, the proliferation of information technologies (IT) over 
the past decade has imposed new challenges to the intellectual property system, 
and to copyrights, in particular. A classical example is the case of computer 
20 
programs described earlier. The IT industry is largely surrounded by loývv cost 
and massive copying. This has raised policy concerns and a series of sia generis 
IPRs have emerged. On the top of computer programming firms, firms within 
the film and music industries have raised their concern about unauthorized 
copying and the ease with which their products can be transmitted through the 
internet. Amendments to copyright law have been the immediate, though not 
unique (e. g., computer programs patents in the US), response to the challenges 
imposed by this type of technology. Databases, for example, can be protected in 
the European Union under the auspices of the Directive on the Legal Protection 
of Databases 15 . 
By the same token, the Directive on Semiconductor 
Topographies protects for ten years semiconductor chips. Both integrated 
circuit layouts and mask works, which are a set of images fixed or encoded at a 
later stage of manufacturing, are eligible for protection (Besen & Raskind 1991). 
Biotechnology and recent advances in genetics have also demanded a more 
sophisticated framework. The development of new plant varieties using those 
techniques, for example, has meant claims for protection. This has resulted in 
the creation of plant breeders' rights, which is a patent-like protection but with 
limited scope. In general, all these examples show how difficult it is for the 
jurisprudence on intellectual property rights to keep pace with technological 
change. 
15 Reichman & Samuelson (1997) argue that this may raise hurdles for researchers and educational 
organisations due to the costs involved in handling the material. 
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1.5 THE PATENT SYSTEM: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
Patent systems are designed to combat underinvestment in socially desirable 
inventive activities through the concession of a temporary monopoly over the 
outcomes of R&D, provided that these outcomes have the requirements 
specified by law. The extent to which this reward system16 satisfactorily plays 
its role is disputed with conflicting interests and rationales at stake, but this has 
been so throughout the course of its development. 
The evolution of the patent system followed the enhancement of the 
status of inventions in the Middle Ages, and the potential disclosure of the 
knowledge associated with their creation. In Egypt and other ancient cultures 
knowledge was kept secret within priestal castes. As such, no patent-like 
institutions were apparently needed. In Greek and Roman civilisations slaves 
were responsible for manual labour, and hence the inventions developed in that 
period did not have devoted to them much of the time from more educated 
people. In the Middle Ages labour started to be perceived as co-operation with 
God, and hence 'artes mechanicae' were incorporated in the concept of science 
(Kaufer 1989). 
In parallel, as described by Kaufer (1989), the term 'invention 
conceptually changed to a meaning closer to what we know nowadays. As the 
search for mineral resources was one of the main interests of societies at that 
time, people used to refer to 'invention' as the discovery of mining sites. Those 
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who were first to 'invent' an ore site were able to have some privileges. As soon 
as surface ores deposits were depleted, it was necessary to go deeper into the 
soil. Then, a problem arose: the presence of water. Mechanical draining de-ices 
were created to overcome that problem, and inventors were awarded with 
privileges. At that time the principles of favouritism and utility were extremely 
important for the sovereign to afford a privilege for an individual. These 
privileges are considered the forerunners of the current patent system, 
particularly when they took the form of a statute in Venice, in 1474: the 'Parte 
Veneziana'. The purpose of the Venice Patent Code was to foster technical 
advance by using monopoly privileges as substitutes for government subsidies. 
Such policy change was due to financial difficulties Venice was experiencing as 
a consequence of wars (ibid. ). The 'Parte Veneziana' was, then, designed to 
attract engineers rather than to stimulate artisan production (WIPO 1997). 
But monopoly privileges were not a 'luxury' of Venice. Other parts of 
Europe were moving in the same direction, such as Berne (Switzerland) where 
in 1467 a monopoly was granted for the manufacture and sale of paper (Price 
1906). The same applied to England where, paralleling continental governments, 
the Crown was making use of privileges to establish new industries. But 
differently from other countries, there were in this country more favourable 
conditions to the development of a systematic patent policy. According to Price 
(1906: 7) the chief conditions were: i) the shift of monopoly within city 
16 More discussion on incentive systems for innovation can be found in Gallini & Scotchmer (2001), 
Geroski (1995), Waterson (1990), and Wright (1983). 
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boundaries towards the Crown level, and ii) a nearly absolute sovereign who 
was surrounded with "the best practical economic ideas that the time afforded, 
and who was interested in the industrial development of the country (... )". 
Price (1906) distinguishes three periods in the evolution of the English 
patent system. The first period was up to Elizabeth's reign during which many 
cases of abuse of monopoly emerged favoured by the corrupt courtiers. So, in 
1597 a bill was offered in the House of Commons to combat such abuses. The 
intense political dispute led the Queen to interfere in the debate by informing 
that she herself proposed the reform. Her proclamation revoked the most 
abusive monopolies and the remaining cases were left to the common law to 
decide which grants should be allowed to stand. Just after her death, in 1603, a 
case in law, known as the leading Case of Monopolies17, was adjudicated and, 
for the first time, the criterion of legitimacy of a patent was accepted and the 
common law proved an adequate remedy against monopolies. 
The death of Elizabeth and the enthronement of James I was initially 
marked by a continuation of the effort to reform the abuses. However, the effort 
was not enough to clear them up. King James I himself promised to revoke 
some of the monopolies. Responding to a petition of the Committee on 
Grievances of the Parliament, James I issued a declaration known as Book of 
Bounty in 1610, which set out the case against monopolies. The Book of Bounty 
stated that monopolies were against the law of the land but the Crown reserved 
17 This case was a dispute for importing, making and selling of playing-cards. 
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the right to reward new inventions and the discretion to withdraw them in case 
of rise in prices due to such grant. However, patents were exempt from the 
Book of Bounty and the Crown continued to grant patents of monopoly (Boehm 
& Silberston 1967). Hence, the opposition in Parliament became more 
pronounced. Moreover, the revenues accrued to the Crown from the patent 
system were marginal, and there were difficulties abroad that were also 
besetting the Crown. This formed a propitious time for reforms, and thus 
investigations into the conduct of the referees of the patent cases were 
undertaken. So, late in 1621, the House of Lords presented a bill against 
monopolies, focusing mainly on the form of the system, not on its purpose. 
There then emerged in 1623/1624 one of the most memorable events of the 
history of the patent system, and, according to Price (1906), perhaps the most 
important legislative achievement under King James' reign: the Statute of 
Monopolies. This period from the Case of Monopolies to the Statute of 
Monopolies is the second remarkable period highlighted by the author. 
After the act of 1623/1624 several monopolies were sanctioned by James 
I, and later on by his son Charles I. The persistent policy of increasing revenues 
to the Treasury was conflicting with the interests of the Parliament. The latter, 
in 1628, signed the Petition of Right, whose basic premise was that no taxes of 
any kind could be allowed without its permission. As a consequence, Charles I 
dissolved the Parliament in 1629. Over the next eleven years there was no 
Parliament and the promotion of corporations was even more intense in order 
to raise money, especially because Charles I did not charge fixed annual rents 
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but rather levied a fee on each unit of goods sold. In congruence with his 
interests Charles I decided to resort to the custom of demanding Ship Nlonev18 
in 1634, but this time from all counties in England and Wales. In 1640 he also 
called the Short Parliament primarily to obtain money to finance his military 
struggle, but they sat for just three weeks (hence the name) due to their 
opposition to his financial policies. A rebellion, which was broken out in 
Scotland, made him summon the Parliament again, the Long Parliament'9. The 
failure of the Statute of Monopolies to consider the possibility of monopolies 
moving from individuals to a corporate form was, according to Price (1906), 
amended this time. Thus, the Long Parliament ended a number of monopolies 
and, with this action, those monopolies ceased to be a political grievance, at 
least in the early years of the English patent system. 
Due to the Industrial Revolution the number of patents granted grew 
rapidly in England after 1760. Within the period between 1751 and 1850, for 
example, the figures rose from 7 to 455, reaching a cumulative total of 4223 for 
that period (Dutton 1984). The Industrial Revolution also brought the 
emergence of technology-based types of businesses. This was accentuated by a 
shift in the locus of inventive activities away from individual inventors towards 
corporate laboratories (Freeman & Soete 1997). From 1790 to 1883 other codes 
for granting national patents were established - e. g., the United States Patent 
Act in 1790 and the French Patent Law in 1791 (Kaufer 1989). 
18 In the past, whenever there were fears of a foreign invasion, kings were able to order coastal counties to 
provide ships or the money to build ships. 
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The emergence of the patent system, however, has not stopped it from 
being criticised. During the nineteenth century, for example, a movement in 
favour of free trade acted against that system. Critics advocated that the patent 
system contributed to monopolistic behaviour and could be damaging to free 
trade interests. In 1873, a worldwide depression changed this scenario and a 
movement towards protectionism took place. This event probably strengthened 
the patent movement (ibid. ). 
The establishment and development of new industries followed by 
firms' expanding activities resulted in more intense trade negotiations at 
international level. The presence of strictly national patent systems, or simply 
its absence, constituted to a certain degree a hindrance to the growth of 
international trade. Then, from 1883 to date many international and regional 
conventions have sought a more internationally homogeneous patent code. As 
reported in the 'Jurisprudence' section above a new agenda for IP protection 
worldwide was established during the Uruguay Round of the GATT, by the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). In 
essence, the objective is to harmonise the IP framework (including patents) 
across country members of the WTO. The argument, however disputed, is that 
in stimulating protection of inventions outside the country in which they were 
developed, international trade is encouraged (WIPO 1997). 
19 It receives this name for sitting almost continuously until 1660. 
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1.6 AN OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 
Patent systems operate at single country levels (e. g., UK, US) and at supra- 
national levels (e. g., EPO, WIPO), but there is no such a thing as an 
international patent covering all countries in the world. Thus, the first step in 
the process of obtaining a patent is to file an application to a patent office. Once 
a patent application is filed it will be either examined or registered. The latter 
case implies that a patent will automatically be granted and its validity will 
only be challenged in court. When an inventor chooses to use one of the supra- 
national systems, he/she has to designate the member countries of interest and 
pay the corresponding fees. Anyone in a country not designated is entitled to 
use that invention freely20. Moreover, as patent laws are not completely uniform 
amongst countries, the granting of a patent is contingent on national laws 
recognising the subject matter as patentable. Although there might be variations 
across countries, the general guidelines presented here for the UK apply to 
some extent to other nations. 
For a patent to be granted the invention has to fulfil several requirements. 
Basically, there are three main requirements to be met: i) novelty, ii) inventive 
step and iii) industrial applicability (deadlines and fees also apply). The first 
requirement, novelty, means that only new inventions can be patented. If an 
invention is publicly disclosed before a patent application is filed it will not be 
20 An exception is the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) which issues patents 
automatically covering all 14 member states, unless a patent application is also a PCT application. The 
Eurasian Patent Office (covering 11 member states of the former Soviet Union) also issues single patents 
covering all signatory countries (Knight 1996). 
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capable of protection21. The knowledge previously disclosed is known as either 
prior art or state of the art of the technological field. The second requirement by 
definition is reached whenever an invention is not obvious to someone with a 
good knowledge and experience in the corresponding technical field. Finally, 
the requirement of industrial applicability implies that the invention can be put 
into practice (WIPO 1997). 
Inventions are new ways of doing something, or offer new technical 
solutions to a problem, and they have different forms. Generally speaking, an 
invention lies in one of the two categories: i) products, or ii) processes (or 
methods). Processes or methods would be procedures responsible for making a 
product. A slight variation of a product is the composition of matter. This 
category of invention is peculiar to the chemical/ pharmaceutical industry 
where several compounds can be mixed in order to obtain a final product with 
properties that otherwise would not be achieved. Thus, that dichotomous 
definition may not be particularly informative, especially if the invention is a 
machine. Although a machine can also be a product if a firm makes machines 
for sale, it does not necessarily mean that it will be launched on the market, 
especially if selling machines is not the firm's core business. A firm may keep 
the apparatus secret and use it to make a product, since it is unlikely that 
competitors will have access to it (and then copy it). It also means that, like 
process patents, for a machine patent it tends to be more difficult to prove 
21 There are countries where the invention can be disclosed before a patent is applied for without 
invalidating the filing by the original inventor. This period known as 'grace period' has a maximum 
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infringement than for a product patent, because the latter can be found easily in 
the marketplace. Thus, if on the one hand, product inventions are more likely to 
be available in the marketplace whereas process inventions may, never be 
accessed by competitors. On the other hand, if a process patent is infringed it 
tends to be more difficult to detect, and hence to enforce, than a product patent 
(WIPO 1997). 
The UK Patent Office requests a fee to be paid on filing. And within 12 
months the applicant22 must request, and pay the corresponding fee for the 
preliminary examination - to check whether the application is able to proceed - 
and search - to look for any relevant documents which may invalidate or 
restrict what is claimed in a patent application. There is no need to wait 12 
months to request preliminary examination and search; it can be done on filing. 
The date when a patent application is first filed with a patent office (priority 
date) is the date which a patent, if granted, will have as the beginning of its 
lifetime. The priority date is the date which is used to give priority to an 
invention. This means that if more than one inventor seeks protection for the 
same invention, a patent will be granted for the one who applied first. This 
regime of first-to-file is spread worldwide, though the US is an exception since 
it has a first-to-invent regime. The first-to-file regime implies that an inventor 
who does not file patent applications (when something patentable is available) 
length of 12 months of first disclosure, and the date of first publication is used as the priority date. This 
does not apply to the UK but it is under consideration (Grubb 1999). 
22 The individual, or organisation, that applies for a patent. Under the US law the applicants must be 
inventors. If they work in an organisation they need to legally assign all or limited rights under a patent 
to that organisation (assignee). 
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may allow other inventors to hold the corresponding intellectual rights if they 
apply for a patent (on the same invention) earlier (Cornish 1999). 
The priority date is also the date used to check whether or not an 
invention is actually new. In other words, everything publicly available before 
the priority date is considered prior art and can be used against what is claimed. 
Prior art can also be used as an underlying issue to verify to what extent the 
inventive step requirement is fulfilled. The applicant can also decide, for 
whatever the reason, to file a new patent application within 12 months from 
priority date, but comprising the same inventive concept, claiming priority 
from the first one - so called internal priority (Grubb 1999). 
The prosecution of a patent application is naturally preceded by the 
moment a firm decides that it will apply for a patent. But the best timing of 
applying for a patent is not simply that moment when there is something 
patentable; the perceived competition may impact on the timing. Thus, within 
the first-to-file regime a higher degree of competition may induce firms to 
apply for patents earlier than they would normally do, and that is why it is 
commonly perceived that the invention described in a patent document is likely 
to be based upon research undertaken under laboratory or small-scale 
conditions. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO 
1997), the `true' invention (the one which a firm launches on the marketplace) is 
not always completely disclosed because, sometimes, it is too late to incorporate 
in the patent application any improvement made during a later stage, such as in 
a pilot. Perhaps this rationale does not apply to the first-to-invent regime 
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adopted by the US because firms do not have necessarily to hurry to apply for a 
patent, as long they can prove they have invented earlier than competitors. 
Nevertheless, if they have interest in foreign markets they will face the first-to- 
file regime abroad, and thus they need to apply for patents earlier than other 
agents if intellectual property rights are to be held. 
A hurry to file a patent application, however, may incur losses in either 
how broad or how strong a patent can be (Miele 2000). The importance of the 
timing of applying for a patent stems from the fact that the excludability that a 
patent provides depends also on the proper information available for the 
application. For example, since information is needed to support what is 
claimed, an early filing may weaken the validity of the patent. If the applicant 
has not performed the experiments that provide enough data to justify what is 
claimed, the patent application may be narrowed by the patent examiner 
during the examination stage. Thus, the patent may become easier to be 
circumvented due to its limited scope (or breadth). Moreover, even if the 
corresponding patent is not narrowed by the patent examiner it becomes more 
likely to be challenged. Therefore, the timing of applying for a patent is not only 
a matter of being earlier than others, in case of first-to file regimes, but also a 
matter of how the technical information available will impact on the overall 
business objective of that patent (Knight 1996). 
A particular invention may have its function accomplished in a different 
manner. That is, although competitors may not be liable to exactly replicate a 
patented invention, they could come up with variations of the invention to 
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perform nearly the same function without infringing anyone else's patents. 
However, it takes time for others to invent something that can perform the 
same function in a different way. And the longer it takes, the more likely it is 
that the first to reach the market will recoup the expenses incurred with R&D. 
In this sense, the degree of excludability achieved by a patent may influence the 
benefits derived from innovative effort. 
Unless the one who applied for a patent (applicant) withdraws his/ her 
application, or simply abandons it, the invention will soon be disclosed. An 
invention is kept secret until the 18th month from the priority date (unless a 
request is made for earlier publication), and then the patent application is 
published 23 . 
Then, the disclosed invention becomes prior art against any 
application filed later, but it also implies that everyone may know what the 
invention is about. 
After a patent application is published it will start another stage of the 
prosecution. The next phase is the substantive examination which is carried out 
by a patent examiner, who aims to investigate whether or not the invention 
claimed meets the patentability requirements presented in the patent 
specification24. This stage is also made upon request, within six months of the 
publication date. The patent examiner may or may not settle an objection 
against the applicant. In general, both parties reach an agreement after a period 
23 This practice has also been adopted by the USPTO since 29th November 2000. Before that date the US 
used to publish the patent only after it was granted (Johnson & Popp 2001). 
24 The body of text, in a patent application, that describes the invention in more detail. 
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of 'dialogue'25, before a patent is issued. That period of 'dialogue' between 
patent examiners and inventors tends to delineate the scope of the patent (if 
granted), which is basically described by its claims. Claims are numbered 
paragraphs at the end of a patent/ application that set forth the subject matter 
over which intellectual property rights are granted/ claimed (Hanchuk 2002). 
They may pose a threshold to others keen on using the invention. They are 
granted on the basis of what is specified in a patent application, and on the 
existing prior art. Therefore, they determine the degree of excludability a patent 
holder can get. If what is claimed only covers a few variations of the invention 
(narrow patent), it is likely that it will be easier for others to duplicate the 
function of the invention, without copying it in strict terms. If, however, an 
array of embodiments of an invention is described by the claims the patent 
holder will get a broad patent, which on average gives a higher degree of 
excludability. This is so because a greater scope of the patent will make it more 
difficult for others to develop a competing invention for a closely related 
purpose (Miele 2000; Granstrand 1999). Nevertheless, if a narrow patent is 
concerned with optimal conditions under which an invention can be performed, 
a narrow patent may suffice to confer a high degree of excludability (Grubb 
1999; Knight 1996). 
Patentees can apply to more than one national patent office individually. 
In this case, they can make use of one of the most important treaties: The Paris 
Convention. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property is a 
25 The scope of the patent is the major reason for such'dialogue' between patent examiners and patentees. 
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multilateral treaty which dates back to 1883. In essence, it gives the patent 
applicant 12 months from the first filing (priority date) to apply for a patent to 
any other signatory country without risks of losing priority due to intervening 
prior art. Therefore, if any prior art appears within those 12 months it will not 
be considered against the foreign patent application. In non-signatory countries, 
however, any delay in applying for a patent may be crucial to the applicant 
forfeiting his/ her rights. 
Despite the advantage of this 12 months period when the country is a 
signatory of the Paris Convention, the option of going to national patent offices 
individually, as opposed to using supra-national patent offices, implies earlier 
patenting costs. The non-use of supra-national routes means that expenses with 
translations and patent attorneys services necessary to prosecute the application 
in the desired country have to be made earlier. This is so because the objective 
of supra-national routes is to make the acquisition of intellectual property easier 
and more uniform, and hence more beneficial (economic) conditions are offered. 
The European Patent Office (EPO), for example, is responsible for carrying out a 
single patentability examination (though patent applications are considered by 
a committee of three examiners), which can make it simpler and less costly 
compared to several individual applications. A patent to be granted by the EPO 
can be obtained by filing a single application in one of the official languages of 
that organisation (i. e., English, French or German) in a unitary procedure before 
the EPO and is valid in as many of the contracting states as the applicant 
designates. If the EPO grants a patent the applicant then may need to file 
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translations in each designated European member country26 and pay national 
fees (Grubb 1999). If the objective, however, is to protect the invention in as 
many countries as possible, the alternative route is the Patent Co-operation 
Treaty (PCT)27, though it does not cover all the countries in the world; there are 
a few countries which are non-signatories of the PCT28. The Patent Co-operation 
Treaty (PCT) was first signed in 1970 and came into force in 1978. The PCT was 
mainly designed to make international applications simpler for the residents of 
the signatory countries and it seems that its popularity has increased (Grupp & 
Schmoch 1999). Also, in the same way as the Paris Convention, the PCT allows 
the applicant to file a PCT application within 12 months of the priority date. 
Initially the applicant only needs to file a single document designating 
the states where protection is likely to be sought; neither translation nor 
payment of national fees is necessary, though other fees (e. g., search fees) need 
to be paid. The application at this first phase (so called 'Chapter I') will be 
submitted to a first simple examination, and a search in prior art will be made 
to enable the applicant to judge whether it is worth proceeding with the 
application. Based upon the search report the applicant may amend the patent 
application before it is published (18 months from priority date) in order to 
adjust the scope of the patent according to the prior art. 
26 As of 2004 there are 29 contracting States of the European Patent Office: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
27 If one is solely interested in countries that are members of the European Patent Convention, the 
European Patent Office is an alternative to the PCT route. The choice between PCT and EPO is not 
mutually exclusive. 
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After the application is published the applicant has to choose to proceed 
to a preliminary international examination report, which will give an opinion 
on patentability (this is the second phase and is also called 'Chapter II'). If the 
decision is positive, the entry into the national phase will be postponed, unless 
any designated country is not elected under Chapter II. If the applicant's 
decision is negative he/ she will face all the costs related to the national phase 
(e. g. patent attorneys, translation) no later than 20 months from the priority 
date. A positive decision may delay such costs up to 30 months from the 
priority date29. At that time, and based upon the international preliminary 
examination report, the applicant may decide whether or not to proceed with 
the application into the national phase. 
Once a patent is granted it is up to the patentee to enforce it. To keep a 
patent in force the patent holder must pay renewal fees. In the UK renewal fees 
are requested from the fifth year from the priority date and for a patent to be 
kept in force renewal fees must be paid yearly30 until the end of the term of 
protection (20 years) or until the patentee thinks it is worth it (Cornish 1999). 
This does not mean, however, that a patent is necessarily valid; at a certain time 
an objection can be presented by someone else to the Patent Office or, if not 
presented at that time, the patent can be challenged in court. The parties 
involved can also reach an out of court agreement if they realise it is feasible. 
28 As of September 2004 there are 124 signatory countries of the PCT. 
2 If the route after the PCT is the EPO, those deadlines are 21 and 31 months, respectively. 
30 Renewal fees vary from £50 in the 5th year to £400 in the 20th year, as of 2002. 
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1.7 ORGANISATION OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. This chapter has highlighted in 
general terms what the research is about and has provided information to 
complement the theoretical framework developed in the next chapter. 
That chapter reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literatures on 
patents. It identifies gaps in knowledge that justify this study, formulates the 
main research questions, and briefly describes the research methods employed 
to answer those questions. 
Chapter three gives an insight into how UK pharmaceutical firms use 
patents and why patents are important for those firms. It also describes how 
that information was gathered. 
The object of the fourth chapter is the importance of patents. That 
chapter addresses what makes patents more or less important within UK 
manufacturing industry. Hypotheses are derived from the literature review. 
The chapter then explains the analytical framework used to test those 
hypotheses. The findings derived from that analysis are presented and 
discussed before conclusions are drawn. 
Chapter five tackles whether or not patents and other methods of 
appropriation are related. That issue is investigated by testing research 
hypotheses formulated in advance. They are presented in that chapter, followed 
by the econometric framework employed and the results achieved. Then, the 
findings are discussed and, finally, conclusions are reported. 
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The remaining objectives (i. e., how firms construct their own patent 
portfolios) of this thesis are studied in chapters six and seven. Chapter six 
details the methodological procedure. Chapter seven reports the results, 
discusses the findings in light of the literature review, and presents conclusions. 
The last chapter summarises the main conclusions of this research and 
describes the implications of the findings for the literature, public policy and 
management. The limitations of this study are also discussed and 
recommendations for future research are proposed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PATENTS AND FIRMS: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The market for knowledge is highly imperfect. One of the reasons for this is the 
difficulty for knowledge to be traded. Intellectual property rights (IPRs), even if 
imperfectly, translate knowledge into a tangible form. In doing so, IPRs 
ameliorate the conditions under which knowledge can be traded, though this is 
no guarantee of a perfect market. Patents are one type of intellectual property 
and are concerned with technical inventions. The patent system has been under 
the scrutiny of economists for many years, although the question of whether or 
not that system fosters technical progress is still unresolved. That question, 
however, is not the focus of the current research; rather, central to this thesis is 
how firms use patents and what makes patents be deemed more (or less) 
important. These issues emerge as important from a review of the relevant 
economics and business literatures, which this chapter provides. 
Economic theory has long been concerned with the grounds for the 
existence of a patent system, and with what should be an optimal design for 
that system. The economic literature also examines firms' patenting behaviour, 
and thus this literature is reviewed in this chapter. 
The business literature has drawn attention to patents to a lesser degree 
than has the economics literature31 (at least in theoretical terms). Our review of 
the former reveals that further rationales for the use of patents by firms can be 
31 Granstrand (2003) presents a bibliometric analysis of the contribution of various areas to the intellectual 
property field. The top 10 journals that have most published papers on IP are from law and economics 
(apart from one - natural sciences oriented). 
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considered, that are mainly discussed by the strategic management literature. 
The perspective of this literature is then reviewed after the 'Economics of 
patents'. 
Afterwards, empirical findings from previous studies are discussed, 
encompassing issues such as: the value of patents; what makes some firms more 
inclined to patent than others; and the use of patents. As a result, several 
unexplored or only partly resolved issues are identified, which become the 
basis of the empirical research that follows. The specific methods to be 
employed in this research are briefly discussed later in this chapter and in more 
detail throughout this thesis. 
2.2 PATENTS AND THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
2.2.1 TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND PATENTS 
For a better understanding of the economic motivations behind the patent 
system one should look first at the relevance of technology in economic theory. 
The descriptive paper by Young (1928) at the beginning of the last century 
advocated the expansion of markets as central to economic progress; either this 
expansion being in "finding an outlet for a potential product" or in 
I' 
augmenting profits by reducing costs" (ibid.: 537). What the author argued, 
following Adam Smith's ideas, was that the expansion of markets, through the 
division of labour, could lead to increasing returns to scale. Despite the verbal 
nature of his idea, it further stimulated the development in the economic 
literature of formal models incorporating such insight (e. g., Romer 1986). 
According to Young (1928) the expansion of markets would be a result of 
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advances in the organisation of production that would change the industrial 
structure. Technology, then, could be ascribed the status of the unsettling agent 
responsible for such a change. This was later formalised in Solow's (1956) 
model which allowed for technological change to take place in models of 
economic growth. 
Schumpeter (1942,1934) was another economist of the last century who 
recognised the central role played by technological change in modern capitalist 
economies. He advocated that relationships in the market, and organisational 
structures, are renewed (or destroyed) through a process of 'creative 
destruction emanating from continuous innovation. Schumpeter also believed 
that temporary monopoly profits accrued to those who innovate and this could 
explain rates of economic growth. The author also highlighted the importance 
of large monopolistic firms in the innovation process due to their ability to bear 
the costs associated with innovative activities. 
Thus, it has become common knowledge that for many firms competitive 
advantage derives from the development and use of new technologies. 
Moreover, new technologies could also arise from learning by experience. 
Although to some degree these new technologies may be acquired from outside 
the organisation, many will be the result of the firms' own innovative effort 
often formally structured as a research and development (R&D) activity, 
although this is not necessarily so. And R&D activities have played an 
important role in promoting economic growth. 
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Another important contribution is by Romer (1990) who developed a 
model of economic growth where i) technology change was to a great extent 
derived from market-related actions (i. e., a model of endogenous technological 
change) and ii) some characteristics of technology (and which make it different 
from other economic goods) were incorporated 32 . 
These characteristics of 
technology pointed out by the author are analogous to the characteristics of 
knowledge since it is common in the literature33 to consider technology as 
knowledge, in a general sense. Thus, it has become topical to discuss two 
characteristics of knowledge as a good. The first is that knowledge is non- 
rivalrous, that is, it can be used by one economic actor without precluding its 
use by another; a characteristic that most economic goods do not share. On the 
other hand, knowledge shares a common characteristic with other economic 
goods: it is, at least partially, excludable; excludability being a function of both 
the nature of knowledge and the legal system. In addition, simply having access 
to new knowledge is not the same as the ability to use it productively. Thus, the 
knowledge generated by one firm may not, necessarily, be reproduced by 
another firm because knowledge is to a certain degree context specific, that is, 
firms may differ with respect to their absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990). 
32 Romer (1994) has also shown that institutions play an important role in economic growth and that the 
costs of doing business in developing countries may reduce the number of productive activities in these 
countries and hence slow down their economic growth. 
33 See for example Dasgupta & David (1987), and Silberston (1971). 
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Nevertheless, once knowledge is implemented or disclosed by one agent 
other agents are likely to have access to it. Therefore, knowledge will not only- 
be an output itself but also an input to other agents. The presence of knowledge 
spillovers 34 may, however, prevent knowledge producers from reaping 
adequate benefits from their investments in its generation, especially if this is a 
horizontal spillover. The reasoning behind this argument is that, assuming that 
most firms are profit seeking and the inventor is operating under competition, if 
knowledge is both non-rivalrous and partly non-excludable it may be copied35, 
though this may not necessarily be possible (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). To the 
extent that knowledge can be copied, its potential inappropriability can make 
inventors, or originators of that knowledge, unable to appropriate its true social 
value, and, therefore, they will be likely to underinvest in its production 
(Lumberton 1994). This, according to Arrow (1962), would not only be socially 
inefficient but also would hamper knowledge generators from exploiting it 
effectively. 
As technology has been recognised as pivotal in promoting economic 
growth (Jones 1998), and the market for knowledge is not perfect (Teece 1998), 
it is not uncommon to find in economics textbooks (e. g., Parkin et al. 2000) 
explanations for the existence of market failures in the production of knowledge 
Sa Spillovers can be defined as any indirect effect of public expenditure. Knowledge spillovers are defined 
as the situation in which one economic agent benefits from R&D efforts of another economic agent without 
tangible remuneration. Horizontal spillovers occur between competitors, and vertical spillovers flow 
between firms in different industries. Knowledge spillovers may also occur from one area of production to 
another different area (Bernstein & Nadiri 1988). 
35 Even if the costs of copying are high, they are likely to be lower than the costs incurred by the original 
inventor. 
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- such as limited information, poor definition of property rights, externalities '-, 
monopoly, and public goods. All of which may undermine the incentives to 
undertake research and development activities 37 . Thus, a typical issue of 
concern for policy makers is how to encourage firms to engage in innovative 
activities. Patent systems, even if imperfectly, are seen by many as an important 
element of a reward process that may foster technological change, and hence 
economic growth. It is largely as a reaction to excludability, or alternatnveh,, the 
appropriability problem, that patent systems have been developed (Geroski 
1995). They exist partly to correct distortions caused by the difficulty in 
appropriating the returns from the generation of knowledge (ibid. ). Therefore, 
it is expected, assuming that firms are profit seeking, that firms pursue patent 
protection to ensure that they recoup benefits from their innovative effort. 
The common characteristic of all patent systems, however, is that the 
knowledge to be patented must be disclosed to the world, and it is publicly 
disclosed before a patent is granted38. This aims to speed the diffusion of 
knowledge and to avoid duplication of R&D. Adding to this, disclosure avoids 
the presence of 'submarine patents' - patents which are kept secret, due to 
deliberate delays, and are only issued after the technology has been adopted by 
someone else, obliging the latter to pay royalties. There is thus an implicit cost 
to owning a patent; i. e. secrecy over the patented knowledge is no longer 
36 These are effects of a purchase or use decision by one set of parties on others who did not have a choice 
and whose interests were not taken into account. 
37 Arrow's (1962) seminal work gives an insight into how market failures do work and undermine 
allocation of resources for invention. 
38 The US only started to adopt early disclosure (i. e., before a patent is issued) in 2000. 
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available. This is the socio-economic contract between the patent holder and 
society (Cornish 1999). 
When intellectual property rights are assigned it means that the owner 
can exploit it in different ways (e. g. licensing, blocking competitors' 
technological movement, etc. ). However, the patent system may lead to 
distortions. As Arrow (1962) observed, to the extent that patents are successful, 
they may produce an underutilisation of the information disclosed. A conflict 
emphasised by Scotchmer (1991), who observed that stronger protection 
granted to the first generation of producers might lead to higher costs for the 
second generation of producers. Despite their relatively high importance in 
some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, the role played by patents as 
incentives for innovation seems to be less important than the market structure 
that precedes the generation of knowledge and that is imposed by using the 
knowledge (Benkler 2001). Also, an analysis of the patent system must be 
exercised with caution since it is a 'one size fits all' system. 
Both macro and microeconomic literatures have drawn attention to the 
role of patents, though the latter to a greater extent than the former (Keely 2001). 
Despite the scant attention paid to patents by the macroeconomic literature, at 
least compared to the microeconomic, some attempts have been made to model 
particular aspects of economic growth incorporating intellectual property rights. 
For example, Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991a) modelled economic growth where 
intellectual property rights are respected across countries. In another paper the 
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authors focused on the impact of incomplete intellectual property rights on 
economic growth (Rivera-Batiz & Romer 1991b). 
On the empirical side, studies at the macro level have explored the 
incentives from a theoretical viewpoint, but the majority of studies have been 
guided by the idea that patents motivate invention (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998 a, 
b). Gould & Gruben (1996), for instance, observed, using a cross-country 
comparison, that stronger intellectual property rights promote higher economic 
growth rates. Maskus & McDaniel (1999), in turn, looked at the design of the 
Japanese patent system and realised that its features were effective in 
encouraging technology diffusion and incremental invention, and this helped 
Japan to catch up with leading countries. More recently, Kanwar & Evenson 
(2003) found that patents seem to spur innovation, and a lack of such an 
incentive structure can hamper technological change. However, it is also fair to 
say that during some point in time some countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland benefited from the lack of a regime of intellectual property rights in 
the sense that this allowed them to develop particular industries (Kaufer 1989). 
However, this may not necessarily apply nowadays, when international trade is 
more intense, and intellectual property rights issues are also discussed at the 
World Trade Organization level. But what is believed by economic historians is 
that only when intellectual property rights institutions were well developed did 
the market incentives become sufficiently large to promote widespread 
innovation, and hence a higher rate of economic growth (North 1981). 
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Although our purpose is not to explore all possible avenues of the 
economic reasoning on patents, the main arguments should be reviewed in 
more detail than the above because the social benefits and costs of awarding 
patents are still controversial39. The multiplicity of arguments, however, does 
not mean that crystal clear and settled stances exist, or that one approach is 
necessarily superior to another (even if being more commonly employed). 
Firstly, the various arguments sometimes overlap, and secondly, because the 
difficulty in empirically exploring them only allows us to have limited 
knowledge on the topic, theories are still inconclusive. 
2.2.2 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Even if fundamental differences between physical and intellectual assets exist, 
the justification of intellectual property rights derives to a large extent from the 
notion of physical property rights. According to Benson (2002) both notions of 
property are bound up with what is called, in the legal literature, as the 
incidents of the right of property - namely, the right to possess, use and 
alienate40. Nevertheless, differences between the two types of assets are often 
used to criticise property rights in intellectual activities. 
Despite the criticism, the intellectual property regime has been 
extensively implemented. The rationales for the existence of that regime (the 
patent system included) derive from two main schools of thought: the 
39 See also Andersen (2003), Menell (2000), and Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998a, b) for more details on these 
lines of thought. 
40 Alienation of intellectual property rights, according to the author, is not necessarily alienation of the 
knowledge embedded in the creation of ideas but rather alienation of the rights to control their use. 
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deontological and the consequentialist (Granstrand 1999). The former relies 
upon moral rights, especially natural rights, justified mainly by Locke's labour 
theory of property41 and Hegel's personality theory of property42. The latter 
refers to economic consequences of the legal recognition of intellectual property 
rights. It justifies intellectual property on the basis of two concepts: utilitarian 
and teleological. The utilitarian concept has to do with consumers' preferences 
and the teleological concept addresses the fulfilment of the proper ends of 
human life. The utilitarian concept predominates in the contemporary legal and 
economic perspective. Thus, that line of thought is described in this sub- 
section43 
Starting from historical accounts one may be tempted to conclude that 
the creation of the patent system was more reliant upon political issues than 
upon any sound economic theoretical foundation (Plant 1934b). Perhaps for 
some the prospect of the impact of such monopoly privileges was seen as good 
enough to justify its existence. Machlup & Penrose (1950) address some of the 
main arguments in favour of patents used throughout the nineteenth century 
but are possibly still in use nowadays. Although not all arguments presented by 
the authors were reliant on the utilitarian perspective, it was generally 
advocated that industrial progress was desirable and patents were an important 
instrument to achieve that end. Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998a, b) have recently 
reviewed the debate and have summarized the main streams into four broad 
41 Locke (1690). 
42 Hegel (1821). 
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theories: i) patents motivate invention, ii) patents induce the development and 
commercialization of inventions, iii) patents enable orderly development of 
broad prospects, and iv) patents induce disclosure of inventions. 
The first theory is based upon the idea that the anticipation of patents 
provides the incentives for invention to be undertaken. In the absence of a 
patent system there would be only marginal incentives for useful and better 
inventions to be pursued. In this case what is argued is that more inventing is 
better. However, there might be cases of duplication of innovative projects, and 
this may give rise to invention races, which may not be necessarily desirable. 
For instance, Kamien & Schwartz (1976) show that a higher degree of rivalry 
may induce greater R&D investments but will eventually cause the intensity of 
innovative activity to decline. According to Loury (1979) there is a case for 
patents, based upon their duration, in maximizing welfare, since they may 
work as entry barriers and pose a cost on newcomers on the basis of avoidance 
of duplication of R&D. At the same time, the winner-take-all feature of patents 
may induce patent races which also entail the creation of distortions44, the so 
called 'common pool' problem, due to the excessive, and socially wasteful, 
effort to be the 'winner' (Dasgupta 1988; Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980b). This social 
cost, however, can be dependent on how important patents are within 
particular market structures (Cohen et al. 2000; Levin et al. 1985; Loury 1979). 
Moreover, within this theory there is also an argument that inventors who 
43 Menell (2000) provides a more comprehensive survey of the theories on intellectual property. 
44 See also Dasgupta (1988), Dixit (1988), and Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980a). 
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cannot themselves directly exploit their inventions can be motivated to invent 
because of the prospect of the use of their intellectual property rights in, for 
example, licensing out their inventions or attracting capital. The latter, in 
particular, can be quite relevant in order to finance further inventive activities. 
The theory that investments in follow-on work needed to develop and to 
commercialize inventions are made possible by the award of a patent starts 
from the point at which previous theory ends. But the previous theory argues 
that patents should not be granted when invention would occur in any case. 
The second theory summarised by Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998a, b), however, 
departs from the previous by accepting that inventions would have been made 
even without a patent in prospect. What this theory brings under the spotlight 
is the timing of the patent award, because it assumes that patents are filed in the 
early stage of the inventing process. This assures that the economic rewards of 
further effort at the development stage can be appropriated if fruitful results 
come from this phase (Eisenberg 1996). Yet, this theory assumes that the follow- 
on work is unlikely to be patentable and that inventors cannot use other means 
of protecting the benefits of this further work. Furthermore, in accepting the 
patentability of inventions that would come out regardless of proprietary 
control, such as university inventions, there might be a burden of restricting 
access to inventions that would be in the public domain. 
The third theory (also known as the 'prospecting' theory), in turn, 
emphasises the importance of a patent on an opening invention because this 
would permit an array of further possibilities to take place in an orderly fashion, 
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that is, the first innovator will be responsible for the organisation of the market 
to develop follow-on products efficiently (Scotchmer 2005). This argument w'is 
articulated by Kitch (1977) who called attention for this feature of the patent 
system-45. Different from the previous theory it does not assume that there is )'List 
one possibility at the end of the innovation process. The initial invention is seen 
as the beginning of a first generation of inventions that can be further 
developed into other generations. Under Kitch's idea, unless there is a broad 
patent on an opening invention, wasteful resources will be allocated to explore 
further possibilities left out by the opening invention. Contrary to the theory 
that argues that more inventing is better, this line of thought recognises the 
problem raised by too much rivalry (Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980a, b; Kamien & 
Schwatrz 1976; Barzel 1968). Moreover, it further explores another element of a 
patent: its scope. Different from previous debate which focused on the length of 
the protection assured by a patent, this theory draws attention to, amongst 
other things, the breadth of the protection. 
Kitch (1977) pointed out a fallacy in the arguments on patents by refuting 
the assumption that inventors could not claim more than they had invented. 
According to the author "the invention as claimed in the claims and the 
physical embodiment of the invention are quite different things" (ibid.: 62). 
They, therefore, can be constructed at various levels of abstraction in order to 
mark the outer bounds of the rights. It is up to the inventor to substantiate his 
claims in the patent application in order to convince patent examiners that he 
-15 Although Kitch attributes this insight to Steven Cheung. 
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deserves the rights over what is claimed. The broader the scope of a patent, the 
more difficult for rivals to come up with a competing alternative. Yet, the 
broader the scope of a patent, the higher the likelihood of a patent being 
challenged (Knight 1996). The problem in allowing a broad patent in an 
opening invention is that this may limit the work of others who could build 
upon the opening invention. According to Merges & Nelson (1990) the problem 
with Kitch's argument is that it ignores path dependence. That is, firms tend to 
work on the part of the prospect over which they have built competency, and 
leave unexplored some areas where they do not have the skills to develop, even 
if these are in a promising area. That license agreements can ameliorate this 
problem is correct, but the costs of technology licensing are steep, especially if 
they are tailored to particular licensees (Caves et al. 1983). 
The last theory highlighted by Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998a, b) derives 
from the belief that in securing a patent one is disseminating knowledge that 
otherwise would be kept secret in the absence of the patent system. This cost to 
patent owners is argued to be necessary in order to mitigate the monopoly 
power derived from holding a patent; a monopoly power that may not only 
deviate the output from competitive levels, but may also lead to social costs of 
the effort expended in acquiring monopoly positions (Cowling & Mueller 1981, 
1978). To some extent this theory is related to the literature that seeks to explain 
the number of patents a firm applies for; an issue that is of particular relevance 
for the present thesis, and that will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. For the moment, it is enough to underline that patenting behaviour is 
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also explained on the basis of the amount of information a patent discloses 
(Horstmann et al. 1985). As it is difficult for inventors to exploit all possibilities 
of their inventions, the disclosure of information in a patent grant may enable 
other users to come up with complements or alternatives to the patented 
invention, and hence increase the use of the inventions. However, this theory 
seems to neglect features of knowledge (presented elsewhere in this thesis) that 
may not make inventions completely accessible, and that allow patent holders 
to restrict access to the knowledge they generate and disclose in their patents. 
Another line of thought in economics on why the patent system should 
exist rests with organisational economics (or new institutional economics). The 
seminal work by Coase (1937) criticizes the price system commonly used by 
neoclassical economics. His attempt was to answer why some transactions take 
place inside firms rather than in the price system. He advocates that there is a 
'cost to using the price mechanism' (ibid.: 390), and this is not a production cost. 
Firms, he says, exist because they may avoid that cost (also known as a 
transaction cost). 
Coase's arguments have been used more intensively since the 1970s, and 
according to Foss et al. (2000) there are two main categories of theories of the 
firm. One argues that contracts are elaborated even under asymmetric 
information due to ex-ante incentive alignment; these are known as principal- 
agent models46. Another assumes that it is costly to elaborate a contract because 
11 See for example Holmström & Nlilgrom (1991), and Alchian & Demsetz (1973). 
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not all contingencies are known a priori; these are the incomplete contracting 
models47. 
Thus, although Coase's argument was concerned with why firms per scc 
exist, it led to the development of analyses of the roles of contracts. One can 
then observe that property rights may play a role in both streams of the theory 
of the firm. Demsetz (1967: 348), for example, argues that the 'primary function 
of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater 
internalization of externalities'. So, property rights emerge in response to the 
willingness of interacting persons to adjust benefit-cost possibilities. Grossman 
& Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990) see the firm as a collection of jointly 
owned assets, and by owning these assets firms are able to exercise some 
control over human assets. Although the arguments are based upon property 
rights in general, it is not difficult to extend the ideas to intellectual property 
rights. In the case of patents, for instance, even if employees leave a firm for 
another, and take their knowledge with them, their former employer will not be 
in a too fragile position, for he still owns the assets. Moreover, there are costs 
associated with the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of the contracts 
that govern the transfer of knowledge assets, and that can be substantial 
(Williamson 1995,1985). 
Although the purpose of intellectual property is to secure the rights of 
owning and selling ideas, Boldrin & Levine (2002) argue that there has been a 
47 See Williamson (1996) for instance. 
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distortion of that system that needs to be corrected. They argue that intellectual 
property rights have been extended to the rights of regulating the use of ideas, 
which creates a socially inefficient monopoly. Because of this and other reasons 
(e. g., the technology revolution that led to the emergence of Biotech and IT 
technologies) some have argued that patent reform is needed (Shapiro 2004; 
Kingston 2001). But reform requires more research to be carried out as to the 
costs and benefits of the patent system. Otherwise, we shall always be facing 
the dilemma addressed by Machlup (1958: 80) who once said that "If we did not 
have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But 
since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it"'. 
Even if abolition of the patent system is not appropriate, perhaps a better 
design is. In fact, the theories above illustrate that not only the incentive system 
itself is of interest but also its design. The economics literature has not neglected 
this and it is reviewed next. The theoretical approach to design-related aspects 
of the patent system has also been supplemented by empirical studies 
(reviewed later in this chapter). 
2.2.3 DESIGN-RELATED ASPECTS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Early discourse on patents was largely descriptive (e. g., Machlup & Penrose 
1950). Nordhaus (1967) was perhaps the pioneer in modelling the patent system, 
moving from the question of whether or not patents should be granted to the 
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question of what design is best for that system-ý. The Nordhaus model assumed 
that patent duration was the pivotal policy instrument in the design of the 
patent system. His analysis suggested that very little could be gained from 
longer patent terms, but that the optimal life is very sensitive to the percentage 
cost reduction of the invention and elasticity of demand. 
Scherer (1972) re-interpreted the model proposed by Nordhaus and 
assumed that the invention possibility function exhibits increasing returns (at 
least at the beginning of the technology cycle) rather than decreasing returns, as 
suggested by Nordhaus. Scherer's conclusion was that the higher the private 
benefit/ R&D cost ratio the shorter the optimal life of a patent can be. In a reply, 
Nordhaus (1972) argued that as the life of a patent has to be finite (and this is 
not optimal), it is better to err on the side of a longer patent life rather than on 
the side of a shorter one. 
Kitch's (1977) argument that a broad patent should be awarded to an 
opening invention was soon contested by McFetridge & Smith (1980), who 
demonstrated that the efficiency of commercialisation is dissipated in the 
rivalry for the patent itself. Yet, Kitch's idea has the merit of shifting the 
attention to other elements of patent design that can be touched by policy 
makers. So, whilst patent life was key in seminal models the economics 
literature started a few years later to devote more attention to aspects such as i) 
patent scope (or breadth) and ii) patentability requirements. Furthermore, 
48 This does not mean that the previous question has been properly answered. 
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insights from the rivalrous competition literature have been used to further 
develop the early models. 
Prominent works that advanced economic theory on patents are by 
Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert & Shapiro (1990). They looked at how patent life 
and patent breadth should work to increase the incentives to innovate and 
reduce welfare loss. Their models differ in various aspects, starting with the 
definition of what is meant by patent breadth. The former considers patent 
breadth as the region of the product space delimited by the patent grant. The 
latter interprets breadth more generally as the ability of the patent holder to 
raise price due to any aspect of patent policy. They also examine the impact of 
elements of patent design on different types of products. Gilbert & Shapiro 
(1990) focused on homogeneous products, and concluded that that infinitely 
lived patents are optimal if patent breadth is increasingly costly (i. e., if the 
deadweight loss49 derived from such increasing breadth increases due to the 
patentee's growing market power). Klemperer (1990), in turn, drew attention to 
differentiated products. In this case, deadweight losses occur because either 
consumers switch to less-preferred varieties of the product or consumers 
completely give up (or fail) to purchase the patented product. So, the author 
demonstrates that if the main source of deadweight loss is substitution to 
alternative products a shorter patent life and a broad patent scope are desirable. 
On the other hand, infinitely lived, and narrow patents are preferable when the 
49 Permanent loss of well being to society that can occur when equilibrium for a good or service is not 
Pareto optimal. 
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welfare loss is caused mainly because of the substitution out of the product 
class altogether. 
In contrast to the models which assumed that imitation could not happen 
when an invention was patented, later models allow for the possibility of 
inventions to be improved upon by rivals, that is, the possibility of someone 
inventing around a patent, which happens when close substitutes are brought 
to market and can threaten an existing innovation without infringing its patent. 
However, these models assume that imitation is costless. Waterson (1990) 
relaxes this assumption. He argues that the main impact of a product patent is 
to affect the choice rivals make rather than to create a monopoly. In his model 
the scope of protection is incomplete and what is examined is how the scope of 
protection should be designed to fit the variety demanded in an industry. He 
concludes that welfare losses are likely to be higher when a broader protection 
is assured in industries where variety is valued very highly. 
Gallini (1992) also relaxes the assumption that imitation is costless, and 
proposes a model where the decision to imitate is dependent on patent life. She 
initially observes that optimal patent duration discourages imitation. When 
imitation is costly changes in patent life affect imitation decisions, and hence 
affect patent breadth5°. Then, she extends her analysis and allows patent 
authorities to use multiple instruments in order to design a patent policy. The 
policy prescription of her model is that an optimal patent design under costly 
5° Gallini (1992) uses a definition for patent breadth similar to Gilbert & Shapiro (1990) - i. e., breadth is the 
flow of profits earned by the innovator until the patent expires. 
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imitation is achieved when a broad patent is allowed and patent life is adjusted 
to generate the desired return from research. Nevertheless, Wright (1999) shows 
that the optimal patent design is not always extremely narrow or broad, it can 
have an intermediate breadth, provided that patent length is adjusted to ensure 
a certain reward. The author concludes that an optimal patent system is product 
specific. 
An optimal patent design, therefore, depends on market structure, 
demand conditions, and the structure of imitation costs (which makes it 
impossible for an optimal patent system to be achieved by policy authorities). 
This also means that a patent may not confer upon its owner a well defined 
legal right. Economists51 have increasingly recognized that uncertain character 
of patents and what has been argued is that a patent give its owner a right to try 
to exclude others from infringing his/ her patent rather than a right to exclude. 
Thus, patents possess a probabilistic nature, and as observed by Lemley & 
Shapiro (2005: 76) "[w]hen the patent holder asserts its patent against an alleged 
infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice. If the patent is found invalid, the 
property right will have evaporated". 
The fact that an optimal patent system is unrealistic, however, does not 
mean that time and effort should not be devoted to the improvement of the 
patent system because, even if imperfect, its existence (or not) has consequences 
that need to be identified. For instance, a broad patent on a prospect may assure 
51 See for example Shapiro (2003). 
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that the property holder will control the opening invention and some of the 
improvements of subsequent inventions because follow-on work may be 
dependent on previous activities. That may result in many potential 
improvements within the scope of the broad patent being underdeveloped or 
not even being pursued by the sole patentee (Merges & Nelson 1990). Thus, a 
broad scope on a prospect can result in deficient incentives to generate follow- 
on inventions because no one knows all possible outcomes. According to 
Merges & Nelson (1990: 973), "the real problem is not controlling overfishing, 
but preventing underfishing (... )", and a broad patent may be crucial in 
restricting further development. DenicolO (2000) investigated the optimal 
degree of forward patent protection assuming that there is a patent race on the 
two stages of the innovation. He allowed subsequent innovations to take 
various forms (i. e., unpatentable and infringing, patentable and infringing, or 
patentable and not infringing). He observed that underinvestment in 
subsequent innovations occur under a regime with a degree of forward 
protection that results in unpatentable and infringing subsequent innovations. 
The problem pointed out by Merges & Nelson (1990), i. e. preventing 
underfishing, is more acute when the innovation is cumulative because the 
opening invention may have only little value on its own but it serves as the 
technological foundation for valuable follow-on inventions. Thus, a concern of 
policy makers is how to compensate the developers of opening inventions 
(Scotchmer 1991). Furthermore, there is a concern for how the patent system 
organises the division of profit among sequential innovators (Green & 
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Scotchmer 1995). The extent that follow-on inventions are related to previous 
ones has various implications because cumulativeness is not uniform. For 
instance, i) a single innovation can lead to one or more follow-on innovations 
(e. g., the laser), ii) a second generation innovation (e. g., bioengineered products) 
may demand several first generation innovations (also called research tools), 
and iii) improvements can be only incremental in the sense that there is no clear 
distinction between the starting point and the later innovations (so called 
quality ladder), they simply keep getting better (Scotchmer 2005). 
The implications of the type of cumulativeness for the design of the 
patent system depends to a large extent on how the parties involved are able to 
negotiate, that is, how their bargaining power differs. In the case of the first 
type of cumulativeness a license agreement (in the case of infringements) may 
be crucial and firms need to tackle what is perhaps the biggest problem to 
licensing: asymmetric information as to the value of the innovations (Gallini & 
Wright 1990). Scotchmer (1991) shows that several firms may compete for an ex- 
ante license (i. e., before an innovation is complete) and this may help the patent 
holder to recoup the costs associated with the innovation. However, if one firm 
is able to receive an ex-ante license does not mean that it is in a favourable 
position because as other firms are also pursuing improvements on the 
innovation it may end up facing 'blocking patents'52, which make the license 
less valuable, provided that the improvements made by rivals are patentable. 
52 When neither the first innovator nor second innovators can commercialize the improved version of the 
innovation without a license agreement. 
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The second type of cumulativeness demands a different analysis because 
it cannot be argued that the second generation of innovators will have 
incentives to invest. In the first type of cumulativeness the first innovator ww, ill 
always profit by licensing the innovation. In the second type of cumulativeness 
there are several patent holders' interests at stake and bargaining may break 
down, this is what Heller & Eisenberg (1998) call the 'anticommons'. So, joint 
ownership of the research tools may be needed in order to enable a second 
generation innovation to be commercialized. Alternatively, a patent pool53 may 
come into effect with the advantage that the joint price is lower than if they 
were sold separately by different patent owners, especially if patents in the pool 
are complementary (Lerner & Tirole 2002). 
The incentive structure in quality ladders is different because there is no 
clear distinction between innovator and improver; all of them will eventually be 
in both positions. The problem is how to ensure that there is enough profit to be 
shared even after it is eroded due to competition. O'Donoghue et al. (1998) and 
O'Donoghue (1998) argue that to assure that the patent system achieves its 
purpose of promoting technical progress and rewarding innovators, both 
inventive step and patent breadth need to be taken into account. Thus, there 
might be a threshold of inventive step such that improvements below it are not 
53 Patent pools mean that intellectual property rights have been amounted to be the subject matter of cross- 
licensing either directly or indirectly (e. g., joint-venture set up to administer the pool). Cross-licensing 
means an interchange of intellectual property rights between the parties. 
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patented so that firms do not pursue such improvements, and the breadth34 
(leading) is large enough to cover the costs of the innovation. 
Inventive step is commonly defined as the extent that an invention is 
non-obvious to someone skilled in the art. This is different from novelty 
(another patentability criterion), which is a verification of whether the invention 
has already been publicly disclosed before a patent application is first filed 
(priority date). When it comes down to the economic modelling of these 
concepts they are sometimes presented in a loose way, but in essence they 
attempt to explain the extent that a current invention differs from previous ones. 
The stringency (weak vs. strong) of the novelty requirement, as it is sometimes 
referred to, may impact on the technological pace for it may affect the amount 
of information that is disclosed in the patent specification55 (Scotchmer & Green 
1990). 
A strong novelty requirement means that a more advanced innovation 
can be patented and marketed without infringing previous patents whereas a 
marginal innovation may infringe, and hence cannot be patented. A weak 
novelty requirement, in turn, means that smaller improvements in the 
technology can be patented without infringing previous patents. As a result, 
under the latter requirement small increments are more likely to be disclosed 
than are big ones. Under a strong novelty requirement a patent authority could 
54 O'Donoghue et al. (1998) distinguish two types of patent breadth: one that protects competition from 
products of superior quality (leading breadth), and another that protects against competition from 
inferior products as compared to the patented one (lagging breadth). 
65 
demand more complete information which might not necessarily be in 
innovators' interest because if they so provide they will be generating 
externalities that may harm their ex-ante profits. Thus, the patent holder may 
decide not to apply for a patent, even if it were possible. At the same time the 
patent holder could benefit from this higher degree of novelty required because 
it would make it more difficult for rivals to circumvent existing patents as well 
as for them to secure another patent. Therefore, innovators could be more 
inclined to patent rather than to suppress information. 
The model by Scotchmer & Green (1990) shows that a strong novelty 
requirement would be only socially preferred when it rectifies incorrect 
incentives for a firm to drop out of the race when it is lagging behind. The 
preference for the weak novelty requirement, as opposed to the strong one, is 
on the basis that it does not necessarily dissuade firms from research due to the 
dissipation of profits because if profits were to be eroded firms would not 
patent anyway. La Manna et al. (1989) also considered welfare implications of 
the novelty requirement. The authors investigated whether there was any merit 
in a loser-take-some reward system. That is, the novelty standard would be 
manipulated in order to allow for multiple patents to be granted to genuine 
inventors whereas true free-riders (i. e., those who have not invested in R&D) 
would be excluded from the reward. This permissive patent system, as the 
ss The body text in the patent application which describes the invention and which attempts to persuade 
patent examiners as to the fulfilment of the patentability requirements for a patent to be granted. 
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authors called it, was shown to be more socially preferable than the current 
regime. 
Industrial applicability, which is another patentability requirement, has 
also merited attention. Based upon a three-stage model of R&D La Manna (1994) 
examines whether patents should be awarded to the outcome of the research 
stage (i. e., research prototype) or to the outcome of the development stage (i. e., 
developed product/ process); the degree of industrial applicability is expected 
to be higher in the development phase. When firms engaging in R&D compete 
for a single patent the research prototype system is unambiguously more 
socially favourable than the developed product/ process system because 
development costs have to be incurred before knowing whether a patent will be 
held. But if multiple patents are allowed to be granted either in the research or 
in the development phase the developed product/ process system may be more 
beneficial because under the research prototype system entry can be excessive. 
The payment of renewal fees, which is necessary to keep a patent in force, 
has also been modelled. Cornelli & Schankerman (1999), for example, show that 
a variable patent life (through renewals) as opposed to a fixed one is welfare 
enhancing because a uniform (fixed) patent life provides more incentives to 
low-productivity firms than to high-productivity ones. But this is disputed. 
Scotchmer (1999), for instance, argues that patents should have a uniform life 
rather varying in length. 
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Although it is simple to understand why the theoretical modelling of the 
above elements of patent design is important, an empirical comparison of how 
different patent system designs have impacted on inventive activities of 
different countries is equally important. It is relevant, therefore, to investigate 
how firms use patents to better understand their actual impact on firms' 
behaviour and on economic growth. However, as patent systems are becoming 
more harmonised, an empirical study of how patents are used (which is 
considered in this thesis) may provide broader de facto evidence as to which are 
the most important elements of patent design. 
2.2.4 PATENTS AND COMPETITION 
Concerns about patent holders' monopoly power are not new. Gilbert & 
Newberry (1982) show that the patent system creates opportunities for firms 
with monopoly power to sustain it. As the authors observe, monopolists can 
maintain sleeping patents56, and in order to deter entry they must patent before 
potential competitors. Their analysis may now be dated because sleeping 
patents are rarely obtained due to changes in the operational procedure 
regarding the prosecution of patent applications (even in the US where sleeping 
patents were observed more frequently). Nevertheless, Gilbert & Newberry 
(1982) reinforce Barzel's (1968) view that if patents were to be used this would 
be at a later date than the date under competition. Tirole (1988) argues that the 
monopolist's incentive to remain as such is likely to be greater than the 
incentive of the newcomer because monopoly profits are higher than oligopoly 
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profits. Yet, the monopolist may not have as much to gain from innovation as 
potential entrants. The monopolist's innovation may dissipate all or part of the 
existing monopoly profits'. Moreover, its net incentive will be only the new 
profit minus the existing profit. 
When newcomers enter the market they may start patent races, which 
inefficiently duplicate costs (Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980a, b; Kamien & Schwartz 
1976). Nevertheless, patent races are not necessarily inefficient. Fudenberg et al. 
(1983) argue that such races accelerate the rate of investment and put more 
pressure for further advances in knowledge. The authors explore intermediate 
patent races where pre-emption may take place but it is not automatic. They 
introduce experience and a dynamic strategy into race models drawing 
particular attention to whether leapfrogging occurs. They find out that 
leapfrogging depends on the degree of uncertainty, on the lags in information 
and on R&D. However, their model does not allow for differences in firms' 
research intensities. 
Lippman & McCardle (1988) extend the model of Fudenberg et al. (1983) 
and show that followers can force the race leader to drop out. They also point 
out that the ability of a firm to prevent the entry of competitors by having a 
marginal head-start in the patent race is dependent on the natural period of 
research activity. Grossman & Shapiro (1987) describe a two-stage patent race 
model without information asymmetry. They conclude that when one firm is 
56 Patents that are neither'used' nor licensed to others. 
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ahead of another in the innovation process the leader has a greater incentive to 
invest in R&D than has the follower, who may have more incentives to engage 
in co-operation. The authors observe that when competition is quite intense co- 
operation may increase joint expected profits as compared to when no 
arrangement is set up. 
However, those models assume that R&D is memoryless. That is, past 
R&D is irrelevant to current R&D. As a consequence, the R&D race is intense at 
the outset of the game and is decided as soon as a firm falls behind. Doraszelski 
(2003) relaxes this assumption and allows for knowledge to be accumulated 
over time. The author shows that a firm has an incentive to reduce its R&D 
efforts as its knowledge stock increases because the firm's knowledge stock 
enters its hazard rate58 and depending on the shape of this function the follower 
may (or may not) work harder than the leader. He concludes that the pattern of 
strategic interaction among the racing firms is more like action-reaction59 than 
increasing dominance60. 
Other models that have looked at firms' strategic use of patents have 
assumed that there exist information asymmetries between economic agents 
that can be used strategically61. For example, the payment of renewal fees may 
signal to rivals the profitability of the market. Thus, patent renewals can be 
used to deter entry. The patent holder may decide not to pay renewal fees to 
5' These are what the author calls the efficiency effect and the replacement effect, respectively. 
58 This is the rate of transition out of the current state. 
59 The leader in the race invests less in R&D than the follower. 
60 The leader invests more than its rival. 
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eventually discourage potential entrants. On the other hand, in a non-strategic 
framework the non payment of renewal fees can be interpreted simply as the 
expected benefits from the patent being less than the expected value of its costs. 
Crampes & Langinier (2000) show that the signalling feature of the 
renewal decision is an incentive to shorten the period over which the patent 
will be held because the non-payment of renewal fees may indicate a non- 
profitable market. Thus, if patent owners carry on paying renewal fees they 
may attract newcomers. Langinier (2004), however, argues the opposite when 
the patent regards a process. Assuming information asymmetries, the author 
concludes that for process innovations patent holders can strategically renew 
the corresponding patents in order to pretend that demand is low. According to 
the author the decision to keep a process patent in force may signal that the 
market cannot accommodate newcomers. The signal sent to potential entrants is 
that the demand may not be large enough that a division of profits justifies the 
entry costs, and hence the renewal decision creates a barrier to entry). Another 
strategic use comes from the pharmaceutical industry where patent holders 
have introduced generic substitutes for their branded (and patented) products 
before the actual patent expires. Kamien & Zang (1999) propose a model to 
explain this practice and conclude that both consumers and patent holders are 
better off, whereas other generic producers are not. 
61 See Langinier (2004), for example. 
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Whilst economic models have examined the welfare implications mainly 
on the basis of the degree of protection, licensing activity (a natural 
consequence of protection) has been examined to a lesser degree, at least in 
terms of the implications of patent design for licensing. Chang (1995), for 
example, models what policy would be optimal in the absence of licensing 
agreements that emerge before an innovation is developed, i. e. when the 
innovation was motivated by an ex-ante licensing promise (contractual). His 
analysis determines when ex-post licensing agreements (i. e., when innovations 
are already developed) are desirable and when collusive agreements are 
inefficient. He concludes that collusion would be desirable only under limited 
circumstances, that is, when the risk of inefficient entry is relatively small and 
when non-infringement happens. He also concludes that courts should provide 
the broadest protection not only to valuable inventions relative to possible 
improvements but also to inventions of little value relative to expected 
improvements. This is so because the value of the first invention is not its stand- 
alone value; it is a function of the overall value resulted from improvements 
instead. 
Nevertheless, further improvements are not necessarily developed by the 
original inventor, and thus patent disputes are likely to happen, especially if 
patent thickets62 arise. The presence of overlapping patents is of particular 
concern for policy makers because those patents can lead to settlements of 
disputes that are not necessarily pro-competitive. Thus, analysis of those 
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disputes is as important as analysis of disputes when just one patent is at stake 
(Shapiro 2001). One may conclude that firms' patent behaviour may pose 
challenges to competition law and policy (Dumont & Holes 2002). As patent 
issues may overlap with other policy instruments (e. g., competition law) 
attention has also been paid to those elements, and they have been incorporated 
into economic models 63 . 
For example, Shapiro (2003) proposes a model of 
antitrust that delineates the limits of such settlements, especially when mergers, 
patent pools, and negotiated entry dates are involved. In order to remedy 
abuses of monopoly within the patent system arena compulsory licensing has 
long been proposed 64 . 
Tandon (1982) extended the Nordhaus model by 
introducing licensing royalty rates. He shows that the optimal patent life is 
indefinite, and that the use of compulsory licensing65 increases welfare gains. 
This policy instrument has been abandoned by many countries, though 
developing countries have been more reluctant to do so. According to Chien 
(2003) this policy option should not be revoked by developing countries66. 
Although firms do have incentives to pursue license agreements, this 
activity does not unambiguously positively or negatively impact on the extent 
of innovation. Gallini & Winter (1985) observed that licensing stimulates 
innovation in industries with low cost variability (concentrated industries), and 
62 A dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights. 
63 O'Donoghue (1998); O'Donoghue et al. (1998); Scotchmer (1996); Chang (1995); Green & Scotchmer 
(1995). 
64 See, for example, Machlup & Penrose (1950). 
65 Unintended license determined by the government where a third party can make, use or sell a patented 
invention without the patent holder's consent. 
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is a disincentive where costs are asymmetric (unconcentrated industries). 
However, licensing is not always observed, as confirmed in models where the 
distribution of research results depends on firm's technological knowledge. 
Katz & Shapiro (1985b), based upon an asymmetric model of duopolist 
producers, suggest that small innovations are more likely to be licensed than 
those innovations over which the innovator (or potential licensor) can afford an 
effective monopoly, or the licensor is at least as efficient with the new 
technology as the licensee. 
Saracho (2002) shows that royalty fees are superior to fixed-fee licensing. 
Rockett (1990) presents a different perspective on licensing, which sees this 
practice as a way for the patent holder to choose the competitors that it will face 
when the patent expires. That is, the patent holder affects the initial conditions 
of the entry game either by changing the order of entry or by crowding the 
market so that further entry can be deterred. This, according to the author, can 
be achieved by licensing early to a particular licensee in order for the latter to 
have a head start over competitors, and by reducing royalty fees, respectively. 
So, there exist benefits of licensing to stronger competitors as well as to weaker 
ones, and a balance has to be struck before choosing to whom to license the 
innovation. Yi (1998), however, shows that this trade-off does not exist if two- 
part tariffs67 can be charged. The model prescription is that if non-negative two- 
part tariffs are feasible, the patent holder should license to the rival with higher 
66 The author found no evidence of a decline in the innovation rate of firms affected by compulsory 
licenses. 
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absorptive capacity (the stronger one) whereas if that tariff is not viable the 
technology should only be licensed to the weaker competitor. Many models of 
licensing agreements, however, assume that licensing activities are costless. To 
the best of our knowledge the presence of transaction costs are not incorporated 
in models of technology licensing where IPRs are also analysed68. 
As observed from earlier discussion the nature of the knowledge 
involved in the final innovation may also impact on firms' patent behaviour 
because it may influence the extent to which firms will interact. When multiple 
interacting components are what determine the overall system performance, 
firms may be forced to negotiate because it is unlikely that a single firm will 
hold all the expertise, and hence IPRs, needed to create and commercialize the 
final innovation. This type of innovation is commonly referred to as complex 
innovations. Complexity emerges as a result of the bodies of knowledge 
involved (Wang & von Tunzelmann 2000), and of the number of parts that 
interact (Simon 1996). In short, complexity can be thought of as "(... ) the 
number of customised components, the breadth of knowledge and skills 
required and the degree of knew knowledge involved in production, as well as 
other critical (... ) dimensions" (Hobday 1998: 690). For the purposes of this 
study, however, the definition of complexity will follow the work by Cohen et 
67 A fixed fee plus per-unit royalties. 
68 Hill (1992) developed an analytical framework to detect when (or not) licenses should be pursued and 
he took into account those costs. According to him competitive intensity, number of capable competitors, 
profitability, the height of the barriers to imitation, and the cash flow are pivotal in the decision-making 
process. But that work is not within the scope of the economics literature. 
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al. (2002) who distinguish 'complex' innovations from 'discrete' innovations on 
the basis of the relative number of patentable elements in the final innovation. 
There has been an increasing number of studies on complex innovations, 
both theoretical69 and empirical70; most of them focus on complexity at the level 
of the number of parts that interact. It is clear from these studies that this 
particular class of innovations departs from the traditional understanding of 
radical and incremental innovation. Henderson & Clark (1990), for example, 
supplement the previous typology with two other categories of innovations: i) 
modular, and ii) architectural. The former concerns changes in the core design 
concepts of a technology, though the linkages between the parts are not largely 
affected. The latter regards changes in the relationships between the parts 
without necessarily introducing a new component technology. This typology 
not only applies to mass produced goods (e. g., VCR, cars) but also applies to a 
class of products coined by Hobday (1998) as CoPS (complex product and 
systems). The latter comprises high technology capital goods, constituted of 
parts (or sub-systems) that are often customised and produced in small batches, 
and as a consequence of high cost (e. g., air-traffic control systems, flexible 
manufacturing systems). 
From an economic standpoint one may argue that complexity means that 
the utility of the core part of the system is largely reduced if not coupled to 
69 For example, Hobdav (1998), Desruelle et al. (1996), and Ulrich (1995). 
70 Magnusson et al. (2003); Kumaresan & Miyazaki (2002); Hobday & Brady (2000); Bonaccorsi et al. (1999); 
Henderson & Clark (1990). 
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complementary products or services. Further, there exists increasing returns to 
scale in their production (Desruelle et al. 1996). Another characteristic of 
complex innovations is that, at least when it comes down to consumer durable 
goods, they can, on occasions, be dependent on network externalities, that is, 
the benefit that one agent derives from a product depends on the number of 
other agents using that product. This network effect can be a direct one, that is, 
the total number of subscribers to a network determines the value of access to 
that network, or it can be an indirect effect, which value is conferred by the 
number of agents adopting compatible products (Church & Gandal 1993; Katz 
& Shapiro 1986,1985a). This brings new challenges to both intellectual property 
and competition policies because a few firms may use patents in standard- 
settings, and thus forestall competition after the standard is established. 
The very nature of patents as part of a legal framework, and the various 
licensing issues that emerge from contractual arrangements where patents are 
involved naturally lead to legal disputes. Interest in patent litigations is a recent 
phenomenon, although the economic analysis of law is older (e. g., Cooter & 
Rubinfeld 1989). Both empirical71 and theoretical literatures on the economic 
analysis of patent litigation have grown over the past decade or so. To the best 
of our knowledge, Meurer (1989) was one of the first to model litigation when 
patents are concerned. His model analyses when patent licensing happens as a 
consequence of settlement agreements due to risks of patent invalidity. The 
71 Graham & Somaya (2004); Somaya (2003); Lanjouw & Schankerman (2001a, b); Lanjouw & Lerner (2000); 
and Lerner (1995). 
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basic condition is that the patentee has private information about the validity of 
the patent, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to a single competitor. 
He finds that when a patent is valid the patent holder never licenses, whereas 
when the patent is invalid the patent holder may or may not refuse to license. 
Choi (1998), in turn, models the enforcement of patents when there is more than 
one potential entrant. As multiple imitators may either try to free ride on 
information, or to pre-empt each other, information becomes more relevant 
than in the paper by Meurer (1989). The author shows that information about 
patent litigation may affect entry decisions of potential entrants. Thus, legal 
costs are not the unique factor affecting firms to opt for a settlement with 
potential patent infringers. 
Aoki & Hu (1999) more explicitly incorporate legal costs in their model 
and show that a legal regime where costs are high for both parties (patentee and 
potential imitator) is socially optimal, though a regime with moderately high 
legal costs provides a greater incentive to innovate. The authors also show that 
the probability of winning contributes to whether patentees license (or not) 
their technology. Llobet (2003), in turn, shows that when innovation is 
cumulative and firms hold private information about the quality of their 
inventions, a higher level of protection granted by the courts may be 
detrimental to the patent holder because it reduces the entry of potential 
infringers that would otherwise license the patented invention. Crampes & 
Langinier (2002) study how a patent holder's monitoring effort influences the 
entry decision of the imitator both when the parties involved decide 
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simultaneously and when their decisions are sequential. A counterintuitive 
result they found is that the likelihood of entry can increase with the penalty for 
infringement. 
Schankerman & Scotchmer (2001) investigate the deterrence effect of 
legal mechanisms of protection of intellectual property when the invention 
would normally be licensed (e. g., research tools). They studied two enforcement 
regimes72, namely liability rules (damages) and property rules (injunctions? 1). 
They find that in that case neither enforcement regimes deter infringement. 
Although the authors found that, depending on the length of time an injunction 
takes to be claimed, liability rules can be superior to property rules, these 
results seem to reinforce the view that patents are to a large extent probabilistic 
in nature and the outcome of patent disputes is not necessarily known. 
Regardless of the regime used what can be assured is that there is a cost for 
each decision that the patent holder makes when infringement is detected. For 
example, if the patent holder allows the infringer to stay in the market the 
market power of the patent holder can be reduced. If the decision is to go to 
court, legal expenses will be incurred. And even if an agreement is reached, this 
involves settlement costs. 
72 The doctrines that govern liability rules are'lost profit' (the infringer has to reimburse the patentee), and 
'unjust enrichment' (infringers hand their gains over patent holders). 
73 Injunctions are equitable remedies in the form of a court order that either prohibits or compels a party 
from continuing a particular activity. That is, they stop the use of the patented knowledge. The party 
that fails to adhere to the injunction faces civil or criminal contempt of court and may have to pay 
damages or sanctions for failing to follow the court's order. They allow patent holders to sue infringers 
even before the latter has brought a new product to the market. 
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The basic premise that patents spur innovation has long been modelled 
assuming that the alternative to patents is to keep things secret. Using that 
assumption, Takalo (1998) studied the impact of patent breadth and length on 
innovation. In a duopoly model where the innovator has the option for 
patenting or keeping the innovation secret he shows that patents are used when 
patent breadth is large, and secrecy is encouraged when spillovers are high. On 
the basis of the same assumption Takalo & Kanniainen (2000) have shown that 
patents can actually slow down technological progress. They argue that in 
holding a patent the losses that patent holders incur with rival's introduction of 
competitive innovations are reduced. As a consequence, patent holders may 
delay market introduction of new innovation. Atallah (2004) used a two-firm 
competition model where firms invest in cost-reducing R&D to describe when 
secrecy is likely to take place. The author models decisions on R&D, secrecy, 
and prices. The results suggest that legal and strategic protections are 
substitutes since increase in spillovers increase secrecy. 
In contrast to the above models Cassiman et al. (2002) conclude that legal 
and strategic protections are complements. They model the allocation of 
resources to basic and applied R&D, and to secrecy. They model the behaviour 
of an innovator that faces a fringe of imitators. The imitators, however, do not 
innovate, and hence there is no strategic interaction. Despite this limitation their 
results seem to be in line with their own empirical findings for Belgian 
manufacturing. Anton & Yao (2004) have recently proposed that firms do not 
use either patents or secrecy, rather their assumption is that what a firm has to 
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decide is how much knowledge will be disclosed. In this case, the innovator's 
strategy is mixing patenting and secrecy. 
This research empirically addresses whether patents, secrecy, and other 
appropriability mechanisms (e. g., IPRs, lead-time) are complements or 
substitutes. In doing so, we hope to shed some light on the dispute above, 
especially on the 'Hamlet' problem of patents zýs. secrecy, which we are sceptical 
about. We suspect that the Anton & Yao (2004) proposition might be correct, 
especially if further insights from the rivalrous competition literature are 
brought into the debate. That literature recognises the role of patents as entry 
deterrents, although they were initially seen simply as 'innocent' entry barriers 
(i. e., only used as a side effect of profit maximisation) rather than strategic entry 
barriers erected purposely (Salop 1979). The work by Horstmann et al. (1985) 
emphasised the strategic role of patents due to the information they disclose to 
rivals. They concluded that a patent is unlikely to be pursued when it conveys 
stronger information to imitators. In order to influence this disclosure and 
promote the diffusion of technical knowledge, which is one of the objectives of 
the patent system, policy makers can manipulate the design of the system, and 
according to Matutes et al. (1996) patent breadth is more important than patent 
length for that purpose. 
Recent economic models74 have drawn attention to the role played by 
patents (and other forms of intellectual property) in the firm-university 
74 See for example the issue number 21 of the International Journal of Industrial Organization in 2003. 
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relationship. This is also known as the economics of intellectual property at 
universities, and is claimed to be at the very heart of the knowledge-based 
economy (Foray & Steinmueller 2003). Although there is an increasing number 
of empirical studies75 of the economics of intellectual property at universities, 
the theoretical foundation is still slim. Some aspects that have been theoretically 
analyzed are, for example, whether university researchers should engage in that 
type of partnership (e. g., Beath et at. 2003), or the roles of university technology 
transfer offices (TTO), university scientists, and the central administration of the 
university in the licensing process (e. g., Jensen et al. 2003). As our primary 
concern in this thesis is with competition between firms, we narrow our focus 
on whether that type of collaboration impacts on intellectual property issues. 
The sparse theoretical development in this area has not advanced our 
knowledge enough. Panagopoulos (2003), who has modelled the conditions 
under which firms should engage in profitable research joint ventures (RJVs) 
with universities, suggests that firms and universities involved with new 
technologies are more likely to form RJVs. A reason for this, according to his 
model, is the opportunity cost of an agent in sacrificing his own research 
initiatives to collaborate with another agent. The opportunity cost will be lower 
for firms working with innovations closer to science and that quickly evolve 
because of the degree of intellectual property protection. In dealing with this 
type of technology firms are able to anticipate that it is difficult to fully 
appropriate the returns to R&D because, in general, it also needs to benefit from 
75 Agrawal & Cockburn (2003); Monjon & Waelbroeck (2003); Mowery et al. (2001); Henderson et al. (1998). 
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knowledge spillovers. But this does not mean that firms will not put a value on 
patents because in having proprietary control over the technology firms may 
have better control of the extent of knowledge spillovers due to various 
contractual arrangements where intellectual property rights issues are also 
embedded. So, it is expected that firms engaged in RJVs with universities are 
more likely to value patents higher than those who are not engaged in these 
activities. Whether this expectation is actually fulfilled empirically is not known 
but it is investigated below in this thesis (chapter 4). Next section, however, 
reviews how intellectual property rights, patents in particular, can affect a 
firm's performance (relative to rivals), an issue of primary concern to the 
literature on strategic management. 
2.3 PATENTS, KNOWLEDGE AND STRATEGY 
Strategy is concerned with understanding the causes and forces that explain 
differences in performance between organisations (Pettigrew et al. 2002). Thus, 
according to Bowman et al. (2002), two questions are central to strategy: i) why 
are some firms more successful than others? and ii) how can a given firm be 
made more successful? The question that follows is whether there is a role to be 
played by patents in those differences in performance. The elements that make 
up the design of a patent system are largely the same as the tools firms can use 
to enhance their competitiveness (at least when it comes to patent issues). This 
means that the strategic role of patents in terms of their capacity to influence 
firms' interactions also depends on those elements. 
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As observed by Bowman et al. (2002) the strategy field is characterised by 
pluralism, where concepts and theories have been borrowed from various 
disciplines. The authors point out three academic styles in the field: one that 
comes from the institutionalists, one that is provided by economists, and 
another derived from behavioural scientists. They argue that the views of these 
three groups have become more integrated over the years. As it would be an 
heroic task to review all the literature, and this would not be needed for the 
purposes of this research, we have narrowed our focus. 
Although previous contributions, such as the structure-conduct- 
performance pictured by Porter's five forces analytical framework 76 , are 
acknowledged, we place special emphasis on what has evolved over the 1990's. 
The reason is that we do not need to go further than that to notice the role of 
patents in the field of strategy. Within Porter's framework protection is 
emphasised in terms of positioning in an industry, and a possible way to 
accomplish this task would be through the creation of entry and mobility 
barriers, and this is where property rights fit in. 
One of the more recent concepts in the strategic management literature is 
the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), which has grown in popularity over 
the last decade, and whose roots trace back to earlier works of industrial 
economists (e. g., Penrose 1959). The RBV derives from these studies and was 
first coined by Wernerfelt in the mid-1980s (Wernerfelt 1984). This view of 
76 Porter (1985,1980). 
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strategy contends that superior performance is a result of firm-specific 
resources77 (i. e., assets, capabilities, competencies, information, and reputation). 
To the extent that those resources are unique and difficult to imitate, they confer 
sustainable competitive advantage on the firm (Barney 1991). Reed & DiFillipi 
(1990) suggest that tacitness, complexity and specificity are key characteristics 
of resources that make them difficult to imitate. But even if competitors attempt 
to somehow acquire or develop those resources there are impediments 
(isolating mechanisms) to this behaviour (Rumelt 1987). One of those 
impediments, and central to this thesis, is the patent, though it is for a specific 
purpose and of variable effectiveness. Perhaps as important as identifying 
patents as isolating mechanisms is to observe that they may help in guarding 
against the dissipation of value. In doing so, value is not only created but also 
appropriated (Teece 1986). 
More recently, a similar argument has emerged where knowledge, as 
opposed to resources, has been under the spotlight as the most strategically 
relevant resource (Grant 1996). The knowledge-based view of strategy (KBV) 
advocates that the firm is a repository of knowledge. As such, differences in 
knowledge stock, and in its development and deployment, lead to different 
performances 78 . Thus, this 
line of thought views superior performance as 
dependent on the ability of firms to be good at innovation, protecting intangible 
knowledge assets and using them (Teece 2001). Again, patents are at the very 
77 See Barney (1991); Prahalad & Hamel (1990); Wernerfelt (1984). 
78 See Foss (1996 a, b); Grant (1996). 
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heart of strategy by deterring imitation and helping the appropriation of the 
value derived from knowledge, at least from technologically-related knowledge. 
There are elaborate definitions79 of what knowledge is, but, as suggested 
by Polanyi (1967), it is most typically defined in two categories: i) explicit (or 
codified) knowledge, and ii) tacit (or implicit) knowledge. The former is 
knowledge about facts and theories, can be transmitted via formal systematic 
language, and as a consequence can be captured more easily than tacit 
knowledge. The latter is experientially based, that is, it is personal, it is specific 
to a domain, and more difficult to be formatted, communicated and shared with 
others. 
Even if for the purposes of this thesis we do not envisage any additional 
benefit in a more elaborated treatment of knowledge, it is important to note that 
the above dichotomous categories lead to a comparison of ease/ difficulty in 
transmission/ use of knowledge that may be misleading. As observed by 
Malerba & Orsenigo (2000) such a dichotomy does not address a proper 
comparison because tacitness and codification are not simple properties of 
knowledge itself. They are partly influenced by economic incentives and other 
social/ institutional processes. Therefore, the extent that knowledge is explicit/ 
tacit may vary in degree, and these categories are perhaps the extreme points of 
a spectrum80 (Saviotti 1998). 
7') See, for example, Casselman & Samson (2004), Nonaka et al. (2001), and Malerba & Orsenigo (2000). 
80 For a further treatment of knowledge management see Nonaka & Teece (2001). 
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Although imitation barriers, such as patents, can influence the creation of 
sustainable competitive advantage this advantage is perhaps mainly achieved 
because firms recombine knowledge in creative ways to pursue new market 
opportunities (Kogut & Zander 1993). Firms, therefore, may specialize in the 
creation and transfer of knowledge (Kogut & Zander 1996), even if knowledge 
spillovers are associated with the way research is structured amongst firms in a 
particular industry (Keep et al. 1994). The life cycle of technology may also 
influence the codifiability of knowledge and this may have implications for 
competitive advantage. Cardinal et al. (2001), for example, argue that firms in 
developed and developing fields tend to have different processes through 
which knowledge is generated and transferred throughout the value chain 
(R&D, production, marketing sales). 
If firms evolve in part through the combination of knowledge (Kogut & 
Zander 1996), it is in their interest to control how knowledge is transferred both 
within and outside their boundaries. However, it is far from easy to build up 
organisational structures and management practices that develop and leverage 
knowledge within a variety of innovation contexts (Collinson 2001). Even intra- 
firm transfer of knowledge has proved to be difficult (what is referred to in the 
literature as knowledge 'stickiness'). Szulanski (1996) argues that organisations 
'do not know what they know' because of knowledge-related barriers (e. g., 
absorptive capacity, difficulties in the relationship between source and recipient) 
rather than their lack of willingness to learn. Kogut & Zander (1992) observed 
that infra-firm transfer of tacit knowledge is more likely to happen than inter- 
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firm transfer. Moreover, they detected that tacit knowledge is in fact slower to 
be transferred. Nevertheless, despite knowledge being difficult to transfer an 
innovator should be concerned about other firms having access to his/ her 
knowledge. Other firms' own knowledge may enable them to codify, absorb, 
and transform new knowledge at various degrees, and perhaps on occasions 
derive more value from the transferred knowledge than its originator. As 
noticed by Collinson (2001), in order to master knowledge accordingly, firms 
need a better understanding of how organisational and management 
characteristics influence the development, deployment, and integration of 
knowledge. The ease/ difficulty with which knowledge can be transferred 
poses challenges to managers who need to control the flow of knowledge if the 
returns of the creation of this knowledge are to be appropriated. Thus, because 
of the fuzzy boundaries of property rights and of the nature of knowledge, a 
key challenge for top management is to figure out how to protect and retain the 
firm's own knowledge. As Teece (2001: 141) observed, "it is not just an 
intellectual property issue that can be delegated to the law department". 
Although Hall (1993,1992) has linked strategy to intangibles, as far as we 
know there is no formal theoretical treatment of what a de facto patent strategy 
is, at least in the strategic management literature. To the best of our knowledge 
a first attempt to answer this question has been made by Somaya (2002). Even if 
still in progress, his work has the merit of being the first to outline patent 
strategy as encompassing several decisions on issues relating to obtaining 
patent rights, enforcing these rights, and licensing them. In addition, the author 
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points out that there is a 'non-market' element, which is the firms' attempt to 
influence policy makers. 
The various uses of patents reported earlier in this thesis`' (e. g., licensing, 
signalling) as well as the way patent portfolios can be organised 82 are all 
elements of a patent strategy. Granstrand (1999) observed on the basis of case 
studies of large Japanese and Swedish firms several ways patent portfolios are 
constructed, which the author described as generic patent strategies, and the\- 
are as follows: 
" Ad hoc blocking - this strategy derives from an informal approach 
to patenting; it is characterized by limited resources and/ or little 
attention to narrow patents and portfolio effects. The result is low 
effectiveness as a mechanism of protection because rivals can 
easily invent around the patented invention. 
" Strategic patenting - despite being ambiguous this term means 
that a single patent with extremely high or (economic) unfeasible 
invent around costs is obtained. This type of patent therefore has 
large blocking power. 
" Blanketing - this is when a series of patents are taken out in a 
more or less structured way but with the purpose of turning an 
area into a minefield of patents. 
81 See Teece (2000), for instance. 
82 See Glazier (2000), Rivette & Kline (2000), and Knight (1996). 
89 
" Flooding - this strategy is similar to blanketing but patents are 
taken out in a less structured way. Both strategies are more likely 
to be observed in emerging technological fields, and are 
motivated mainly by the high uncertainties regarding profitable 
R&D directions and the economic importance of the scope of a 
patent. 
" Fencing - this strategy consists of a series of patents ordered to a 
certain extent with the purpose of holding a proprietary control 
over a range of different alternatives for achieving a similar 
functional result. That is, various substitutes for an invention are 
patented. 
" Surrounding - this practice refers to patenting of complementary 
elements of a central patented invention, which may be held by 
the same inventor or by someone else. If surrounding and core 
patents are held by the same inventor s/he may preclude 
competitors from having access to the technology. If surrounding 
and core patents are held by different inventors, those who have 
control over complementary technologies for the core invention 
may induce a negotiation because the patent holder of the core 
invention will not have all the rights necessary to commercialize 
the innovation. 
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But a patent strategy should not be completely disentangled from other 
intellectual property issues. Reitzig (2004c) enumerates various examples where 
intellectual property strategies are used to create and sustain competitive 
advantage. The capture and protection of value from innovation, however, goes 
beyond the use of IPRs because, at least with respect to appropriation, firms are 
able to use other appropriability mechanisms. Therefore, we suspect intellectual 
property strategies are developed within the remit of firms' appropriation 
strategies, which for the purposes of this study consist of the choice and 
planning as to the way certain mechanisms will be deployed to capture value 
from innovation and to protect that value from being dissipated due to the 
intervention of other agents (e. g., imitators, competitors). Those mechanisms 
are, in essence, ways firms use to appropriate the value derived from the 
knowledge they (or someone else) developed. Examples of appropriability 
mechanisms are: being first to market, using IPRs, moving down the learning 
curve, holding co-specialised assets, keeping things secret, generating very 
complicated innovations, creating costs to consumers in switching to other 
innovations, and so on. Insofar as several mechanisms of appropriability exist, 
firms are likely to use them to the extent that the returns from innovation are 
increased by their use (assuming that firms are profit seeking), that is, they are 
used to capture and to protect the value from innovation. 
Nevertheless, and different from economics (as reported earlier in this 
thesis), the above literature does not seem to have drawn much attention to the 
knowledge disclosure character of patents; the focus has been mainly on 
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appropriability on the basis of excludability. As regards patenting Hufker & 
Alpert (1994) report what managers should look at when dealing with it (e. g., 
licensing, related patents, and predictable improvements). A clear message 
from their paper is that information disclosure is central83, and this should not 
be overlooked when bringing patents to the strategic framework. 
Recent work by Foss & Foss (2002) seems to fill that gap. The authors 
develop a view of competitive strategy using the rationales of the economics of 
property rights and transaction costs. The property rights perspective in the 
theory of the firm sees transaction costs as the costs of capturing, protecting, 
and exchanging such rights (Barzel 1997). However, this approach has not 
devoted much attention to the role of contracting and expectations in the 
process of competitive interaction (Williamson 1999). Foss & Foss (2002) try to 
overcome this problem by developing a single framework within which the 
processes of creation, capture and protection of value is encapsulated. Within 
their framework strategizing encompasses the influence over value creation to 
the advantage of the firm. As a result, competitive advantage84 is achieved. 
Central to the property rights-based view of strategy (PRV) is the fact that all 
parties engage in capture and protection activities. In addition, contracting 
plays an important role in strategizing because of its impact on capture and 
protection activities due to transaction costs that may dissipate the value 
created. Finally, the PRV accounts for inefficiencies caused by property rights 
83 See Ernst (1998a) for an example of how analysis of information in patent portfolios can be used in R&D 
planning. 
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not being completely secure, and thus one may influence the value she/he 
appropriates by interfering in others' expectations. In a patent context, this is 
done by influencing the access of rivals to a technological domain, either 
directly (e. g., enforcing property rights) or indirectly (e. g., disclosing 
information that can be used by other agents). And at the same time being 
influenced by expectations as to the resources other agents will spend on the 
capture of the value of knowledge created by the patent holder. 
Although we have emphasized the role of patents in the appropriation 
process, it is widely known that patent protection may not be very effective in 
reaping the economic benefits from innovation. For example, an innovation, 
even if patented, can be imitated; or the legal system of the country where a 
patent is obtained may not be favourable to enforcing of property rights. Anand 
& Galetovic (2004) show some strategies that may work when property rights 
are weak. In essence, they show that in the absence of strong IPRs a firm may i) 
threaten offenders with strong competition, ii) exploit complementarities and 
offer potential offenders a better deal than the contingencies they envisage, and 
iii) strengthen its position in terms of complementary assets/ products. 
Therefore, if on the one hand there is a strategic role for patents, on the other 
hand this role can be constrained. 
Thus, the extent that effort and time should be devoted to patent issues is 
expected to vary. Firms operating in more technology-based sectors are likely to 
81 Above-normal profits. 
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be more concerned about appropriability conditions, which may in fact be 
paramount for the economic success of their R&D laboratories (Brockhoff 2003). 
Conversely, firms operating in less R&D-intensive sectors may not value 
patents as much; reputation as well as know-how is perceived more important 
than patents as a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Hall 1993). Firms 
should understand the environment in which they operate before committing 
too many resources to patenting, and if resources are to be used in patent 
activities, firms should be aware of the purpose, which may not be mere 
protection (Teece 2000), and of the costs that may dissipate value (Foss & Foss 
2002). Thus, two questions that arise are i) whether value can in fact be derived 
from patent activity, and, if so, ii) how patents are used to create such value. 
These issues are addressed in the next section where factual data of various 
kinds are explored for this purpose. Gaps are identified and a research agenda 
is built upon them. As we shall see our current knowledge on the way patents 
are used has limitations that justify our interest in carrying out this empirical 
research. 
2.4 PATENTS AND FIRMS: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
2.4.1 THE VALUE OF PATENTS: A SUMMARY 
One of the elements of concern to the strategic management literature is how 
firms build and sustain competitive advantage, that is, how firms' strategies 
influence value creation to their advantage. It has been recognised by that 
literature that there exist forces which limit the extent to which competitive 
advantage can be duplicated. These forces are known as isolating mechanisms 
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and serve as barrier to imitation. Patents as well as trademarks are types of legal 
barriers (contracts in many cases can also been seen in this way) that may help 
firms in achieving that purpose. Thus, patents seem to have a strategic value. 
The extent of this value, however, is still unclear. 
The economics literature is perhaps the literature which has devoted 
more attention to the evaluation of patents85. The value of protection is the 
difference between patent protection and the next best appropriation alternative 
(Lanjouw 1993). So, the value of a patent is found in its ability to exclude others 
from appropriating economic benefits from the underlying invention. But even 
if a patent is very effective as a barrier to imitation for a particular invention, 
the corresponding invention may have little or no market value, and hence the 
economic value of its patent would be only marginal. Thus, the private 
economic value of a patent depends on both the market value of the invention 
and the relative strength of the patent protection. 
Economists' interest in the value of patents, however, was not initially 
motivated by the value of patents per se but rather by how the impact of 
technical change on productivity growth could be measured. These studies 
used to interpret technology as a residual from a production function (Solow 
1957). Residuals, however, are not very convincing when something important 
has to be shown. That certainly left economists in an uncomfortable position 
and new forms of measurement were pursued (Griliches 1995,1989). The 
85 See also Lev (2001), and Contractor (2000). 
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production function model was the point of departure in this body of empirical 
work. That function connected some measure of output to inputs, and technical 
knowledge was also incorporated as one of the inputs (Griliches 1979). More 
specifically, the theoretical framework of the majority of studies is the Cobb- 
Douglas production function (Griliches 1986), which is presented in logarithms 
as 
1og(Y)=a+Nt+alog(K)+(31og(L)+y1og(C)+E 
where Y is a measure of output (production or sales), La measure of 
labour input and ta trend variable. K and C are measures of the cumulated 
research effort (capital) and other physical capital, i. e. machinery, buildings etc. 
A, a, (3, and y are the unknown parameters to be estimated. The error term (also 
known as the Solow residual), P-, captures the total factor productivity. 
The limited (or non) availability of data on R&D expenditures led some 
researchers to seek proxies to overcome this problem (e. g., Schmookler 1954), 
and patents were one of them. Why patents? As observed by Griliches 
(1990: 1669) "a patent does represent a minimal quantum of invention that has 
passed both the scrutiny of the patent office as to its novelty and the test of the 
investment effort and resources by the inventor and his organization into the 
development of this product or idea, indicating thereby the presence of a non- 
negligible expectation as to its ultimate utility and marketability". But the use of 
patents in productivity measurement has lots of problems associated with it. 
One of them is that patents disclose information that can be used by other 
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economic agents. Thus, patents are not only outputs of inventive activities but 
also inputs to these activities. This problem motivated researchers (e. g., Scherer 
1965) to look for correlations between patent counts and other variables (e. g., 
R&D)86. Jaffe (1986), for instance, found that a higher ratio of patents per R&D 
outlay takes place in sectors where firms spend more on R&D, and that the 
returns to R&D depend on the amount of R&D spent vis-ä-vis other firms. So, 
higher returns are achieved if a firm has relatively high R&D expenses whereas 
other firms in the same industry also have high R&D expenses. Low returns can 
be expected if a firm invests less in R&D than its industry counterparts. 
Difficulties in evaluating the private returns to innovative activity by the 
above approach made some researchers turn to an alternative method, namely 
the valuation placed by the financial markets on a firm's assets. Then, again, 
there are restrictions with this approach, such as its limited applicability 
because it can be used only for private firms traded on well-functioning 
markets (Hall 2000). Broadly speaking, this approach has attempted to find a 
correlation between a firm's intangible assets (with patents and R&D playing an 
important role as indicators of those assets) and its market value87. 
The market valuation of patents has been addressed using techniques 
such as correlation analysis (e. g., Ernst 1998b), econometric based models (e. g., 
Guellec & van Pottelsberghe 2000), or by an option pricing approach (e. g., Pakes 
1986). However, for most studies the basis of the analytical framework is the 
86 This approach is not problem-free either. A more detailed list of problems with this approach can be 
found in Hall (2000), and Griliches (1990). 
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Tobin's q approach, which relies on the fact that publicly traded firms are 
bundles of assets and the market value (the value of equity plus debt) of the 
firm is related to its stocks of tangible and intangible assets (Tobin 1969). This 
can be represented as follows: 
V (Ai, A2, ... ) =f (Al, A2, ... ), 
where f is an unknown function that describes the relationship between 
the assets. 
The function f has been specified in two different ways in the literature: 
(i) an additive separable linear form, and (ii) a multiplicative separable form. 
The additive form implies that it would be possible to disentangle the assets 
and sell them separately for the same price as if they were embedded in the 
firm. However, when one takes into account intangible assets it is rather 
difficult to separate them and sell them off. Despite that the additive model has 
the advantage of simplicity. It also assumes that the marginal shadow value 
(the gross rate of return) of the assets is equalised across firms. According to 
Hall (2000), such an assumption is more defensible from a theoretical point of 
view than the assumption of constant elasticity that underlies the multiplicative 
form. 
The additive model is reliant on Griliches' seminal work (Griliches 1981), 
which underpinned a number of studies of this sort, and it is given by 
87 See for example Hall (2000), Deng et al. (1999), Pakes (1985), and Griliches (1981). 
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vit = qt (A; t+ ytKt) at , 
where qt is the discount of market value over the replacement cost of 
tangible assets of firm i and Alt represents the book value of the physical assets 
of firm i in time t. Kit denotes the firm's intangible assets, )It measures the 
shadow value of such assets, and at indicates departures from constant returns 
and market equilibrium. Taking logarithms of both sides the previous equation 
becomes 
log Vet = log qt + at log Azt + at log (1 + ytKitVAt). 
The assumption of constant returns (6t = 1) entails that the equation 
assumes the form 
log ViVAit = log qt + log (1 + ytKiVAit) 
This framework has produced a body of empirical work. For example, 
Hall (1993a, b) investigated the stock market valuation of R&D investments in 
US manufacturing over two decades (1970-1990). She found that the rate of 
return to industrial research and development fell during the 1980's. 
Griliches et al. (1991) observed that information about changes in 
patenting rates does not provide any additional information beyond what R&D 
already contains because patenting rates account for only a very small fraction 
of changes in the stock market value of the firm. But according to the authors 
this could be because of the metrics employed (patent counts). This was not 
totally unexpected since Griliches (1981) also found 'surprising' effects in his 
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work. However, a study by Megna & Klock (1993) on the semiconductor 
industry suggests that R&D stock and patent stock measure different elements 
of intangible capital. This could be a market structure effect but according to 
Hirschey (1985) there is no consistent link between market structure and market 
value. A result that does not reconcile with the research by Blundell et al. (1999), 
who found that the market values innovations more highly in firms with high 
market shares than in firms with small market shares. These differences in the 
results could be because the authors took a different approach and employed 
innovation counts and market share as measures of innovativeness as opposed 
to R&D and patent counts. 
Stoneman & Bosworth (1994) found that R&D plays a more dominant 
role than patents in the explanation of market value of UK firms. In contrast, an 
analysis of the UK pharmaceutical sector by Bosworth & Mahdian (1999) 
identified that R&D and patents perform broadly the same role in the 
explanation of market value. Toivanen et al. (2002) observed that equity 
markets value R&D, but the market value is most sensitive to the first 
announcement of R&D expenditure in the firm's accounts. The question, 
perhaps, is whether R&D and patents capture the same effects. 
Bosworth et al. (2000) studied the contribution of intangible assets to the 
performance of 146 UK firms. In addition to patents, their models also 
accounted for trademarks. Their initial findings indicated that the stock of 
measured intangibles fails to explain variations in market values, that is, 
intangible assets did not seem to have a significant influence on firm 
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performance. So, it seemed that the market considered only a few firms to be 
capable of generating returns to their intangible assets. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence of systematic differences in the performance of firms that are captured 
by the firm fixed effects and not by the measured variables. Their further 
analysis revealed that the variation in firm-specific effects, and thus the 
variation in the firms' q ratio, is positively related to both the average stock of 
trademark applications and the average stock of patent publications. Therefore, 
the value of firm-specific factors is linked to the firm's accumulated patenting 
and trade mark portfolio. 
Schankerman & Pakes (1986) detected that the distribution of the private 
value of patent rights is sharply skewed. That is, the economic significance of 
individual patents is variable, with only a very few highly valuable patents. So, 
when the patent stock is used in empirical analyses, unimportant patents may 
overshadow valuable patents. Griliches et al. (1991) observed that patents are a 
noisy measure of the underlying economic value of the innovations with which 
they are associated. Their findings corroborate the notion that only a few 
patents are valuable; most of them are of marginal value. Harhoff et al. (2003, 
1999) surveyed patent owners in Germany about the value of their patented 
innovations. They confirmed the existing knowledge that the value distribution 
of patents is highly skewed. 
Austin (1993) was encouraged to undertake analysis at a more 
disaggregated level as a result of concerns about what makes few patents more 
valuable than most patents. He drew attention to the relationship between the 
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scope of patents and their market value. However, he found no (statistically) 
significant evidence that broader patents are more valuable than narrow 
patents. Using a more disaggregate measure of patent scope, namely the IPCý" I 
Lerner (1994) identified a positive relationship between scope and market value 
for biotech companies. 
Another approach has been the use of patent citations89 as a proxy for the 
`quality of a patent' (Hall et al. 2000). That is, it is assumed that the most 
valuable patents are those which are most frequently cited by other patents, a 
hypothesis confirmed by Harhoff et al. (1999). Deng et al. (1999) found that 
building upon this patent attribute can be a useful tool for the investment 
analysis of technology- and science-based firms. 
Other patent attributes such as i) patent renewals (Pakes & Simpson 
1989), ii) family size (Guellec & van Pottelsberghe 2000), iii) oppositions90 to 
patent grants (Graham et al. 2003; Harhoff et al. 2003), iv) litigation (Crampes & 
Langinier 2002), v) accelerated examination requests (Reitzig 2004a), vi) 
qualified word counts (ibid. ), and vii) a composite 'quality index' (Lanjouw & 
Schankerman 1999) have also been used. Thus, it seems that individual 
valuation of patents largely depends on their attributes. But this is not the full 
88 The International Patent Classification (IPC) is a categorization of technology fields suggested by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) under which individual patent applications are 
ascribed during their prosecution within patent offices. A patent can end up with several classifications 
depending on the scope (or breadth) of the invention. They are periodically revised, and countries may 
have their own classification (e. g., US) but the purpose of the IPC is to standardize the classification 
across countries. A rough proxy for the scope of a patent (as used by Lerner 1994) is the number of 
subclasses into which a patent is assigned during its prosecution in a patent office. 
89 Either forward citation (Trajtenberg 1990) or backward citation (Narin et al. 1997). 
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story; firms' behaviour (Reitzig 2004b), and sectoral differences (Greenhalgh & 
Rogers 2004) also have a role to play. 
Although valuation of patents per se is an important issue, eve should not 
neglect ex-ante reasons why certain patents are more valuable than others. In 
this respect, the investigation followed in this thesis of how firms produce their 
patent portfolios and what attributes firms do possess that make them place 
more (or less) importance on patents is a step forward toward understanding 
how the value of patents is created. 
2.4.2 PROPENSITIES TO PATENT 
As there are conditions governing the granting of patents91, one cannot expect 
that all firms are able to secure property rights. Moreover, although it is 
intuitive that firms that hold more patents are more innovative, this can be 
misleading. It is misleading because it does not account for the effects of, for 
example, the industry's competitive structure (Comanor 1967), or their size 
(Scherer 1965). Thus, it is fair to say that the interest in firms' propensities to 
patent emerged largely due to deficiencies that patents per se have as indicators 
of innovative activity. This line of research has attempted to detect the 
characteristics of firms that make them more inclined to apply for patents rather 
than using raw patent numbers to measure firms' level of innovativeness92. 
91 Generally speaking, it is a post-grant challenge available to parties that enable them to contest the 
validity of patents issued by Patent Offices. 
The basic premise is that a firm has to have an invention that meets patentability criteria. 
92 See for example the studies by Schmookler (1962a, 1954) where patents are used for that purpose. 
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There are two main definitions of what is meant b propensity to 
patent93. The first, to the best of our knowledge, dates back to Scherer in 1965. 
Scherer (1983,1965) measures propensity to patent as the number of patents per 
unit of R&D input. His definition may be valuable if one takes into account the 
availability of such statistics publicly. Nevertheless, Scherer's definition does 
not allow for possible 'interferences' in the patents-R&D relationship, such as i) 
the efficiency of R&D, ii) the reasons why firms patent, iii) technological 
opportunities, and iv) the possible undercounted R&D in small firms. Scherer 
also used the number of patents as a response variable in estimation models in 
order to investigate what determines a firm's propensity to patent. This practice 
seems to have been used more often recently due to advances in the 
econometrics of count data (e. g., Gourieroux et al. 1984a, b; Hausman et al. 
1984). 
The second main definition of a firm's propensity to patent is based upon 
the proportion of inventions/ innovations that are patented. The first attempt to 
use this definition was made by Mansfield (1986) who asked US firms the 
proportion of their patentable inventions that were patented. Mansfield's 
definition has the merit of avoiding the R&D productivity problem but has the 
disadvantage of underestimating the value of patents because many inventions 
do not necessarily become innovations and therefore have little or no economic 
consequence. In an attempt to overcome this problem many variants of this 
93 Arundel & Kabla (1998) revise a broader scope of definitions. 
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definition have been used recently (e. g., Cohen et al. 2000; Duguet & Kabla 2000; 
Brouwer & Kleinknecht 1999; Arundel & Kabla 1998). 
The results derived from previous studies on the propensity to patent 
agree to a certain degree around particular issues. For example, firm size seems 
to play an important role in determining the number of patents (Brouwer & 
Kleinknecht 1999; Scherer 1983,1965). R&D outlays are also seen as a major 
factor in determining a higher propensity to patent (Duguet & Kabla 2000; 
Scherer 1983,1965). Another point to make is that in industries where R&D 
expenses are to a large extent government-oriented the propensity to patent is 
low (Scherer 1983). This result may arise from either the presence of well- 
established firms whose future market position is not particularly dependent on 
taking out a lot of patents (Griliches 1990); or because the government supports 
some industries and insists upon either title or a royalty-free license to any 
inventions made under its contracts (Scherer 1983); or the level of uncertainty 
attached to R&D is very high (Taylor & Silberston 1973). But within particular 
industries that receive government support, the propensity to patent may be 
high due to the supplementation of the invention-generating potential of 
company-financed R&D (Scherer 1983). The impact of other forms of support, 
in particular innovation-oriented collaborations, may also increase firms' 
propensities to patent (Brouwer & Kleinknecht 1999). 
Firms` propensities to patent also vary across industrial sectors. 
Empirical evidence suggests that differences in technological opportunities are 
thought to be a major determinant of that variability. Moreover, incentives 
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peculiar to individual industries, such as the relevance of patents to different 
sectors, may help in determining different propensities to patent (Brouwer & 
Kleinknecht 1999; Scherer 1983,1965). Market power, however, seems to have 
only a modest positive effect on the number of patents (Duguet & Kabla 2000; 
Scherer 1983), though its intensity may vary by country. A higher degree of 
competition is conducive to a higher propensity to patent (Arundel & Kabla 
1998). Firms with overseas sales also tend to obtain more patents than those 
with domestic operations only (Scherer 1983). 
Another possible explanation for differences in the propensity to patent 
lies in environmental factors not related to firm and market structures. These 
factors constitute what Teece (1986) coined 'regimes of appropriability'. These 
regimes derive, in particular, from the nature of technology and the efficacy of 
legal mechanisms. By nature of technology Teece means whether it is product 
or process oriented, and also the extent that the knowledge involved is tacit or 
codified. By efficacy of legal mechanisms, Teece means the extent that 
intellectual property rights can be enforced. Regimes of appropriability may not 
only induce firms to pursue patent protection but also to explain when they are 
not worth using as a protective device. A tight appropriability regime means 
that technology is relatively easy to protect whereas a weak appropriability 
regime means that it is almost impossible to protect a technology. 
Nonetheless, one should be cautious when analysing sectoral differences 
in propensities to patent. It is expected and is, in fact, observed that the 
likelihood of applying for patents increases with an increase in the perceived 
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importance of patents (Arundel & Kabla 1998). However, even within 
individual industries one can observe a large variability in firms' propensities 
to patent (Mansfield 1986). An explanation for this variability is that firms 
pursue patents for reasons that have nothing to do with protection, as we shall 
see later in this chapter. Moreover, as Mansfield and associates (1981) observed, 
the degree of protection is variable. As a result, firms may be more inclined to 
use other ways of appropriating the knowledge they create. For example, 
secrecy may be more effective than patents in protecting new processes but less 
effective in protecting new products (Arundel & Kabla 1998; Levin et al. 1987). 
This might be a reason to believe that it is hard to attribute sectoral differences 
in patent propensity rates to process innovations. 
However, the effectiveness of ways of appropriating the returns from 
innovation may change over time. For instance, the perceived effectiveness of 
secrecy has increased in the US, but apparently this has not happened to patents 
(Cohen et al. 2000). Even so, Kortum & Lerner (1999) have observed an 
unprecedented increase in patenting in that country over the past decade. This 
could be a consequence of institutional changes in US policy or some sort of 
technological revolution; not least the reduced threshold of inventiveness and 
the piecework of patent examiners. The authors, however, have found no 
robust support for these arguments. They suggest that the main cause of such 
an increase in firms' level of patenting has been changes in the management of 
innovation. Arundel (2001) suggests that it could be that both patents and 
secrecy have experienced a rise in their importance but the latter a quicker 
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increase. The author argues that secrecy may compensate for the inadequacies 
of patents. The evidence from semiconductors by Hall & Ziedonis (2001) is that 
an increase in the propensity to patent has more to do with changes in the way 
firms manage the R&D output rather than the R&D input, in particular due to 
the way in which firms tend to use patents in this industry. A recent study by 
Hall (2004) seems to support this view to a certain degree because her findings 
indicate that although R&D has also increased in the electrical and computing 
sectors, this cannot explain the size of the increase in patenting. 
The present thesis, whose roots trace back to Taylor & Silberston in 1973, 
is not motivated solely by the potential change in firms' patent behaviour, 
though we suspect that such has possibly occurred as a result of institutional 
and technological changes as well as globalisation. Although now dated, the 
path-breaking work by Taylor & Silberston (1973) is still the most 
comprehensive study of the impact of the patent system on the UK economy. 
They investigated 44 firms within 5 industries, and their primary concern was 
with policy issues such as price, UK trade, and administrative costs. We, 
however, focus on how patents are important and used to strengthen firms' 
competitiveness in UK manufacturing. Taylor & Silberston (1973) found large 
variations in firms' propensities to patent, even within the same industrial 
sector, and also detected a pronounced decline in firms' patent propensity as 
the size of the line of business increased. Unfortunately they did not have any 
justification for this behaviour, and more recent studies do not reconcile with it 
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(e. g., Hall & Ziedonis 2001; Scherer 1983). We believe, therefore, this is a good 
opportunity to revisit the topic. 
Furthermore, previous studies have concentrated upon patents applied 
for or issued. This may not be particularly informative and may overestimate 
how important is the fundamental attribute of patents, which is stopping others 
from copying. The potential overvaluation of patents' fundamental attribute 
rests with the multi-purpose role they play as indicated elsewhere in this thesis 
(e. g., technology negotiation, researchers' incentive structure, etc. ). Although it 
is expected that those who most apply for patents are those who most value 
them, they may apply for reasons other than exclusionary ones. 
Finally, despite the tradition in the UK as to the use of patents in 
empirical studies of innovative activity94 there has not been any specific 
investigation as to what determines UK manufacturing firms' perception of the 
importance of patents as a protective device. 
It is therefore both of importance and of interest to explore the basic role 
of the patent system itself (i. e., to incentivise innovation by providing 
protection against deliberate imitation). This is going to be addressed in this 
thesis by empirically identifying what makes firms assign more (or less) 
importance to patents as a mechanism of protection. In providing evidence of 
what firm attributes are related to the perception of a higher importance for 
patents as a mechanism of protection we hope to advance our current 
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knowledge as to whether patents are serving their central purpose. Such 
investigation will be one of the main contributions of this study and differs 
from existing studies for a number of reasons. Firstly, in looking solely at the 
exclusionary side of patents, distortions caused by several motivations behind 
patent applications, reflected in patent numbers, are minimized. Secondly, in 
identifying the attributes that impact on the perceived importance of patents for 
protection against copying, based upon data and research method accordingly, 
we hope to avoid distortions caused by not-controlling for important elements"D 
affecting that perception. Finally, the results may help managers, on the basis of 
their business, assess more clearly whether patents should be pursued. 
2.4.3 PATENTS AND APPROPRIATION 
In order to strengthen competitiveness firms can use isolating mechanisms that 
are impediments to the imitative dissipation of rents (Rumelt 1987), or 
analogously, appropriability mechanisms, that are not only forms of precluding 
replication but also of capturing value from knowledge assets (Teece 1986). But 
this is no guarantee of gaining competitive advantage because if firms fail to 
correctly identify the real source of returns they may not protect their resources 
adequately (Cool et al. 2002). Insofar as patents can be an element of the control 
of knowledge flows, central to this thesis is the understanding of how patents 
are used to enhance firms' appropriability process. It is relevant, therefore, to 
review both the use of patents in relation to other mechanisms of 
94 Cantwell & Iammarino (2000); Bosworth & Mahdian (1999); Geroski (1991); Patel & Pavitt (1987); Pavitt 
et al. (1987); Pavitt (1982); Stoneman (1979). 
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appropriability and how decisions with respect to patenting affect 
appropriabiiity. 
2.4.3.1 Patents and Other Appropriability Mechanisms 
The underlying reason for our interest in the relationship between patents and 
other methods of appropriation is that if these other methods were effective 
means of appropriating the returns from innovation, patents would not be 
needed. For example, one alternative to increase the benefits derived from the 
innovative effort is to develop inventions with a degree of complexity that no 
one else is able to replicate, even if allowed to. Because several bodies of 
knowledge are required to generate these complex innovations it is possible for 
the degree of complexity to be such that imitation is either very costly or not 
economically feasible for late-comers, and hence the complexity itself would bar 
imitation. Complexity can be a technology-specific characteristic. Even so, 
innovators may attempt to move across the complexity `spectrum` in order to 
achieve non-imitative results. As this may not be economically or technically 
feasible innovators may need to rely upon other mechanisms. A question that 
arises is the extent that firms that rely on the complexity of their innovations (or 
on other methods of appropriation) seek patent protection. 
Bekkers et al. (2002) studied the role of patents in shaping the global 
system for mobile communications (GSM). They found that the market power 
of the dominant firms in the network was positively associated with their 
95 Industrial sector, for example. 
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ownership of essential patents. So, even if ownership of IPRs implies restriction 
of use, which is contrary to standard-setting that aims diffusion of technology, 
holding property rights over some parts of a complex system may impact on 
the bargaining power of patent holders and thus may allow a better bargaining 
position. This suggests that patents and complexity are not substitutes in the 
appropriation process. 
As described elsewhere in this thesis, economic theory has assumed on 
many occasions that patents and secrecy substitute for one another (e. g., Attalah 
2004; Takalo 1998), though a few claim these mechanisms complement each 
other (e. g., Anton & Yao 2004; Cassiman et al. 2002). Another example regards 
intellectual property rights. The law itself may pose the reasoning that by 
having different types of IPRs, covering distinct groups of activities, they 
substitute for one another because their suitability depends on the output of the 
intellectual exercise. 
Perhaps mirroring theory (or vice-versa) the empirical evidence is still 
inconclusive as to whether patents and other mechanisms complement or 
substitute for one another, and this justifies our interest in following this avenue. 
Although the view that the use of one mechanism excludes the use of another, 
especially patents, may be on some occasions correct, especially when the 
analysis is at the innovation-level, this view neglects the possibility that firms 
develop appropriation strategies. If firms do so, they may use various 
mechanisms, especially because knowledge can vary in its degree of 
codifiability, and hence it is important to pay attention to the interaction of 
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mechanisms (if any). Thus, we suspect that firms may use more than one 
mechanism to compensate for possible limitations of a particular mechanism in 
appropriating the economic benefits derived from innovative effort. 
One of the most revealing studies of firms' perceptions about 
appropriability is that by Levin et al. (1987). They investigated typical 
conditions of appropriability in 130 lines of business for US firms. The results of 
their survey suggest that the efficiency of the patent system is restricted. The 
authors found that process patents are the least effective mechanism of 
appropriability amongst those examined. Product patents were rated higher 
than process patents as a method of appropriability. In turn, secrecy was rated 
higher than process patents but lower than product patents. Their study also 
detected that lead-time, the learning curve, and sales or service efforts are 
regarded as more effective than patents in protecting competitive advantages of 
new products/ processes. They noticed, however, that in the pharmaceutical 
industry patents were rated as being more effective than all other means of 
appropriability. According to the authors this is because the discreteness and 
easy differentiability of the patentable subject matter of that industry help to 
develop a comparatively clear standard of assessment of a patent's validity. 
The study by Levin et al. (1987) indicates that the studied mechanisms of 
appropriability could be reduced to two dimensions: i) patents, and ii) other 
non-intellectual property rights (lead-time, secrecy, learning curve advantages). 
In an attempt to find patterns in the data the authors carried out factor analysis 
and cluster analysis of the mechanisms of appropriability. The results of factor 
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analysis, again, suggested that patents and other mechanisms tend not to be 
used together. However, they recognize that this is not robust evidence since 
the data did not reduce satisfactorily to these two dimensions. The results from 
the cluster analysis were not elucidated further. Firms could be gathered into 
three groups: i) a first group where all mechanisms were not rated effective, ii) a 
second group where there was a clear distinction between patents and other 
mechanisms, and finally iii) a third group where all mechanisms were ranked 
very effective. Although the results are to a certain degree suggestive the 
significant heterogeneity in the data did not lead to further conclusions. 
A similar analysis undertaken by Sattler (2002) for German firms led to 
the same sort of results. The author detected the existence of one factor where 
patents and design registration loaded together, and another factor comprising 
secrecy, complexity of design, long-term employment relationships and lead- 
time. His cluster analysis results, in line with Levin et al. (1987), suggested that 
there are three groups, and in one of them all mechanisms are relatively highly 
rated. 
In a follow-up study on mechanisms used to appropriate the returns 
from innovation Cohen et al. (2000) surveyed 1478 managers in R&D 
laboratories within US manufacturing industry. They observed, again, that the 
effectiveness of patents varies across industries, but in the majority of 
manufacturing industries patents tend to be the least effective mechanism. An 
interesting result is that secrecy appears to be more heavily employed across 
industries than was found previously in Levin et al. (1987). Despite being 
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judged of low effectiveness, patents are still applied for as often as they used to 
be. According to the authors, one reason explaining this finding is that patents 
add sufficient value at the margin when they are used with other mechanisms. 
The study by Cohen et al. (2000) matches to a large degree the findings of 
Levin et al. (1987). The former found three factors as opposed to the latter 
where only two factors were detected. One factor accounts for sales, services 
and manufacturing capabilities, and lead-time. Another factor accounts for 
patents, and other IPRs. And a final factor contains secrecy. Their results, 
however, suggest that other IPRs can cross load with the first factor. Moreover, 
secrecy occasionally loads with patents or complementary capabilities. 
Therefore, the findings by Cohen et al. (2000) diverge from the substitutability 
standpoint by pointing that patents and some other mechanisms can be used 
together. 
A somewhat distinct (non-survey based) study is the one by Graham 
(2003). He investigates the use of submarine96 patents in the US and concludes 
that patents and secrecy can be complements. It is advocated that the tacit part 
of knowledge is better protected by secrecy whilst the codified part better 
protected by patents (Arora 1997). Although Graham's study does not 
completely reconcile with the results by Levin et al. (1987) and by Sattler (2002), 
it parallels the evidence reported by Hounshell & Smith (1988), who described 
patents and trade secrets being used concurrently by German dye firms. 
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Moreover, it lends support to the findings of Cohen et al, (2000) with respect to 
the possibility of patents and secrecy being used together. A recent analysis of 
the US software industry has extended that possibility from secrecy to other 
forms of IPRs (Graham & Somaya 2004). 
When it comes to patents and lead-time the findings do not converge 
either. If there is evidence that patents and lead-time do not load together 
(Sattler 2002; Levin et al. 1987), there is also an indication of the contrary (Cohen 
et al. 2000). The simultaneous use of patents and lead-time suggests that patents 
are used not only to protect innovations but also, amongst other things, to slow 
down competitors. Bresnahan (1985), in studying the plain paper copier market 
after Xerox's monopoly ended, noticed that this firm "patented every 
imaginable feature of the copier technology" (ibid: 15). Although not being 
totally clear, first-mover advantages are believed to derive from various sources 
such as, for example, switching costs, network externalities, and buyer inertia 
due to uncertainty over quality and/ or due to habit formation (Mueller 1997). 
On top of that, the durability of first-mover advantages is also a result of the 
pre-emption of certain scarce assets, such as input factors (e. g., natural 
resources), geographic and product (i. e., niches for product differentiation) 
locations, and investments in plant and equipments (Lieberman & Montgomery 
96 This term refers to patents that make use of continuation patent applications to delay patent grants, and 
hence to prolong the period that patents applications are kept secret. This practice, however, is no 
longer possible due to changes in the US patent system. 
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1988). Thus, patents may suit this type of exercise. This is not to say that neither 
first-movers always succeed97 nor that patents are always adequate. 
The results of Cohen et al. (2000) could be thought as surprising, since it 
is argued that the benefits from patents accrued to pioneers are only marginal 
(Robinson 1988). Perhaps a firm working in a fast track technology area may 
not consider applying for a patent because at the time a patent is granted the 
innovation is already obsolete. But a head-start over rivals is not demanded 
only in areas of fast technological progress. Being a first-mover is not simply an 
option; first-mover advantage arises endogenously through the combination of 
capabilities and luck (Lieberman & Montgomery 1998,1988), and hence may 
not derive from market structure and the nature of technology. But if patents 
are used as an entry deterrence mechanism first-movers can benefit more from 
them (and trade secrets) than can followers (Robinson 1988). However, a head- 
start may imply that the technology is not completely established (or 
developed). Thus, perhaps only a small share of the output is patented in the 
short-run, though this can change over time. 
The above suggests that evidence on how patents and other mechanisms 
of appropriability interact is still sparse. Although previous empirical studies 
have examined how patents and other appropriation methods interact, their 
own limitations have not allowed them to move the boundaries of our 
knowledge much farther, at least with respect to the extent that these methods 
97 See the model by Hoppe (2000) which describes the second-mover as possibly being the most beneficial 
due to the uncertainty about the profitability of the innovation. 
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substitute for or complement each other. For instance, a few studies (e. g., Sattler 
2002; Cohen et al. 2000; Levin et al. 1987) were not designed for that particular 
purpose; other studies (e. g., Graham 2003) investigated only two mechanisms 
(i. e., patents and secrecy); and others (e. g., Graham & Somaya 2004) looked only 
at one industrial sector (i. e., computer software). Therefore, the interaction 
between patents and other methods of appropriation is another issue this 
research addresses. This work is dissimilar from the previous studies not only 
because different data and analyses are used but also because it encapsulates 
different mechanisms at the same time across a variety of industrial sectors. As 
observed from the above, when these mechanisms were studied together the 
analyses were based on an inappropriate technique, and when the techniques 
were more sophisticated, the analysis was restricted either to a single industry 
or to a single mechanism (in addition to patents). We expect that by overcoming 
some of the limitations of previous studies, we shall make a new contribution. 
2.4.3.2 The Role of Patents in Appropriation 
Arguing that patents are used to stop imitation is perhaps common knowledge. 
Empirical studies 98 have reinforced that view, and have extended our 
knowledge as to why (or not) firms use patents. Those studies have also 
focused on the limitations of patent protection. Mansfield et al. (1981), for 
example, detected that holding a patent does not stop rivals completely from 
entering the market. Patents can be circumvented and, therefore, may not be an 
effective mechanism to protect innovations. 
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Those results for the US appear to confirm the UK findings of Taylor & 
Silberston (1973) which indicate that patents do not provide perfect 
appropriability as many theoretical models of patenting suggest. Singh et al 
(1988) also observed that patents are not a priority when UK firms set up their 
strategies to compete against incumbents and newcomers. Levin et al. (1987) 
detected that on the top of the possibility of a patent being circumvented, it may 
not be so effective when subject to stringent legal requirements for proof that it 
is valid or is being infringed. Moreover, some innovations are difficult to patent. 
The effectiveness of patents as a method of appropriability thus seems to be 
limited, it being difficult also to generalize how effective a patent may be. 
Mansfield (1986) found in his study of 100 US firms from 12 industries, 
that there are inter-industry and inter-firms differences on the perception of 
how useful patents are, and that the incentives patents provide to increase the 
rate of innovation are very small in most industries studied. Despite that the 
author found that the bulk of patentable inventions are patented and firms 
generally prefer to rely on patents than on secrecy. He pointed out some 
reasons why firms have become more interested in patenting. Firstly, because 
there has been an increase in perceived competition. Secondly, because there 
has been a change in firms' product mixes, with more sophisticated product 
lines, which are more likely to be patented. Finally, because technological paths 
involving analytical equipment have reached a stage where it is easier for a 
rival to detect what innovators launch onto the market. 
" Levin et al. (1987), for instance. 
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In addition to the above reasons why firms seek patents, it can be argued 
that when firms take out a patent they purchase an option (albeit on an asset the 
value of which is difficult to estimate but that can be defended in due course if 
necessary) whose cost is not particularly expensive (Geroski 1995). In 
purchasing this option they are able to prevent duplication and to secure 
royalty income (Levin et al. 1987). Yet, there is only modest evidence that 
licensing is extensively used (Arundel & Kabla 1998). Firms may be interested 
in blocking competitors' attempts to patent closely related inventions, and 
patents can give some control over a technology path which enables patent 
holders to settle themselves in a specific market (Cohen et al. 2000). So, the 
greater the degree to which a firm controls the complementary technologies 
needed to commercialise an innovation the greater is the incentive to both 
invest in R&D and apply for patents (Arora et al. 2000). So, patents can be used 
as assets to trade in technology negotiations (Granstrand 1999). 
Moreover, as patents can be used as reasonable indicators of inventive 
performance it might be expected that they are employed and thus applied for 
as part of incentive structures for research workers (Geroski 1995), though 
Duguet & Kabla (2000) found no evidence for this in French manufacturing 
industry. In addition, firms can use patents to enter foreign markets where 
licensing to a domestic firm is required (Bertin & Wyatt 1988). Furthermore, the 
ease with which rivals have information about a firm's development decisions 
may be an incentive for firms to pursue patent protection (Mansfield 1985). 
Liebeskind (1997), for example, found out that the use of protective mechanisms 
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(namely rules, compensation schemes, and structural isolation) to keep matters 
secret is both difficult and costly. Thus, by patenting their inventions firms may 
increase imitation costs because imitators will need to engineer around the 
patented invention as opposed to simply imitate it (though this does not mean 
that imitation is costless). 
Despite the usual disclosure required patents do not seem to be very 
effective in diffusing knowledge. Levin et al. (1987) reported that the use of 
patent disclosures as a method of learning about competitors' innovation was 
one of the least effective methods. The firms reported that they relied more on 
independent R&D and licensing, respectively, to learn about competitor 
technologies, but in the case of product innovations reverse engineering was the 
second best alternative. Hall et al. (1988) observed that most UK small-medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) do not consider patent information relevant for their 
business. As innovation requires other technical expertise, such as knowledge 
about how an equipment operates or how technical information can be used, 
experimentation is always key for firms to acquire knowledge codified in patent 
documents (Grubb 1999; WIPO 1997). The private cost of patenting due to 
knowledge spillovers thus does not seem to be so high. However, one can get 
more than technical information from a firm's patent portfolio. Patent data 
enables one to trace patentees' technological trajectory and their technology 
strength (Ernst 1998a). 
The extent to which patents (and the information therein) are used seems 
to be a result, amongst other things, of country-specific differences in the patent 
121 
environment. Pitkethly (2001), for instance, observed that Japanese firms use 
the practice of monitoring competitors based upon patent information more 
often than UK firms do. And the same applies to US firms as compared to 
Japanese firms (Cohen et al. 2002). The heterogeneity in firms approach to 
appropriability is not restricted to the use of patent information. A broad study 
by Cohen et al. (2002) shows different patterns of use of patents by American 
and Japanese firms. Pitkethly (2001) also found differences between British and 
Japanese firms in dealing with licensing of intellectual property rights, where 
Japanese firms seem to be more prone to take out patents to use in technology 
negotiations. Granstrand (2000) shows how the organisation of IPRs within 
Japanese firms has evolved and argues that western firms lag behind. Bertin & 
Wyatt (1988) also detected different approaches to patenting amongst 
multinationals. Nevertheless, the usefulness of patents as a protective device for 
Swiss firms was found not to be very different as compared to US firms (Harabi 
1995). Although there are similarities between the US and the UK economies we 
cannot say in advance that firms in those economies patent for the same reasons, 
unless we systematically collect evidence to confirm (or not) this view. As our 
current knowledge on why firms patent relies mainly upon US evidence, and 
our existing knowledge why UK manufacturing firms patent is poor, this thesis 
will pursue new evidence on this question. 
Although Granstrand (1999) detected patent strategies adopted by 
multinationals, he did not investigate whether one strategy prevails, or if there 
are cross-country differences in the way those patent strategies are deployed. 
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Cohen et al. (2002) have tackled to some extent that issue and addressed a 
comparison between American and Japanese firms. They have found that 
Japanese firms hardly ever use the fence strategy; they are keener on 
negotiating with other players. American firms tend to use patents in their more 
fundamental aspect: to exclude others; whereas Japanese firms are more 
inclined to use patents for access and freedom of operation in the market. 
Although it has changed99 the Japanese patent system only allowed few claims 
per patent, which may have created an environment where cross-licensing is 
more likely to happen than is excludability-100. 
The ways and the extent that firms use patents are to a certain degree 
influenced by the type of industry in which they operate. Bertin & Wyatt (1988) 
studied the use of patents by multinationals and detected that the existence of 
an intellectual property strategy is sectoral dependent. In fact, there are 
industries where the innovation commercialized in the marketplace consists of 
numerous separately patentable elements ('complex' industries). In other 
industries ('discrete') only relatively few elements comprise the marketed 
innovation (Cohen et al. 2000). Cohen et al. (2002) observed that they differ with 
respect to the purpose patents are applied for. In the case of complex industries 
firms normally hold patents that other firms need, and vice versa. So, firms 
become mutually dependent and try to overcome mutual hold-up by cross- 
licensing and other forms of negotiation and information sharing (e. g., patent 
99 Sakakibara & Branstetter (2001). 
100 See also Granstrand (2000). 
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pooling). In doing so, they are able to secure their freedom to operate. Hall & 
Ziedonis (2001) found that firms in the semiconductors industry pursue a 
strategy of active patenting, which the authors call a 'harvesting strategnv' (a 
combination of flooding and surrounding strategies described earlier). They 
found that, in semiconductors, patents are largely used in negotiations with 
other patent holders, so firms are more inclined to patent to avoid hold-ups 
rather than to enforce exclusivity101. This is closely related to the use of patents 
to avoid litigation initiated by competitors because the length and costs of 
lawsuits depend on the amount of technical information provided by each 
party involved (Somaya 2003; Duguet & Kabla 2000). 
But a vast patent portfolio is not a 'privilege' of firms in complex 
industries. Firms in discrete industries may apply for patents on close 
substitutes to their core invention (Granstrand 1999), though in sectors (e. g., 
pharmaceuticals) where patents are an effective means of protection firms may 
not need to build a fence around their core innovations (Cohen et al. 2000). By 
following this fence strategy firms in discrete industries may end up with a 
large number of patents, and hence overlapping patents (patent thickets) are 
likely to be present in these industries as well, even if to a lesser degree than in 
complex industries. The value of patent thickets, however, seems to be 
dependent on the use that is made of them (Reitzig 2004b). 
101 See also Grindley & Teece (1997). 
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Although earlier studies have shed light on firms' patent strategies, our 
current knowledge is still very thin. We, therefore, take this opportunity to 
explore which patent strategies firms in UK manufacturing rely on. We expect 
the findings to add to the current literature. Moreover, although to date the 
studies have focused on which patent strategies are used, there is no empirical 
evidence as to the extent that these strategies are used. An analysis of firms' 
perceptions of the composition of their patent portfolio with respect to the way 
patents are structured might move the boundaries of our current knowledge 
forward, and hence this is explored in this thesis. 
The empirical literature on patents reviewed above has shown that two 
major concerns have been addressed: first, why firms do patent (or not), and 
second, what do they patent (under the format of scope and complements/ 
substitutes)? Nevertheless, little is known as to other issues concerning the 
practicality of patenting activity, namely i) where to patent? and ii) when to 
patent? 
Generally, firms should file a patent application in countries where they 
have or plan to have a business interest. In theory, what is expected is that 
business strategy identifies either where products will be sold or where 
growing and likely-to-be-profitable markets are located. Knight (1996) argues 
that the effectiveness of patent protection, the legal framework and the 
willingness of firms to spend money on patents should also be considered as 
factors to be taken into account in deciding where to patent. Grupp & Schmoch 
(1999) observed that there are in fact several different strategies companies have 
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pursued in the telecom industry regarding the countries where they file patent 
applications. Guellec & van Pottelsberghe (2000) inferred from their study of 
small high-tech companies that patenting in a large number of countries may 
reflect a lack of maturity of the applicant. They argue that, for many 
technologies, it is enough to combine patenting in the largest markets with 
economies of scale to get worldwide protection. Nevertheless, few attempts 
have been undertaken to understand the rationale behind the decision on where 
UK firms patent. Therefore, this research will fill that gap. 
As suggested by Patel & Pavitt (1995) there is not much known as to 
another issue regarding patent activity, that is, when (in the terms of the 
innovation timeline) firms choose to make patent applications? Our lack of 
awareness on that issue clearly justifies our interest in that aspect of the 
patenting process. Since the regime that governs the vast majority of national 
patent law is the first-to-file regime it seems logical that patent applications are 
filed as early as possible (Griliches 1990). Nevertheless, the belief that patent 
applications are filed at the beginning of the research and development process 
does not support the idea that patents are able to give adequate protection to 
inventions, and hence solve the problem of appropriability. Moreover, early 
applications may incur losses in either how broad or how strong a patent can be 
since additional information is needed to support what is claimed and this may 
weaken the validity of the patent and it becomes more likely to be challenged 
(Knight 1996). Empirically, Pakes (1985) observed a simultaneous relationship 
between the determinants of R&D expenditures and the determinants of 
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patenting. This indicates that after patents are applied for searches for further 
uses and improvements of the patented inventions continue, suggesting that 
patents are applied for at an early stage of the innovation process. However, it 
is fair to say that our current knowledge as to when (along the innovation 
process) firms apply for patents resorts mainly to anecdotal evidence. 
Particularly for pharmaceuticals it is commonly accepted that `patents are 
typically granted years before a product completes its clinical testing and is 
approved for marketing by the regulatory authorities' (Grabowski & Vernon 
2000: 99). As there has not been a systematic investigation into when firms do 
apply for patents this empirical research will be the first attempt to do so, and 
thus will enhance our knowledge on the patenting process. 
We have noticed therefore that although the studies above elucidate 
various patent-related issues, they do not touch on all aspects such as the ways 
firms' own patent portfolios102 are `structured'. What we mean by 'structured` is 
the composition of the portfolio in terms of patent scope and length resulting 
from firms' decisions as to why, what, when, and where to patent. We believe, 
therefore, that this is an opportunity for further research, and it is pursued in 
this thesis. This piece of research advances our knowledge because it shows 
how firms' own patent portfolios are produced. To date, existing empirical 
literature has drawn attention mainly why firms patent. Little is known about 
the patent portfolio building process. Our current knowledge in this area is to a 
102 What is meant by 'own portfolio' is the portfolio of patents resulted from firms' own innovative effort 
rather than in partnership with or traded with other organisations. 
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large extent based upon anecdotal evidence (e. g., Graustrand 1999). There is 
therefore a need for more integrative approaches. 
2.5 A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Although there are many studies on the use of patents it seems that there are 
still gaps in our knowledge, which the above literature review partly reports. It 
is this vacuum that this research will primarily try to fill by answering three 
general questions: 
i) To whom are patents important? 
ü} Do patents complement or substitute for other appropriability 
mechanisms? 
iii) How do firms produce their own patent portfolios? 
In order to carry out this work empirically, these general questions are 
translated into more specific research questions, as follows: 
1. What makes firms perceive patents as more (or less) important to 
protecting the returns from innovation? 
2. How do firms' perceptions of the importance of other 
appropriability mechanisms impact on the decision to patent and 
on the level of patenting? 
3. How do firms act with respect to four basic questions - why to 
patent?, where to patent?, what to patent?, and when to patent? 
The answers to those research questions were pursued on the basis of the 
research methods described in the next section. 
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2.6 METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS: GENERAL REMARKS 
The first step towards answering the research questions is to design the 
procedure that is supposed to provide the answer sought. As Yin (199-1: 19) 
observes, "Every type of empirical research has an implicit, if not explicit, 
research design". In order to outline a research design Punch (1999) argues that 
a pragmatic approach might be useful, that is, to start by focusing on what is 
aimed to be found out in the research without engaging fully with the 
philosophical considerations involved, though he says that a pragmatic choice 
does not dispense with philosophical issues; they are always present, even if 
implicitly. For the sake of space we do not deeply engage in philosophical 
debates but a few remarks are made. 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the way 
knowledge is obtained, or it is about how knowledge is accepted to be valid. 
One of its stances is positivism, which claims to offer a scientific picture of 
social events, seeking causes of social phenomena and leaving no room for 
subjective statements of individuals (Burrell & Morgan 1979). Positivism has 
four chief principles: i) phenomenalism, ii) nominalism, iii) unity of scientific 
method, and iv) value freedom (Buckingham & Saunders 2004). 
Phenomenalism assumes that facts exist prior to research and do not depend on 
it. Nominalism assumes that although theories guide questions, facts stand 
independently of them. The unity of scientific method principle claims that all 
science should accumulate knowledge through direct observation and rigorous 
testing. The value freedom principle assumes that the collection of facts is 
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different from their evaluation, that is, the facts should not allow for ethical 
judgements (ibid. ). 
The weakness of the positivism stance is that there is little space for 
identifying the meaning of social phenomena. Its strength rests with the 
possibility of replication and generalisation of the results (Saunders et al. 1997). 
The present research is based mostly upon the collection of the same 
information from a sample, which permits replication and generalisation of the 
results. It is fair to say that the underlying epistemological stance governing this 
thesis is positivism. 
Every research strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and to 
answer different sorts of questions requires different methods (Punch 1999). 
Maxwell (1998) asserts that the selection of the research method depends not 
only on the research questions, but on the actual research situation and what 
will work most effectively in that situation to give the necessary data. Yin (1994) 
suggests that a research strategy should be selected according to: i) the type of 
research question, ii) the control that an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events, and iii) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
phenomena. We have selected both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
tackle the research questions raised throughout this thesis with particular 
emphasis on the latter. 
The research methods were selected during the research design, which 
consists of an overall plan to guide the research from the collection to the 
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analysis of the data (Punch 1999). The research design is therefore an ordered 
effort to guide the whole research enquiry. Its development took into 
consideration factors such as research questions, weaknesses and strengths of 
research methods, budget and time constraints, and availability of data source. 
After consideration of the circumstances under which this research project 
would be undertaken, decisions were taken as to, when applicable, how data 
would be collected. What is meant by 'when applicable' is that during the 
research design we came across a data set collected by someone else, that could 
be helpful in answering the research questions. These supplementary data were 
gathered by the means of a survey. Our research strategy for data collection 
was also a survey but, in addition, semi-structured interviews were used to 
support it. As will become clear the two surveys differ in scope. 
After identifying gaps in the literature, and deciding how to collect 
information to fill these gaps, data collection itself was initiated. The starting 
point was a series of semi-structured interviews that were expected to provide 
in depth understanding of relevant issues. They were carried out with the 
personnel who head the decision-making processes concerned with patents in 
UK manufacturing firms. We were hoping that this would enlighten us as to 
issues regarding the decision-making process around patents such that it 
becomes possible to understand how and why those decisions are made. For 
such explorations the literature reports a qualitative approach is appropriate 
(Maxwell 1998). Further, as suggested by Henry (1998), such an approach may 
provide an orientation or familiarisation with the topic under study. According 
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to Gillham (2000) interviews are useful to obtain information and 
understanding of issues relevant to the general aims and specific questions of a 
research project. This part of the research was restricted to firms within the 
pharmaceuticals industry, because the literature reports that this industry is the 
one where patents play the most important role, and as such is more likely to 
yield information that could help us to broaden and deepen our knowledge on 
the topic. As a result we would be able to better design our own instrument of 
data collection, and to better interpret factual data gathered from various 
sources. This was then a purposeful sampling, which is a strategy to select 
deliberately particular settings, persons, or events for the important information 
they can provide (Maxwell 1998). Although a purposeful sample such as this 
has limitations, according to Maxwell (1998) it can be suitable depending on the 
research goals and the stage the research is at. 
On the basis of the results of the interviews the research then progressed 
to the second phase, a survey. Survey is a research strategy that allows 
collection of large amounts of data (Fowler 1993), which can be done at a single 
point in time, also known as cross-section, or repeatedly over a time span, also 
known as longitudinal (Moser & Kalton 1993). Surveys are used to discover 
facts about a population and/ or to identify probable causes of behaviour or 
attitudes (Buckingham & Saunders 2004). Overall, the literature reports that 
social surveys employ the following methods of gathering data: i) observations, 
ii) interviews, and iii) correspondence; all of which present advantages and 
disadvantages (Aldridge & Levine 2001). Observations may be adequate if the 
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researcher can directly observe a phenomenon. If the researcher cannot observe 
the phenomenon being studied an alternative is the interview (either face-to- 
face or by telephone). But in general interviews are very time consuming and 
expensive. Alternatively, postal services can be used, through which the 
researcher can establish a flow of communication with respondents. The recent 
IT revolution has opened up other possibilities for the distribution and return of 
questionnaires, such as the use of floppy disks, emails, and webpages, though 
little is known about their effectiveness (Salant & Dillman 1994). 
Typical disadvantages of mail surveys are that i) it is the method which 
produces the lowest response rate of the survey methods, ii) there is no 
opportunity for clarification of questions, iii) encouragement of respondents is 
very limited, iv) anyone can answer the questionnaire, even if addressed to the 
most appropriate informant, and v) the accuracy of the information can be 
influenced because respondents can see all the questions before answering them 
(Moser & Kalton 1993). 
The main advantage of employing mail surveys, as compared to other 
surveys and research methods, is that it is the cheapest way to gather 
information if the sample is widely dispersed geographically. Although 
telephone surveys can also be a cheap alternative, it is only applicable to 
situations when the informant can be contacted. This however can be 
particularly unattractive for the researcher because answers are more likely to 
be formulated based upon the assumption of what the interviewer wants to 
hear. Furthermore, interviewer voice inflection can influence the response, and 
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respondents are more sensitive to leading questions than are respondents to 
mail surveys. 
An assessment of the various factors pointed out in the literature led to 
the conclusion that a postal survey should be selected as the leading research 
technique to collect specific information on patent-related issues ('patent 
survey'). The target population was all manufacturing firms listed in the 
Department of Trade and Industry R&D Scoreboard. The choice of sample frame 
was made to be in line with the objectives previously mentioned. Although a 
list of firms that apply for patents could perhaps be obtained from the UKPO, 
this would lead to other difficulties such as the lack of information of firms' 
other attributes (e. g., number of employees). Thus, we used the database above 
(R&D Scoreboard) from which a list of firms could be obtained with additional 
and relevant information (e. g., R&D expenses, size). We suspect that a sample 
derived from that database would suffice for the purposes of this study because 
the literature reports firms that spend on R&D are more likely to apply for 
patents than are non-R&D spenders, and hence would be able to provide the 
information of interest for this research. The questionnaire employed was to 
some extent built upon previous questionnaires elaborated by Pitkethly (2001), 
Cohen et al. (2000), Granstrand (1999), Levin et al. (1987) and Taylor & 
Silberston (1973). More detail about this survey is provided in chapter 6. 
While awaiting the responses from the above survey data gathered by 
the UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) were analysed. The Community 
Innovation Survey was conducted by the Office for National Statistics on behalf 
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of the Department of Industry and Trade (DTI). The third round of this surrey 
was held in 2001, and the dataset was kindly provided by the DTI for the 
purposes of this research. The CIS comprises firm-level information for the 
1998-2000 period. Our primary concern was with section 15 of the survey- which 
explores the methods of protecting innovations, though responses from other 
questions were also used in our analysis, as will be clear in the following 
chapters. A more detailed description of the CIS is found in the Appendix 1. 
The difference between the CIS and the survey designed by the researcher is the 
level and detail of information on patents. The CIS was concerned with general 
innovation-related issues whereas the patent survey addressed more specific 
questions not present in the CIS, or when present, phrased in a different way. 
These three data collection procedures form the bulk of evidence from 
which our analyses derive. The chapters that follow detail the findings and 
provide more information both on the way the data were analysed and the 
research methods used. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUILDING PATENT PORTFOLIOS: 
rQl 
EVIDENCE FROM SIX 
I 
PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry is perhaps the industry where patents are most 
valued as a protective device. Although there is evidence that the use of patents 
may vary across industries, an insight into how pharmaceutical firms make 
their decisions as to i) why, ii) when, iii) what, and iv) where to patent may thus 
provide some anecdotal insight. 
The exploratory character of this phase of the research demanded an 
appropriate research method that is described in the next section along with the 
profile of the sample investigated. The findings are described in the section 3 
with some comments on pharmaceutical firms' attitudes towards patenting. 
The final section of the chapter draws tentative conclusions from the analysis of 
a limited sample. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
As our objective is to understand how firms deal with the patenting process, in 
particular how decisions are made during that process, we have selected a 
qualitative method, which has the capability to illustrate processes taking place; 
processes that experimental and survey research are often poor at identifying 
(Maxwell 1998). Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were the data collection 
tools used. They employ a commonality of both themes to be covered and 
questions to be asked, while, at the same time, providing a flexibility that 
allows follow-onto answers when considered useful (Kvale 1996). This 
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technique is also suggested by Gillham (2000) in cases when the research 
questions require an elaborated in-depth response. 
In line with the nature of this type of interview, a series of questions vas 
formulated as a loose guide for reference during the face-to-face meetings (see 
interview guide in Appendix 2). We also made use of prompts and probes to 
help the interviewees to provide the information that we were seeking. This is a 
technique commonly reported in the literature (e. g., Kvale 1996; Foddy 1993) as 
being helpful to keep focus during the interview. It enables interviewers to have 
some control over the situation and to steer the direction of the conversation, 
even if loosely, and thus to cover the required topics. The ultimate objective was 
to make the interview process to some extent open but not too vague, keeping 
the flexibility desired without missing the information that was being sought. 
The face-to-face interviews were all undertaken with companies in the 
UK pharmaceutical industry. Although we were aware that there may well be 
inter-industry differences with respect to patenting activity, we focused on the 
pharmaceutical industry primarily because the literature103 reports that this 
industry is the one where patents are pivotal, at least on the basis of protection 
from copying. As such we judged that it would be more likely to yield the 
information we were looking for relating in particular to, what firms patent, 
why they seek patent protection, when they apply for patents and where they 
are more likely to register their patent applications. Although these questions 
103 See for example Levin et al. (1987); Mansfield (1986). 
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apply to all industries, the familiarity of pharmaceutical firms with patent 
issues is expected to make them more pronounced in that industry than in other 
industries. 
In order to check the suitability of the interview guide and the way the 
questions were organised a pilot interview was undertaken with the head of 
intellectual property of a pharmaceutical company originally from another 
country (Denmark). As Gillham (2000) observes, there is a lot more to 
interviewing than asking questions. In that sense, a pilot test was useful in 
providing a first insight into the interviewing process and to help in detecting 
how to make interviews work. Moreover, it provided us with an understanding 
of the meaning that particular phenomena and events had for the actors 
involved. 
A requirement for the validity of a research design is that the sample 
must fit in with other components of the study. So, we followed the 
recommendations of Miles 8t Huberman (1994) regarding a qualitative 
sampling plan. We tried to select our sample as falling into the purposeful 
sampling category since it could help us to capture to a certain degree a 
potential heterogeneity among firms in pharmaceuticals (Maxwell 1998). The 
main criteria for selecting the companies would be their size and their 
technology - attributes that might impact on the way firms seek patent 
protection. Nevertheless, as observed by Gillham (2000) in real world research 
you have to use the methods that are possible. Insofar as access to the 
interviewees was restricted we ended up with a sample conditioned more by 
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convenience than design. Despite that the final sample (Table 1) seems to have 
the heterogeneity that was being sought. 
Table 1- Interviewed Firms Profile 
Firm 
Company A 
Company B 
Company C 
Company D 
Company E 
Company F 
# Employeesa 
3,000 - 3,500 
100 -150 
50 -100 
100,000+ 
50,000+ 
1,000 -1,500 
# Internal PAb 
03 
Nil 
Nil 
104 
45 
06 
# Patents Sales- (£M) 
600 360 
09 7.8 
75 1.00 
15,000 17,200 
10,000 11,400 
NA 498 
R&Da (EM) 
57 
3.0 
8.6 
2,600 
1,900 
106 
Source: annual reports. 
b Patent attorneys. 
To generate the sample detailed above we firstly consulted the 
Department of Trade and Industry R&D Scoreboard, for a list of UK 
pharmaceutical firms undertaking R&D (a total of 54 firms). We randomly 
selected half of them and obtained correspondence addresses either from the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) or over the internet. 
The names of the individuals who should hold the information we were 
looking for were obtained either on the internet or by telephone calls to the 
companies. These were then approached by means of a formal letter explaining 
the purposes of the research, requesting assistance, and assuring confidentiality 
in that no source of material would be explicitly named in the research output. 
We dealt with that stage formally since the process of setting up an interview 
could indicate to the interviewee how we valued the contribution the 
interviewees would make (Kvale 1996). We received ten replies of which six, 
reflecting the heterogeneity we were seeking, acceded to our request. This 
sample was deemed to be consistent with the aims and objectives of the study 
and also manageable within the binding time constraints. 
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Prior to any meeting a checklist of topics that would be addressed 
forwarded to the interviewees. On average the interviews lasted 70 minutes 
each and whenever possible they were tape recorded. The day after each 
interview, a letter was sent to the interviewee expressing our gratitude for their 
willingness to help with the research and for being able to set aside a period of 
time to be interviewed. The recorded interviews were later transcribed. Content 
analysis was carried out to identify substantive statements made by the 
interviewees and to group the information in the categories of interest (i. e., why°, 
what, when, and where), for which the interview guide was quite helpful. 
3.3 BUILDING PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
In this section we review the findings from the semi-structured interviews by 
looking first at why pharmaceutical firms take out patents and their opinions as 
to the effectiveness of the patent system; secondly, we report on what firms 
tend to patent and why; thirdly, we address the timing of patent applications; 
and finally we analyse where the interviewed firms apply for patents and the 
determinants of this decision. 
3.3.1 REASONS FOR PATENTING AND THRESHOLD OF PROTECTION 
Many reasons were given for seeking patent protection often confirming what 
can already be found in the literature (e. g., Bosworth 2005). The primary reason 
given by the interviewees was the fundamental rationale behind a patent 
system: to stop others from copying their inventions (for a limited period). The 
long development time (including clinical trials and regulatory review) and 
high development costs of a new product in the pharmaceutical industry 
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reinforced the relevance of such protection. In addition, protection was said to 
be important in pharmaceuticals because such inventions once disclosed are 
simple to copy. Moreover, we were told that firms are able to easily detect 
whether another drug infringes the scope of their patents. These properties 
make patents a useful protective mechanism in this industry. 
Patents, by granting exclusivity, help firms to earn premium prices 
enabling them to more effectively cover the costs of their research (including 
costs relating to products that do not reach the market). That this is so in the 
pharmaceutical industry is completely consistent with previous studies (e. g., 
Levin et al. 1987; Taylor & Silberston 1973). In addition other reasons were 
given, which we list below. 
(i) As an entry deterrent. Firms, especially larger firms, reported that they 
take out and even hold portfolios of patents in order to undermine the 
technological development of competitors, delaying, or sometimes 
even blocking, access to a market niche. Although smaller firms we 
interviewed also signalled this possibility and interest, they stated that 
they had insufficient funds to enable them to maintain `sleeping' 
patents in force on a regular basis. They have to be more selective when 
they pay renewal fees. The effectiveness of this approach, however, 
was said to be variable because rivals may generate knowledge outside 
the domain of a patented invention. But this approach was said to be, 
on average, more efficient than relying on just one patent, although it is 
difficult to generalise. 
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(ii) To enhance appropriability conditions. Despite the role of patents as 
entry deterrents we were often told that generally a combination of 
things is required to enhance firms' appropriation. It was said that 
firms cannot rely solely on patents and expect that their success will be 
guaranteed. Overall, in order to reap the benefits from R&D they have 
to use a broad spectrum of elements that both underpin their sales and 
avoid other firms to step into their market niches. Although they were 
not asked to pin point which elements they were talking about sales 
force, secrecy, and brand (trademarks) were frequently mentioned by 
the interviewees. 
(iii) To secure royalty income. The possibility of out-licensing a technology 
was definitely taken into consideration by the interviewed firms104, 
regardless of their size. Thus, the interviewees felt that they need to 
have their technology patented in order to out-license it. But, at least on 
the basis of the emphasis given to this issue by smaller firms as 
compared to larger ones, it seems that out-licensing may be more 
important to the former than to the latter. This might be a result of their 
lack of global production and distribution networks. As such their 
existence might depend more heavily upon their ability to convince 
other companies to in-license their technology. Not least, smaller 
companies may have more problems in covering the costs of clinical 
104 Although we have not identified the conditions under which technology would be out-licensed rather 
than exploited internally by the firm. 
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trials, regulatory review and product launch and as such mar need to 
collaborate more often with larger companies. We were informed that 
if inventions are not well protected by patents it is less likely that larger 
pharmaceutical companies will in-license them. Although agreements 
might be made if a patent is still pending, smaller companies reported 
they tend not to even seek agreements for non-patented inventions. 
Their limited bargaining power in the absence of patent protection as 
well as their lack of control of complementary assets were said to put 
them at a disadvantage in negotiations with larger corporations. If they 
have an invention that is neither patented nor has a patent pending, 
they tend not to approach other companies; behaviour reinforced by 
the problems of maintaining non-disclosure agreements. Larger 
companies, who tend to operate world-wide, will on occasion consider 
out-licensing a technology (e. g., to access a particular market) but we 
were told that even to them, patent protection is a paramount 
requirement if they want to secure royalty income. 
(iv) To use in technology negotiations. Patents, we were told, are used as 
assets during cross-licensing negotiations. Although cross-licensing 
was not reported to be key to guarantee freedom to operate for the 
interviewed firms, as it is, for example, in semi-conductors (Hall & 
Ziedonis 2001; Grindley & Teece 1997), it is an option that should be 
kept open, the interviewees said. Our interpretation of the interviewees 
opinions is basically that patents prove valuable in trading for 
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technologies controlled by others, and thus even if an invention is not 
of local use, it may be patented in order to be used in acquiring more 
useful technology elsewhere. On a few occasions, firms said that they 
engaged in patent pools with other firms. 
(v) To influence investors perceptions. By the time of the interviews, all 
sample firms, but one, were publicly traded in the stock market. Two of 
them, the smallest ones, indicated that they use patents to give 
confidence to investors and in turn to facilitate the financing of 
innovative activities. As further evidence of this, one of the companies 
in the sample devoted to patent issues almost one third of the content 
of its prospectus for admission to the official list of the London Stock 
Exchange. In addition, the prospect of holding a patent may, at least to 
smaller firms, go beyond funding opportunities because, according to 
the interviews, financiers may also offer information, advice, and 
credibility to the investment. 
(vi) To signal to others. Following similar lines firms said that in holding 
patents they signal not only to investors but also to other institutional 
bodies (e. g, competitors, universities, and so on) who they are and 
where they may go technologically. The disclosure of their 
technological competence, although not necessarily in their own 
interest, may sometimes help in opening windows of opportunities 
(e. g., licensing, mergers, and acquisitions) of which they are not fully 
aware. But signalling is not associated only with business opportunities. 
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It can impact, in at least two ways, on other firms' behaviour. For 
example, a patented technology may divert other firms R&D direction 
because in following the same technological path as the already- 
patented technology there are risks that resources will be wasted if a 
newer technology is not outside of the scope of previous patents. Even 
if a patent is granted for the newer invention there is also the risk of 
patent infringement. And in this case, incumbent firms' patent 
portfolio may signal the likely costs of an infringement. 
To incentivise researchers. We were unable to judge whether patents 
were effective in this but the companies in the sample considered 
patents to be at least partly useful as an incentive mechanism. None of 
the companies, however, reported that patents have a direct 
relationship with researchers' salaries; behaviour that seems to differ 
from that found in Japanese companies (Granstrand 2000). For obvious 
reasons we could not identify whether this is a sectoral difference or a 
cultural one. According to the interviewees, in the sample firms, 
patents are only one item amongst many used to measure the 
performance of human resources (others might include for example 
publications in academic journals). As there might be areas where it is 
easier to patent than others it was argued that it may be unfair to use 
crude number of patents as a performance indicator. In fact, there may 
be areas where the output of inventive activities will not be patentable 
at all. 
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In addition to asking why firms patent we also questioned firms' attitudes to 
the effectiveness of the patent system. The interviewees, in general, could not 
envisage that pharmaceutical firms would continue to invest so heavily- in R&D 
if patent protection did not exist. According to the interviews, it seems that the 
basic premise of the pharmaceutical industry is that in order to get a reasonable 
return from the investment in R&D a monopoly provided by patents is essential. 
Nevertheless, although they agreed that the patent system in general is very 
important105, the effectiveness of individual patents in protecting property 
rights was confirmed to be variable. 
Patent effectiveness depends upon the extent to which the property 
rights can be protected by the courts. According to the interviewees, any 
difficulty in defending a patent in court comes down to: (i) weakness in the 
patent itself perhaps resulting from limited declared information substantiating 
its scope, making it liable to be challenged by competitors and/ or; (ii) the legal 
frameworks in some countries which restrict the extent to which a patent can be 
enforced. Although the respondents agreed that the litigation process itself is 
uncertain 106, they complained that the usefulness of patents is somewhat 
limited in environments where little can be done to overcome infringement. 
Thereby, the legal system governing the markets in which firms operate 
considerably affects the effectiveness of patents to those firms. 
105 The firms also stressed that sometimes patents take too long to be issued which increases the 
uncertainty of the returns to a particular product. 
101 One of the interviewees even emphasised that patents are tickets to court. 
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As regards the importance of the subject matter in determining 
effectiveness, the interviewees reported that due to specificity the core product 
(drugs) of the pharmaceutical industry is relatively easy to protect from 
copying. A firm can stop others from copying because copies in 
pharmaceuticals are easy to detect due to technology and market structure. 
However, inventors may only be able to block competitors in terms of specific 
products rather than broad areas of technology in that there might be different 
ways of doing the same thing, or closely related products ('relatives' as one of 
the interviewees said) may not be covered by the patent. Often it seems that 
patents can make things more difficult for, but cannot completely stop, the 
competition. 
It was also indicated to us that there is a cost to obtaining and 
maintaining patents as well as tackling infringements. In fact we were told that 
there are cases where infringements may be ignored by patent holders, a 
particular reason for which (especially for smaller firms) was the relative cost of 
patent litigation as compared the benefits the enforcement of the patent would 
bring. This depends to a large extent on the strength of a patent (a mixture of 
scope, and ease to defend in court) and on how close a patent is to the end of its 
life. In addition, the costs of taking out and maintaining patents were said to be 
easily overshadowed by the costs of patent litigation. One of the firms, for 
example, realised that it would be better off spending money in other activities 
that could strengthen its competitive position (e. g. R&D, marketing) rather than 
having equal expenses on patent litigation. 
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Also, our reporting firms indicated that they tend to keep things secret 
(either using trade secrets or pure secrecy) regardless of their decision as to the 
patentability of the invention. But secrecy was said to be more prominent when 
it is difficult to police the invention (such as new processes or equipment). One 
of the interviewees also described that there might be situations where know- 
how is outdated quickly and in such cases it might not be worth seeking patent 
protection. It seems, therefore, that a combination of patents with other 
mechanisms is the way firms enhance the degree of appropriability over their 
innovations. 
It was also emphasised that as most pharmaceutical companies operate 
world-wide, they hold very large numbers of patents (up to as many as one per 
product per market), and in such circumstances it is only by managing the 
whole portfolio that they will generate the full benefit of patents and limit, but 
not necessarily stop, the operations of (potential) competitors. 
3.3.2 WHAT IS PATENTED? 
The interviewees said that their practice is largely to patent new products107. A 
product, however, can take various forms. For instance, it can be a chemical 
entity, which in general is the active ingredient responsible for fighting against 
a disease (some of these compounds are not active themselves but are 
metabolised in the body to form an active drug, they are known as prodrugs); it 
107 Although product patents are the dominant type the firms also consider process patents and new use 
patents. The former refers to inventions which describe new ways of manufacturing a product. The 
latter is a patent related to a substance or a composition which did not have pharmaceutical use 
previously, or if it had a pharmaceutical use before, it was for different purposes. 
149 
can be a composition (a combination of two or more active ingredients, or 
combination of a pharmaceutical carrier with a compound not used as a drug 
before), or a drug delivery system (which is a composition that its constituents 
enable to be administered in a particular way), and so on. Therefore, even if a 
product patent is the objective, its content may vary from one company to 
another because the companies operate in different technology fields, have 
different technical capabilities, and different business interests. 
Firms' interests largely lie in product patents because they tend to be the 
most difficult to invent around, according to the interviews. For example, the 
ways to manufacture a product may be easier to invent around than the 
product itself. If competitors develop new processes to manufacture a patented 
product they will only be able (in the absence of a licence) to market the process 
itself and not the product. To develop and to market a new competing product 
other firms will need more resources (financial and time) than simply copying 
an invention. A product patent will, therefore, delay competition and help in 
appropriating the returns from invention. 
It seems that when 'the product' is a pharmacologically active ingredient 
the excludability achieved is greater because the patent protects the product 
however it is made or formulated. The firms stated that if a particular 
formulation, or a particular process, is patented then others may more easily 
invent around as compared to inventing around the active ingredient's patent. 
It was also pointed out to us that the difficulty and resultant high costs 
associated with the development of new drugs have been increasing the 
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importance of patents relating to drug delivery systems since such inventions 
may provide more effective ways for an existing drug to be released into the 
body. 
Based on what was reported by the sample studied, it appears that to 
enhance excludability, firms also attempt to patent not only the technology that 
leads to the commercialised product but also complementary technologies that 
may improve a product's performance or its differentiability. In line with the 
argument of Arora et al. (2000) it seems that the control of complementary 
technologies is a major incentive to firms to invest in R&D. Our firms said that 
they are keen on patenting a broad range of inventions encompassing almost 
anything surrounding a particular product, even if the invention is not within 
their core business (e. g., machines). However, smaller firms seemed to be more 
selective because of financial constraints. 
Another issue we addressed was the extent to which the scope of a 
patent helps firms to recoup their investments in R&D. In general, it was 
indicated that firms seek protection not only for the marketed product itself, but 
also for as many embodiments of the invention as possible. By securing 
property rights on the variations of the invention firms are more likely to reach 
a higher degree of excludability, keeping competitors away not only from the 
inventor's products but also from very closely related knowledge that may 
enable competitors to launch a competing alternative in the marketplace. This 
should facilitate a higher return to R&D. Notwithstanding these arguments, 
narrow patents are not necessarily to be ignored. On average, they may be of 
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lesser value, and that is why firms seek broader protection, but narrow patents 
might be applied for more quickly than and as such provide earlier but less 
extensive protection, which in some cases may prove to be more valuable. 
According to the interviewees, if a firm comes up with a breakthrough 
invention that possibly will serve as a platform technology for others, the 
benefits of patents are particularly high. As a result companies will attempt to 
patent not just their own products but the whole field around these products 
('blanketing' or 'flooding'). As observed by Granstrand (1999), such an event is 
most likely when there is an emerging technology which is not close to the prior 
art. One of the interviewees said that the blocking of a technology field and the 
'flooding'/ 'blanketing' phenomena are more likely to happen amongst biotech 
firms. 
3.3.3 WHEN TO PATENT? THE TIMING OF FILING PATENT APPLICATIONS 
Figure 1 details a typical route to drug discovery. Briefly, research and 
development activities may last several years before a product is first launched 
on the market (perhaps an average of 12 years). The initial phase starts with the 
identification of targets - the points at which therapeutic agents should 
intervene in order to fight a disease. Using a high throughput screening search 
thousands of compounds are tested, and hopefully some compounds (lead 
compounds) will be able to act on those targets. After the identification of those 
active compounds, a series of experiments takes place aimed at changing the 
structure of those compounds in order to optimise their activity (lead 
optimisation). If that is successful, a candidate drug will go to the longest and 
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most expensive stage: development. We are interested in where in this process 
patenting is likely to occur. 
1 
Figure 1- Simplified Model of a Route of Drug Discovery 
Research Stage 
" Target identification 
" Screening 
" Lead identification 
" Lead optimisation 
Development Stage 
" Scale up 
Drug Candidate -< 11 Synthesis 
" Pharmaco kinetics 
" Clinical trials 
A typical response from the interviewees was that firms tend to start to 
apply for patents as soon as they have a promising compound (italics in Figure 
1 above). This means that patent applications start to be filed just after the 
screening phase, (i. e., during lead identification and lead optimisation). At that 
point, according to the interviews, about 10 - 20% of the total resources 
necessary to bring a product to the market have been committed. This 
corroborates the view that patents are applied for at an early stage of the 
research and development process108 (e. g., Grabowski & Vernon 2000). 
But filing a patent application early means that firms may not have a 
clear picture of whether or not the final product, the one to be launched onto 
the market, will be exactly the same as that first identified. On many occasions 
they do not know even whether the product will be launched because it will not 
have yet passed through clinical trials. Furthermore, respondents emphasised 
that R&D is an ongoing process and there are always new results coming out, 
108 It is worth noting that in most other industries the development time of a new product is much shorter 
than in pharmaceuticals and so patenting may not take place at such an early stage. 
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which will also be analysed as to their patentability. Thus, even after a patent 
application is first filed, there might appear new results that are also likely to be 
patented. Depending on when new results appear they may or may not be 
incorporated in the first patent application. Firms pointed out that they make 
use of internal priority whenever possible. That is, they file a first patent 
application, but within 12 months from the priority date they may file a new 
application claiming priority over the first one. That occurs if the new outcomes 
of R&D are deemed to be important enough to be specified in a patent 
application since those outcomes will enable the applicant to better substantiate 
what is claimed. As a result, a stronger patent109 is more likely to be achieved. 
They also said that depending on the new results they may decide to 
apply for other patents within the priority year instead of claiming priority over 
the first application. That is a judgement based on whether or not the new 
results will be able to originate a new patent application that does not infringe 
the first one; and also whether or not it is likely that someone else will file an 
earlier patent application. When the new output is going to provide only small 
differences from the first filing and the following filings and/ or when the 
perceived competition is very high, it is more likely that firms will use internal 
priority. The continuous character of R&D implies that the boundaries of the 
invention are likely to be expanded after a first patent application is filed. If 
new knowledge is also patented, variations (embodiments) of this knowledge 
can also be protected and perhaps a higher excludability might be achieved. 
109 A patent that can be stood in court if it is challenged by someone else. 
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Nevertheless, not all results from further experimentation appear within 
12 months of a filing and, therefore, priority over the first patent application 
cannot necessarily be claimed. The alternative is to file a new patent application. 
As the new filing embraces other variations of the invention one could expect 
that it would be deemed to be obvious (no inventive step) by the patent 
examiner and, therefore, a patent would not be issued on that. It was pointed 
out to us that if those new results come out before the priority filing is 
published (at most within 18 months from priority date) the risks of that filing 
being opposed as to its inventive step are low (not taking into account what 
someone else is doing). That happens because the former application has not 
yet been published and therefore the latter does not have to be inventive over 
something that was not in the public domain. Using one of the respondents' 
words: 
'(... ) if you file a lot of applications on similar things then you 
should do it before publication [of the first filing]. (... ) once it 
[the first filing] is published if you then file them [follow up 
applications], they have to be new and inventive'. 
Firms also said that, although it is not common, they can file more than 
one patent application at the same time embracing different scopes. According 
to the respondents this is more likely to happen when the pressure to patent 
earlier is very high and the information available on the invention is still very 
limited. So, one can file both narrow and broad patent applications at the same 
time. Narrow filings rely upon the results obtained up to the time of filing 
whereas broad filings rely upon inventors' expertise as to the extent that an 
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invention can be broadened in the near future and thus have a more speculative 
character. If future results come out and are able to support the broader 
application then one can drop the narrow application and progress the broader 
one. Likewise, if the results are not enough to support the broader application 
this can be dropped and the narrower one progressed. 
According to the interviews, it seems that the degree of excludability 
achieved by using patents depends on the extent that several parts of the 
invention are also patented. Although the nucleus of the invention is the 
therapeutic agent, if there are various ways to formulate the product, more 
effective forms of releasing the active ingredient in the organism, or even other 
uses for the product and these variations are also in a company's patent 
portfolio, that company has more freedom to operate and more power to block 
others trying to launch a competing product. For this reason non-product 
patents (e. g., process and new use patents) may appear, if they do so, later in 
the drug discovery process (or perhaps even after a product is launched on the 
market). 
Given that patents have a fixed life, the timing of patent applications 
may considerably affect the time that a product will be protected on the market. 
If a larger part of the fixed patent term is devoted to further research and 
development then the period in which protected revenues can be earned will be 
shorter. This would encourage later rather than earlier application. In order to 
partially overcome this problem and extend the period of protection, the 
interviewees said that they may apply for a Supplemental Protection 
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Certificate11° (SPC). However, that certificate is limited in scope since it only 
covers the particular marketed product for which regulatory approval had been 
obtained. 
Follow-up patent applications have a higher risk of being objected to by 
the patent examiner as to either the novelty or the non-obviousness requirement, 
and of not being granted because others have filed patent applications in 
between. However, according to the respondents, later patents derived from 
follow-up applications may 'extend' the term of protection of the first patent, 
especially if the applications were made within 18 months of the priority date. 
As mentioned earlier, such patent applications do not have to be inventive over 
an application that has not yet been published. As the subsequent applications 
are supposed to be an 'improved version' of the first filing, they will partially 
incorporate the subject matter of the first filing plus something new that will 
enable the patentee to get property rights. Therefore, when a product is 
launched it is likely that it will also have incorporated these improvements. 
Thus, when a patent based on the first filing expires the follow-up patents will 
be still in force. The company, therefore, can achieve a slightly `longer' patent 
life (up to 18 months) yielding greater financial returns. 
In the meantime if a competitor comes up with an invention based upon 
the first filing it is likely to infringe any of the follow-up patents. But even if the 
1 10 This is a certificate issued by members of the European Economic Area (i. e. EU plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway), which extends for up to five years the term of protection over an invention 
which has to undergo an administrative authorisation procedure required by law before it is put on the 
market. 
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competing innovation does not infringe the follow-up patents, the impact on 
the leader's sales may not be significant if the latter has property rights over 
variants of the innovation, which is more likely to happen if follow-up 
applications are also filed. However, this depends on the scope of the original 
patent, which can be broad enough to incorporate several nuances of the 
invention, and for which follow-ups may not be applied for. 
3.3.4 WHERE TO PATENT? 
Regardless of size, all the sample firms had international visions. No sample 
company applies for patents only to the UK Patent Office, though for some 
inventions this happens when the firm wants a speedy granting for some 
particular reason. Even smaller companies, which are more likely to face 
resource constraints, view patents in an international context. Although such 
firms have operational bases restricted to the UK, they aim to out-license their 
technology to larger pharmaceutical companies implying that the resulting 
products will ultimately be marketed world-wide and, therefore, patent 
protection is necessary in most of the main international markets. 
There was a common response among the sample firms studied as to 
where patents should be secured. All six companies agreed that the US, Europe 
(Western) and Japan are the major territories where they should seek patent 
protection. The chief reason pointed out by the informants was that these 
countries are the largest markets for pharmaceuticals. The interest in these 
markets does not mean that the firms studied do not apply for patents in other 
territories. According to the interviewees, depending on the perceived impact 
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of the invention on their businesses, they can go beyond these major markets. In 
general, what they reported was that they have a pre-determined list of 
countries where patent applications are likely to be filed. 
Another factor affecting the choice of the country where patent 
protection is sought is the extent that firms can enforce their property rights. 
Again, US, Western Europe and japan are cited as examples of places where 
legal frameworks are consistent and have the appropriate expertise in case of 
litigation. Moreover, according to the interviewees, patent office personnel in 
these territories are more skilful in dealing with patent issues and with 
operational procedures. 
When firms decide that a patent application will be filed it also has to 
decide whether or not the invention will be filed locally first before it is filed in 
other countries. We were told that the patent applications of a UK company, for 
example, will not always be filed first in the UK. Some of the firms have R&D 
units abroad and they need to follow local rules, that demand inventions 
created in their territories to be filed first there before anywhere else. 
Regarding the decision to patent abroad the favourite route according to 
the respondents is through the Patent Co-operation Treaty; though attention 
was also drawn to the European Patent Office (EPO) and to the Paris 
Convention. When firms choose to go straight to other countries' patent offices, 
as opposed to the PCT, firms reported that they need to pay attention to 
whether or not the country is a signatory of the Paris Convention. If so, they 
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tend to use perhaps the most practical aspect of the Paris Convention which is 
the possibility of claiming priority for applications made in another territory 
within 12 months from priority date111. If the country is not a 'Convention 
country', the firms aim to make sure that the invention will not be publicly 
disclosed after the first filing and are more likely to rush to file in that country 
in order to avoid forfeiting property rights (in particular because someone else 
may have filed between the date they first filed and the date they filed in a 
country that is not a signatory of the Paris Convention). 
If the interest is just in the European market firms are more likely to use 
the European Patent Office (EPO) route. However, if the markets targeted do 
not justify the costs of this route (economies of scale may not apply), they may 
go straight to the respective patent offices. The PCT route is considered when 
there are markets of interest which are not covered by the EPO, and most of the 
time that is the usual route that firms follow. As costs increase the greater the 
number of countries a firm applies to, the PCT may be of great advantage since 
it might be cheaper than filing in each of the target countries (as with the EPO 
route it all depends on the number of countries designated). Thus, matching 
what theory says (e. g., WIPO 1997), the main advantages of the PCT were 
considered to be: firms can delay the bulk of the costs which arise when the 
application goes to the national phase; firms can have a better idea of the 
invention before they incur these costs; and firms have both a search and a 
The date upon which either a patent application is filed (in first-to-file regimes) or an invention is 
conceived (in first-to-invent regimes). 
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preliminary examination report that gives a fair idea of the patentability of the 
invention before the costs of the national phase, which may reduce uncertainty- 
relating to the level of protection. 
The timeline of patent filings seems also to be influenced by where firms 
apply for a patent since the excludability sought may be drastically affected. In 
deciding where to register their patents, the proprietary position sought may be 
important. To patent everywhere may seem the best way to get a broader 
proprietary position. However, as not all patents are of high commercial 
importance the costs of the patenting process may not justify the benefits of the 
protection achieved, and a difficult balance needs to be struck between costs 
and coverage. Thus, it seems that the choice of where to secure property rights 
is to a large extent dependent on the size of the market, the legal framework, 
the perceived importance of the invention for the business, and, the costs 
associated with that. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have explored why, for what, where and when UK 
pharmaceutical firms take out patents. The results arise from a series of 
interviews with appropriate personnel in six various sized firms, and although 
it might be difficult to generalise we have no reason to believe that the views 
expressed are not typical of the pharmaceutical industry, though they may not 
be typical of all manufacturing industry. 
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These interviews revealed that although the main purpose of patents is 
to limit copying (and the effectiveness of patents in this appears to be 
determined largely by the enforcement climate and the ability of others to 
'invent around' a discovery), there are, as expected, a number of additional 
reasons for firms to apply for patents. Although our results match the evidence 
of earlier studies, we found supplementary information that patents may attract 
not only venture capital but also intellectual capital in the form of financiers' 
expertise, at least with respect to smaller firms. 
The interviews have also shown that it is mainly by managing a whole 
portfolio of patents that firms will generate the full benefits of patents and limit 
the operations of (potential) competitors. The simplistic view that holding a 
single patent will generate adequate excludability does not fit the facts 
(although a strategic patent may be rather effective). The portfolio approach is 
beneficial to the inventor because it enables him/her to secure property rights 
on several variants of an invention (making inventing around more difficult) as 
well as on complementary technologies that may improve a product's 
performance or its differentiability. 
Our findings suggest that patent applications across borders are mainly 
determined by economic issues. Although the protection achieved is largely 
determined by the legal framework, the timing of application seems to be quite 
important in determining the scope of the final patent grant and its 'relatives' (if 
any). The ongoing character of the R&D process as well as uncertainty due to 
162 
competition require patent applicants to make decisions on filing patents based 
upon actual results and future contingencies. 
Some final reflections seem to be in order. Firstly, the portfolio approach 
observed by studying a few pharmaceutical firms indicates their concern with 
substitute and complementary innovations. Thus, it seems rather difficult, at 
least in pharmaceuticals, to obtain a strategic patent. It is not unsurprising that 
the market perceives high patent numbers as representing the difficulty of 
appropriating the benefits of R&D112. On the other hand, high patent numbers 
may reflect the strength of firms' technological base upon which they compete. 
Thus, a deeper analysis has to be carried out if one is willing to understand 
what the figures mean. 
Secondly, the effective patent life in pharmaceuticals is often claimed to 
be rather short. The degree to which patent legislation should accommodate 
this is unclear. If policy makers are keen on taking this issue further, patent 
breadth, as expected (Matutes et al. 1996), has revealed itself to be an important 
element of the patent system design that can be used to decrease deadweight 
loss. 
Finally, the empirical analysis of patent races should be very cautious 
about using crude patent counts. Although dynamic economies of scale 
('success breeds success') may take place, patents may be taken out at various 
points in time for various reasons. For example, the first patent (priority patent) 
112 See Toivanen et al. (2002). 
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is applied for early in the innovation process so that improvements can be made 
before the final innovation is commercialized and new patent applications filed; 
or the 'surrounding' strategy pursued by firms may underscore the possibility 
of innovations being complements, and thus one may conclude that earlier 
innovations were motivated by later ones. In total, however, the evidence 
provided by the six firms is perhaps a rather thin foundation upon which to 
make general statements, thus a more comprehensive, and representative, 
sample is needed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FIRMS' PERCEPTION OF THE 
IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS: 
THE CASE OF UK MANUFACTURING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
There have been many attempts to empirically investigate firms' propensities to 
patent. Most studies look either at the number of patents issued (either total 
figures or normalized by R&D outlays) or at the proportion of 
inventions/ innovations patented (Hall & Ziedonis 2001; Duguet & Kabla 2000; 
Brower & Kleinknecht 1999; Arundel & Kabla 1998; Mansfield 1986; Scherer 
1983,1965). In many ways this is both their strength and weakness. The 
strength is that these studies have the merit of encompassing the multi-purpose 
role of patents (as evident from the previous chapter). The weakness is that by 
looking at patent numbers the results may overestimate how important is the 
fundamental attribute of patents, that is, stopping others from copying. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate more directly the 
determinants of firms' perception of the importance of patents in UK 
manufacturing industry. Particular issues to be addressed are: the extent that 
the importance of patents varies across industrial sectors and by firm size; 
whether innovativeness and competitiveness impact on firms' perception of the 
importance of patents; whether innovation co-operation and government 
support affect the importance of patents for the firms engaged in these activities; 
and how the importance of patents varies when firms seek a tighter 
appropriation strategy. Our results derive from an analysis of responses of 
firms to questions in the third UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3), using 
an ordered logit model framework. 
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The second section of this chapter presents the hypotheses to be tested. 
The third section describes the variables used in the regression analysis. The 
fourth section justifies the econometric framework employed. The fifth section 
describes the results. The sixth section discusses the findings. Finally-, in the 
seventh section, conclusions are presented. 
4.2 HYPOTHESES 
The extensive literature on firms' propensities to patent, presented in chapter 2, 
underlines several relationships between patenting and firms' attributes. In this 
chapter only a few of the relationships will be examined due to limitations of 
the data, though we believe they are the key ones in affecting firms' perceptions 
of the importance of patents. These relationships are examined by testing the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: The more innovative a firm, the more likely it will be to place a 
higher importance on patents. 
H2: The larger a firm, the more likely it will be to place a higher 
importance on patents. 
H3: The higher the level of competition a firm faces, the more likely it 
will be to place a higher importance on patents113. 
H4: Firms that receive government support are less likely to place a 
higher importance on patents. 
H5: Firms that establish innovation cooperation with universities are 
more likely to place a higher importance on patents. 
1One could posit that if a monopoly firm uses patents as a barrier to entry this hypothesis would be the 
opposite. 
167 
H6: The higher the appropriation intent of a firm, the more likely it 
will be to place a higher importance on patents. 
H7: The importance of patents varies across industrial sectors. 
4.3 VARIABLES 
The hypotheses above were tested by examining regression-based coefficients 
of a set of variables (proxies) derived from the CIS 3 questionnaire. 
Response variable 
(i) Importance of patents. The second part of question 15 of the CIS 3 
questionnaire poses the following question: 
"During the period 1998-2000, please indicate the importance to your 
enterprise of the following methods to protect innovations". 
The respondents were given four ordinal categories: not used, low, 
medium, and high importance. There were eight methods114 in total, and 
responses to one of them, namely patents, served as the response 
variable in the empirical work of this chapter (we assume that assigning 
'not used' means that patents had at most marginal importance over the 
period 1998-2000). 
114 The mechanisms of protection listed on the questionnaire are: registration of design, trademarks, 
patents, confidentiality agreements, copyright, secrecy, complexity of design, and lead-time advantage 
on competitors. 
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Explanatory variables 
(1) Innovative capacity. If firms do not innovate they are unlikely to apply 
for patents, and hence patents would be of no value to them. Conversely, 
more innovative firms are hypothesised to be more concerned about 
reaping the returns from their innovative effort, and patents are one of 
the mechanisms available for this purpose. Thus, hypothesis H1 was 
tested using ex-ante and ex-post measures of innovative capacity. The ex- 
ante measures used in different models were R&D expenses, which is a 
traditional measure of knowledge stock, and percentage of staff holding 
a scientific/ engineering degree. R&D expenses were used in logarithmic 
form to linearise the relationship with patents 113, and were also 
normalized by firm turnover to avoid confounding the effects of the 
R&D and size variables. 
The percentage of firms' staff educated to science and engineering 
degree level or above was employed to overcome, at least in part, a 
common criticism of using R&D, that is, smaller firms may under report 
this cost. In the estimation both variables refer to the year 2000. One can 
argue that there is a logical lag between innovating and patenting, and 
hence one would not expect to use contemporaneous values. However, 
as shown in the literature (Blundell et al. 2002; Hall & Ziedonis 2001; 
Griliches et al. 1991), the results of using a lagged structure are roughly 
115 In models used in this study log values are commonly employed because they tend to result in a better 
fit (as measured by the log-likelihood) than the gross values (Liao 1994). 
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the same as the results with contemporaneous levels of R&D. We believe 
the same applies to percentages of personnel with scientific degree 
because on average these variables tend to vary marginally over time, 
and thus the estimates are unlikely to be too inaccurate in a non-lagged 
structure. 
As an ex-post measure of innovative capacity a dummy variable 
for whether or not a firm introduced a product new to its industry was 
used. This is a rough guide as to the degree of innovativeness of a firm 
since it indicates whether the launched product was new not only to the 
firm. The reason for using this variable is because the ex-ante variables 
above may not portray the commercial potential of the innovation. 
Although some firms may put more emphasis on innovativeness than 
others, they may not necessarily succeed in bring the invention into the 
market. Moreover, patents are said to be applied for at the beginning of 
the innovation process (Griliches 1990). 
Firm size. Size may impact on firms' perceptions of the importance of 
patents because, amongst other things, larger firms are less constrained 
by the costs of patenting activity. We use the logarithm 116 of firm 
turnover as a measure of their size. Again, this variable refers to the year 
2000. Unlike other variables, this variable was derived from the Inter- 
116 For the same reason as R&D outlays. 
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Departmental Business Register (IDBR) records'17. This was mainly to 
(iii) 
enlarge our sample by avoiding non-response. Five outliers were 
identified and they were adjusted using the CIS 3 data set. If level of 
patenting is a good proxy for the importance of patents we would expect, 
according to previous studies (Scherer 1983,1965), that the importance of 
patents is positively associated with firm size, as stated in hypothesis H2. 
Note however that Taylor & Silberston (1973) could not find such a 
relationship in the UK. 
Degree of competition. The degree of competition may impact on the 
perception of the importance of patents in a number of ways, but the 
impact is not unambiguous. On the one hand, a higher degree of 
competition may show the weaknesses patents have in fully protecting 
inventions. On the other hand, a higher degree of competition may 
demand the use of entry deterrents such as patents, even if they are not 
very effective (Levin et al. 1987). Note that a high number of patents in 
an industry might be associated with a high degree of concentration in 
that industry. Thus, incumbents would enjoy the benefits of patents as 
entry deterrents, and the number of newcomers would be only marginal. 
In that case a higher importance of patents is likely to be related to a low 
degree of competition . and 
hence hypothesis H3 that the importance of 
patents is positively associated with the degree of competition could be 
117 The matching (IDBR-CIS) was done by the Department of Trade and Industry. So, that information was 
available in the original CIS dataset. 
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the opposite. In our empirical models an indicator variable representing 
the firm's largest market is used as a proxy for the degree of competition, 
and hence we suspect that H3 is more likely to be observed. That is, we 
expect firms operating at international/ national level to be in a more 
competitive environment than those operating at local/ regional level. So, 
we can test, at least in part, hypothesis H3. The reference market was the 
national one, and other markets were i) local (situated within 
approximately 50 miles), ii) regional (situated within approximately 100 
miles), and iii) international. 
(iv) Government support. A dummy variable was introduced to control for 
whether firms received government support for innovation-related 
activities. The literature advocates that patents may become less 
important for those firms that receive support from the government, 
especially financial support. The argument is that governmental support 
is given in exchange for, at best, a reduced license fee to be charged if 
other firms become interested in the innovation (Griliches 1990). So, 
innovators would have limited incentives to pursue patent protection. 
We aim therefore to test hypothesis H4 that patent importance is 
negatively related to support from the government. 
(v) University partnerships. Hypothesis H5 that the importance of patents 
is positively related to the establishment of innovation partnerships with 
universities was tested by means of a dummy variable. This variable was 
employed to control for companies which set up innovation co-operation 
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with universities. Universities can be seen as one of the major sources of 
technical knowledge (Trajtenberg et al. 1997). Thus, innovations derived 
from these partnerships are likely to be of higher scientific content, and 
hence likely to be patentable. Moreover, patents may be used as an 
incentive mechanism for the researchers involved. Even if university 
researchers deem scientific papers more valuable than patents, firms 
engaging in this type of partnership may be more concerned about 
patenting because of the anticipated interest of university researchers in 
disclosing the results of the joint-project. If they do so before a patent 
application is filed firms will forfeit their rights, since the application will 
not fulfil at least one of the patentability criteria: novelty. 
(vi) Appropriation intent. Hypothesis H6 was tested using an index of the 
overall importance of the mechanisms of protection based upon question 
15 of the questionnaire. This index is an aggregate of the importance 
given to mechanisms of appropriability, which is expected to reflect a 
higher (or lower) concern about appropriability issues. In doing so, we 
can verify whether the importance of patents is positively correlated to a 
higher inclination to appropriate the returns from innovation. Hence, the 
assumption that follows is that the higher the overall score the more a 
firm seeks to appropriate the returns from its innovation. So, this index, 
henceforth `stated appropriation intent index' (or 'SAI index') was built 
upon all mechanisms, except patents. For each firm the sum of the 
importance of its appropriation mechanisms was computed. The 
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literature suggests that regimes of appropriabilitv (a mix of technology 
characteristic and enforcement climate) may be a reason for firms to 
pursue patents. To avoid to some extent confounding effects of 
appropriability regimes, our firm-level index was normalized by the 
average of the corresponding industrial sector. Then, to make it more 
interpretable on a scale from 0 to 1 we normalized it by the maximum 
value of our full sample in manufacturing. Algebraically we have: 
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Where x1i is the importance assigned by each firm i to the 
mechanism of appropriability 1, and Nj is the total number of firms of our 
sample classified in the industry j, according to the UK 92 SIC. We 
assume that appropriation intent is exogenous, although it may not be 
correct118. Moreover, the variable constructed to measure appropriation 
intent derives from the same question as the response variable, which is 
likely to strengthen the relationship between the two, and hence its 
strength may underestimate the influence of other variables. 
Industrial sector. Innovativeness has long been recognised as dependent 
on industrial sectors (e. g., Schmookler 1962a, b, 1954). The same applies 
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to patenting activity (Scherer 1965). So, in order to test the hypothesis H7 
that the importance of patents varies across industrial sectors wwwe use 
dummy variables to identify firms in the following industrial sectors: 1) 
Basic Metals, 2) Chemicals (excluding drugs), 3) Communication 
equipments, 4) Electrical equipments, 5) Fabricated metals, 6) Food. 
beverages and tobacco, 7) Glass, clay and ceramics, 8) Machinery (except 
office), 9) Medical, precision and optical instruments, 10) Motor vehicles, 
11) Office and computing equipments, 12) Other manufacturing, 13) 
Other transport equipments, 14) Pharmaceuticals, 15) Printing and 
publishing, 16) Refined petroleum products, 17) Rubber and plastic 
products, 18) Textiles and clothing, and finally 19) Wood and paper. The 
baseline was the printing and publishing industry, where patents were 
roughly found to have minor importance. 
A base specification model, without accounting for appropriation intent, 
was initially estimated. Subsequently, an augmented model incorporating 
appropriation intent was estimated. These exercises aimed to avoid the effects 
of appropriation intent masking the effects of other variables, since the response 
variable (i. e., importance of patents) and the appropriation intent variable 
derive from the same question in the CIS 3 questionnaire. Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics of all variables above. 
118 Reasons for not overcoming this problem are presented later on. 
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Table 2- Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable 
Continuous 
Sales (£'000s) 
R&D (£'000s) 
Limited corttinttous 
% Personnel with technical 
or scientific degree 
SAI index 
N Mean Median Min Max 
3440 23591.21 2662.5 0 3447748 
1680 688.92 00 323800 
2814 4.99 10 100 
2715 0.134 0.083 01 
Dieyti*cs 
Novel Product 3440 0.131 0 
Government support 3292 0.118 0 
Innovation Partnerships 3313 0.139 0 
Market (Local-l; 
Regional=2; National=3 3383 2.710 3 
International=4) 
4.4 ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
As observed above, the dependent (or response) variable is not continuous; it 
comes from a four-point opinion scale. Therefore, the data available for our 
analysis are proportions of responses to each category determined by firms 
with certain attributes (e. g., size, industry), and an appropriate approach for 
such analysis is needed. 
It is commonly assumed in the traditional linear regression model that 
the error term (ei) is independent and identically distributed with zero mean 
and variance 62, that is, iid N (0, a2 ). And the response variable should be 
linearly related to the explanatory variables. The discrete nature of our response 
variable, however, may demand a model which departs from the simple linear 
form. We are interested in the probability that a firm with certain attributes will 
fit in some category of the scale used. As probabilities are bounded between 
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zero and one, a model in a linear form may lead to nonsense probabilities, not 
to mention that F -i 
be heteroscedastic (Greene 2003). Thus, models that link 
the probability of an event to a set of factors are needed. According to Agresti 
(1990: 80) a broad class of models was introduced by Neider & Wedderburn119 
which allows for the relaxation of some assumptions of the conventional linear 
regression model. This framework is known as Generalized Linear Models 
(GLMs)120, and this framework, for example, does not require the response 
variable to be strictly explained by a set of covariates in a simple linear form. 
The function that links response and explanatory variables may be distributed 
as any monotonic differentiable function. And the random variable may not 
have a Normal distribution. This framework, therefore, has the merit of 
encompassing models for continuous and categorical (or qualitative) variables 
within a unified theory (Agresti 1990). 
A special case of the framework above is the framework of probability 
models121. This framework serves as the basis of our approach, and allows for 
models that produce predictions consistent with the underlying theory (Greene 
2003). According to Gourieroux (2000), models dealing with qualitative 
dependent variables date back to the 1940s with initial applications in biology, 
followed by psychology and sociology. Generally speaking, it starts with the 
following definition: 
I 19 Neider & Wedderburn (1972). 
120 We refer the reader to Agresti (1990), and, in particular, McCullagh & Neider (1989) for more 
information on the subject. 
121 A more detailed treatment of probability models can be found in Gourieroux (2000), and Ben-Akiva & 
Lerman (1985). 
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Pr (event J occurs) = Pr (Y = j) = F(x, ß) (4.1 ) 
The simplest case is when j takes only two values. This leads to models 
for binary choice. There are also multinomial choice sets, which need some 
adjustments of the definitions used in binary choice models. In our case models 
for ordered data are of particular interest'22; they are also known as ordered 
polychotomous univariate models. These models assume that the dependent 
variable y is generated by a latent variable y* whose values are not observed. It 
is a function of the vector x, and of the vector (3 of unknown parameters. It also 
has a disturbance term which is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed, with zero mean and a shared cumulative density function F which 
is known up to a scaling parameter (Gourieroux 2000). This latent variable can 
be considered random and is defined by: 
y*=x'ß +c (4.2) 
What we observe is the value of each alternative (y) of the choice set. So, 
assuming that our first alternative of the choice set is zero (as it is in fact in our 
case) and the last alternative is J, the observed values can be represented as 
follows: 
y=0 if y*<a1 
y=1 if al <y*<_a2 
y=2 if a2<y*<a3 
122 See, for example, Zavoina & McElvey (1975). 
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y= j if of <y* 
Where a, < a2 < ... <a, are the threshold parameters with lower and 
upper limits ao = -Go and a,.,., = +oo, respectively. Then, from the above we can 
define the following probabilities: 
Pr(y=o1 x)-Pr(y*-< a1)=Pr(s5a1-x'ß)=F(al-x'(3) (4.3) 
Pr(y =1 1 x) = F(a2 - x'ß) - F(al - x'ß) (4.4) 
Pr(y=Jlx)=1-F(a1-x'3) (4.5) 
To model the probabilities above we need to specify a probability density 
function f(. ) that corresponds to the cumulative probability distribution, F(. ). In 
other words, a monotonic differentiable function that also allows for the 
probabilities to be bounded between zero and one is needed, that is, f(z)>_ 0 and 
+00 
Jf(z)dz =1. The most commonly used functions are i) the normal distribution 
-CO 
(probit models), and ii) the logistic distribution (logit models). The former has a 
choice probability that is expressed as an integral whereas the latter is 
expressed in a more closed form (Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1985). The analytical 
convenience of the logistic distribution and its good approximation to the 
normal distribution are the main reasons for its choice, although it is difficult to 
justify its choice on theoretical grounds (Greene 2003). 
Thus, from (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) we have the following in the logistic 
format: 
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Pr(y=O1 x)=F(al -x'ß)=1`, (al _x'ß)- 1+ eat-xý 
eaz-X'P eu, 
`ß 
Pr(y =1 1 x) = A(a2 - x'ß) - A(a, - x'ß) =1+ -1 + 
Pr(v= T Ix) =1- 
ýa, -X'ß 
-V l I--/ 
1+e a, -x'p 
Therefore, generally speaking we have: 
Pr(y =KI x) = F(aK - x'ß) - F(aK-1- x'ß) 
Pr(y =KI x) - A(aK - x'ß) - A(aK-1- x' (3) 
euF X'ß eaK-1-X 
ß 
Pr(y =K{ x) =1+ 
eaK-"ß -1 + eaK-1-X'Y 
One can notice from the above that the parameters are not linearly 
related to the dependent variable since a logistic distribution for the disturbance 
term was chosen. In other words, we are assuming that the error terms are 
independent and identically Gumbel (or type I extreme value) distributed (Ben- 
Akiva & Lerman 1985). 
The model is estimated using the principle of maximum likelihood, 
which provides a means of choosing asymptotically efficient estimators for the 
parameters. It determines the value(s) of corresponding parameters that would 
make a sample most probable to happen. The likelihood function can be 
described as: 
NK 
J 
(yik 1 0) fl fl Pr(yi =kI X)I(Y; -k) ; or 
i=1 k=1 
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NK 
(ý L(9) =ýý (F(aK - Xiß) F(aK-1 - XiN»1(Yý=k) 
i=1 k=] 
(4.6) 
I(yi=k) takes the value of 1 when yi=k and zero otherwise. Taking the 
logarithmic of the likelihood function (4.6), we have: 
NK 
A(O) _ 1(yß = k)Ln (F(ak - x' ß) - F(ak 1- x'ß)) (4.7) 
i=1 k=1 
Then, the above function is maximized with respect to P, which in 
general is assumed not to vary across categories. This is called the proportional 
odds assumption. Nowadays it is possible to computationally relax this 
assumption and to allow the effects of the explanatory variables to vary with 
the point at which the categories of the dependent variable are dichotomized. 
This leads to the generalized ordered logit model. 
The interpretation of the estimates is straightforward. A positive sign of 
a coefficient indicates an increased chance that a subject with a higher score on 
the corresponding explanatory variable will be observed in a higher category. 
Hence, a negative coefficient indicates that the chances that a subject with a 
higher score on the independent variable will be observed in a lower category. 
Unfortunately this straightforwardness does not apply when measuring the 
goodness of fit of these models. Unlike ordinary least square regression (OLS), 
there is no single measure that reflects the proportion of the variance accounted 
for. A starting point to measure the goodness of fit of this type of model is using 
the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic: 
LR(i) = -2 [LL(a )- LL(a, ß)] (4.8) 
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The LR statistic is chi-squared distributed with 'i' degrees of freedom 
and allows one to determine if the overall model is statistically significant. 
Where 'i' is the number of explanatory variables; LL(a) is the log-likelihood of 
the model which only has a constant and LL(a, ß) is the log-likelihood of the 
model with the explanatory variables. In order to measure goodness of fit a 
transformation of the likelihood ratio is commonly employed, which is the 
likelihood ratio index, also known as pseudo-R2. There exist other possibilities 
but for our purposes the McFadden's-R2 will suffice. It is defined as: 
McFadden"s-R2 =1- [LL(a, ß) / LL(a)] (-I. 9) 
This is a scalar measure which varies between zero and 1. Nonetheless, it 
is important to exercise some caution in dealing with this index. Unlike R2 in 
OLS, the likelihood ratio index is not the percentage of the variation in the 
dependent variable that is 'explained' by the estimated model. It is simply the 
percentage increase in the log-likelihood function of the zero-parameter 
function when parameters are introduced to estimate the model. The meaning 
of such a percentage increase is unclear. Therefore, it has no intuitively 
interpretable overall meaning, except in its extreme values (Train 2003). It might 
be valid to say that a model with a higher likelihood ratio index fits the data 
better. But this is only true if the models were estimated on the same sample 
and with the same set of alternatives. If we are estimating models with different 
covariates, but with the same set of alternatives (i. e. the same response variable), 
the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) might be more useful (Akaike 1973). 
The smaller the value of the AIC, the better the fit of the model to the observed 
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data. The AIC, unlike the Likelihood Ratio Test, has been used to select among 
non-nested models. 
The next section presents the outcome of our regression analysis using 
ordered logit models. It should be clear from previous discussion that the 
dataset is a cross-section, and the unit of analysis is the enterprise - henceforth 
firms. In chapter 1 we mentioned that the term `firm` would be employed 
loosely in this thesis but we should not overlook the implications of the level of 
analysis for the results. Regarding the CIS dataset our analysis is at enterprise 
level and enterprises are defined as the smallest combination of legal units that 
produce goods or services, and which benefits from a certain autonomy in decision 
making, especially for the allocation of its current resources. It might be that quite a 
few enterprises belong to the same group of companies and the consequences of 
this for our results are not very clear. For example, if one enterprise is responsible 
for carrying out R&D for the rest of the group it may be that the remaining 
enterprises will not report R&D but are likely to report that they hold patents, 
which could underestimate the impact of R&D on the importance of patents. 
4.5 RESULTS 
A first look at the importance of patents gives the impression that patents are 
relatively unimportant in UK manufacturing as compared to other mechanisms 
(Table 3). Nevertheless, if attention is drawn solely to firms that used 
mechanisms of appropriability, the importance of patents seems to significantly 
increase compared to the importance of other mechanisms (Table 4). 
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Table 3- The Importance of Appropriability Mechanisms 
(full sample) 
Mechanism N mean sd min max 
Lead-time 2794 1.034 1.193 03 
Secrecy 2782 . 911 1.155 03 
Conf. Agreement 2789 . 903 1.170 03 
Complexity Design 2772 . 779 1.051 03 
Trademarks 2776 . 683 1.100 03 
Patents 2786 . 604 1.075 03 
Copyright 2757 . 535 . 
978 03 
Registration Design 2767 . 496 . 
962 03 
It is not unexpected that patents are more important for those who use 
them than for those who do not use them. But it is somewhat striking that their 
importance increases by more than, for example, lead-time, trademarks, and 
complexity of design. It thus seems worth pursuing what factors are likely to 
impact on the importance firms place on patents. 
Table 4- The Importance of Appropriability Mechanisms 
(restricted sample - users) 
Mechanism N mean sd min Max 
Conf. Agreement 427 2.351 . 
727 13 
Secrecy 423 2.322 . 
739 13 
Patents 420 2.312 . 
791 13 
Lead-time 434 2.272 . 
766 13 
Trademarks 413 2.245 . 
776 13 
Registration Design 401 2.085 . 
792 13 
Complexity Design 415 2.055 . 
777 13 
Copyright 403 2.042 . 
817 13 
The estimation results come from four models, where two different 
variables for innovative capacity are used, and the incorporation of 
appropriation intent is made in each case. The purpose of this differentiation in 
what measures innovative capacity was not a mere sample enlargement due to 
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more responses to the question on the amount of technical staff than to the 
question of how much R&D was spent. The objective was to identify the impact 
of non-reporting of R&D on the results. It was expected that firms reporting 
R&D were, on average, larger than those not reporting R&D since smaller firms 
may undertake innovative activities in a less structured way, and therefore may 
not necessarily report this cost. Thus, by relying solely upon R&D as a measure 
of innovative capacity the results could be affected by sample selection bias. 
Table 5- Estimates of Ordered Logit Models for Patent Importance 
in UK Manufacturinga, b 
Expl. Variable 
R&D intensity (Log) 
% Sci. /Eng. Staff 
Sales (Log) 
Novel Product 
Local market 
Regional market 
International market 
Gov. Support 
Univ. Partnerships 
SAI index 
(1) 
0.181 *** 0.064 
(0.070) (0.074) 
0.017*** 0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) 
0.467*** 0.421*** 0.324*** 0.296*** 
(0.064) (0.038) (0.070) (0.040) 
0.434** 0.972*** 0.068 0.298* 
(0.191) (0.132) (0.222) (0.157) 
-0.344 -0.937*** -0.232 -0.635** 
(0.590) (0.254) (0.588) (0.264) 
-0.348 -0.967*** -0.128 -0.366 
(0.459) (0.233) (0.544) (0.252) 
0.124 0.433*** 0.108 0.253* 
(0.214) (0.127) (0.228) (0.144) 
-0.269 0.351** -0.294 0.066 
(0.214) (0.142) (0.242) (0.153) 
0.608** 0.506*** 0.943*** 0.449** 
(0.250) (0.189) (0.305) (0.226) 
10.786*** 11.143*** 
(1.211) (0.546) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 492 2258 467 2202 
Log-Likelihood -553.0 -1661.8 -443.9 -1222.0 
Model Chi-square 113.88*** 467.40*** 170.42*** 691.39*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.1044 0.1691 0.2417 0.3586 
AIC 2.366 1.498 2.030 1.137 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 ýo. 
The reference market is the national one. 
In fact, both the average sales and number of employees of models (1) 
and (2) in Table 5 were compared. On average, both sales and number of 
employees are higher for the sample in model (1) than for the sample in model 
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(2). The estimation results of model (1) come from a sample which presented in 
2000 average sales of 50 million pounds and 321 employees. Whereas the results 
of model (2) derive from a sample with average sales of 20 million pounds and 
181 employees in 2000. Another difference across the models in Table 5 is the 
estimation (or not) of firms' appropriation intent (SAI index) for reasons 
already put forward when the variables were described. 
A clear picture that emerges from the aforementioned results is the 
larger magnitude of the estimate of the correlation between the importance of 
patents and firms' appropriation intent, compared to the relationship between 
patents and other variables in the models. The coefficients for the SAI index in 
models (3) and (4) can be interpreted as a significant and positive increase in the 
probability of regarding patents as of high importance as opposed to medium, 
low or no importance when comparing those who most valued other 
appropriation mechanisms and those who least valued these mechanisms. 
Hypothesis H6 that states that the higher the appropriation intent of a firm, the 
more likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents cannot be rejected. 
It is also noticeable that when appropriation intent is incorporated in the 
models most of the remaining explanatory variables become non-significant, 
although size and partnership with universities remain significant. The 
emergence of non-significant (or significant) estimates in models accounting for 
overall appropriation intent could be a result of multicollinearity when this 
variable is included. The correlation matrices of these models do not 
corroborate this view (Appendix 3), as the correlations with other variables are 
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weak. So, that possibility should be discarded. Although we suspect that 
appropriation intent may capture to a certain degree the effects of other 
variables, we conjecture that the observed phenomenon is a result of both the 
response variable and the SAI index being derived from the same survey 
question. 
Size123 and partnerships with universities have shown some persistence 
across models. As both variables are significant and positively associated with a 
higher importance of patents hypotheses H2 (the larger a firm, the more likely it 
will be to place a higher importance on patents) and H5 (firms that establish 
innovation cooperation with universities are more likely to place a higher 
importance on patents) cannot be refuted. 
Regarding innovative capacity, models (1) and (2) suggest that it is 
positively related to the importance of patents, which lends support to 
hypothesis H1 (i. e., the more innovative a firm, the more likely it will be to 
place a higher importance on patents). Those models were also estimated 
replacing the introduction of new products by another variable representing 
whether or not a firm had introduced a new process to the industry124. Again, 
the importance of patents was detected to be positively associated with a higher 
degree of innovativeness. However, we should interpret these last results 
carefully. First, because the variable was not significant when R&D was 
113 These results were not different when firm size was controlled using firms' number of employees. 
124 We attempted to estimate models with variables for both product and process innovations 
simultaneously but ti, we could not avoid collinearity and hence they were discarded. 
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controlled for125. And second, because being a process innovator does not 
preclude a firm from being a product innovator. In fact, in our sample half of 
process innovators are also product innovators126. In line with previous studies 
(e. g., Levin et al. 1987), the perceived importance of patents seem to be smaller 
to process innovations than to product innovations. 
The results from models (3) and (4), however, cast some doubt on 
hypothesis H1 (the more innovative a firm, the more likely it will be to place a 
higher importance on patents). That is to say, the effects of appropriation intent 
seem to prevail over innovativeness effects. It could be that innovative capacity 
effects have captured appropriation intent effects in models (1) and (2), leading 
their coefficients to be more pronounced and significant. This might be said to 
overestimate the impact of innovativeness on the importance of patents. But if 
innovative capacity coefficients in models (3) and (4) are not significant (or are 
only marginally significant) it does not necessarily mean that innovative 
capacity does not positively impact on the importance of patents. As expected, 
this can be a problem with the metrics involved, namely the origin of the data 
used to measure appropriation intent. Therefore, the results for innovative 
capacity can be considered as in line with previous studies as indicating 
positive impact on the importance of patents. This may be evidence that patents, 
125 The estimates for the introduction of novel process innovations are the following when we control for 
R&D and for technical skills, respectively: i) 0.218 (Wald test= 0.91; p-value=0.364), and ii) 0.546 (Wald 
test=3.43; p-value=0.001). 
126 Of the total number firms in our full sample (N=3440) 271 reported to have implemented a process new 
to their industry, 137 of which also reported to have introduced new products to the industry. The total 
number of firms reporting introduction of new products (regardless of whether or not introduced new 
processes) was 451. 
188 
in fact, matter, and the hypothesis that the more innovative a firm, the more 
likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents (HI) should not be 
rejected. 
Regarding competition, it is noticeable in (model (2)) that patents are 
judged more important by those operating in more competitive environments. 
Taking the national market as a point of reference, the likelihood that patents 
will be regarded highly important as opposed to medium, low or not important 
decreases for less competitive markets (local and regional) and increases for a 
more competitive market (international). This, however, does not hold in model 
(1). This is because the sample in this model comprises on average larger firms, 
as was described earlier. So, even if the major markets are local and regional, for 
example, they might be part of a group of companies which has a patent policy 
dictated by the head office. Another possible explanation for the degree of 
competition not being significant when R&D is taken into account is that R&D 
intensity itself may reflect competition. So, effects of competition may be 
embedded in the R&D variable. These arguments however are unlikely to apply 
to the proportion of personnel educated in science and engineering, which 
reinforces that hypothesis H3 (i. e., the higher the level of competition a firm 
faces, the more likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents) should 
not be rejected, although appropriation intent may be capturing the effects of 
competition and at best allowing a modest positive impact of competition on 
the importance of patents in models (3) and (4). 
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Contrary to our suspicion as to the negative effect of government 
support on the importance of patents, the results from Table 5 suggest that 
government support provides an incentive for the perception of a higher 
importance of patents when percentage of technical skills is controlled for 
(model (2)). Although this cannot be said when R&D is taken into account, this 
difference may have to do with the average firm size of the samples in models 
(1) and (2). If on the one hand, government may condition its support on the 
grounds of weaker appropriability due to moral hazard reasons. On the other 
hand, government has to create proper conditions to underpin innovation 
activities, and patents are one of the public policy instruments available. These 
results are for any type of government support for innovation-related activities. 
In order to explore these results a bit further the models were re-estimated 
using an explanatory variable to identify whether or not financial support was 
given, instead of any type of support. The results are pretty much the same, that 
is, a negative impact but insignificant in the variant of model (1), and positive 
and significant in the variant of model (2). For the same reason discussed for 
innovative capacity the non-significance of the estimates when appropriation 
intent is accounted for should not obscure our analysis. Hypothesis H4 (i. e., 
firms that receive government support are less likely to place a higher 
importance on patents), therefore, should be refuted. 
190 
Table 6- Importance of Patents and Number of Patent Applications Across 
Industrial Sectors (descriptive statistics) 
Industry 
Importance Number of patent 
of patentsa, c applicationsb 
N Mean N Mean Min Max 
Basic Metals 60 0.58 64 0.66 0 25 
Chemicals, except drugs 85 1.34 92 3.20 0 80 
Communication equip. 95 0.95 100 5.30 0 135 
Electrical equip. 166 0.81 172 1.79 0 100 
Fabricated metal 291 0.34 336 0.30 0 48 
Food, beverages and tobacco 211 0.30 225 0.10 0 10 
Glass, clay and ceramics 71 0.61 79 1.33 0 90 
Machinery, except office 210 1.00 229 1.59 0 47 
Medical and precision instr. 152 1.03 156 2.31 0 78 
Motor vehicles 178 0.82 183 1.14 0 50 
Office and computing equip. 40 0.73 45 2.47 0 70 
Other manufacturing 365 0.49 394 0.49 0 50 
Other transport equip. 112 0.46 120 0.35 0 10 
Pharmaceuticals 17 1.82 17 39.12 0 300 
Printing and Publishing 240 0.17 266 0.32 0 30 
Refined petroleum products 13 0.62 14 0.57 05 
Rubber and plastic products 141 0.79 142 1.72 0 50 
Textiles and clothing 172 0.34 180 0.24 0 10 
Wood and paper 167 0.50 174 0.22 06 
Scale from 0 (no importance) to 3 (high importance). 
1998-2000. 
Numbers in bold are column maximum and minimum values. 
Evidence from the literature suggests that even within industries where 
patents are relatively non-important for protection purposes, one can find firms 
interested in filing many patent applications (Mansfield 1986). In fact, this can 
be observed in our sample if one looks at the range of patent applications 
within each industrial sector in Table 6. Yet, on average, industries where 
patents are regarded more important are also industries where patenting 
activities are more intense. There are only a few exceptions127. Thus, it seems 
that patent numbers can be a good proxy for the importance of patents. This 
127 For example, firms in the office and computing industry regard patents less important than firms in the 
electrical equipment industry. However, the former presents a higher average number of patent 
applications than the latter does. 
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result contrasts with our initial suspicion that the level of patenting may 
overstate the importance of patents (for protection purpose). 
Table 7- Importance of Patents Ranked Across Industrial Sectors 
Table 6 
Printing and 
Publishing 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 
Fabricated metal 
Textiles and clothing 
Other transport equip. 
Other manufacturing 
Wood and paper 
Basic Metals 
Glass, clay and 
ceramics 
Refined petroleum 
products 
Office and computing 
equip. 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
Electrical equip. 
Motor vehicles 
Communication equip. 
Machinery, except 
office 
Medical and precision 
instr. 
Chemicals, except 
drugs 
Pharmaceuticals 
(1) 
Printing and 
Publishing 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Refined petroleum 
products 
Other transport 
equip. 
Basic Metals 
Glass, clay and 
ceramics 
Wood and paper 
Textiles and 
clothing 
Motor vehicles 
Chemicals, except 
drugs 
Electrical equip. 
Other 
manufacturing 
Office and 
computing equip. 
Communication 
equip. 
Medical and 
precision instr. 
Fabricated metal 
Pharmaceuticals 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
Machinery, except 
office 
Table 5 
(2) 
Printing and 
Publishing 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Other transport 
equip. 
Refined petroleum 
products 
Textiles and 
clothing 
Office and 
computing equip. 
Basic Metals 
Other 
manufacturing 
Glass, clay and 
ceramics 
Fabricated metal 
Wood and paper 
Communication 
equip. 
Electrical equip. 
Pharmaceuticals 
Motor vehicles 
Chemicals, except 
drugs 
Medical and 
precision instr. 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
Machinery, except 
office 
(3) 
Printing and 
Publishing 
Fabricated metal 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Textiles and 
clothing 
Refined petroleum 
products 
Other transport 
equip. 
Wood and paper 
Glass, clay and 
ceramics 
Other 
manufacturing 
Basic Metals 
Motor vehicles 
Office and 
computing equip. 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
Electrical equip. 
Communication 
equip. 
Machinery, except 
office 
Chemicals, except 
drugs 
Medical and 
precision instr. 
Pharmaceuticals 
(4) 
Prinking and 
Publishing 
Fabricated metal 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Textiles and 
clothing 
Other transport 
equip. 
Other 
manufacturing 
Wood and paper 
Glass, clay and 
ceramics 
Basic Metals 
Office and 
computing equip. 
Refined petroleum 
products 
Rubber and plastic 
products 
Electrical equip. 
Motor vehicles 
Communication 
equip. 
Machinery, except 
office 
Medical and 
precision instr. 
Chemicals, except 
drugs 
Pharmaceuticals 
But, as observed earlier, industrial sector is unlikely to be the unique 
factor that induces firms to perceive patents more important. That is why a 
large variability in the number of patent applications can be observed at firm 
level, even within industries where patents are apparently not important. Thus, 
the control for other effects is important and one should draw attention to the 
estimates controlling for industrial sectors (Appendix 4), where the baseline is 
the Printing and Publishing industry. For the sake of clarity, the estimates 
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shown are compared to the aggregate importance of patents from Table 6. They 
are reported in Table 7 in ascending order of magnitude from top to bottom. It 
seems that model (3) and model (4), in particular, have a better match with the 
results reported in Table 6 than have models (1) and (2), especially model (1) 
where there is no statistical evidence that the importance of patents differs 
across sectors. 
Perhaps the apparent non-variation of the importance of patents across 
industrial sectors in model (1) can be explained by the average firm size of the 
sample. As the firms in model (1) have on average a larger size than the firms of 
model (2), this may not allow an adequate comparability across industries 
because we may end up comparing larger firms across industries. It might be 
that larger firms' perception of the importance of patents varies across 
industrial sectors but not to the extent that an opinion-based scale could capture. 
As in model (3) this scalability issue is, at least in part, controlled for by the SAI 
index in that model the expected variability across sectors can be observed. This 
is also so for models (2) and (4), which lend support to hypothesis H7 that the 
importance of patents varies across industrial sectors. 
A few remarks should be made about the performance of the estimated 
models. Firstly, as the chi-squares of the models are all significant at 1% level 
the hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero can be rejected. Secondly, models 
that take into account appropriation intent have their goodness of fit enhanced 
as compared to models where this variable is absent. Moreover, models using 
percentage of personnel with science/ engineering degree to control for 
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innovative capacity seem to outperform, in terms of goodness of fit, models 
using R&D intensity for the same purpose. However, a degree of caution 
should be exercised when examining this. All models in Table 5 differ as to 
their sample size because of non-responses. Thus, it would be more sensible to 
compare estimation models using the same sample. So, if the models are limited 
to the same sample, the ones which use R&D to control for innovative capacity 
perform slightly better than the ones using percentage of technical staff128 V 
Conversely, Akaike's information criterion (AIC) presented in Table 5 seems to 
favour models with percentage of staff holding a science/ engineering degree. 
As R&D poses some restrictions on the analysis, perhaps models (2) and (-I) are 
stronger candidates to be the final model. 
Thirdly, models (3) and (4) outperform models (1) and (2), respectively. 
This gives support for taking appropriation intent into account, and hence 
model (4) would be the preferred model. But in taking the appropriation index 
into account other issues emerge. For example, it is arguable whether patents 
themselves are conducive to a higher overall appropriation intent index rather 
than the opposite. That is, there is a possibility of this index being correlated to 
the residual of the patent importance variable, and then being endogenous as 
opposed to exogenous, as we assumed. In this case, the Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
test could be carried out. The problem, however, is that despite its simplicity 
and consistent estimates produced, that test was developed for binary models, 
128 Sample size=413; model (1): pseudo-R2=0.1063, AIC=2.380; model (2): pseudo-R2=0.0989, AIC=2.399; 
model (3): pseudo-R2=0.2314, AIC=2.071; model (4): pseudo-R2=0.2300, AIC=2.075. 
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not for ordinal ones. To the best of our knowledge there is no endogeneity test 
for ordinal outcomes. And even if appropriation intent was detected to be 
endogenous, our data set, although large, is limited with respect to adequate 
instruments to correct for endogeneity129. We, therefore, leave this for future 
research. 
Finally, the proportional odds assumption was checked comparing the 
log likelihood of the estimated models with their binary counterparts, that is, 
pooling a number of binary models equal to the number of categories minus 1 
(three in our case). For all models the assumptions made could not be rejected130. 
That is, the impact of each variable is the same on each category of the response 
variable, though this assumption is weaker for models (3) and (4). 
4.6 DISCUSSION 
It emerges from the results that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms 
to consider patents as of high importance, which makes us not reject hypothesis 
H2. It is not a surprise that larger firms apply for a larger number of patents 
than smaller firms do. In fact, previous studies have shown firms' propensities 
to patent to be positively associated with firm size (Scherer 1983,1965). As 
patenting activity demands availability of resources for the application and 
enforcement of patents it is likely that larger firms have an advantage over 
smaller firms. Besides, economies of scale apply to this type of activity. So, 
129 Had instruments been found, bootstrap should be carried out to correct standard errors 
13° Model (1): p-value=0.5482; model (2): p-value=0.2900; model (3): p-value=0.0961; 
model (4): p-value=0.0613. 
195 
larger firms may incur relatively lower costs as compared to smaller firms. As a 
consequence larger firms are more likely to build up a patent portfolio seeking 
higher barriers to entry, as also suggested by our interviews in pharmaceuticals 
(chapter 3). Smaller firms, in turn, by having more limited resources are less 
likely to build and to manage a portfolio of patents. 
On the other hand, even if smaller firms do not have the financial 
resources to secure a large portfolio of patents, they could regard patents as 
important as larger firms. So, our actual findings could not be totally expected. 
However, as we observed from the interviews (chapter 3), patents seem to be 
more beneficial to firms if a portfolio approach is used. Perhaps the results are 
suggesting that being large is not just a matter of having more financial 
resources but also a matter of being more resourceful in a broader sense. The 
existence of well defined personnel to deal with patent matters is more likely to 
be found within larger firms than within smaller firms. Thus, the presence of a 
more formal structure to deal with patent issues may not only enable firms to 
more easily monitor their rivals' patents but also give them a better perception 
of the role played by patents in their competitiveness. And as larger firms are 
more likely to devote more time and effort to patenting issues they would be 
more likely than smaller firms to regard patents as more important. 
The results of a previous study by Taylor & Silberston (1973) for the UK 
did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that firms' propensities to 
patent increase with firm size. Our findings contradict Taylor & Silberston's but 
are in line with other non UK studies. Has there been any change in the UK in 
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this respect? Possibly not. Although the econometric framework employed in 
this study differs from Taylor & Silberston s, there is no particular reason to 
believe that this would lead to a different result. We conjecture that the reason 
underlying such differences rests with sampling issues. Perhaps their results 
rely upon a sample with much smaller size variability than ours, or their 
sample does not contain smaller firms. Even so, it is difficult to explain why, 
because our estimates based upon a sample of larger firms (when controlling 
for R&D) point in the same direction: the larger the firm, the more likely it is to 
place a higher importance on patents. 
For obvious reasons, on the basis of the data set used, there is no proper 
explanation to justify why larger firms are more likely to perceive patents to be 
more important than are smaller firms. It might be true that, in general, larger 
firms are those already established in the market and presenting in many cases 
a technological lead over competitors. Thereby, patents being deemed more 
important by larger firms than by smaller firms may portray the pursuit of 
enhancing market power of the former. Although the pre-empting power of 
patents is said to be marginal (Levin et al. 1987; Gilbert & Newbery 1982), and 
patents are not priority when UK firms set up their strategies to compete 
against incumbents and newcomers (Singh et al. 1998), patents may add 
sufficient value at the margin (Cohen et al. 2000). Yet, it seems that more value 
is added to larger firms than to smaller ones. What, perhaps, can be asserted 
from the results is that when the crude number of patents is used to measure 
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innovativeness there might be a bias towards larger firms; thus, we might be 
underestimating smaller firms innovative capacity. 
In terms of public policy not much can be said for we do not have 
evidence about the reasons underlying such behaviour. A recent study by 
Derwent (2000) extends the initial study of Hall et al. (1999) for the UK to the 
European scale. As it is particularly concerned about SMEs it might be helpful. 
For example, that study found that SMEs in the UK are less likely to apply for 
patents than their European counterparts. A particular reason for not pursuing 
patent protection pointed out both by UK SMEs and other European SMEs was 
that patents are not relevant for their line of business. There is also a belief that 
the patent system does not fit SMEs needs. Moreover, the threat of litigation 
puts smaller firms outside the patent system. It is argued by that study that 
such behaviour reflects a poor understanding of the patenting process by 
smaller firms. That study advocates that a SME-oriented campaign could be 
valuable to elucidate patenting issues. But this view may not necessarily be true 
if most SMEs are not innovative. The justification, therefore, as to the 
irrelevance of patents for their line of business may be true, especially because it 
is likely that small firms produce quite different products than large firms in the 
same sector. So, a policy oriented towards smaller firms should perhaps be 
segmented by the needs of these firms that might not necessarily be patents per 
se. But if a patent policy is of concern there is still a question: Is such effort 
worth it? As patenting is a sporadic activity, and dynamic economies of scale 
are only found after a somewhat high threshold (Geroski et al. 1997), perhaps 
198 
little can be done to change SMEs perceptions. Nevertheless, a broader 
spectrum of smaller firms could be motivated to use the patent system if more 
attention from policy makers was devoted to post-patenting issues such as 
renewal, out-licensing, and especially litigation (Kingston 2001). 
Innovative capacity was detected to be positively associated with an 
increase in the importance of patents, when appropriation intent was not taken 
into account. Thus hypothesis H1 that the more innovative a firm, the more 
likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents could not be refuted. 
Innovative capacity was also explored under an ex-post form by measuring how 
the introduction of a product novel to the market would impact on the 
importance of patents. The results converge to the same point: the more 
innovative firms in UK manufacturing seem to regard patents more important 
than the less innovative ones do (at least according to the metrics used in this 
study). We recognize, however, the limitations of the metrics employed. 
Unfortunately, there was nothing we could do to improve the 'quality' of the 
metrics used. Hence these limitations should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results. For example, having a higher percentage of personnel 
with a technical background may not make a firm more innovative. Also, the 
ex-post measurement used is very subjective since introduction does not mean 
commercial success. And even if it were able to describe commercial success it 
would not reveal the extent of this success. 
As the findings regarding innovative capacity are not based solely on 
R&D, smaller firms are also being 'heard'. Thereby, it seems fair to argue that 
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these results are in line with our expectations. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
metrics used, what the findings suggest is that if patents are more important for 
the most innovative firms, they might to a certain degree be playing their role in 
fostering innovation. As a result wealth creation might take place (though it is 
not known whether higher R&D intensities are a result of patent races and, 
therefore, common pool problems are eroding wealth creation). Our data set 
does not allow us to go deeper into whether patents are fostering innovation, an 
issue of concern for policy makers. Nevertheless, in controlling for firm size our 
estimation results regarding innovative capacity indicate that being small does 
not preclude a firm from regarding patents as important, as long as this smaller 
firm is an innovative one. Thus, smaller innovative firms and larger innovative 
firms seem to assign a higher importance to patents than their less innovative 
counterparts do. Thus, a patent policy oriented towards high-tech start-up firms 
may be pointless if it just underpins small high-tech firms' existing perceptions 
of the importance of patents. From a managerial standpoint, the results suggest 
that more attention should be paid to patents when, regardless of firm size, 
relatively large resources (and time) are being devoted to the creation of 
technological innovations. 
Another result from this study is that partnerships with universities 
seem to influence the perceived importance of patents. Firms which set up 
partnerships with universities are more likely to regard patents as more 
important than firms that do not establish this type of partnership. Thus, 
hypothesis H5 was not falsified. This result could be expected to a certain 
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degree since firms may wish to avoid losing proprietary control over the output 
of this type of partnership. Especially, because it is well known that an 
important element of university researchers' reputation building process is the 
sharing of their work with their peers. If they do so before a patent is applied 
for, property rights will not be secured. Hence, firms engaged in this type of 
collaboration will be better off if they seek patent protection before the 
invention is publicly disclosed somewhere else. 
The question that arises is whether this would also hold for other types 
of partners. To understand whether the nature of the partner causes any change 
in the perceived importance of patents, parallel models were estimated 
investigating how the estimates for partnership differed across types of partner. 
More specifically, four other partners were studied: firms within own group, 
suppliers, clients, and competitors. The results are reported in Table 8131. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the results are that for no other partnership is the 
importance of patents increased. That is, only joint-innovation projects with 
universities seem to be conducive to a higher likelihood of firms assigning a 
higher importance to patents. This might be a surprising result because a 
previous study of Brouwner & Kleinknetch (1999) indicates that R&D 
collaborations increase firms' propensities to patent. We should then expect a 
positive (and significant) impact of the estimates of innovation partner variable 
on the importance of patents. 
131 The same sort of results were achieved in models (3) and (4). 
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Table 8- Effects of Innovation Partner on the Importance of Patents 
Type of 
Variants of model (1) Variants of model (2) 
partner Coeff. a 
Watestld 
p-value Coeff. a 
Wald 
p-value test 
Within group -0.029 -0.11 0.909 0.142 0.79 0.428 
(0.255) (0.179) 
Suppliers -0.221 -0.90 0.370 -0.013 -0.07 0.941 
(0.246) (0.175) 
Customers -0.034 -0.14 0.888 -0.158 0.88 0.378 
(0.244) (0.179) 
Competitors -0.359 -0.82 0.413 0.015 0.05 0.959 
(0.438) (0.294) 
Universities 0.608 2.43 0.015 0.506 2,68 0.007 
(0.250) (0.189) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
One possible interpretation rests with empirical evidence by Hagedoorn 
et al. (2003) that the number of joint-patents is positively associated with 
previous experience in sharing this type of property rights and is not associated 
with previous R&D alliances. So, it may be that firms have learned to share 
property rights with universities more quickly than with other partners. The 
findings might also be a result of the degree of innovativeness involved in 
partnerships of this type. Although the innovation process receives feedback 
from various sources (von Hippel 1988), collaborations with universities in 
research projects are likely to comprise innovations of more exploratory, or 
basic, nature. That is, there seems to be a movement of industries towards 
science base (Trajtenberg et al. 1997). On the one hand, it can be argued that the 
basic character of university research does not lead to patentable subject matter 
(one of the patentability criteria is for the invention to have industrial 
applicability). On the other hand, the output of a joint-project with a university 
is more likely to be a breakthrough innovation than the output of other types of 
collaborations, though this argument can be disputed. 
202 
Adding to that, relationships between researchers are not only built over 
time but also dependent on successful and trustful exchanges (Bout- 2000). Are 
the findings suggesting that this trustful exchange between private firms and 
universities still needs to be consolidated? It is very unlikely that this is the 
driving force. We conjecture that the very nature of the university researchers' 
profession described earlier (i. e., scientific publications) is determinant. If so, it 
is likely that firms consider that knowledge generated from partnerships with 
universities is more likely to leak out than with other partners, and hence 
stronger appropriability should be exercised. So, the results could be suggesting 
a more defensive approach to information disclosure than to the control of 
property rights (or the importance of the output itself) when university 
collaborations are consolidated. For obvious reasons, technological 
collaborations with other partners also demand the exercise of proprietary 
control. However, as public disclosure is of less concern with respect to other 
types of partners than with universities, what is likely to be at stake is the extent 
of the control of property rights itself, rather than the disclosure of information. 
In addition, universities have increasingly seen collaborations with industries as 
an important source of revenue and income (Panagopoulos 2003), which means 
that they need to fulfil industries expectations if a successful relationship is 
aimed; certainly, an important issue regards intellectual property rights. 
Perhaps these results are good news for policy-makers because one 
possible interpretation is that the tax payers' contribution might be productive, 
that is, it results in potentially useful innovations. Moreover, the strengthening 
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of appropriability conditions in this type of partnership may be one of the 
alternatives to stimulate a closer relationship between industry and academia. 
However, this is debatable because if the outcome of these partnerships is 
publicly funded, appropriation of the results by a few agents may not 
necessarily be desirable. Although the data available do not show the structure 
of these partnerships, or the nature of the outcome of these partnerships, the 
findings may suggest that innovation collaboration between firms and 
universities should not be overlooked by policy makers. Thus, as suggested by 
Foray & Steinmueller (2003) a policy is needed to preserve and, maybe, 
stimulate this type of partnership and it has to be a careful one because, 
according to the authors, such collaborations have to fulfil the expectations of 
private firms as to appropriability conditions without missing the sense of 
collectiveness. 
Further evidence from the estimated results indicates that patents 
become more important when competition is more severe. The results suggest 
that competition is likely to be conducive to an increase in the perceived 
importance of patents. Even when appropriation intent is controlled for, there is 
a relationship between a higher level of competition and the importance of 
patents. Although when R&D intensity is taken into account competition has no 
impact on the importance of patents, the impact of market structure should not 
be ignored. This is because R&D intensity represents to a certain degree the 
level of competition a firm faces. Moreover, the average size of firms in the 
sample is larger when R&D is accounted for than when R&D is not accounted 
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for. Therefore, those who invest in R&D are very unlikely to focus their 
activities simply on local or regional markets (no more than 100 miles from 
where they are located). Further, the UK competitive environment needs not 
necessarily lag behind the international arena and firms (larger ones, in 
particular) may need to seek the same level of competitiveness than 
multinationals. On the one hand, under severe competition deficiencies of 
patents can be more noticeable, but on the other their virtues can be more 
pronounced. Thus, the importance of patents seems to be sensitive to the size of 
the market where a firm operates (which is a proxy for level of competition). 
Our results re hypothesis H3 (i. e., the higher the level of competition a firm 
faces, the more likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents) suggest 
we cannot reject it. 
The results also indicate that the relationship between the importance of 
patents and the support received by the government is positive and significant, 
if appropriation intent is not taken into account and the sample is not restricted 
to larger firms on average. That is, hypothesis H4 (i. e., firms that receive 
government support are less likely to place a higher importance on patents) 
could be rejected. However, the estimate for government support in model (1) is 
not only insignificant but also goes in the opposite direction of the coefficient of 
model (2). It seems that size of the respondent plays a role in the relationship 
with government. Perhaps the government supports smaller and larger firms in 
different ways, or even their own size makes them perceive the outcome of their 
relationship with government differently. 
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Thus, larger firms could perceive their relationship with the government 
as somewhat harming the private returns they could get from exclusive 
property rights granted by a patent. Smaller firms, however, may perceive that 
one of the incentives given by government is the possibility they have to 
enforce their intellectual property rights, and hence compete against larger 
firms. This argument seems to receive support from an analysis of the 
composition of the sub-samples which declared to have received government 
support. The sub-set of firms that declared to have received support in model (1) 
consists of 56% of small, medium-sized firms (less than 250 employees) and 
44% of large firms (250 employees or above). In turn, the group of firms that 
reported to have received government support in model (2) is composed of 75% 
of small, medium-sized firms and 25% of large firms. Thereby, if our reasoning 
is correct, a larger proportion of smaller firms receiving support from the 
government is conducive to a higher likelihood of assigning more importance 
to patents (holding other things constant). Therefore, if patents are more 
important to larger firms than to smaller ones, this turns the other way round 
when they receive government support for their innovative activities. 
Patents can be a strong or a weak protective device, and engineering 
around patents is likely to be the norm rather than the exception. On other 
occasions patents can be very effective in stopping others from coming up with 
a competing alternative to the existing innovation. Notwithstanding, firms are 
not expected to rely solely upon one mechanism to build up a tighter 
appropriation, though under certain circumstances a particular mechanism can 
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be more adequate than others. Mansfield (1985) observed that information leaks 
out. But if information may leak out, it may also leak in. This means that firms' 
appropriation is an exercise in controlling flows of knowledge and this control, 
according to the results that examined the importance of patents, seems to 
depend on the appropriability regime under which a firm operates. The 
observed variability of the importance of patents across industrial sectors did 
not reject hypothesis H7, indicating that patents are not only important for 
pharmaceutical firms. 
In general, the rejection (or not) of the hypotheses above was made not 
regarding the impact of appropriation intent. Had appropriation intent been 
accounted for, a few results would be different. Although it seems that the 
overall appropriation intent exercises a strong influence on the perceived 
importance of patents, the index (SAI) created to measure this intent has 
limitations that could not be overcome. The four-point scale used in the 
questionnaire will always give a margin for criticism because, for example, 
what means 'high importance' for one firm in an industry may have a different 
meaning for another firm in another industry. Moreover, the findings cannot be 
extrapolated beyond the mechanisms used in the questionnaire. For example, as 
there was no space in the questionnaire for trade secrets, 'secrecy' should be 
interpreted as keeping things secret by any means rather than a confidentiality 
agreement contract. Thus, there is 'room for improvement' in this respect. 
So, the results from other models (model (2), in particular) should not be 
disregarded. Despite the limitations of the appropriation intent index, it is hard 
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to believe that hypothesis H6 (i. e., the higher the appropriation intent of a firm, 
the more likely it will be to place a higher importance on patents) should be 
refuted, though one may cast doubt on the magnitude of the impact. An 
alternative to the index created would be to use factor analysis. This would be 
more useful if we were investigating how other mechanisms of appropriability 
are related to patents, and this is, in fact, investigated in the next chapter. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Patents have long been used as indicators of inventive activity, although the 
limitations of this practice were always known. A body of empirical work has 
emerged that examines R&D productivity by means of investigating the patent- 
R&D relationship. That empirical literature has explored what makes one firm 
more inclined to patent than others. Such evidence has also proved to be useful 
for those interested in the patent system because it is, even if imperfectly, a 
documentation of who benefits most from that system. Thus, the usefulness of 
the patent system in correcting market imperfections can be analysed. 
Holding other things constant, we assume that patents are more 
important for those who use them most. So, we expect that the attributes that 
make firms patent more are the same that make them perceive patents as of 
higher importance. Nevertheless, the empirical literature has also shown that 
there are a number of reasons patents are applied for that go beyond the 
protective purpose (e. g., attracting financial resources, strategic behaviour). 
Moreover, actual facts reported by the empirical literature suggest that even 
when patents are not very effective as a means of protection they are applied 
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for. As a result, in using patent numbers to measure the importance of the 
fundamental attribute of the patent system (i. e., stop copying), the results could 
be misleading. 
This chapter advances our existing knowledge on that point by 
examining what firms' attributes make them perceive patents more (or less) 
important as a protective device. We use ordered logit models to analyse a 
unique survey-based data set from the third round of the UK Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS 3). Our results, to a large degree although not totally 
(see below), match previous studies of this kind. This suggests that contrary to 
our expectations patent numbers may be a good proxy for evaluating the 
importance of patents as a mechanism of protection, but only if firms' other 
attributes are controlled for. This also suggests that despite the multifaceted 
role played by patents the main purpose of those who use the patent system is 
to protect their inventions against copying. However, our results reinforce the 
view that the use of patents as an innovation indicator needs to be carefully 
interpreted because they may understate the innovativeness of firms for a 
number of reasons (e. g., size, industrial sector). 
Overall, our findings are that one cannot reject the hypotheses that i) the 
importance of patents varies across industrial sectors and by firm size, ii) 
patents are more important for firms with greater innovative capacity, iii) 
competition is to a certain extent conducive to a greater importance for patents, 
iv) innovation collaboration and government support may increase the 
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importance of patents depending on the agents engaged in these activities, and 
v) the importance of patents is also dependent on firms' appropriation intent. 
Contrary to Taylor & Silberston's (1973) findings for the UK, our results 
indicate that propensities to patent in the UK do vary by firm size. We 
conjecture that the reason underlying our different result rests with sampling 
issues and not with reduction of the importance of patents amongst smaller 
firms over time. 
Another difference between our results and an earlier study on firms' 
propensities to patent regards the impact of innovation collaborations, 
Brouwner & Kleinknecht (1999) studied propensities to patent in the Dutch 
manufacturing industry and found that R&D collaborations positively impact 
on those propensities. Our results corroborate their results only in part; we 
found that in the UK firms that have established joint innovation collaborations 
with universities deem patents as of more importance than firms that have not 
set up such a partnership. But, somewhat surprising, we did not find that the 
same applies to other types of partnerships. As the estimates of Brouwner & 
Kleinknecht (1999) are at more aggregate level than ours we do not know to 
what extent our results really differ. As partnerships and intellectual property 
seem to have become topical, and on the basis of our existing knowledge, it 
seems important to ask why different partners impact differently on firms' 
propensities to patent; an issue that clearly deserves future research. 
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Our findings have also shown that firms' interest in appropriation is 
conducive to more emphasis on patent protection, though our analysis has the 
limitation of not identifying what makes firms be more (or less) interested in 
appropriation. If appropriation intent mirrors firms' strategies, an avenue of 
research that could be followed is the examination of patents zýis-ä-cis other 
mechanisms in firms' appropriation strategies. Especially because the 
explanation for that result may lie in one of the limitations of this research, that 
is, the way appropriation intent is measured. 
Although we have examined several attributes relating to firms' 
perception of the importance of patents, a clear limitation of our study is that 
we have not been able to identify whether the direction of the causality is 
correct132. In the absence of a proper technique to answer this question within 
the econometric framework employed we leave this enterprise for future 
research. Another limitation of our investigation regards the measurement of 
the importance of patents. As our metrics relies on a likert-type scale, it is 
difficult to predict the consistency of respondents answers133. Moreover, it is 
hard to assess whether the perception of importance of patents was described in 
general terms, or on the basis of the most valuable innovations. 
132 For example, more innovative firms were detected to place more value on patents. Could it be that 
because patents are perceived very important that firms invest more in innovative activity? 
133 Arundel (2001) proposes a method to overcome the potential problem of internal consistency of 
respondents' answers, which relies upon differences in the importance of appropriability mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACT OF THE IMPORTANCE 
OF APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS 
ON THE DECISION TO PATENT 
AND THE LEVEL OF PATENTING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Creation of knowledge may not necessarily bring competitive advantage if 
rivals hold other complementary assets that mitigate the returns accrued to the 
knowledge generator, or if rivals are able to easily duplicate this knowledge 
(Teece 1986). In order to avoid, at least in part, the erosion of profits from their 
knowledge assets firms need to control various appropriability mechanisms 
accordingly. For example, although knowledge can be kept secret from rivals, 
this is not always possible (sooner or later they may have access to it). 
Alternatively, knowledge can be disclosed to a certain degree but, at the same 
time, it can be made non-tradable by rival firms. To this end, intellectual 
property rights can be secured. Moreover, firms can rely on lead-time 
advantage in an attempt to appropriate the rent streams as much as possible 
before a competing alternative emerges. Further, a firm can build upon its 
capabilities to create innovations that are so complex that other firms are not 
able to imitate for their lack of equivalent capabilities. 
Thus, attention to the use of appropriability mechanisms is an important 
approach, though not enough, to understand how firms capture value from 
knowledge assets. If on the one hand the literature has recognized the 
importance of these mechanisms (e. g., Winter 2000; Teece 1986), on the other 
hand little is known as to whether they complement or substitute for one 
another. In this chapter we advance current knowledge by looking at how 
various mechanisms are related to patents, though we do not go as far as asking 
how they are related to one another. In particular, we study how firms' 
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perception of the importance of several mechanisms of appropriability impacts 
on the decision to patent and the level of patenting. 
Following a similar structure to the previous chapter, the next section 
puts the research hypotheses forward. The third section describes the variables 
used in the estimated models. The fourth section explains why a particular 
econometric framework was employed. The fifth section presents the findings. 
The sixth section discusses the results. Finally, in the seventh section, 
conclusions are drawn. 
5.2 HYPOTHESES 
The literature reviewed in chapter 2 detected a dispute as to the complementary 
or substitutability of mechanisms of appropriability, especially patents and 
secrecy. This chapter examines the interaction between patents and other 
appropriability mechanisms. For the sake of simplicity, the substitutability 
standpoint is addressed in most operational hypotheses below, though there is 
no particular bias against the contrary. It is assumed that if the substitutability 
stance prevails a higher importance given to a particular mechanism of 
appropriability has the opposite effect on both the decision to apply for the first 
patent and, given that the first patent application is filed, the number of patents 
applied for. The hypotheses were formulated in pairs; one relating to the 
decision to patent and another relating to the number of patents applied for. A 
number of reasons explain this approach, and are described later in this chapter. 
Perhaps the main reason is that such an approach gives better visibility to the 
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relationship between patents and other methods of appropriation. The 
following hypotheses were tested: 
H8a: The more important secrecy is perceived to be, the less likely a 
patent will be applied for. 
H8b: The more important secrecy is perceived to be, the lower the level 
of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
H9a: The more important another category of IPR is perceived to be, the 
less likely a patent will be applied for. 
H9b: The more important another category of IPR is perceived to be, the 
lower the level of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
H10a: The more important lead-time is perceived to be, the less likely a 
patent will be applied for. 
H10b: The more important lead-time is perceived to be, the lower the 
level of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
H11a: The more important design complexity is perceived to be, the less 
likely a patent will be applied for. 
H11b: The more important design complexity is perceived to be, the 
lower the level of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
H12a: The higher the appropriation intent of a firm, the more likely a 
patent will be applied for. 
H12b: The higher the appropriation intent of a firm, the higher the level 
of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
The set of hypotheses that do not assume that patents and other 
mechanisms are substitutes are those which infer the impact of appropriation 
intent on the decision to patent and level of patenting (H12a and H12b). The 
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substitutability standpoint is not assumed in the construction of our proxy for 
appropriation intent because of operational constraints (mathematical 
convenience, more specifically). 
5.3 VARIABLES 
Similar to the previous chapter, the variables employed in our regression 
analysis come from the CIS 3 questionnaire, and they were used to test the 
above hypotheses. Most variables used in the estimation of the model in this 
chapter were employed in the regression analysis of the previous chapter. They 
are described here again in order to reinforce the reasons underlying their use. 
Response variable 
(1) Patenting. Our dependent variable is the number of patents applied for 
in the period 1998-2000, and thus is a non-negative integer. A zero 
outcome means either that a firm had no patentable inventions or that it 
decided not to apply for a patent although having a patentable invention. 
The number of patent applications comes from the first part of the 
question 15 of the CIS 3 instrument that asks the following: 
"How many patents, if any, did your enterprise apply for during the period 
1998 to 2000? " 
Explanatory variables 
(i) Appropriability mechanisms. The main objective of this study is to 
examine how an emphasis on a particular appropriability mechanism 
impacts both on the decision to patent and on how many patents to 
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apply for. In the absence of a better measure for the extent that a 
mechanism is used, the degree of importance of each mechanism is 
employed instead. This proxy derives from the item 2 of the question 13 
of the survey instrument, as described elsewhere (chapter 4) in this thesis. 
Incorporating these variables in the model we can test most of our 
research hypotheses. So, the importance assigned to confidentiality 
agreements and/ or to secrecy tests hypotheses H8a and H8b. 
Hypotheses H9a and H9b are tested by the parameters of the model 
which employs the firms' perception of the importance of copyright, 
registration of design, and/or trademarks. Firms' perception of the 
importance of lead-time is used to test hypotheses H10a and H10b. 
Finally, hypotheses H11a and H11b are tested by the results of the model 
using the importance of the complexity of the design of the innovation. 
Appropriation intent. Although the use of each individual mechanism 
might suffice, an analysis based upon each mechanism does not allow an 
understanding of the full picture, i. e. how appropriation intent is 
correlated to the decision to patent and to the level of patenting. To 
overcome at least in part this limitation a composite of the mechanisms is 
used. This variable (described in chapter 4 as SAI index) accounts for the 
overall appropriation intent, that is, it is assumed that the more (and to a 
greater extent) mechanisms are used the more firms intend to 
appropriate the returns from their innovations. This, however, does not 
mean that they succeed. Nor does it mean that they have a better 
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performance than their counterparts. In addition to the 'stated 
appropriation intent' (SAI) index, we also employed a composite 
variable derived from factor analysis. This is a step forward compared to 
the analysis carried out in the previous chapter because it allows us to 
overcome some deficiencies presented by our index, such as the same 
weight on each mechanism in firms' appropriation strategies. Thus, 
hypotheses H12a and H12b can be tested accordingly. More details on 
the 'factor' variable will be given in the section that presents the results. 
Control variables 
(i) Innovative capacity (ex-ante). In many ways the number of patents 
derives from the number of patentable inventions available, although 
this may not necessarily apply. The reason is that firms can apply for 
several, and somewhat similar, patents at the same time in order to 
decide later which application will progress in the patent office. Talks 
with personnel dealing with patent issues, however, have shown that 
this is not very common, especially regarding smaller firms. Also, the 
number of patent applications and number of inventions do not have a 
1: 1 relationship. However, it is commonly accepted in the literature (Hall 
& Ziedonis 2001; Cincera 1997) that the number of patents is a result of 
firms knowledge stock, for which R&D expenses are widely used as a 
proxy. One would expect patents to be applied for after R&D expenses 
have been incurred, and hence past R&D would be most suitable for our 
estimations. However, due to the high within-firm correlation of R&D 
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over time and its marginal change the results of using a lagged structure 
are roughly the same as the results with contemporaneous levels of R&D 
(Blundell et al. 2002; Hall & Ziedonis 2001; Pakes & Griliches 1980). Thus, 
our R&D expenses are for the year 2000. We use R&D in its logarithmic 
(natural) form in order to linearise the relationship between R&D and 
patents for in most regressions of this type log values result in a better fit 
(as measured by the log-likelihood) than the inclusion of the level values 
of the variables (Liao 1994). We also use another proxy for measuring 
knowledge stock (ex-ante), namely the percentage of staff holding a 
scientific/ engineering degree. The advantage of this variable as 
compared to R&D outlays is that the latter may provide biased results 
towards larger firms since smaller ones may not report this cost for not 
having formal R&D function. As a starting point, we briefly compared 
the two models134. Although the results have shown that R&D is a better 
proxy to capture patent-related innovative activity, by accounting for 
R&D not only the sample size is reduced but also smaller firms are 
underrepresented135. 
(ii) Innovative capacity (ex-post). A dummy variable for whether or not a 
firm introduced a product new to its industry was used. This variable 
may portray a firm's degree of innovativeness because by being novel to 
11# The results can be provided upon request. 
135 When R&D is accounted for the sample average sales and number of employees are of approximately 
51.2 million pounds and 323, respectively. In turn, when percentage of personnel holding technical skills 
is employed the average sales and number of employees are reduced to 19.9 million pounds and 174 
employees, respectively (figures for year 2000). 
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the whole industry the product is new to not only the innovator, and 
therefore it differs from existing innovations. We use an ex-post variable 
for innovative capacity because it may supplement any deficiency that 
the ex-ante innovative capacity variable may have, since this 
characteristic may be pivotal in determining patenting activity (Cohen 
1995). 136 
(iii) Firm size. Size may pick up a set of firm characteristics, such as scale 
economies in the patenting application process. So, different number of 
patent applications can be a result of firms' capacity to allocate more 
resources to patenting rather than being more (or less) innovative (Licht 
& Zoz 2000; Scherer 1983). To measure firm size we used the logarithm 
of its turnover in the year 2000. Differently from other variables used in 
our analyses, this variable derives from the IDBR records. The best-fit 
rationale for the logarithmic form of R&D also applies in this case. The 
number of employees was also used in order to account for firm size, but 
there was no significant difference in the results that would justify its use 
as opposed to turnover. 
(ivy Size of market. As the question about the number of patent applications 
does not differentiate between patents applied for to the UK Patent 
Office and to other Patent Offices worldwide, it is likely that firms 
r36 We have also examined that the relationships between the ex-ante and the ex-post variables are not 
strong enough to cause collinearity. 
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having operations abroad have patent applications abroad as well137. As 
a result a larger number of patents would not indicate that a firm is more 
innovative but rather that either it operates in various markets or it 
foresees trading in these markets in the near future (Patel & Pavitt 1995). 
So, indicator variables were introduced to represent firms' largest 
markets. The reference market was initially chosen to be the national one, 
and the estimates reliant upon the following markets: i) local (situated 
within approximately 50 miles), ii) regional (situated within 
approximately 100 miles), and iii) international. 
(v) University partnerships. A dummy variable was employed to control 
for companies that establish innovation partnerships with universities. 
Nowadays there is an increasing pressure for universities to appropriate 
their knowledge (Henderson et al. 1998). 
(vi) Government support. It has long been recognized that government 
support interferes in patenting activities (Taylor & Silberston 1973; 
Scherer 1965). The literature advocates that patents may become less 
important for those firms that receive support from the government, 
especially financial support. So, the incentives for innovators to pursue 
patent protection would be limited when this type of support is received. 
According to Griliches (1990), one possible reason is that governmental 
support implies a modest license fee to be charged if other firms become 
137 It does not mean that those which do not have operations abroad have not pursued international patent 
routes. This can happen if firms envisage a possibility of exploring the innovation in the corresponding 
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interested in the innovation. Although this argument may not necessarily 
hold nowadays, or this does not at all apply to the UK, we introduced a 
dummy variable to account for this possibility. 
(Vll) Industry. This study does not focus on the industry level but rather on 
the firm level. As the number of patents may vary across industrial 
sectors (Scherer 1983), a series of dummies, reflecting different market 
conditions, could be controlled for. We used a single dummy instead, 
which distinguishes industries where the commercializable final 
innovation consists of numerous separately patentable elements 
('complex' innovation based industries) from industries where relatively 
few elements comprise the marketed innovation ('discrete' innovation 
based industries). This is in line with recent studies138 (e. g., Cohen et al. 
2002; Kusonaki et al. 1998). Appendix 5 gives some detail as to how these 
industries differ from each other. The 'complex' industry has a higher 
average number of patent applications than has the 'discrete' industry, 
though the latter has a larger range139. As we shall see in the next section 
they do not seem to be significantly different in statistic terms. The 
'complex' industry has also a higher mean proportion of staff holding a 
scientific/ engineering degree. In turn, the 'discrete' industry accounts 
country in the future. 
138 Following Cohen et al. (2002) procedure, industrial sectors with UK SIC 92 codes less than 29 (e. g., food, 
beverages, and tobacco, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metals) were categorized as 'discrete' whereas 
'complex' industries were assigned to sectors with UK SIC 92 codes 29 or above (e. g., machinery, 
communication equipments, medical, precision and optical instruments, office and computing 
equipments). 
139 The maximum number of patent applications (300) comes from pharmaceuticals. 
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for a larger average sales. Both industries supply mainly the national 
market; but the complex industry is more internationally oriented than is 
the discrete one. In terms of estimation, the use of several industry 
dummies allows the models to have a better goodness-of-fit (pseudo-R), 
but the overall model performance (AIC, BIC)14° seems to impro%-e when 
a single dummy is used to control for 'complex' industry instead (sec 
Appendix 6). 
The variables above were used to empirically test our research 
hypotheses. For the sake of parsimony we undertook an analysis to select a base 
specification model before estimating the models with the explanatory variables 
of interest; the analysis is described later in this chapter before presenting the 
results. The econometric framework within which our regressions were run is 
described in the next section. 
5.4 ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
In using the number of patent applications as dependent variable our 
estimation techniques have to take into account the non-negative integer nature 
of this variable. Thus, it departs from the traditional least squares estimation by 
using a specification that accounts for such characteristic. The framework of 
count data models is, therefore, the most appropriate in this case (Greene 2003). 
140 The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) imposes a greater penalty for additional parameter than 
does AIC. BIC tends to be more consistent and efficient than AIC (Shono 2000). 
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This category of models has been refined in many cases by the study of the 
R&D-patents relationship141. 
A starting point for the study of count distribution is the Poisson model. 
It specifies that each yi (number of occurrences) is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution with parameter A,. The probability density of yi is given by 
Pr(Yi - Yi) =e 
ýt 
f yi = 0,1,2, ... (5.1) Yi 
where Xi is related to the regressors xi in a log linear form to ensure its non- 
negativity 
In 2i = x; ß (5.2) 
while ß is the associated vector of unknown parameters. Thus, the Poisson 
distribution has expected value A, and has variance A as well. This equality of 
the two conditional moments is a characteristic of the Poisson distribution, and 
is referred to as equidispersion. In many cases, however, a violation of the 
variance assumption is observed and as a consequence, in contrast to other 
multi-parameter distribution, a violation of the Poisson assumption is also 
observed (Winkelmann 2003). Departures from equidispersion can be 
underdispersion (variance smaller than the mean) or overdispersion (variance 
larger than the mean). Overall, it is not uncommon to find the latter in patent 
counts. A possible reason for such phenomenon is the existence of unobserved 
141 See, for instance, Blundell et al. (2002), Blundell et al. (1999), Crepon & Duguet (1997a, b), and Hausman 
et al. (1984). 
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heterogeneity that makes the Poisson distribution not adequate to explain the 
number of occurrences of an event. In the patent framework, for example, there 
are uncertainties and risks inherent to R&D activities as well as to the 
commercialization of innovations, firms different capabilities and strategies, to 
name but a few. Moreover, there is a possibility of contagion, which is the 
influence of past events on the occurrence of future events. Sav, for instance, 
that subsequent patents are applied for because a previous patent application 
was found to relate to a really valuable invention and the innovator is mining 
the field with other patents to enhance protection. In this case, this occurrence 
dependence is also known as positive contagion. 
So, in order to relax the restrictive assumption of equidispersion and to 
better model count distributions where departures from the Poisson 
distribution are observed other classes of models have been developed 142. They 
allow for unobserved heterogeneity by modifying the mean function Ai with a 
multiplicative error iii, that is 
I 
where both )t and ui are unobserved. It is then assumed that u; has a known 
density function &J, and hence the joint density function of yl and ui can be 
expressed as 
f (yi, Ili) =f (yi { ut)g(l{1) (5.3) 
112 See Winkelmann (2003) and Cameron & Trivedi (1998) for a more complete survey of these models. 
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from which the marginal distribution of yi can be obtained by integrating the 
joint distribution over u;. Thus, 
f(Y)= Ff (yu)dit = 
Ff (yA-)dA. 
As f (y I ii) is assumed to be Poisson distributed we get 
f(Y)= 
AY 
e 
zuKYg(it)dii 
Yf 
(5.4) 
(5.3) 
and g(it) can be a parametric density function or a semi-parametric one143. 
Although robustness can be gained when using a semi-parametric assumption, 
efficiency is lost as compared to an introduction of a parametric assumption 
(Winkelmann 2003). One of the most widely used parametric forms of g(tt), and 
of particular interest of this study, is the gamma distribution, which allows the 
integral above to have a closed form, and hence is mathematically convenient. 
The result of this Poisson-gamma mixture is the negative binomial model in the 
form 
f(yI a, )-- 
r(a+y) aaIY 
ý 
r(a)I'(y+1) A +a A +a 
(5.6) 
where the expected value of y is A (as in the Poisson distribution) and variance 
equals to 2+22/ a. This negative binomial model with a quadratic variance 
function is also known as 'Negbin II'. This is so because it can be 
reparameterized in different ways such that the variance assumes various forms, 
143 Gurrnu et al. (1999). 
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though the expected value remains the same. For example, one of the 
parameterizations leads the variance to be a linear function of the mean. This 
variant is referred to by Cameron & Trivedi (1986) as'Negbin I'. Winkelmann & 
Zimmermann (1991) proposed a more generalized form known as 'Negbin ' 
which presents mean A, as before, but a more generalized variance A (1 + 0722k 
Negbin I is obtained by setting k=0, and Negbin II by setting k=1. Moreover, if 
6 equals zero a Poisson distribution is observed. Thus, the Poisson model is 
said to be nested in negative binomial models. 
Unfortunately, neither negative binomial models nor Poisson models 
might be appropriate if a large number of zero observations is observed -a 
common phenomenon with respect to patents. These models treat the zero 
outcomes of the data generating process in the same way as the positive 
outcomes. In doing so, they neglect that a zero outcome may be a result of 
another decision-making process, that is, whether or not to apply for a patent, 
which may be a strategic decision. It is reasonable, therefore, to model this 
process of deciding to apply for patents differently from the process generating 
positive outcomes. One approach that takes into account this difference is the 
hurdle models, where a binomial process is assumed to govern the binary 
outcome of whether or not apply for a patent and, once the hurdle is crossed, a 
truncated-at-zero count data model governs the positive values (Mullahy 1986). 
A problem that arises when applying these models to patents is that they 
assume that there is only a single type of zero outcome (Gurmu 1998), that is, a 
decision of not applying for patents. However, zero outcomes can be not only a 
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result of a negative decision as to file a patent but also a consequence of the 
impossibility of filing a patent because neither an invention is available to be 
patented nor an invention meets patentability criteria. In order to account for 
the existence of two regimes governing zero outcomes zero-inflated models 
seem to be more appropriate, namely zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated 
negative binomial models. Like their hurdle-at-zero counterparts zero inflated 
models combine a variable ct, which separates zero outcomes from positive 
outcomes, with a latent variable y; such that the observed count yl is defined 
by 
0 if cj=1 yý - Y* if c, =0 
(5.7) 
So, zero outcomes arise either from regime 1 (ci=1) or from regime 2 (ci=0, 
y; =0). Having said that, the probabilities for the outcomes should be identified. 
If the probability for ci=1 is denoted by wi the probability function of yi can be 
defined as follows 
f(Yi)=wid; +(1-c't)%(Yi) (5.8) 
where di =1-min {yi, 1{ and g(y) is the count data distribution function 
(Winkelmann 2003). Thus, the probability function of yi can be expressed as 
Pr(yi, 0)= c, )i+(1- CJi)S(O) 
Pr(yi=k)= (1- col)S(k), k=1,2,3,... 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
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In our case, u2 is modelled following the Lambert specification (1992), 
that is, as a logit function 
eXp(z, y) 
1+ exp(ziy) 
(5.11) 
where z, is the vector of covariates determining the probability of not applying 
for a patent and y is the parameter vector. 
Due to possible unobserved heterogeneity we will assume that g(. ) is a 
negative binomial probability function. Therefore, our estimation results derive 
from a zero-inflated negative binomial model and are obtained by maximizing 
the log-likelihood function of the model, which is given by 
A= 
Y+= 
ln(exp(z', y) + a(ln a- ln(exp(x',, ß) + a)) 
+Y ln(r(a + y1)/ r(a) +a ln(a -ln(exp(x; ß)) 
y; >o 
n 
+y; (Y 06 - ln(exp(xiß) + a)) - ln(1 + exp(zi)/)) (5.12) 1=1 
Although there is a reason underlying the choice of the probability 
distribution function, this assumption is also tested. Likelihood-ratio tests are 
used to compare nested models (i. e., zero-inflated Poisson) and non-nested 
models (i. e., negative binomial) are compared by the Vuong (1989) test. The 
results are reported in the next section. 
5.5 RESULTS 
Initial remarks 
From the outset it should be clear how the estimates of the zero-inflated 
negative binomial models are interpreted. Following standard estimation 
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techniques the estimates of the count part are interpreted as that a covariate 
with a positive sign means an increase in the probability of a larger number of 
patent applications. In turn, a covariate with a negative sign in the decision part 
means that there is a decrease in the probability that a firm will NOT apply for 
a patent. That is to say that a negative sign means an increase in the likelihood 
that a patent will be applied for. Therefore, opposite signs in the decision and in 
the count parts lend the same interpretation with respect to the probability of a 
positive outcome. 
Model selection 
Exploratory models were estimated in order to observe the impact of the 
replacement of R&D and industry dummies by percentage of scientific staff and 
complex/ discrete industry, respectively. Although the results (Appendix 6) 
suggest that this specification could be accepted, the initial insignificant results 
regarding i) largest market dummies and ii) support from the government 
indicate that a better specification could be sought. In fact, Appendix 5 suggests 
that there is nearly no difference between regional and local markets with 
respect to the participation of the 'complex' industry. In a new specification we 
use both markets as the baseline (model (1) - Table 9). We also observe in model 
(2), where the share of scientific personnel was not accounted for, that the 
results are pretty much the same compared to model (1), and an improved 
model performance is achieved (see AIC and BIC). Thus, for the sake of 
parsimony, we carried on our analysis without controlling for the percentage of 
staff with a scientific or engineering degree. Government support did not show 
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any significance in the models in Appendix 6 and in models (1) and (2) in Table 
9. The likelihood-ratio test indicated that, in fact, this variable could be removed 
from the model144, which led us to model (3) as our base specification (the 
performance of the model is also enhanced according to BIC). 
Table 9- Model Selection of the Determinants of the Decision 
and of the Level of Patenting in UK Manuf acturinga, b 
Covariates 
% Sci. /Eng. Staff 
Sales (Log) 
Novel Product 
National market 
Intl. market 
Gov. Support 
Univ. Partners. 
Complex 
Constant 
N 
Non-zero obs. 
Ln a 
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi-square 
Pseudo R2 
BIC 
AIC 
Vuong test 
LR test 
(1) (2) (3) 
Decision Count Decision Count Decision Count 
-0.006 0.024** 
(0.009) (0.010) 
-0.288*** 0.387*** -0.238*** 0.435*** _0.239** 0.427*** 
(0.101) (0.067) (0.089) (0.060) (0.094) (0.058) 
-2.225*** 0.305 -2.356*** 0.462* -2.401*** 0.472* 
(0.651) (0.272) (0.711) (0.270) (0.745) (0.266) 
-0.805 1.133** -0.554 1.352** -0.578 1.347*** 
(0.569) (0.563) (0.551) (0.525) (0.54"1) (0.512) 
-1.095* 2.012*** -0.893 2293*** -0.938 2.260*** 
(0.648) (0.615) (0.598) (0.552) (0.587) (0.539) 
-0.085 -0.171 -0.035 -0.123 
(0.400) (0.281) (0.396) (0.275) 
-2.498** 0.380 -2.807** 0.509 -2.867** 0.447 
(1.215) (0.379) (1.365) (0.357) (1.409) (0.332) 
-0.773** -0.276 -0.710** -0.065 -0.735** -0.080 
(0.300) (0.301) (0.290) (0.297) (0.287) (0.298) 
4.948*** -4.209*** 4.253*** 4.848*** 4.293*** -4.779*** 
(0.831) (0.779) 
2414 
316 
1.389*** 
-1560.38 
118.49*** 
0.144 
-15533,98 
1.309 
4.76*** 
3016.18*** 
(0.767) (0.748) 
2865 
354 
1.477*** 
-1780.53 
115.29*** 
0.144 
-19109.93 
1.255 
5.25*** 
4197.63*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %o. 
The reference markets are the local and regional ones. 
(0.776) (0.727) 
2902 
359 
1.495*** 
-1805,61 
117.04 
0.144 
-19407.29 
1.255 
5.24*** 
4236.04*** 
Likelihood ratio test was carried out for all variables but only government support was not significant 
(X2 = 0.21, p=0.8984). 
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Outcome 
The base specification model was then augmented by introducing our 
variables of interest, that is, the importance assigned to the mechanisms of 
appropriability. The results can be seen in Tables 10 and 111-3. 
Covariates 
Sales (Log) 
Novel product 
National market 
Intl, market 
Univ. partners. 
Complex 
Low import, d 
Medium import. d 
High import. d 
Constant 
N 
Non-zero obs. 
Ln a 
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi-square 
Pseudo R2 
BIC 
AIC 
Vuong test 
LR test 
1.393*** 
-1669.94 
141.72*** 
0.171 
-16064.74 
1.352 
4.56*** 
3957.97*** 
Decision Count 
-0.147 
(0.091) 
-2.062*** 
(0.672) 
-0.833 
(0.641) 
-0.979 
(0.710) 
-2.186*** 
(0.651) 
-0.871*** 
(0.306) 
-1.531*** 
(0.475) 
-2.095*** 
(0.653) 
-1.898*** 
(0.631) 
4.241*** 
0.413*** 
(0.059) 
0.377 
(0.246) 
1.169* 
(0.690) 
2.011*** 
(0.697) 
0.479 
(0.302) 
-0.113 
(0.279) 
0.479 
(0.341) 
0.885*** 
(0.327) 
0.635** 
(0.308) 
-4.799*** 
(0.907) (0.867) 
2491 
351 
1.534*** 
-1675.69 
111.56*** 
0.170 
-15965.10 
1.362 
4.15*** 
4160.33*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
h* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. 
The reference markets are the local and regional ones. 
a The baseline is the non-use of a mechanism. 
Decision Count 
-0.147 0.413*** 
(0.091) (0.059) 
-2.062*** 0.377 
(0.672) (0.246) 
-0.833 1.169* 
(0.641) (0.690) 
-0.979 2.011*** 
(0.710) (0.697) 
-2.186*** 0.479 
(0.651) (0.302) 
-0.871*** -0.113 
(0.306) (0.279) 
-1.531*** 0.479 
(0.475) (0.341) 
-2.095*** 0.885*** 
(0.653) (0.327) 
-1.898*** 0.635** 
(0.631) (0.308) 
4.241*** -4.799*** 
(0.907) (0.867) 
2471 
337 
1.422*** 
-1639.32 
114.87*** 
0.162 
-15861.68 
1.344 
4.80*** 
3839.74*** 
Decision Count 
-0.130 0.427*** 
(0.102) (0.061) 
-2.233*** 0.402 
(0.585) (0.251) 
-0.665 0.973* 
(0.643) (0.551) 
-0.998 1.730*** 
(0.701) (0.589) 
-2.348*** 0.572* 
(0.611) (0.323) 
-0.689* 0.166 
(0.389) (0.257) 
-2.107*** 0.210 
(0.600) (0.350) 
-3.045*** 0.362 
(0.982) (0.372) 
-2.719*** 0.800** 
(0.796) (0.331) 
4.120*** -4.803*** 
(0.967) (0.713) 
2483 
342 
1.425*** 
-1634.83 
124.44*** 
0.175 
-15976.34 
1.334 
4.67*** 
3804.48*** 
las Regarding the adequacy of the analytical framework, all models present both the Vuong and the 
likelihood-ratio tests significant. This means that the zero-inflate negative binomial model fits the patent 
applications distribution better than the negative binomial model and the zero-inflated Poisson model, 
respectively. 
Table 10 - Appropriability Mechanisms and Patenting: 
Results from Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Modelsa, b 
Conf. agreement Secrecy Copyright Reg. of design 
Decision Count 
-0.058 
(0.087) 
-2,033** 
(0.971) 
-0.219 
(0.943) 
-0,290 
(1.019) 
-1.480*** 
(0.528) 
-0.823** 
(0.341) 
-2.150*** 
(0.459) 
-2.139*** 
(0.481) 
-2,709*** 
(0.728) 
3.531*** 
(0.999) 
0.428*** 
(0.057) 
0.451 * 
(0.235) 
1.269* 
(0.681) 
1.966*** 
(0.725) 
0.408 
(0.336) 
-0.011 
(0.269) 
-0.259 
(0.413) 
0.610 
(0.390) 
0.731* 
(0.419) 
-5.091*** 
(0.896) 
2501 
349 
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The picture that emerges from the estimations is that the importance of 
each mechanism is significant in the decision part but not necessarily in the 
count part. On the one hand, the use of each mechanism implies an increase in 
the likelihood that a firm applies for at least one patent. On the other hand, the 
count part reveals that few mechanisms are directly related to the number of 
patents. Overall, the estimation results are contrary to our initial hypotheses, at 
least the ones that relate to the probability of applying for patents (i. e., H8a, 
H9a, H10a, and H11a). 
Table 11 - Appropriability Mechanisms and Patenting: 
Results from Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Modelsa, b 
Covariates 
Sales (Log) 
Novel Product 
National market 
Intl. Market 
Univ. Partners. 
Complex 
Low import. d 
Medium import. d 
High import. a 
Constant 
N 
Non-zero obs. 
Ln a 
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi-square 
Pseudo R2 
BIC 
AIC 
Vuong test 
LR test 
Trademark Lead-time Design complex. 
Decision Count Decision Count Decision Count 
-0.054 0.462*** 
(0.078) (0.065) 
-1.622*** 0.376 
(0.494) (0.238) 
-0.510 1.213 
(0.649) (0.792) 
-0.708 2.007** 
(0.660) (0.816) 
-1.948*** 0.473 
(0.580) (0.298) 
-0.896*** -0.031 
(0.281) (0.251) 
-1.824*** 0.795** 
(0.449) (0.370) 
-2.549*** 0.693** 
(0.481) (0.313) 
-2.344*** 0.563* 
(0.396) (0.338) 
3.699*** -5.552*** 
(0.803) (0.850) 
2486 
343 
1.229*** 
-1631.19 
126.38*** 
0.179 
-16010.06 
1.329 
5.76*** 
3872.43*** 
-0.129 0.453*** 
(0.083) (0.065) 
-2.272*** 0.413* 
(0.780) (0.246) 
-0.237 1.303** 
(0.764) (0.562) 
-0.456 2.171*** 
(0.808) (0.592) 
-2.587*** 0.415 
(0.830) (0.302) 
-0.685** 0.014 
(0.316) (0.249) 
-1.425*** 0.234 
(0.406) (0.440) 
-2.071*** 0.109 
(0.452) (0.374) 
-2.673*** -0.009 
(0.570) (0.339) 
4.058*** -5.088*** 
(0.895) (0.769) 
2505 
350 
1.504*** 
-1700.63 
129.52*** 
0.156 
-16038.63 
1.375 
5.47*** 
4086.83*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. 
The reference markets are the local and regional ones. 
The baseline is the non-use of a mechanism. 
-0.105 0.462*** 
(0.112) (0.065) 
-2.565** 0.376 
(1.098) (0.238) 
-0.338 1.213 
(1.201) (0.792) 
-0.371 2.007** 
(1.241) (0.816) 
-2.225*** 0.473 
(0.749) (0.298) 
-0.628* -0,031 
(0.328) (0.251) 
-1.645*** 0.795** 
(0.449) (0.370) 
-2.279*** 0.693** 
(0.462) (0.313) 
-2.572*** 0.563* 
(0.910) (0.338) 
3.628*** -5.552*** 
(1.051) (0.850) 
2484 
346 
1.511*** 
-1671.36 
143.97*** 
0.163 
-15912.09 
1.363 
4.38*** 
4065.84*** 
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Secrecy is the mechanism upon which academic arguments are most 
disputed. A message from the findings is that firms that place more emphasis 
on secrecy (in the two forms studied here) are more likely to patent than the 
ones for whom secrecy does not matter. From the substitutability standpoint 
this is a striking finding because by suggesting that secrecy and patents are 
likely to be used together it challenges the concept that firms have to choose one 
or the other. Therefore hypotheses H8a and H8b do not stand on the basis of the 
findings of this study, and should be refuted. 
The models accounting for intellectual property rights (i. e., copyright, 
design registration, and trademarks) indicate that hypotheses H9a and H9b can 
be rejected. An increasing degree of importance of each type of IPR is not 
necessarily conducive to a larger number of patent applications, but for those 
which copyright, registration of design or trademarks are highly important the 
probability they will apply for a larger number of patents is higher than for 
those who do not perceive these mechanisms important at all. The same applies 
for the decision as to whether or not apply for a patent. But in these models it 
seems that on a few occasions (mainly in the decision part) there is a limit of 
importance above which the likelihood that firms decide to apply for a patent 
starts to decline. This may indicate that for the firms that highly rate these 
mechanisms they are likely to be more important than patents. However, it 
seems that despite these mechanisms being more important than patents the 
latter is not ignored. Furthermore, no evidence is observed that firms that value 
other types of IPRs are less likely to apply for patents than firms that do not use 
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copyright, design registration, and trademarks. It seems that those firms less 
likely to apply for patents are exactly the ones who do not use other types of 
IPRs either. This lends support to the complementary argument. 
Lead-time is one of the mechanisms whose results seem puzzling at first 
glance because the decision part and the count part point in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, for those for whom lead-time is increasingly important, the 
probability of applying for one patent is higher than for those who disregard 
lead-time as a way to capture value from innovation. On the other hand, final 
patent numbers decrease as lead-time becomes more and more important. 
However, the non-significance (from the statistical standpoint) of the 
coefficients in the count part makes it difficult for the substitutability argument 
to prevail. Thus, hypotheses H10a and H10b cannot be sustained, and hence 
should be rejected. 
The complexity of innovation provides results to a certain degree similar 
to the results of IPRs. That is, it is signalled that a higher importance of the 
complexity of the innovation may lead a firm to become more prone to patent. 
However, although firms that place some importance (low or medium) on 
complexity tend to apply for more patents than those for which complexity is 
not used, the same cannot be said for those who highly rate complexity. Again, 
one could be tempted to interpret these results as that an increase in the 
importance of complexity reduces the number of patents, and therefore they are 
substitutes. But this assertion cannot be made once there is a clear sign to the 
contrary in the decision part. Even if one concentrates only upon the count part 
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of the model it is difficult to argue in favour of the substitutability line of 
thought because no negative (and statistically significant) impact is observed. 
Thus, hypotheses H11a and H11b should be refuted. 
The findings presented above regarding the impacts of the appropriation 
methods on the decision to patent and the number of patents were 
supplemented by the overall intent firms described to have in protecting their 
knowledge assets. An initial attempt to capture firms' appropriation intent was 
made by using the 'stated appropriation intent' index described earlier in this 
chapter and in the previous chapter. The proxy used to represent appropriation 
intent does not include the importance given to patents, and it is deliberately 
assumed that patents and other mechanisms have equal weight in firms' 
appropriation strategies. In order to relax this assumption we let the data 'speak 
for itself' using a more scientific approach. The technique of factor analysis was 
also used to construct a variable (or variables, if applicable) representing the 
overall appropriation intent. 
Table 12 - Factor Analysis of Mechanisms of Appropriability 
Mechanism Factor Loadings Factor Loadings 
Patent 0.75942 
Conf. Agreement 0.78851 0.78753 
Copyright 0.72072 0.72420 
Design Registration 0.71805 0.74728 
Trademark 0.71933 0.74004 
Complexity of design 0.79195 0.77479 
Lead-time 0.73910 0.72174 
Secrecy 
_ 
0.82847 0.81482 
One of the purposes of the technique of factor analysis is to look for a 
'simpler structure' by reducing the number of dimensions of analysis (Tacq 
1997). Thus, we would be able to verify the way all mechanisms are related, and 
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perhaps elaborate further on the substitutability/ complementary debate. 
Along the lines of the 'stated appropriation intent' index a first exercise was 
undertaken without accounting for the importance of patents. Following that, a 
second investigation was made, but now accounting for the importance of 
patents. In both cases just one factor was detected146 (eigenvalue greater than 
one), and they could explain 99.23% and 97.58% of the variance, respectively 
(Table 12). 
Table 13 - Appropriation Intent and Patenting: 
Results from Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Modelsa, b 
Covariates 
Sales (Log) 
Novel Product 
National Market 
Intl. Market 
Univ. Partners. 
Complex 
Appr. Intent 
Strategy 
Constant 
N 
Non-zero obs. 
Ln a 
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi-square 
Pseudo R2 
BIC 
AIC 
Vuong test 
LR test 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
Decision Count Decision Count Decision Count Decision Count 
-0.149 0.464*** 
(0.118) (0.064) 
-2.147*** 0.560** 
(0.698) (0.262) 
-0.427 1.375** 
(1.157) (0.550) 
-0.671 2.089*** 
(1.231) (0.574) 
-1.925*** 0.669** 
(0.652) (0.308) 
-1.112** 0.291 
(0.445) (0.286) 
-14.85*** 0.904 
(3.659) (0.770) 
5.457*** -5.737*** 
(1.472) (0.992) 
2436 
332 
1.633*** 
-1579.43 
128.26*** 
0.182 
-15704.77 
1.311 
6.24*** 
4005.86*** 
-0.086 0.437*** 
(0.124) (0.059) 
-2.253*** 0.407* 
(0.708) (0.234) 
-0.108 1.281** 
(1.115) (0.626) 
-0.013 1.942*** 
(1.262) (0.657) 
-1.535** 0.623** 
(0.679) (0.302) 
-1.097** 0.128 
(0.495) (0.235) 
-2.378*** 0.385** 
(0.479) (0.157) 
2.649** -5.344*** 
(1.196) (0.748) 
2436 
332 
1.577*** 
-1558.11 
139.07*** 
0.193 
-15747.41 
1.293 
4.39*** 
3887.31*** 
-0.041 0.422** 
(0.130) (0.059) 
-1.424** 0.401* 
(0.619) (0.224) 
0.105 1.181- 
(1.190) (0.625) 
0.117 1.735*** 
(1.283) (0.651) 
-0.775 0.638** 
(0.668) (0.309) 
-0.951** 0.159 
(0.474) (0.237) 
-2.816*** 0.500*** 
(0.410) (0.180) 
2.257* -5.209*** 
(1.366) (0.724) 
2433 
331 
1.449*** 
-1511.47 
142.90*** 
0.215 
-15814.33 
1.256 
4.05*** 
3835.95*** 
-0.172** 0.419*** 
(0.086) (0.059) 
-2.362*** 0.451* 
(0.720) (0.256) 
-0.705 1.203** 
(0.545) (0.509) 
-0.886 2.096*** 
(0.582) (0,520) 
-2.730*** 0.434 
(0.964) (0.315) 
-0.706** -0.030 
(0.287) (0,273) 
-1.081*** 0.249 
(0.295) (0.322) 
4.311*** -4,772*** 
(0.795) (0.733) 
2764 
355 
1.505*** 
-1767.93 
126.45*** 
0.147 
-18232.57 
1.292 
5.03*** 
3974.14*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The reference markets are the local and regional ones. 
'46 Although the simplest criterion is to retain factors with eigenvalues greater than one (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou 1999), Tacq (1997) argues that this is not always appropriate. However, in this study that 
criterion was applicable because the factors retained could explain most of the variance. 
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The results from factor analysis indicate that not all mechanisms have the 
same weight in firms' appropriation strategies, although inter-mechanism 
differences are not large. Thus, perhaps the results from the estimations where 
factors are used (instead of the SAI index) shed more light on the relationship 
between patents and appropriation strategy than the results from the 
appropriation index. The factors were then incorporated in the regression 
models using model (3) from Table 9 as the base specification model. The 
estimates are reported in Table 13 (models (5) and (6), respectively). 
According to the estimates of the model (4), the more importance firms 
give to appropriation the more likely it is that they will apply for a patent. 
However, that model indicates that once the decision is made, one cannot assert 
that higher appropriation intent means larger number of patent applications. 
Although in model (4) one would expect firms keener on appropriation to 
pursue patents more intensively, a few remarks should be addressed. Firstly, 
firms may use a range of protective devices rather than patents to seek 
appropriation of their innovations. So, even devoting a great deal of effort to 
appropriation a firm may not be interested in patents if other mechanisms are 
perceived more effective, especially if they are substitutes to patents. Secondly, 
the index (SAI) used does not incorporate the importance of patents. But this 
does not seem to be the real cause since one of the models using a factor from 
factor analysis did not take into account the importance of patents either. 
Finally, the index was built up assuming that all mechanisms have the same 
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weight, and although the factor loadings (Table 12) are not far off they seem to 
contribute differently. 
If in model (4) appropriation intent was not found to be related to the 
number of patents, this was not the case in models (5) and (6). The results from 
these models suggest that a higher interest in appropriation leads to a higher 
probability of deciding to apply for a patent, and, given that this decision is 
made, a higher number of patents is applied for. Therefore, we are driven to not 
reject hypotheses H12a and H12b. 
We also took advantage of one particular question in the survey 
instrument to observe the patent-strategy relationship. Question 17 (item 1) 
asked whether firms have made any changes in their strategy to gain 
competitive advantage. More specifically, it was asked whether 
'implementation of new or significantly changed corporate strategies (e. g., 
mission statement, market share)' has impacted on performance. The findings 
(model (7)) suggest that firms are becoming more inclined to align patenting 
decisions and strategy, though the number of patents was not found to be 
explained by changes in strategy. These results however should be interpreted 
in light of firms' overall innovativeness, as we shall see in the next section. 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
The results presented earlier demonstrate the uneven impact of each individual 
mechanism. Regardless of the pattern observed across the mechanisms studied 
it is clear that the use of them do not make patents less likely to be pursued, 
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though the extent those mechanisms are related to the level of patenting seems 
to be only marginal. The substitutability argument could be advocated if 
positive and statistically significant signs were found in the decision part, or if 
negative and statistically significant signs were found in the count part, but 
none of them were observed. An increase in the probability that a firm will 
apply for a patent when other mechanisms are used suggests that they are not 
substitutes in firms' appropriation strategies. Even the non-significance of many 
coefficients in the count part does not suggest that patents and other 
mechanisms are substitutes. It simply means that those who use other 
mechanisms and those who do not use them are likely to apply for the same 
number of patents, other things constant. Thus, the number of patents a firm 
applies for seems to be more dependent on its innovative capacity (other things 
constant) than on its strategic action (model (7)). 
The negative trend observed in the count part of the model accounting 
for lead-time may be a result of, amongst other things, the rent streams that are 
quickly dissipated over time due to the pace of technological progress. One 
perhaps would expect that when lead-time is ranked very highly, patents do 
not matter much because a higher importance assigned to lead-time may be a 
sign of the high rate of obsolescence of the innovation. Thereby, the innovation 
would loose its value sooner and, therefore, the value of its corresponding 
patent(s) would follow such depreciation. This view may be reliant upon the 
assumption that speed is more important in industries where the rate of 
technological progress is faster, and hence patents would be neither useful nor 
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efficient. This interpretation can be misleading though. Firstly, for we have seen 
that patents can be used as bargaining chips in these industries (Hall & 
Ziedonis 2001). Secondly, because lead-time advantage is pursued not only due 
to the rate of obsolescence of innovations but also due to firms' strategies as to 
be the leader in the market; having a head start over competitors may help in 
reaping the returns from innovation before someone else comes with an 
alternative to the existing innovation. In this case, patents can be of assistance in 
delaying the appearance of alternative innovations, and hence can help in 
extending lead-time benefits (Robinson 1998). Therefore, although our findings 
indicate that the level of patenting of those who rely upon lead-time is not 
higher than of those who are not reliant on this mechanism, the benefits accrued 
to a first-mover may increase as long as an isolating mechanism such as patents 
can be used concurrently. As we have found no strong evidence to support 
hypotheses H10a and H10b, they should be refuted. 
Maybe the same sort of rationale can be applied when interpreting the 
results of innovations' design complexity. One could argue that the more 
complex an innovation is the more difficult it is to be imitated. Therefore, the 
related invention does not even need to be patented to be protected against 
others from copying, its design is its own 'protection'. This may be a naive point 
of view though, but it is true that a firm operating at the frontier of knowledge 
and being able to master a cutting-edge technology can have a head start over 
late comers. However, a strategy of not patenting could only be viable if a firm 
could make sure that it has all other, or at least the main, complementary assets 
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to commercialize the innovation (Teece 1986). Moreover, the innovator would 
have to assure that his/ her tacit knowledge would not be accessed by rivals, 
and this seems to be very costly (Liebeskind 1996) and perhaps impossible 
(Mansfield 1985). Therefore, despite it being well known that patents can be 
circumvented and most of the time they only provide limited effectiveness in 
protecting the returns from innovations (Granstrand 1999; Levin et al. 1987), the 
results suggest that any help in postponing competition is welcomed by firms, 
and patents, on average, seem to contribute on this. Nevertheless, the results 
indicate that the number of patents does not increase when complexity is highly 
ranked. As complexity could be interpreted as the number of commercialized 
parts of the final innovation, the complementary innovations are unlikely to be 
under the control of a single firm, and thus other firms may hold patents on 
certain parts of the final innovation. Hence a further effort to hold more patents 
could be counterproductive because at the end of the day the firm will not be 
the only one to appropriate the economic benefits from final innovation. It is 
true that these firms, as compared to those for which innovation is not so 
complex, have a further incentive to apply for patents since they are likely to 
use patents to bargain with other innovators (Hall & Ziedonis 2001) and to hold 
a large portfolio of patents to avoid litigation (Somaya 2003). So, these 
incentives to apply for more patents could be 'inflating' the coefficients and 
overshadowing the 'true' effect. However, as an industry dummy is employed 
in this estimation, this industry characteristic is supposed to be controlled for. It 
seems therefore that the results support the idea that patents enhance the 
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degree of appropriability that the complexity of the innovation per se gives to 
firms, and thus hypotheses H11a and H11b should be rejected. 
Intellectual property rights in the form of copyright, registration of 
design and trademarks were found to be correlated to patents and hypotheses 
H9a and H9b were thus rejected. Although the legal rationale may hold as to 
the suitability of each intellectual property to particular circumstances (i. e., 
output of intellectual activity), from a strategic point of view those mechanisms 
seem to complement each other with respect to the extent that appropriation 
will be derived from the innovative effort. Moreover, this may be evidence that 
economies of scale apply to those activities. The results for copyright could be 
disputed on the grounds that firms that place too much value on copyright 
might be those for which patents are not necessarily applicable to gain 
ownership over their innovations (e. g., literary works, computer programs). 
Nevertheless, this may not necessarily exclude patents from their portfolio of 
protective devices because innovation does not have to be restricted to the final 
product. Innovative firms may pursue innovation at various levels (e. g., 
technology, organisation, communication) and the process that produces the 
final product could well be an object of firms' innovativeness, and thus 
patented. Perhaps registration of designs and trademarks would be expected to 
be more closely related to patents than copyright. Registration of designs, for 
example, enables firms to exercise ownership over complementary inventions 
that might not be patentable but that might be of some value to the overall 
output delivered to customers. Thus, it can be expected that patents and 
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registration of designs work hand-in-hand. Trademarks, in turn, may be helpful 
in the diffusion process. Whilst patents preclude others from commercializing a 
patented invention without the innovator's consent, trademarks help in 
disseminating that innovation and making the market aware of it; patents per se 
are unlikely to make the market buy innovations. 
Patents and secrecy were found to a large extent to work as complements 
as opposed to substitutes. This may not reconcile with what the theoretical 
literature argues (Takalo 1998). That patent numbers are not negatively (and 
significantly) impacted by the use of secrecy suggests that the disclosure of 
technical information is not as serious a drawback to patent protection as was 
thought. Perhaps the inadequacies of secrecy (e. g., Liebeskind 1996; Mansfield 
1985) and patents (e. g., Cohen et al. 2000; Duguet & Kabla 2000; Mansfield et al. 
1981) are the driving forces behind their concurrent use; or their merits enable a 
synergy that enhance appropriability and therefore, whenever possible, they 
are explored at the same time (Graham 2003). Mansfield (1985) observed that 
information leaks out. And this may not necessarily be negative since it also 
leaks in. Thereby, in seeking for appropriating the returns from their innovative 
effort firms are expected not to rely only upon one mechanism to build up a 
tighter appropriation climate, though a mechanism can be more adequate than 
another under some circumstances. For example, depending on the 
appropriability regime where a firm operates, patents can be a strong or a weak 
protective device, and engineering around patents is likely to be the norm 
rather than the exception. But sometimes patents can be very effective in 
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stopping others from introducing a competing alternative to the existing 
innovation. The complementary role between patents and secrecy can be a sign 
of the importance of tacit knowledge. If patents disclose the technical 
knowledge used to generate the innovation, they only enable rivals to have 
access to the codified part of this knowledge. As long as the tacit part of 
knowledge is kept by innovators they are likely to be able to have an advantage 
over rivals. Even if interpretation depends to a large extent on firms' absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal 1990), codification is an inevitable part of the 
appropriation process, and the more it is codified the more likely it is to be 
undesirably accessed. 
The extent, however, that firms will use patents and other mechanisms 
seems to be dependent on the degree of appropriability of the knowledge 
concerned. For example, the more mature a technology is the easier it is to be 
imitated. In other words, the degree of appropriability tends to fall over time 
because more agents become able to codify the innovators' tacit knowledge and 
transform this codified knowledge on their own tacit knowledge. Even if 
patents are not applied for, the process of codification is required because 
knowledge has to be communicated in order to be embodied into innovations. 
This means that sooner or later other agents will become able to interpret the 
tacit knowledge held by the innovator as long as they have access to its 
embodied form. Insofar as the number of agents able to interpret this 
knowledge increases alternative modes of appropriability must be sought 
(Saviotti 1998). For example, the control of complementary assets (e. g., brand 
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name, distribution channels, switching costs, customer services) is an important 
element for firms to appropriate the rents from their innovations (Teece 1986). 
An increase in the returns can be expected if a firm controls, for instance, either 
the most important or the unique distribution channel. The questionnaire used 
in this research, however, has the limitation addressing only a single 
complementary asset (i. e., trademarks - interpreted as synonymous to brand). 
As we were not able to examine all mechanisms of appropriability, we 
extrapolated the firms' emphasis on appropriation on the basis of the available 
mechanisms; we described that emphasis as 'appropriation intent'. We 
observed that hypotheses H12a (i. e., the higher the appropriation intent of a 
firm, the more likely a patent will be applied for) and H12b (i. e., the higher the 
appropriation intent of a firm, the higher the level of patenting, ceteris paribus) 
were not rejected by the evidence from the estimations where the variable 
'appropriation intent' was derived from factor analysis. Although hypothesis 
H12b seemed to be falsified by the initial evidence (on the basis of the SAI 
index), we noticed that it was a matter of 'refinement' of the variable. 
Anton & Yao (2004) are perhaps the pioneers in modelling competition 
assuming that a mixture of patents and secrecy can be used as opposed to one 
or the other. Although they assume that the decision as to how patents and 
secrecy will be employed depends on how much knowledge will be disclosed, 
we conjecture that the approach should be slightly different. One reason is that 
even if the knowledge is broadly disclosed its codification may not be 
immediate. Other firms may not hold the skills (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) or the 
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assets (Teece 1986) to transform the codified knowledge based on their own 
knowledge (either by imitating or by developing a competing alternative). 
Another reason is that knowledge disclosure does not seem to be a serious 
downside of the patent system, though this needs to be further confirmed (as 
we shall see in the next chapter). One implication of our results is that economic 
theory should go further and not restrict the analysis to patents and secrecy 
only. We suspect that the approach should be how much knowledge can be 
appropriated, and thus the role of patents in firms' appropriation strategies 
should be modelled. The extent that knowledge can be appropriated, however, 
is not affected only by how much of this knowledge will be available to 
competitors (e. g., control of complementary assets). 
We also investigated the relationship between patenting activity and 
strategy. The findings suggest that firms that changed their strategy over the 
period 1990-2000 became more inclined to apply for a patent, compared to their 
counterparts that did not go through that change. In the previous section, 
however, we stressed that one should be cautious in interpreting these results 
because they could be misleading. We suspect that such finding is likely to 
derive from innovation contagion, that is, innovativeness is not concentrated 
simply on technology-related issues; it spans over the various functions of an 
organisation. So, firms that are innovative at one level are likely to be 
innovative at other levels. We conjecture therefore that the most innovative 
firms are likely to change their strategies over time, and thus the results may be 
mirroring their innovative profile rather than the patent-strategy relationship. 
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Therefore, this evidence is not robust enough not even to tentatively conclude 
that intangibles are becoming increasingly important (Levv, 2001; Teece 1998), or 
that we might be moving 'towards intellectual capitalism' (Granstrand 1999). 
Let alone to conclude that a pro-patent era observed for the US (Kortum & 
Lerner 1999) has also come into effect for the UK. On this further research is 
needed. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Although appropriation of rent streams may not be the most important element 
to assure competitive advantage, it might be central to firms. If firms are not 
able to appropriate enough returns from their innovations they will not be able 
to, at least, sustain themselves in the market, let alone to outperform 
competitors. Therefore, it is in our interest to advance the understanding on 
how firms co-ordinate their activities for the purpose of appropriating the 
returns from their innovative effort. 
Using firm level data from the third Community Innovation Survey 
carried out in the UK this chapter looks at how patents and other mechanisms 
of appropriability are correlated. We argue that firms' decisions to patent are 
not only a result of their own innovative capacity. There are, we think, strategic 
decisions as to whether patents should be used that rest with the way firms 
choose to appropriate the benefits from their innovations. This may determine 
whether or not a patent will be pursued. Our analyses employ zero-inflated 
negative binomial models in order to examine how appropriation intent and the 
perception of the importance of appropriation mechanisms impact on the 
248 
decision to patent and level of patenting. On the basis of the results detailed 
above the following messages are delivered. 
Firstly, in looking at firms' perception of the importance of 
appropriability mechanisms we observed that a perceived higher importance of 
those mechanisms positively impacts on the decision of applying for a patent. 
Although such perception impacts to a much lesser degree when it comes to 
total patent numbers, there was not found any negative and significant impact 
that would support the substitutability hypothesis. It seems therefore that the 
level of patenting has more to do with firms' innovative capacity than with their 
strategic behaviour. Secondly, appropriation intent, according to our metrics, 
seems to be correlated to firms' patenting behaviour. It is shown that the 
decision to patent and the level of patenting are determined by the emphasis 
firms place on appropriation. These reinforce that patents and other 
mechanisms are more likely to work as complements rather than substitutes in 
firms' appropriation strategies. Finally, the results suggest that innovativeness 
is not concentrated only on technology-related issues; it may span over the 
various functions of an organisation, including strategy. 
Taken as a whole, the results seem to support earlier empirical evidence 
on the complementary role of patents. Based upon an econometric framework 
that accounts for some properties of the response variable, and upon a number 
of mechanisms and industrial sectors, the findings of our investigation have 
contributed to advance our existing knowledge on whether patents interact 
with other mechanisms. Nevertheless, our study presents limitations that 
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should be borne in mind, needless to say the limitations of survey-based studies. 
A clear limitation is that appropriation strategies may be a result of so many 
factors that no single empirical work can explicitly control for them all, and 
thus further empirical research is needed. Moreover, this study does not 
establish any link between the ways firms pursue appropriability and their 
performance. Furthermore, as the importance of the mechanisms of 
appropriability may vary throughout the innovation process, our approach may 
not capture the exact way they interact. Clearly, much else remains to be 
learned but these are just a few avenues of research that merit further attention. 
Despite the limitations, our findings have implications that should be 
addressed. One theoretical implication is that in examining appropriability 
conditions the degree that the knowledge can be appropriated should be 
incorporated. Assuming, for example, that the knowledge that is patented is the 
same that is kept secret can be misleading because it implies that resources are 
wasted if the two methods are used simultaneously. Even if the knowledge is 
the same, it might be in firms' interest to avoid rivals' opportunistic behaviour. 
As no method of appropriation is perfect, appropriability conditions are likely 
to be enhanced if firms know which mechanisms should be used and when. We 
have seen from the results above that, in general, patents and other 
appropriation mechanisms are used concurrently. 
One managerial implication is that attention should be drawn to 
mechanisms of appropriability as a whole, although this does not mean that all 
of them have to be used. But because they seem to collectively strengthen the 
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extent that firms are able to reap the benefits from their innovations, the effort 
devoted to each of the mechanisms has to be in line with the degree of 
appropriability sought and with the degree of appropriability that is feasible. 
As the effectiveness of each mechanism may be a result of existing regimes of 
appropriability peculiar to each industry, it might be valuable to assess industry 
structure and nature of knowledge before delineating an appropriation strategy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LOG BOOK OF A NEW SURVEY OF 
THE USE OF PATENTS 
IN UK MANUFACTURING 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although in general the results are the most important part of a survey, the 
quality of the results is heavily dependent on the way the survey is designed 
and administered. A lot of attention needs to be devoted to the whole process of 
data collection (from survey design to data imputation) in order to minimize 
survey errors and, as a consequence, to make the results more reliable and valid. 
This chapter thus reports how a new survey of the use of patents in UK 
manufacturing was designed and administered. 
The next section describes how the surveyed sample was chosen. The 
third section gives details about the design of the survey instrument. Then, the 
data collection process is explained in section four. Section five reports the 
procedures adopted to overcome problems with the data collected and not 
collected (non-responses). The sixth section presents the extent that inferences 
from this survey are reliable and valid. The last section concludes. 
6.2 SAMPLING 
One of the first steps to address in designing a survey is the target population. 
If the population is large the researcher will be unable to collect all the 
information he wants from all elements and thus a subset of the population will 
often be surveyed. The decision to be made is which part of the population to 
sample. 
The purpose of sampling is to make statistically valid inferences for the 
population on the basis of only a small part of it (Fowler 1993). But in using 
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only a fraction of the population there is a risk of population characteristics 
being distorted so that the sample survey may not represent the population 
properly, and inferences derived from it may not be valid. The objective is to 
end up with a sample that is representative of the population. However, there 
are no strict parameters upon which an assessment can be made as to the 
representativeness of a sample. As observed by Henry (1998: 102), "[t]he 
labelling of a sample as representative reflects a subjective judgement of the 
writer, no more and no less". 
Generally speaking, there are two major types of samples that can be 
achieved: probability and non-probability samples. The probability sample, is 
characterised by each member of the population having a known (and non-zero) 
chance of being selected as part of the sample. The vast literature 14 on survey 
methods favours the probability sample as it is built on a sounder theoretical 
foundation which also allows the determination of the appropriate size of the 
sample to be studied (Moser & Kalton 1993). Fowler (1998) observes that, in 
practice, a balance has to be struck between value (i. e., precision of the 
inferences) and cost. As stated by Moser & Kalton (1993: 151), "(... ) in many 
social research surveys, the desired size is unattainable in any case, because of 
financial, time, or personnel limitations. (... ) [L]imitations imposed by a 
shortage of resources [have] to attain the highest precision possible by statistical 
ingenuity in the design'. An assessment of whether a sampling design is 
appropriate or not depends on the purposes of the results, and on the resources 
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available (Sunman 1983). The challenge, as stated by Henry (1998), lies in 
reducing total error, bearing study goals and resources in mind, as well as an 
awareness that errors cannot be eliminated entirely. This, however, does not 
mean that quality should be ignored during the sampling process by simply 
labelling the research as exploratory148. 
In order to comply with the requirements of a 'good' sample, close 
attention here was paid to the literature. But if we were to define the target 
population as all firms in UK manufacturing that hold patents it would have 
been impossible, at least with the resources and time available, to identify all 
firms in that sample, let alone their characteristics. As a result, we were 
compelled to use a non-probability sample. However, if we restrict our true 
population to the survey population, as advised by Kalton (1983), our results 
could perhaps be read as if derived from a probability sample (according to the 
author this is often done in the face of practical constraints, such as non- 
availability of information about the true population). 
The best sampling frame we could find was a list of firms (list frame) that 
reported to have had costs of R&D. This list, also known as the UK R&D 
Scoreboard, is produced yearly by the UK Department of Trade and Industry. It 
contains information on R&D investment, capital expenditure (Capex), sales, 
profits, employee numbers, and growth of these quantities for UK and 
"I Biemer & Lyberg (2004); Salant & Dillman (1994); Fowler (1993); Kalton (1983); Moser & Kalton (1993). 
148 Sudman (1983) asserts that many PhD students do so merely to protect their research from criticism 
against poor sample design. 
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international firms, and the information is extracted directly from firms' annual 
reports and accounts. Firms are classified by FTSE sector and by country. 
Although the UK R&D Scoreboard contains data on international firms, they are 
outside the scope of this research and therefore not covered in the analysis, 
which is restricted to firms operating in UK manufacturing industry (though 
they do not have to be domestically owned firms). In its current version (i. e., 
2004) the scoreboard contains 700 UK firms and 700 international firms. This 
research made use of the UK R&D Scoreboard 2001 which comprised 597 UK- 
based firms, 343 of which were classified as in manufacturing (according to the 
classification used by the scoreboard). 
We chose to use the R&D Scoreboard because, as suggested by the 
literature and confirmed by the results of previous chapters, the most 
innovative firms are those most likely to make use of patents. Moreover, we do 
not expect the target population to be much larger than the firms included in 
the UK R&D Scoreboard. The results from the Community Innovation Survey 
presented in previous chapters have shown that from a sample of 3440 firms, 
only 370 reported to have applied for at least one patent during the period 1998- 
2000, whereas 420 had used patents during the same period. Although it might 
be said that the generalisation of our results might be compromised by this 
sample frame, we do not think in the circumstances that this will be to any great 
degree. To avoid extrapolating the results too much and making them less 
precise Moser & Kalton (1993) suggest analysing the data bearing the survey 
population (UK R&D Scoreboard) in mind rather than the target one. 
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Despite the theoretical weakness of non-probability samples, their use is 
widespread and there are various methods of obtaining them (Fowler 1993; 
Kalton 1983). The sample frame of this research fits into the purposive category 
(also known as judgement or expert choice), which on some occasions can be 
more useful than a random sample (Biemer & Lyberg 2004). Nevertheless, in 
the absence of a more adequate list frame, the best we could do was to minimise 
the problems that arise when lists of this kind are used. Moser & Kalton (1993) 
indicate a few of them, such as i) elements that should be in the frame but are 
not (missing elements), and ii) elements that are in the frame but should not be 
(foreign elements). Although this is not a correction for bias produced by 
sampling procedure, the survey population will be better delimitated if we 
check for such problems. However, amendments to the list frame were only 
possible on the basis of the full coverage of the UK R&D Scoreboard. 
As our target population is firms in UK manufacturing, the scoreboard 
firms were investigated to see whether149 firms were correctly allocated in the 
scoreboard to the manufacturing sector or not. This led to an increase in the 
survey population from 343 to 414 firms. However, we then excluded the 
pharmaceutical firms interviewed in the beginning of this research because they 
were the sample selected to pilot test the questionnaire. In addition 13 other 
companies were found to be duplicates or else not in operation (insolvency or 
in liquidation), and hence were not included in the final survey population. The 
final list then comprised 395 firms. As the population was relatively small full 
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coverage could be justified and questionnaires were sent to all of them. The 
final sample was to a certain degree randomly selected and thus more suitable 
for analysis using statistical tools. 
For the sake of clarity Table 14 reports the number of firms surveyed in 
various industrial sectors of the UK R&D Scoreboard. As mentioned earlier, there 
were some firms that in principle would not be classified as in manufacturing if 
the classification of the Scoreboard was used. However, a closer look at their 
operations confirmed economic activity being derived from manufacturing 
processes, and hence they were included in our survey population. 
Table 14- UK R&D Scoreboard: Number of Firms by Industrial Sector 
Sector 
Aerospace & Defence 
Automobiles 
Beverages 
Chemicals 
Construction & Building 
Diversified Industrials 
Electronic & Electrical 
Engineering & Machinery 
Food Processors 
Forestry & Papers 
Health 
Total 
Firms Sector Firms 
11 Household Goods 18 
15 IT Hardware 37 
4 Media & Photography 4 
37 Oil & Gas 5 
13 Packaging 5 
2 Personal Care 7 
51 Pharmaceuticals 52 
67 Software & IT Service 13 
20 Steel & Metals 4 
3 Support Services 1 
25 Tobacco 1 
395 
149 Using both the internet and the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. 
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6.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
After defining the survey population, the next step was the development of an 
instrument with which information would be collected. Survey instruments are 
key components of the measurement process and often mentioned as one of the 
sources of errors. As the decision was to carry out a postal survey, the data 
collection form would be completed by the respondent in the absence of the 
researcher. Thus a considerable amount of time was dedicated to its design. 
Questionnaires are designed in order to meet the objectives of the 
research. To this end, the most complete and accurate information as possible 
should be gathered given the limited time and resources. The vast literature on 
survey methods offers several guidelines about the construction of data 
collection forms. These guidelines encompass issues such as i) content, ii) 
structure, iii) order, iv) wording, v) layout, vi) pre-test, and so on. We 
attempted to a large extent to follow those guidelines, especially those from 
Salant & Dillman (1994), Foddy (1993), and Converse & Presser (1986). 
However, as observed by Sheatsley (1983: 200) "[u]nlike sampling and data 
processing, questionnaire design is not a science or technology but remains an 
art". 
The questionnaire was constructed bearing the objectives of the research 
in mind and of course the literature review. Therefore, the focus of the survey 
was upon the use of patents, that is, how firms' patent portfolios are built, 
concentrating on four key questions: i) why, ii) what, iii) when, and iv) where to 
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patent. Questions relating to information that could be easily obtained from 
secondary sources (e. g., R&D expenses) were not asked. The content of the 
survey instrument was supported to a certain degree by previous 
questionnaires 150 administered by Pitkethly (2001), Cohen et al. (2000), 
Granstrand (1999), Levin et al. (1987) and Taylor & Silberston (1973). Despite 
differences in scope, those previous studies could be thought of as overlapping 
with ours. This helped the researcher to have an idea about the length of 
previous questionnaires, their structure, contents, and layout. 
The first decision as to format of the questionnaire concerned the type of 
questions to be asked. Open-ended questions were restricted to a minimum to 
help both the respondents in filling in the questionnaire and the researcher in 
coding the responses (Salant & Dillman 1994). Closed-questions were mostly 
interval and ordinal scaled. Question variety was also introduced to avoid a 
tedious filling-in process (Aldridge & Levine 2001). Although the questions did 
not have a 'don't know' option for lack of space, respondents were instructed in 
the very beginning to leave questions blank if they did not know the answer, or 
to write 'N/ A' to indicate that the question did not apply to their firm. 
The questionnaire was divided into 4 sections and, whenever possible, 
columns were employed to use the space of the paper more efficiently. 
Straightforward questions were asked both in the beginning and end of the 
questionnaire, with more complex questions in the middle. Question 
150 The researcher is particularly grateful to Professors Richard Levin and Wesley Cohen, and Dr Robert 
Pitkethly by kindly providing the survey instruments used in their investigations. 
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numbering used letters and numbers, and questions were printed in both sides 
of paper to minimise instrument length effects on the decision to take part in 
the survey. The extent to which the length of questionnaires negatively- affects 
the response-rate is disputed, despite the immediate intuition that shorter- 
questionnaires are more likely to generate responses. We relied on previous 
questionnaires of this kind to determine the length of ours. 
In addition, the layout of the cover page was carefully examined to make 
clear to addressees what the survey was about and who was administering it. 
The front page also contained a statement of confidentiality and a code number 
for data processing purposes. The cover page was printed on orange paper to 
attract the attention of the respondent and differentiate the questionnaire from 
other documents. The objectives of the research were highlighted (italics) 
overleaf as well as the confidentiality that would be given to individual 
responses. The back of the cover page also contained the directions for the 
completion of the data collection form, and the address to which it should be 
returned, though stamped return envelopes were also provided. 
Scaling was another issue to which attention was given. Firstly, non- 
dichotomous questions were mostly employed for they allow the measurement 
of the strength of attributes (or attitudes). Secondly, Likert-type scales were 
favoured for their ease of formulation and interpretation. Thirdly, some 
decisions regarding middle alternatives were made. Survey researchers do not 
entirely agree whether or not middle points should be included in scales 
(Converse & Presser 1986). On the one hand, middle categories represent a 
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neutral position and respondents under time constraints can feel more 
comfortable in choosing this, which would bias the results. On the other hand, 
the lack of a middle option forces respondents to choose to which side of 
neutral they belong, though this is no guarantee that the results would not be 
biased because the actual response should be the absent middle point (Moser & 
Kalton 1993). The decision was to elaborate a survey instrument where no 
middle category would be provided. It was based on what previous 
questionnaires had used. All of those provided a middle alternative. We took 
the alternative way because in most questions of our survey instrument the 
scale would refer to percentage intervals and middle points would not 
represent a neutral position. 
Fourthly, it was decided to use six points in the response scale. The vast 
literature on survey methods suggests scales between five and seven (Foddy 
1993). As there was to be no centre point, six was the natural outcome. Finally, 
the way intensity would be measured was chosen. Rating scales of the type 
'strongly disagree/ strongly agree' are very sensitive to error because of the 
underlying assumption that respondents interpret intensity in the same way; 
there is no guarantee that when a respondent 'agrees' with something the 
intensity of her statement is lower than another respondent who replied 
'strongly agree'. We thus kept the use of such scales to a minimum. Only a few 
questions used this labelling, and when used the suggestions by Foddy (1993) 
were followed, in particular the one that instructs one to allow respondents to 
look over the whole range of items before responding to each one. Converse & 
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Presser (1986) suggest the use of forced-choice questions, which we did to some 
extent by asking respondents the proportions applicable to particular items. 
This scale was also employed by Cohen and collaborators (2000). As they used a 
five-point scale, in contrast to ours that used six, the categories were slightly 
different. The six categories employed were i) less than 10%, ii) between 10 and 
30%, iii) between 31 and 50%, iv) between 51 and 70%, v) between 71 and 90%, 
and vi) more than 90%. 
Several drafts of the questionnaire were prepared and discussed with 
both supervisor and colleagues before a version to be pre-tested was produced. 
The questionnaire was piloted amongst the pharmaceutical firms that had been 
interviewed, though not all of them took part mainly because of shortage of 
time (three out of six participated in the pilot stage). They provided a few 
comments151 that helped to refine the survey instrument up to its final version, 
which consisted of 47 questions, plus a back page where comments on patent 
activities could be addressed. A copy of the final version of the questionnaire is 
provided in Appendix 7. 
6.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
After selecting the 395 firms that would take part in the survey (survey 
population), addresses were collected using either the FAME database or the 
internet. During the preparation of the survey instrument, a few attempts were 
made to detect the right informant within companies by telephone. This was 
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not successful mainly because those who answered our calls did not know to 
whom we should send our questionnaire. As for most companies the names of 
their directors were available on the FAME database, they were used as an 
intermediary contact as opposed to contacting the 'right' informant directly by 
telephone. 
The mailing process was supposed to be initiated soon after the final 
survey instrument was ready for application. However, as this was in the very 
end of 2002 during the Christmas period, the decision was taken to postpone 
the mailing process to the beginning of 2003 in order to minimise non- 
responses 152. Meanwhile, searches of the names of technical directors (or 
equivalent) were carried out over the internet. For those whose names were not 
available on the web the names from the FAME database were kept as our 
initial point of contact. On the basis of a list of addressees produced, an 
introductory letter (Appendix 8) was sent to explain the purposes and 
importance of the research project as well as to request assistance. Given the 
uncertainty as to the scope of responsibilities of the initial addressee, emphasis 
was placed upon whom the informant should be, and a request was made to 
pass the questionnaire, if necessary, to whoever was in charge of patenting 
issues within the firm. 
151 Due to the small number of firms in the pilot stage no aggregate analysis of the responses was 
undertaken. 
152 In western culture it is expected that people are overloaded with work during the end of calendar ears 
and perhaps this could increase non-response rates. 
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Seven firms declined our request within the first week of receipt of the 
introductory letter, and after this period the first mailing of questionnaires was 
sent. Both the questionnaire and a cover letter (Appendix 9) were mailed at that 
time. Twenty five questionnaires were returned because of either wrong 
address or a non existent addressee. Three weeks later 29 responses had been 
received, 13 of which declined to participate in the survey. 
At the end of the third week a follow-up letter was sent (Appendix 10). 
Then, 34 responses were received over the next three weeks, but only eight 
questionnaires returned. So, after six weeks the first round of mailing was over 
and 24 usable questionnaires had been returned. A second round of 
questionnaires and follow-ups were administered over the following six weeks 
as an extra effort to increase the rate of return. In the mean time, the correct 
addresses (or names) of the 25 questionnaires returned were sought, and they 
were mailed again. The outcome of the second round was thirty nine responses, 
23 in the second mailing of the questionnaire and 16 during the second mailing 
of the follow-up letter. However, only 13 questionnaires were filled in and 
therefore usable. 
A further attempt to increase the rate of return was made by an 
invitation to join an online version of the questionnaire. The latest version was 
developed with assistance from the Information Systems Support Unit (ISSU) of 
the Warwick Business School. Vehovar et al. (2002) observe that web surveys 
are a recent phenomenon and, as such, knowledge on several aspects is still 
obscure (e. g., design, solicitation strategies). Despite the limited knowledge on 
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the topic this was the only alternative available to us, as phone calls proved not 
to be very useful in this case. The wording of the online questionnaire was 
exactly the same as the paper one, though design was different for technical 
reasons. To avoid interference of extraneous participants, each firm received a 
password and a username to have access to the questionnaire. Nevertheless, 
due to legal aspects on confidentiality, the names of informants would not be 
disclosed to the researcher, unless volunteered. Despite this extra effort the rate 
of return was only marginally increased. Nine questionnaires were filled online, 
with only one informant identifying herself. 
Figure 2- Pattern of Responses to the Patent Survey 
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At the end of six months of data collection (from February to August 
2003) the rate of return presented a stationary pattern (Figure 2). Therefore, no 
further effort was made to collect more information. Forty six usable 
questionnaires were obtained, seventy two negative responses were received, 
and seventeen firms were not reached (returned mails). A total of 118 replies 
were received out of 395 contacts attempted, for which 46 questionnaires were 
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classified as usable, which corresponds to an effective response rate of 12% 
(Table 15). 
Table 15 - Patent Survey Response Profile 
(a) Survey population 
(b) Not reachable contacts 
(c) Eligible reporting units (a)-(b) 
(d) Total replies 
(e) Response rate (d)/(c) 
(f) Responding eligible units 
(g) Adjusted response rate (f)/(c) 
395, 
17 
378 
118 
31% 
46 
12% 
The response rate can be considered low but the survey literature 
recognises that business surveys are amongst those most likely to produce 
lower response rates, and university survey researchers appear to suffer from 
even higher non-response rates (Willimack et al. 2002). Table 16 presents 
various reasons that firms reported as to why they did not take part in the 
patent survey. 
Table 16 - Reasons Not to Take Part in the Patent Survey 
Reason No. 
Not involved in patent activity 19 
Work commitments 12 
Survey not relevant 11 
Do not have proper personnel to respond 10 
Policy not to participate in surveys 10 
Confidentiality issues 5 
Mergers/ Acquisitions 4 
Not manufacturing 1 
Total 72 
It could be that the data collection instrument was too long, though its 
length mirrored previous questionnaires. Moreover, it is not clear yet the extent 
that long questionnaires harm response rates (Salant & Dillman 1994; Dillman 
1983). But it is fair to say that this problem was reported by Pitkethly (1995) in 
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surveying British firms. He initially achieved an 11% return rate for British 
firms (as compared to 44% for Japanese firms), but that was boosted to 3'-) "I 
after shortening the questionnaire to one page. That strategy was not followed 
in the current research because it would inevitably lead to a huge loss of 
information. 
The sample drawn from the UK R&D Scoreboard has the profile described 
in Table 17. The average R&D intensity (R&D per total sales) of the 
manufacturing firms on the Scoreboard is 22.6%. The sample has a higher 
average R&D intensity: 48.5%. If these figures are re-calculated for both 
population and sample but excluding firms whose R&D expenses are higher 
than sales, the proportions decrease to 6.5 % and 7.2 %, respectively. 
Table 17 - Profile of the Scoreboard and Sample Firms 
sourcea, b mean se median min max 
ý 
b 
R&D/ sales 
(%) 
R&D (£ M) 
Sales (£ M) 
Profit (£ M) 
R&D/ emp. 
(£ 000's) 
Scoreboard (379) 22.60 4.31 2.06 0.004 803 
Sample (37) 48.50 22.47 4.25 0.26 620 
Scoreboard (395) 32.57 9.07 2.8 0.02 2526 
Sample (38) 35.13 12.80 5.05 0.28 371 
Scoreboard (390) 1339 378 116.5 0 99843 
Sample (38) 3639 2610 70.5 0 99118 
Scoreboard (387) 152 57 5 -1113 16678 
Sample (37) 348 335 4 -1113 12328 
Scoreboard (386) 14.11 1.76 2.7 0.1 433.3 
Sample (37) 22.01 7.76 5.5 0.2 231.1 
Population/ sample size between parentheses. 
Values from the online round of the patent survey not computed. 
The average size of the sample firms is 8305 employees. The industrial 
sectors with the largest number of participants are pharmaceuticals, and 
engineering and machinery (15.22% each). For confidentiality reasons we 
cannot display the results in a very disaggregated form. Thus, we have grouped 
them according to a classification already used elsewhere in this thesis, that is, 
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between 'complex' industries and 'discrete' industries which takes into account 
the number of patentable elements held by new commercialized products or 
processes (the categorisation may vary slightly from the one previously- used 
because here it was not based on the UK SIC 92). Sectors assigned to complex 
industries were: aerospace, automobiles, construction and building, diversified 
industrials, electronic and electrical, engineering and machinery, health, 
household goods, IT hardware, media and photography, software and IT 
services, and support services. In turn, beverages, chemicals, food processors, 
forestry and papers, oil and gas, packaging, personal care, pharmaceuticals, 
steel and metals, and tobacco were assigned to the discrete category. This 
yielded the distribution shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 - Distribution of Firms According to Aggregate Industry 
Scoreboard Sample 
Complex 64% 57% 
Discrete 36% 43% 
In the questionnaire respondents were asked to identify the industry 
where their R&D activities applied most (Q. A5), and also to provide examples 
of the output of those activities (Q. A6). That information enabled the further 
refinement of the allocation of firms to complex and discrete industries. The 
response sample was finally considered to 52% in the complex industry and 
48% in the discrete industry. 
About 32% of the R&D Scoreboard firms were considered to be small and 
medium sized (less than 250 employees). The final sample comprises a smaller 
share of small and medium sized firms: 27%. The distribution by size band and 
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by type of industry can be seen in Table 19. Note that the two categories are 
independent, that is, in examining industry differences one should not be 
concerned about size differences because the null hypothesis of independence 
could not be rejected at 5% either by Pearson chi-square (chit =11.14 [6 d. f. ], 
p=0.084) or by Fisher's exact test (p=0.070)153. 
Table 19 - Share Distribution of Firms by Industry and Size Band 
Size band 
Complex Discrete Total 
(°i°) (%) (%) 
< 50 Nil 25 11 
50-249 9 25 16 
250-499 24 6 16 
500-999 5 Nil 3 
1000-4999 38 19 30 
5000-19999 19 13 16 
> 19999 5 12 8 
Total 100 100 100 
6.5 DATA CLEANING & NON-RESPONSES 
As soon as the questionnaires started arriving a code book was created in order 
to prepare for the input of the answers into a computer. Closed-ended 
questions constituted the greater part of the questionnaire, and thus a coding 
scheme could be done a priori without waiting for the end of the data collection 
process. Open-ended questions were mainly numerical, which also facilitated 
the creation of a coding scheme for them. Whenever they were not numbers, 
they were either names of countries or a description of the output of R&D 
activities. They were entered in the computer as responded but the former were 
153 Sheskin (2004) recommends the use of Fisher's exact test when the sample is small and the table may 
contain cells with low expected frequencies. 
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re-coded later. Data were transcribed manually to a computer by the researcher, 
with non-responses to questions/ items considered as missing and no values 
assigned to them. 
In order to permit the running of statistical programs the dataset had to 
be cleaned, or at least adjusted. The major problem found during the input 
process regarded country-specific items. On a few occasions, when open-ended 
questions asked for the names of countries, respondents answered with a mix of 
individual countries (as requested) with regions (e. g., European Union, rest of 
the world) or continents. Countries received proper codes to make them 
distinguishable whereas regions/ continents were categorized as 'Other', and 
coded accordingly. With respect to 'numbers' (e. g., number of countries 
designated when using PCT) a few informants wrote 'ALL' to refer to the 
maximum number of countries possible under that particular circumstance. 
This was converted to '100' and '20' when referring to PCT and EPO member 
countries, respectively154. 
The editing process also enabled one to detect non-response in various 
questions. Item non-response is sometimes considered more serious than unit 
non-response (King et al. 2001). Missing data can bias the outcome of statistical 
results if it is correlated with the outcome of interest (Little & Rubin 1987). Both 
statistics and survey literature155 have devoted some time to non-response, and 
These figures are not exact as of today. They were rounded down because a few countries have become 
state-members after the survey instrument was administered (2003 relating to 2002). 
155 See for example Groves et al. (2002), King et al. (2001), and Schafer (1997). 
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as a result some techniques have developed over the years, such as the 
modelling of missing values and the use of single or multiple imputations. This 
study, however, approaches this issue in the most traditional way, which the 
majority of survey studies also rely upon, which is by not accounting missing 
data - also known as listwise (or case) deletion. The rationale is that "[t]he only 
real cure for missing data is to not have any" (Anderson et al. 1983: 480). 
Exceptions to the above approach were the questions whose response 
scale was in the percentage (%) format, but only in cases where at least one item 
of the question had been responded. In cases where questions were left 
completely 'blank', no assumption was made and data were coded 'missing', 
that is, no value was attributed to them. The rationale for our approach to 
missing data in those questions where at least one item was answered comes 
from the four most likely reasons that could have caused that event, though the 
decision process is far more complicated (Beatty & Herrmann 2002). Firstly, the 
respondent did not know the answer. Secondly, the item did not apply to the 
firm. Thirdly, the respondent did not want to answer (confidential information). 
Finally, the answer was zero percentage and the informant did not feel 
comfortable with the scale 'less than 10%' to represent it. 
Insofar as the respondent answered at least one item of the question, 
confidentiality should not be the problem and she would be willing to 
collaborate. Moreover, the guidelines in the beginning of the questionnaire 
explicitly asked the respondent to write "N/A-' beside the corresponding 
question/ item if it was not applicable. Further, although the willingness to 
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collaborate of the respondents may have led them to answer the items they 
knew about and to leave blank those they were not familiar with, we suspect 
that had respondents not been knowledgeable on the topic they would not have 
answered the question at all due to the close relationship of the items. We have 
assumed, therefore, that the last cause for item non-response presented earlier 
prevailed over the others and as such was the driving force behind missing 
responses for those questions. More specifically, our assumption is that in the 
absence of a 'zero percent' category respondents would not mark the next best 
('less than 10%'). Thus, missing data for those items were assigned to that 
category, as long as another item of the same question had been responded. 
This approach was used to reduce the bias upwards and thus to avoid 
overemphasis on a particular category. However, the number of responses was 
large enough to not allow the results to statistically differ; the latest average 
when non-responses were taken into account was not found to differ 
statistically, on the basis of t-tests, from the earliest average when non- 
responses were not accounted for. 
Non-response is inevitable in any survey and the concern is not only 
about item non-response but also about unit non-response. As one of the 
purposes of survey research is to infer about a population based upon a subset 
of that population, attention has to be drawn as to how well the sample 
represents the population from which it comes. For a sample to be 
representative of a population, non-respondents should not differ from 
respondents. In order to check for how representative was our sample, we 
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compared average R&D expenses in 2000 (data available from the UK R&D 
Scoreboard). The only problem with this procedure is that the third round of 
data collection was based upon an online questionnaire which did not allow us 
to match the responses to their respondents. As reported elsewhere in this 
thesis, legal matters did not allow us to identify the respondent, and therefore 
they were not categorized in the sample that positively replied to our request. 
Table 20 - Average R&D Expenses by Respondent/ Non-Respondent to the 
Patent Survey 
n 
R&D 2000 (£ Million) 
mean sd min max 
Non-respondent 357 32.30 187.85 0.02 2526 
Respondent 38 35.13 78.91 0.28 371 
R&D Scoreboard 395 32.57 180.20 0.02 2526 
Table 20 clearly shows that in the aggregate the average R&D expense in 
2000 of the sample (respondents) is slightly higher than the average R&D 
expense of non-respondents. A comparison between mean scores of the two 
groups was carried out using a t-test, which according to the literature is the 
most appropriate statistical procedure when the variable is measured in 
interval or ratio levels, that is, on a continuous scale (Sheskin 2004). In doing so, 
we could identify whether that difference and a few others were statistically 
significant. The t-test relies on a few assumptions156 amongst which is the 
equality of the variances of the populations from which the groups come. This 
particular assumption can be tested by the Bartlett's test (Black 1999). So, an 
156 Continuous scale; random sample; cases independent of one another; normal distribution; equal 
variances. 
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analysis of variance was carried out as well before using the t-test to compare 
respondents and non-respondents. 
The results (Appendix 11) indicated that the null hypothesis of equal 
variance could be rejected (chi2=32.18 [1 d. f. ], p<0.001). In relaxing the equal 
variances assumption, the t-test showed that the null hypothesis of equal means 
could not be rejected (I tI=0.18, p=0.8616). That is, the average R&D expense of 
respondents does not significantly statistically differ from the average R&D 
expense of non-respondents. This result lends support to the idea that the 
sample is representative of the survey population. Other known characteristics 
were also explored, namely sales (J t1 =0.97, p=0.3384), profits (I t1 =0.64, 
p=0.5270), and R&D expenses per employee (j t J=1.10, p=0.2788). They 
corroborate the initial findings, i. e., that there exists a high degree of likeness 
between respondents and non-respondents157. It is fair to say that while the 
means are fairly similar for the sample and population, the minimum and 
maximum values differ. In the absence of further evidence, the sample seems to 
be representative of the survey population despite the low rate of return 
achieved and thus the low rate of return should not be matter for major concern. 
As observed by Fowler (1993), the more alike are respondents and non- 
respondents, the lower the rate of return can be. 
Despite the similarities between respondents and non-respondents, the 
literature on survey method suggests that early respondents may possess 
157 The assumption of equal variance was relaxed, according to Bartlett's test in Appendix 11. 
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different characteristics from late ones (Fowler 1993). The prime reason that 
causes that event is supposed to be the level of interest in the topic of the survey. 
It is expected that early respondents have stronger interest in the survey than 
late respondents. As a result, the latter may be less rigorous in filling in the 
survey instrument, and this may cause a bias. To detect any change in 
respondents' characteristics over response time we employed the t-test in the 
same way as when comparing respondents and non-respondents. However, in 
this case the comparison was between respondents to the first wave of 
questionnaires and respondents to the second wave 158. Again, the equal 
variance assumption was relaxed on the basis of the Bartlett's test (see 
Appendix 12). The results suggest that late respondents do not seem to differ 
from early respondents as to the average R&D expenses because the null 
hypothesis that their mean scores are the same could not be rejected (j tj =0.39, 
p=0.7003). Moreover, no statistical difference was observed in terms of sales 
(j tj =0.67, p=0.5117) and profits (j tj =1.08, p=0.2888). The only exception was 
the R&D per employee ratio (It j =2.07, p=0.0486). Overall, it seems that the 
increased stimuli received by late respondents (in the form of follow-ups) may 
not have caused any serious bias during the data collection process, which 
strengthens the external validity of the survey. 
ins Due to identification constraints detailed earlier the third wave of respondents could not be compared. 
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6.6 VALIDITY & RELIABILITY 
The quality of data gathered is in general difficult to measure. It is easier to 
assess the accuracy of the instrument used to collect the data (Litwin 1995). This 
assessment is made by analysing the reliability and validity of the survey- 
instrument. Reliability stands for the statistical measure of how reproducible 
are the data generated by the instrument, whereas validity regards the extent to 
which the instrument measures what it is intended to measure. 
Validity may depend on subjective assessments that collectively improve 
the quality of the instrument. Thus, both untrained individuals (face validity) 
and those who have knowledge in the area (content validity) can give their 
contribution. However, it is also possible to measure how a new instrument 
performs in comparison to another one considered as the standard for 
measuring the same variable (concurrent validity). But it depends on how much 
literature is available on the topic investigated. Another important element is 
the capacity of the survey instrument to forecast future events, attitudes and so 
on (predictive validity). Moreover, correlations between i) different ways for 
obtaining the same information (convergent validity) or ii) similar but distinct 
concepts (divergent validity) can be checked. In general, correlation analyses 
are used (Litwin 1995). 
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Table 21 - Validity Test of the Survey Instrument 
Pairs of questions Spearman Kendall 
Q. B10 vs. Q. B15c 0.4240 0.4178 
P=0.0080 P=0.0097 
Q. A8 vs. Q. C13b 0.7543 0.6354 
P<0.0001 P<0.0001 
Q. D4 vs. Q. C13a 0.5759 0.4788 
P=0.0001 P=0.0001 
In order to cross-check the consistency in the responses to our survey, a 
few pairs of questions addressing the same issue were formulated in different 
ways. Due to the discrete ordered nature of the scale the correlations between 
the questions of each pair were measured by Kendall's and Spearman's rank 
order correlation coefficients. Table 21 shows the correlations as well as the 
level of significance of whether we can reject (or not) the null hypothesis that 
the questions are independent. According to the results, there is no apparent 
reason why the questionnaire should be deemed invalid, though stronger 
correlations could improve its validity. 
Table 22 - Reliability Test of the Survey Instrument 
Question 
A8 
A10 
B5 
B6.1 
B6.2 
B12 
B13 
B15 
C11 
C13 
Cronbach's alpha 
0.5955 
0.6292 
0.5446 
0.6488 
0.7090 
0.7228 
0.7335 
0.6008 
0.6008 
0.8482 
Reliability can be assessed by i) measuring the same thing in the same 
way at more than one point in time (test-retest reliability), ii) changing the order 
278 
of the response set (alternate form reliability), and/ or iii) measuring internal 
consistency. The latter can be calculated using a coefficient of reliability known 
as Cronbach's alpha (Black 1999). That is the most commonly employed 
measurement and detects the inter-item consistency. Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient also allows one to identify the extent that a set of items (or variables) 
can measure a single latent construct. However, when data have a 
multidimensional structure, Cronbach's alpha is usually low. Levels of 0.70 or 
more indicate good reliability, though exploratory studies may have lower 
(Litwin 1995). In fact, as shown in Table 22, the results of the reliability test of 
our instrument provide an average Cronbach's alpha of 0.66. 
The exploratory character of this study may have contributed to both 
validity and reliability not being very high, though the estimates are not 
unsatisfactory. Unfortunately previous studies have not reported such 
measurements. 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reports the main steps of a new postal survey administered with 
the purpose of collecting information on the use of patents by manufacturing 
firms in the UK. 
A lot of effort was devoted to designing and administering the survey. 
Our analyses indicate that, even if not free of errors, the whole survey process 
has produced an acceptable body of information from which inferences can be 
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drawn. The next chapter builds upon the data collected, furnishing results of 
basic statistical analyses and contrasting the findings with existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE USE OF PATENTS 
IN UK MANUFACTURING: 
NEW SURVEY EVIDENCE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of a new survey of the use of patents in UK 
manufacturing. Despite the tradition in the UK of studying patents there has 
not been, as far as we know, any attempt to understand how firms build their 
patent portfolios i. e. there is no extant consistent investigation of firms' decision 
making re why, when and where they patent. Moreover, there is a similar gap 
in our knowledge as to firms' policies on patenting. On the basis of a postal 
survey of manufacturing firms listed in the UK R&D Scoreboard 2001, this 
chapter extends the existing literature by providing evidence on these issues. 
Due to the exploratory character of this study, no formal hypotheses are tested, 
rather the study explores the revealed patterns in the data. 
The next section presents the results of the survey. The third section 
places these results in the context of the existing literature. Finally, conclusions 
are drawn in section four. 
7.2 FINDINGS 
7.2.1 SAMPLE PROFILE 
Questionnaire responses indicate that of the sample firms 89% have their head 
office located in the UK. Of those whose head office is located abroad, only one 
firm reported to not be responsible for its own patenting activities. That firm, 
however, has a patent attorney in the UK who responds to the head office. 
Respondents reported to have an average of 14 years dealing with patent issues, 
and half of them were occupying mostly intellectual property related jobs at 
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various levels (agent, administrator, director, vice-president). The other half of 
respondents were split between technical directors (or analogous - e. g., R&D 
director) and managing directors, 40% for the former and 10% for the latter. 
On average 4% of firms' R&D expenses were reported to be allocated to 
basic research, 37% to applied research 43% to design and/or development, and 
16% to technical services. Overall, expenses on applied research and design 
and/or development do not statistically differ (I t1 =1.14, p=0.2573). Yet, the 
proportions of their R&D budget allocated to applied research and design 
and/or development seem to slightly differ across 'industries'. Firms in the 
discrete industry invest on average 44% of that budget in applied research, 
while firms in the complex industry invest 29% in similar activity (It 1 =1.96, 
p=0.0580). Design and/or development account for around 52% of R&D 
expenses in the complex industry and around 36% in the discrete industry 
(I t1 =2.09, p=0.0436). 
The mean R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by sales) of the 
sample is 48.5%. This figure reflects the incorporation of firms whose R&D 
outlays are larger than their own sales. If these cases were dropped from the 
sample the average R&D intensity would fall to 7.2%, which is still much higher 
than the average R&D intensities of both Japanese firms (3.7%) and US firms 
(2.3%) surveyed by Cohen et al. (2002). Although total R&D outlays were not 
found to differ across industries (I t 1=0.24, p=0.8129), the same did not happen 
to R&D intensity (I ti =2.28, p=0.0288). The average R&D intensity in the 
discrete industry (104%) was found to be larger than in the complex industry 
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(6.2%). Again, reflecting the presence of firms whose R&D expenses are larger 
than their sales. Dropping those firms from the sample there was no inter- 
industry difference with respect to R&D intensity (It 1 =0.73, p=0.4701). That 
R&D effort has been able to create a range of inventions which are portrayed in 
part by firms' average portfolio of 650 patents, 110 of which are registered in the 
UK. Interesting is that despite inter-industry differences in R&D intensity, no 
significant (statistically) difference was found between the size of the portfolio 
of discrete and complex industries. Neither at global level (I t1 =0.55, p=0.5847) 
nor at UK level (I t 1=0.72, p=0.4815). 
7.2.2 PATENTS AND APPROPRIATION 
Manufacturing industry has a long tradition of using patents to 
appropriate the returns from innovation. To measure the contribution of 
patents relative to other means of appropriation respondents were asked to 
report the proportion of their innovations (products or processes) for which 
patents and other methods of appropriation have been key in increasing their 
returns (Q. A8 & Q. A10). Six response categories were given: 1) less than 10%, 2) 
from 10 % to 30 %, 3) from 31 % to 50 %, 4) from 51 % to 70 %, 5) from 71 % to 90 %, 
and 6) more than 90%. The results were calculated by using the mid-points of 
each category, and are presented in Table 23. The findings suggest that patents 
(I tI =2.25, p=0.0273) and being first mover (I t1 =2.62, p=0.0105) are the only 
methods of appropriation that are significantly different in their contribution 
between product and process innovations. Both seem to be more effective when 
the innovation is a product rather than a process. 
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Table 23 - Methods Considered Key Elements in Increasing Returns 
(% of Innovations) 
Method of Appropriation n 
Products Processes 
mean s. e. mean s. e. 
Patents" 46 48.60 5.64 30.86 5.51 
First mover" 46 41.98 4.63 25.00 4.52 
Complem. Sales/ service 46 35.81 4.63 23.86 4.68 
Control of mfg. facilities/ capabilities 46 33.72 4.82 41.00 6.09 
Secrecy 46 33.14 5.06 39.43 5.94 
Complem. technological components 46 27.09 4.36 21.43 3.70 
Switching costs 46 14.07 2.98 17.00 3.98 
** Differences in means (product vs. process) significant at 0.05 level. 
The results also indicate that although patents are perceived to be one of 
the most important means by which to increase the returns from product 
innovations, this is not unambiguous. Their contribution is not statistically 
different either from first-mover advantages (It 1 =0.87, p=0.3915) or from the 
provision of complementary sales or services (I t 1=1.61, p=0.1153). Patents seem 
to be more important than secrecy (I t1 =2.19, p=0.0338) in increasing the returns 
from product innovations. However, this does not apply when the innovation is 
a process innovation when no significant difference was identified between 
patents and secrecy (I t 1=1.07, p=0.2935), which is somewhat surprising in the 
light of previous studies (e. g., Cohen et al. 2000, Levin et al. 1987). 
The importance of patents is further examined by another question 
(Q. C13b), which asks respondents to rate the extent to which they agree or 
disagree with the following statement: "patents are decisive in increasing the 
returns from our innovative effort". The scale is from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree). The median score obtained was 4. This lends support to the 
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results in Table 23 where patents are regarded key to increasing the returns for 
about half of all product innovations, though a lower proportion of processes 
innovations (about 30%). The measurement of agreement does not distinguish 
between the types of innovation (products z7s, processes). Spearman's rank 
order correlation coefficient 159 indicates that responses to both questions 
(proportion and degree of agreement) are positively correlated, but more 
strongly correlated with product (rs=0.7543, p<0.0001) than with process 
(rs=0.5493, p=0.0011) innovation. As expected, there is a bias towards product 
innovations since they are the most probable output of firms' innovative effort. 
In addition to asking what is the proportion of innovations that have 
higher returns because of patents, respondents were asked to report what share 
of those innovations correspond to their most valuable innovations (Q. A9, 
Q. A11). The means for product and process innovations were 39% and 30%, 
respectively160. Respondents also reported the extent of their agreement with 
the following statement (Q. C13g): "Our most valuable innovations would not 
bring high returns if they were not patented". Again, their degree of agreement 
is more strongly correlated (Spearman's rank order) with the proportion of 
product innovations (rs=0.6510, p<0.0001) that have their returns increased by 
patents than with the proportion of process innovations (rs=0.4428, p=0.0111) 
whose returns were enhanced by that type of intellectual property rights. 
159 This is a measure of correlation between two variables that are rank-ordered (Sheskin 2004). Note that 
in one of the questions a percentage scale is employed but it is, in fact, in a rank-order format, where, for 
example, the scale'less than 10%' equals 1, from 10% to 30% equals 2, and so on. 
160 They are not statistically different (I t1 =1.04, p=0.3052). 
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The median score to the statement that patents are decisive in increasing 
the returns of innovation (Q. C13b) was not found to differ between complex 
and discrete industries (ch12 [ld. f. ]=2.273, p=0.1316)161. Nor was the average 
proportion of product t 1=1.46, p=0.1533) and process (j t1 =1.45, p=0.1557) 
innovations for which patents play a key role in increasing their returns found 
to differ by industry. However there does seem to be a difference between 
complex (median=3) and discrete (median=5) industries with respect to the 
extent that their most valuable innovations (Q. C13g) depend on patents to bring 
higher returns (chit [1d. f. ]=4.880, p=0.0272)162. Although the discrete industry's 
most valuable innovations seem to be more dependent on patents (Q. C13g), it 
does not mean that their most valuable innovations are patented more often 
than the most valuable innovations in the complex industry (Q. A9, Q. A11)163. 
Firms in the complex industry were expected to be more likely to use 
patents to give freedom of operation than firms in the discrete industry. In 
examining that mutual dependence, firms were asked to report (Q. D14) the 
importance (over the last three years) of securing property rights over 
inventions linked to other firms' inventions. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
findings indicate that firms in complex and discrete industries do not differ in 
their use of patents to provide access to other firms' inventions (chit 
[ld. f. ]=0.581, p=0.4460). Furthermore, the findings revealed that if firms need to 
161 As the response scale is in ordinal format, Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks was 
used to test whether the medians of the two groups (complex and discrete) are equal (Sheskin 2004). 
162 Based on the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks. 
163 Product innovations: jt1 =1.48, p=0.1547; process innovations: jt1 =0.70, p=0.4949:. 
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have access to inventions patented by other firms, the fact that they do have 
their own patent portfolio is more useful for firms in the discrete industry than 
in the complex one1M. We suspect it is necessary to undertake further research 
in order to clarify this point. 
7.2.3 MOTIVATIONS TO PATENT 
The extent that firms pursue patents was explored by a series of questions. They 
were asked, for example, whether (or not) they had any annual numerical target 
for patent filings in 2002 (Q. B1). About 17% answered yes, with an average 
target of 49 patent applications165 per year. They also revealed what best could 
describe their attitudes with respect to their inventions (Q. B4). Four alternatives 
were given: i) they do not patent anything, ii) they patent what may be used or 
market by their company, iii) they patent what may be used or marketed by 
their company or by their main competitors, and iv) they patent nearly 
everything. The distribution is shown in Table 24. 
Table 24 - Patent Policies by Type of Innovation 
Patent Policy of 
Respondents 
products processes 
Do not patent anything 6.52 17.07 
Patent what may be used or marketed by own 26.09 34.15 
company 
Patent what may be used or marketed by own 47.83 36.59 
company or by main competitors 
Patent nearly everything 19.57 12.20 
As expected, only 3 out of 46 responded that they do not patent and 
these said that this was so for both types of inventions. Interestingly those who 
114 Median score 3 against median score 2 in aI to 6 scale of agreement. 
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report that they patent nearly everything are mainly small or medium-sized 
firms (Appendix 13), which would be expected to suffer more from financial 
constraints. One justification for their attitude is that they are the most R&D 
intensive firms (Appendix 14). 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0- 
Figure 3- Patent Policy Towards Product Inventions by Industry 
45.45 
22.73 
4.55 
1 
12.5 
Discrete 
27.27 
8.33 
Industry 
50TO 
29.171 
Complex 
O Do not patent 
D Own interest patents 
0 Oývn or others' interest patents 
  Patent everything 
I 
u/o 60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Figure 4- Patent Policy Towards Process Inventions by Industry 
50.00 
25.00 
10.00 
Discrete 
X65 Range from 3 to 120. 
15.00 
23.81 
Industry 
42.86 
23.81 
Complex 
9.52 
O Do not patent 
0 Own interest patents 
Own or others' interest patents 
  Patent everything 
289 
The distribution of firms' policies was compared by industry and type of 
invention. Overall, firms' policies do not seem to differ that much between 
complex and discrete industries. The policy of pursuing patent protection for 
nearly every product invention seems to be more often pursued by firms in the 
discrete industry (Figure 3), more specifically by the most R&D intensive firms 
in the whole sample. With respect to process inventions it seems that other 
firms' potential interest is more often taken into account by firms in the discrete 
industry (Figure 4). Firms in the complex industry seem to draw more attention 
to process inventions that can fulfil their own market interests rather than 
competitors' . 
Even if firms come across inventions that can be of interest to them or to 
other firms they may not pursue patent protection. To understand why firms do 
not patent they were asked (Q. B6) to rate the proportion of their inventions 
(product and process) for which a particular reason contributed to a patent not 
being applied for166. As there might be more than one reason operating at the 
same time, the columns in Table 25 do not sum 100%. Although the influence of 
each reason on product and process innovations seems to vary, they do not 
differ statistically, and their influence within each category of invention is not 
unambiguous either. That is, the results do not allow one to make a clear 
distinction (statistically) as to whether or not a cause affects one type of 
166 Scale used: 1) less than 10%, 2) from 10% to 30%, 3) from 31% to 50%, 4) from 51% to 70%, 5) from 71% 
to 90%, and 6) more than 90%. 
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invention more than another. Nor do they allow to decide which is the main 
cause hampering the patenting of each type of innovation. 
Table 25 - Motivation for Not Filing Patent Applications 
Reason 
Product (%) Process (%) 
mean s. e. mean s. e. 
Ease patents are legally circumvented 33.56 4.57 33.92 5.25 
Costs of application 31.44 5.11 29.87 5.34 
Difficulty in detecting infringement 30.22 4.87 41.13 6.01 
Technological pace 26.67 4.32 25.38 4.90 
Difficulty in demonstrating patentability criteria 24.67 3.75 27.31 4.86 
Uncertainty as to the validity of the patent 21.56 3.70 17.56 2.88 
Amount of information disclosed 20.33 3.92 28.85 4.97 
Difficulty for other firms to copy the invention 19.69 3.21 26.15 4.73 
Costs of disputes 16.44 3.35 16.79 3.00 
Ease of being induced to cross-licensing 9.78 1.38 9.10 1.35 
Although the highest average proportion of product inventions that were 
not patented seems to be a consequence of the ease with which someone else 
can invent around a patent, it does not differ (statistically) from the average 
proportion of product inventions whose patenting was hampered by one of the 
following: i) the costs of the application process, ii) the difficulty in detecting 
infringement, iii) the rate of technological progress, and iv) the difficulty in 
demonstrating patent criteria167. The average proportion of product inventions 
that were not patented due to inventing around risks is, however, different 
from the average proportion of the same type of inventions that were not 
patented caused by i) the uncertainty as to the validity of the patent, ii) the 
amount of information disclosed, iii) the difficulty for other firms to copy the 
'b7 1t1 =0.31, p=0.7590; It1 =0.50, p=0.6190; It1 =1.09, p=0.2766; and It1 =1.5036, p=0.1364, respectively. 
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invention, iv) the costs of defending a patent in court, and v) the ease of being 
induced to cross-licensing168. 
Nevertheless, the results from Table 25 are in line with the findings 
presented in Table 23, where secrecy was ranked as one of the most important 
mechanisms for increasing returns from process innovations. Table 25 lends 
further support to those results by indicating that perhaps what is mainly 
behind firms' decisions not to patent process innovations is the difficulty of 
detecting infringement, although we cannot formally test this. Clearly, the 
widespread use of secrecy makes things difficult if a firm is willing to detect 
infringement against its patented process inventions. The results, however, do 
not elucidate whether this is really the driving force that hampers the patenting 
of process inventions. The average share of process inventions that was not 
patented on account of the difficulty in detecting infringement is not 
statistically different from the average share resulting from: i) the ease with 
which patents can be legally circumvented, ii) the costs of prosecuting a patent 
application, iii) the amount of information disclosed, iv) the difficulty in 
demonstrating patentability criteria, and v) the difficulty for other firms in 
copying the invention169. The impact of the difficulty in detecting infringement 
was found to differ from i) the pace of technological change, ii) the uncertainty 
168 1 t( =2.04, p=0.0446; t =2.20, p=0.0308; tý =2.48, p=0.0152; t =3.02, p=0.0034; It1 =4.98, p<0.0001, 
respectively. 
1611 tI =0.90, p=0.3692; ýt =1.40, p=0.1656; ýtý =1.57, p=0.1196; ýtý =1.79, p=0.0778; and It1 =1.96, p=0.0541, 
respectively. 
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as to the validity of the patent, iii) the high legal costs of defending a patent in 
court, and iv) the high probability of being induced to a cross-licensing. 
With a few exceptions, for most reasons listed in Table 25 no difference 
was found between complex and discrete industries. The ease of inventing 
around patents is one of the few that seems to affect more seriously the complex 
industry than the discrete one for both product (I t1 =3.62, p=0.0008) and 
process ({ t1 =2.79, p=0.0082) inventions. Along the same lines, uncertainty as to 
the validity of the patent is statistically different between complex and discrete 
industries for both product (I t =3.30, p=0.0025) and process (I t1 =2.27, 
p=0.0302) inventions, but the effects on the complex industry were found to be 
more pronounced. The last difference observed between both industries, but 
now only at product level, was the average share of inventions less likely to be 
patented because of the amount of information that would be disclosed; a 
concern stressed more by firms in the discrete industry. 
Firms were asked to identify the proportion of their inventions that was 
a result of deliberately circumventing someone else's patents (Q. B7, Q. B8). 
Although firms in the complex industry seem to be more concerned about 
competitors circumventing their own patents, they do not seem to use this 
procedure more frequently than firms in the discrete industry. Deliberately 
inventing around other firms' patents was not detected to be a common practice 
in either industry170, and no significant difference between industries was 
170 Around 10% of inventions are produced in that way. 
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observed for product (I t( =0.02, p=0.9872) or process (I t1 =1.26, p=0.2167) 
inventions. These findings are perhaps a result of what firms decide not to 
patent, that is, inventions easy to circumvent. As they are more likely to apply 
for patents that are relatively difficult to engineer around, it might be relatively 
costly to pursue that avenue. 
Induced cross-licensing was found to exert only a marginal influence on 
the decision not to apply for a patent. Results from the previous sub-section 
point out that there exists no difference between the UK complex and discrete 
industries with respect to the use of patents to assure freedom of operation by 
securing patent rights essential to other firms. Our previous finding thus has 
further support. In addition, no inter-industry difference was detected. That is, 
the percentages of product (I tj =0.50, p=0.6206) and process (I t 1=0.55, 
p=0.5858) inventions that are not patented because of the risks of an induced 
deal were not found to differ between discrete and complex industries. A 
specific question (Q. 1310) about the percentage of firms' patent portfolios 
corresponding to patents consciously designed to surround someone else's 
patents in order to lead to a deal gives further support to this evidence. Neither 
firms in the complex industry nor firms in the discrete. industry seem to devote 
much attention to that practice. The average share of their patent portfolio built 
for that purpose is about 8% for both industries (I t 1=0.07, p=0.9446), on the 
basis of the response scale described above. 
So, it seems indeed that cross-licensing is not commonly used by firms in 
the UK, at least for the purposes of avoiding delay. Thus, firms may be more 
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inclined to defend their legal rights and go to court, if necessary. As a result, 
patent disputes would be expected to be more frequently observed, especially 
in the complex industry. However, if this was the real cause, perhaps complex 
firms would be more concerned than discrete firms about the costs of defending 
their patents in court, and this was not found. Nevertheless, the similarity in 
responses to this item (legal costs) may be a result of sunk costs that are 
common to both industries, and not of foreseeable costs that would be likely to 
be higher due to the risks of legal disputes. 
Firms were questioned about the proportion of the patent infringements 
against them that was ignored, resolved by simple notification, resolved by out 
of court settlement, or resolved by court litigation (Q. B9). Overall, most of 
patent infringements were said to be resolved by simple notification171, though 
not statistically different from other options. Moreover, no difference was found 
between complex and discrete industries172. Firms were also asked up to what 
age of a patent they would be prone to defend themselves against 
infringements (Q. B11). On average, they are keen on defending their patents up 
to 60% of their length'73. Complex firms, on average, reported to defend patents 
up to 57% of their life while discrete firms said that on average they would 
defend patents up to 69% of their life. 
171 Mean 25.66%, s. e. =4.45. 
172 Perhaps an item asking about the proportion of infringements not resolved could shed light on this, but 
this was not addressed in the questionnaire. 
173 Mean 62.56%, s. e. =4.78. 
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Table 26 - Reasons Why Firms Apply for Patents 
Motivation 
To preclude others from freely copying inventions 
To avoid others from patenting a similar invention 
To prevent others from patenting variations of the invention 
To increase competitors' costs to invent around patents 
To enhance the reputation of firm 
To obtain revenue through licensing-out 
To get a better bargaining position in standard-setting 
To have access to a foreign market 
To get a bargaining position to have access to another patent/ 
technology 
To avoid infringement trials 
To facilitate R&D co-operation with other inventors 
To incentivise researchers 
To show the productivity of R&D 
To signal interest to others 
To mislead competitors as to the true technological path 
(%) Applications 
mean s. e. 
68.98 4.32 
55.57 5.17 
53.98 5.35 
36.93 5.16 
34.89 5.07 
28.18 4.87 
21.82 4.30 
20.45 4.22 
19.89 3.44 
17.95 4.07 
16.36 3.30 
11.82 2.88 
11.59 2.31 
11.36 2.24 
7.16 0.93 
Another question (Q. B12) addressed the motivation behind firms' 
pursuit of patents. Strictly speaking, they were asked the proportion of their 
patent applications that were filed according to a number of factors, as shown 
in Table 26. Not surprisingly, firms reported that the major reason why they file 
patents is to pre-empt others from deliberately copying (and commercializing) 
their inventions. Although accounting for a lesser proportion (I t1 =2.55, 
p=0.0145) firms also file patent applications to avoid someone else doing so, 
which could preclude them from accruing higher returns from the innovation 
or even not being able to reap any benefit at all. Accounting for approximately 
the same proportion (I t1 =0.35, p=0.7275) as the previous reason, the objective 
of preventing others from patenting variations of the invention was also 
perceived as an important element that has led firms to apply for patents. This 
protective behaviour is also reflected in the fact that firms seek patent 
protection in order to increase competitors' costs of inventing around their 
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patents, though the extent to which this reason impacts on patenting decisions 
is lower than the previous two174 
It was detected from the findings reported in Table 25 that on a few 
occasions the reasons for not filing patents affect the complex and the discrete 
industries in different ways. Firms in the complex industry reported to be more 
concerned than firms in the discrete industry with inventing around and the 
validity of their patents. Comparing the industries on the basis of the results of 
Table 26, the major difference between them concerns the importance assigned 
to the costs of inventing around patents (I t1 =2.06, p=0.0455). The complex 
industry reported that a higher proportion of its patent applications is devoted 
to increasing competitors' costs. Another (statistical) difference between both 
industries is the proportion of their filings used to access foreign markets, 
though the evidence is not particularly strong (I tj =2.01, p=0.0505). The discrete 
industry was detected to have a higher proportion of its patents (about 29%) for 
that purpose than the complex industry (about 13%0). 
For the remainder of the motivations addressed in Table 26 there was no 
statistical difference between the two industries. In both industries, for example, 
only a marginal share of the inventions seems to be patented in order to 
dissuade competitors, and about the same proportion (It 1 =1.77, p=0.0841) of 
inventions is patented to show any signal to the market. Further, neither the 
percentage of inventions that are patented in order to show the productivity of 
"It1 =3.43, p=0.0013; It1 =2.83, p=0.0071, respectively. 
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R&D nor the share used to incentivise researchers differ statistically from the 
proportion of filings motivated by misleading competitors'75. 
Table 25 showed that a relative large percentage of inventions (20% of 
product inventions and 29% of process inventions) is not translated into patent 
applications because of the knowledge they disclose. One possible explanation 
for that (especially regarding process inventions) lies in Table 26, which reports 
that patent holders do not seem to bluff on their technology bets. Thus, the 
signal sent to the market by patentees is that those inventions for which a 
patent is applied for are potential sources of revenues, and hence may incite 
other firms to pursue the same technological path, which in general is built 
upon the knowledge disclosed by previous patents. 
In another question (Q. D5) respondents were asked to rank176 in order of 
importance their reasons for using patent information. The results are presented 
in Table 27. Despite firms' concern about the information disclosed it seems that 
technical knowledge is less relevant than expected. The responses seem to draw 
more attention to potential overlaps of knowledge than to the absorption of 
knowledge itself. But this could be because the information was addressed in a 
general way. Another question (Q. D4) asked respondents to rate177 how useful 
is the information disclosed by other inventors' patents in guiding their R&D 
activities. An average of 3.2 reflects the medium-low importance of patent 
175 1t1 =1.77, p=0.0838; Its =1.57, p=0.1227, respectively. 
176 From 1 (most important) to 6 (least important). 
177 From I (not at all useful) to 6 (very useful). 
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information. The relationship between the two questions (Q. D4 and Q. D5) was 
examined by the Spearman rank order correlation178. As the scales of both 
questions work in opposite directions, a negative sign means a positive 
correlation. This reflects the type of information that is more likely to be of 
interested to R&D activities. 
Table 27 - Reasons for Using Patent Information 
Reason mean s. e. median 
ranks 
To check if an invention was already patented 2.17 0.23 2 
To check on potential patent infringement 2.88 0.24 2 
To keep track of competitors 2.91 0.24 3 
To find information relating to a specific technological problem 4.09 0.21 4 
To keep abreast of technological changes 4.21 0.21 4 
To obtain market information 4.74 0.24 5 
a Where 1 is most important and 6 least important. 
Table 27 and Table 28 both show that patents are mainly used to detect 
whether there is any risk of infringing another patent. A clear distinction 
between the tables is the role played by patent information at different levels 
(i. e., managerial, technical). Although patents are deemed more useful to map 
the competitive terrain than to provide technical knowledge, for R&D purposes 
that type of information does not seem to be so important (compared to other 
options provided). One can observe (Table 28) that the relationship between 
knowledge spillovers (i. e., to find information relating to a specific 
technological problem) and the importance of patent information to R&D 
activities follow the same direction (i. e., negative sign) whilst the relationship 
178 Both scales are in ordered format but in opposite direction. 
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with market-related information (i. e., to keep track of competitors; to obtain 
market information) goes in the opposite way (i. e., positive sign). 
Table 28 - Relevance of Information to R&D Activities 
Type of information Spearman's rho 
To check if an invention was already patented -0.1425 
To check on potential patent infringement -0.0795 
To find information relating to a specific technological problem -0.0480 
To keep abreast of technological changes 0.0033 
To keep track of competitors 0.0377 
To obtain market information 0.2600 
No difference179 was found between complex and discrete industries as 
to the importance of each type of information obtained from patents, though 
information disclosure as a whole was found, based upon the results of Table 25, 
to exert more influence on the discrete industry than in the complex industry. 
As firms in the discrete industry reported that a larger share of their patent 
applications is filed to gain access to foreign markets, their exposure to other 
firms is naturally higher, and hence may lead them to perceive higher risks 
associated with information disclosure. Or perhaps this is a consequence of the 
way their patent portfolio is structured. 
7.2.4 PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
While patent policies might condition the extent to which firms can appropriate 
profits from their innovative effort, the degree of appropriability conferred by 
patents may depend upon the structure of firms' portfolios. Our survey 
provides information on the way patent portfolios are built in UK 
179 Based on the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks. 
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manufacturing by addressing firms' decisions on i) where, ii) what, and iii) 
when to patent. 
Firms were asked (Q. G10) to report in descending order in which 
countries (five at most) they file the largest share of their patent applications. 
Five firms, that is 12.5% of respondents to this question (n=40), reported they 
apply only to the UK Patent Office. The majority of firms said that they file 
patent applications abroad. A few firms reported either 'EP' or 'EPO' to indicate 
their interest in the member countries of the European Patent Office, amongst 
them the UK. Whilst some of the respondents that answered in that way made a 
distinction between the UK and Europe, others did not. The same applies to 
other European countries, France and Germany in particular. 
Table 29 - Destiny of Most Patent Applications 
Country % of Total Mode Rank 
Industry 
%Complex % Discrete 
UK 20.00 1 56.25 43.75 
US 20.63 1 51.52 48.48 
France 12.50 3 50.00 50.00 
Germany 11.88 4 57.89 42.11 
Japan 12.50 3 45.00 55.00 
Italy 0.63 4 0.00 100.00 
EPO 8.75 2 42.86 57.14 
China 4.38 5 71.43 28.57 
Australia 3.75 5 16.67 83.33 
Canada 5.00 5 37.50 62.50 
The UK and the US were the countries most often cited as where patent 
applications are filed (Table 29); each accounting for around 20%. Despite the 
US being mentioned slightly more often than the UK, the latter was more 
frequently cited as the country which receives most of the patent applications; 
about 60% said that the UK Patent Office is where they file most of their patent 
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applications. This percentage could be higher if firms had reported only 
countries as opposed to regions. The same rationale applies to a comparison 
between Germany and Japan. Although the latter was ranked more often as the 
third country to receive patent applications, Germany could account for a larger 
share if respondents had explicitly pointed out the country as opposed to 
Europe (mentioned by 8.75% of respondents). The distribution of firms in the 
discrete or the complex industry is about the same for the most cited countries 
(i. e., UK, US, France, Germany, and Japan). But the same cannot be asserted 
with respect to other countries. 
To identify what is behind the choice as to the countries where patents 
are applied for, our survey asked (Q. C11) the proportion of filings abroad that 
was motivated by a series of factors, as shown in Table 30. The findings suggest 
that the chief reason leading firms to apply for patents abroad is their current or 
future presence in the market. A smaller180 percentage of patent applications is 
motivated by the size of the market, although it might be that firms either are 
already trading or envisage running a business there because of the size of the 
market. Lower costs associated with the patenting process (e. g., translations 
costs) were ranked the least important reason to choose a country to file a 
patent application (I t1 =2.28, p=0.0284). 
180 Ik1 =3.79, p=0.0005. 
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Table 30 - Factors Influencing Patent Filings Abroad 
Motivation mean s. e. 
Current or foreseeable participation 74.46 4.50 
Size 52.16 6.07 
Presence of competitors 50.54 5.58 
Enforcement climate 32.97 5.31 
World-class technical/ scientific competence 21.49 4.44 
Territorial proximity 19.73 3.85 
Lower costs 10.68 2.12 
Differences between complex and discrete industries were found for the 
enforcement climate (I t1 =2.34, p=0.0253), which seems to be more valuable to 
firms in the discrete industry. Weak evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that current or foreseeable participation in the market (I t1 =1.93, 
p=0.0618) and/ or the size of it (I t1 =1.80, p=0.0804) influence differently 
discrete and complex firms. No other indication of differences between the two 
industries was found. 
We saw in Table 26 that firms apply for patents mainly with the purpose 
of pre-empting competition. Respondents said they are compelled to apply for 
patents either to bar competitors from freely commercializing their innovations 
or to make things as difficult as possible for rivals to come up with a competing 
alternative. They were asked to report (Q. C5) the scope of most of their patents 
as compared to the average in their industry. They were given five alternatives: 
substantially broader, slightly broader, no difference, slightly narrower, and 
substantially narrower. In addition, we asked (Q. C6) the scope that best 
describes their most valuable patents (Table 31). 
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Table 31 - Scope of Patents as Compared to the Average in the Industry 
Percentage of respondents 
Scope choosing category of scope 
Majority of Most valuable 
patents patents 
Substantially broader 2 18 
Slightly broader 24 29 
No difference 67 34 
Slightly narrower 5 16 
Substantially narrower 23 
Firms reported mostly that both the majority of their patents and the 
most valuable ones have scope equal to the average in the industry. But it is 
clear that the distribution changes when the focus is on the most valuable ones. 
Moreover, the percentage distribution of broad and narrow scope is biased 
towards broad scope, which suggests that firms are more likely to pursue 
broader patents. However, it does not mean that patents with narrow scope are 
worthless. On the contrary, Table 31 suggests that narrow patents sometimes 
can be quite valuable; otherwise, there would be no increase in the percentage 
of respondents saying that their most valuable patents present scope narrower 
than the average in the industry. 
Figure 5 shows how the scope changes by industry when comparing an 
average patent to the most valuable one. Generally speaking, it seems that 
patents with narrow scope are more likely to be valuable in the complex 
industry than in the discrete industry. In turn, firms in the discrete industry 
seem to put more value on patents with scope broader than the average. 
304 
Figure 5- Contrasting Patent Scope Between 
Typical and Most Valuable Patents by Industry 
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O Typical - Complex O Most valuable - Complex 
0 Typical - Discrete   Most valuable - Discrete 
th 
4-1 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
16 
21 
5 LO 5ý 
d 
21 
11 
5 
0055 
F -M 
Substantially Slightly No Slightly Substantially 
broader broader difference narrower narrower 
27 32 26 
20 
11 
70 
Patent scope as compared to the average in the industry 
i 
That broad patents are, in general, more valuable than narrow ones was 
partly corroborated by another question (Q. 13j), where respondents rated', " the 
extent that they agree (or disagree) with the following statement: "our patents 
with broad scope are more valuable than our patents with narrow scope". The 
median score was 4, and the mean score 3.7, which shows only a slight 
agreement amongst respondents. Further, our survey asked (Q. B15) the 
proportion of the patent portfolio that is characterized by patents with broad 
and narrow scope182. Respondents answered that they perceive their patent 
portfolio to comprise mainly patents with broad scope (43%). However, the 
proportion of narrow patents (34%) does not statistically differ from broad 
181 Scale from I (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
182 The scale was 1) less than 10%, 2) from 10% to 30%, 3) from 31 % to 50%, 4) from 51 % to 70%'ö, 5) from 
71 % to 90%, and 6) more than 90%. Their mid-points were used to compute the average. 
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patents (I t1 =1.45, p=0.1498)183. Although it might be vague to measure the 
breadth of a patent in this way, the findings suggest that the composition of 
firms' patent portfolios are, on average, based upon a distribution of narrow 
and broad patents that, if not uneven, is slightly skewed towards broad patents. 
Although patent scope is determined to a large extent by the 
technological content of the patent itself, the existing prior art, and the way 
claims are drafted, a rough proxy for measuring scope is the number of claims a 
patent has. Our survey addressed this characteristic by asking how many 
dependent claims are drafted on average for each independent claim of their 
typical patents (Q. C7). The rationale underlying this question is that the broader 
an independent claim is drafted, the more it will need dependent claims to 
support and protect it from being challenged. 
Table 32 - Number of Dependent Claims per Independent Claim 
Number of dep. claims per 
independent claim 
Respondents 
Typical Most Valuable 
Less than 5 11 14 
From 5 to 10 46 34 
From 11 to 15 31 31 
From 16 to 20 6 14 
From 21 to 25 36 
More than 25 30 
Table 32 lends support to previous findings that the most valuable 
patents are not necessarily the broadest ones. While, on balance, the result does 
seem to favour broader patents, the distribution of the most valuable patents 
183 The average proportion of narrow and broad patents do not differ by industry either; It1 =0.85, 
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seems to move from the middle to both extremes (i. e., broad and narrow). To 
measure the degree of association between the two measures (Q. C5 and Q. C7) 
we employed Cramer's phi, as suggested by Sheskin (2004), for the scale of 
scope (Q. C5) and the scale of the number of dependent claims (Q. C7) are more 
nominal in nature than ordinal. There seems to exist a degree of association 
between the two variables that, even if not strong (V=0.4055)184, indicates that a 
high number of dependent claims may, in fact, be a result of a broad 
independent claim, and hence a broad patent scope. 
In addition to the scope, we asked about the composition of firms' patent 
portfolios, that is, the percentage of the portfolio that fits into one or more of the 
categories that we listed (see Table 33). As shown in the last subsection, firms' 
policies are mainly oriented towards defending themselves against imitators 
whereas the effort expended to induce other firms to cross-licensing is relatively 
small. The way patent portfolios are designed may reinforce this approach. 
Table 33 shows innovators' concern as to precluding others from 
commercializing their inventions. Their effort to induce others to deal on the 
basis of overlapping patents seems smaller than the other possibilities. In fact, 
the average proportion of patents that are developed by surrounding someone 
else's patents statistically differs from the other categories185. 
p=0.4017, and It1 =0.94, p=0.3535, respectively. 
184 Note, however, that one variable is based upon a relative measure and the other is computed on 
'absolute' terms. 
185 Differences between average share of own patents surrounding third parties' patents and average share 
of other types of design provided the following statistics from the bottom to the top of Table 33: 
1t1 =2.12, p=0.0370; It1 =2.01, p=0.0481; It1 =2.64, p=0.0100; and It1 =3.49, p=0.0008. 
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Table 33 - Patent Portfolio Designs 
Design mean s. e. 
Patents that surround their own patent 22.13 3.29 
Patents covering an array of technical solutions 19.13 3.29 
Patents with prohibitive invent-around costs 16.13 2.88 
Unordered patents 15.75 2.50 
Patents that surround patents held by other inventors 9.75 1.33 
We have found no difference in the structure of patent portfolios across 
patent policies presented in Table 24186. Nor have we found any difference 
between complex and discrete industries as to the composition of their patent 
portfolios. Although earlier findings have shown that firms in the complex 
industry are keener on pursuing patents with insurmountable invent around 
costs than are firms in the discrete industry, the latest results suggest that they 
do not seem to achieve that purpose more often than firms in the discrete 
industry do. 
For reasons explained elsewhere in this thesis, a patent may not be 
granted because the application does not fulfil the patentability requirements. 
So, the patent portfolio is not fully within the remit of the firm. One obvious 
obstacle is what other inventors do (i. e., either applying for or publishing 
somewhere) that can invalidate the application. If, for example, a firm applies 
for a patent after another firm has applied, and they encompass the same, or 
nearly the same, invention, either the later applicant will not hold a patent or he 
will hold a very narrow patent. In either case the later applicant would be in a 
more fragile position than he would be if he had applied first. Timing is 
186 Analysis of variance (Sheskin 2004) was used to check for statistical differences across patent policies in 
the mean percentage of portfolio characterized by a particular type of design. 
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therefore an important element of the patenting process because other firms' 
behaviour may jeopardise the potential returns of an innovation. 
In order to identify when, along the time profile of innovation process, 
the first patent application is filed respondents were asked (Q. D8), firstly, how 
long it takes approximately for the main output of their R&D activities (i. e., 
product or process inventions) to be generated and be ready for 
commercialization. Then, they were asked (Q. D10) to report how far from 
market introduction is a corresponding patent application filed187. On average, 
an innovation was said to take 3.3 years (s. e. =0.46) to be developed and ready to 
be traded. And a patent was said to be applied for about 2.1 years (s. e. =0.39) 
before the invention is ready to be in the marketplace. This means that, on 
average, a patent is applied for after one third of the innovation process has 
run188. 
Firms in the complex industry were found to develop their inventions 
quicker than firms in the discrete industry. While in the former it takes about 
2.1 years, in the latter the innovation development time is around 4.6 years189. 
187 A filter question (Q. D9) was employed here. It asked whether the patent application was filed before or 
after the launch of the invention. If a patent application is filed after the introduction of the invention, it 
is very unlikely that the application would fulfil the patentability criteria (e. g., novelty). Thus, a patent 
would not be granted. And even if it is granted, it will not be valid in court if challenged by someone 
else. That is, only persons not aware of the topic or not taking the survey seriously would answer'after 
market introduction'. This follows Granstrand (1999) recommendation to test the validity of the 
responses. One questionnaire was discarded for answering 'after'. This is such a serious issue that on 
more than one occasion respondents highlighted the impossibility of filing patent applications 
afterwards. 
188 Those values were also calculated without pharmaceutical firms in the sample. Although the average 
length of the innovation process decreased, the results regarding patent application were about the 
same. More specifically, it was found that, on average, a patent is applied for after an invention has 
gone through 35% of the innovation process. 
189 They differ statistically (I t1 =2.12, p=0.0421). 
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However, patent applications were detected to be filed more or less at the same 
time (proportionately). More specifically, they were reported to be filed after 
the corresponding invention has gone through 33% (complex) or 35% (discrete) 
of the innovation process. 
As firms reported that to a certain degree they seek patents that 
surround their own patents, it would be useful to know when those later 
patents appear. Surrounding patents can be a result of subsequent applications 
that are filed before or after an invention is launched on the market or is ready 
to be used by the innovator (i. e., process inventions). Filings that incorporate 
improvements on the initial conceptual idea and that are applied for before the 
inventions is introduced/ used are defined as follow-ups. Our survey identified 
those who use follow-ups by asking them to answer a few questions on the 
topic. They were instructed to jump to the next section of the survey instrument 
if they did not make use of follow-ups. In that case, it is assumed that if they 
seek to surround their own patents with other patents, they do so by filing 
applications after the invention has already been introduced (or is ready to be 
used). Approximately half of the respondents answered the 'follow-ups 
questions', which may indicate that a large amount of firms' effort to surround 
their own patents derives from patents filed after the innovation is introduced/ 
used. 
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Table 34 -Number of Follow-up Patent Applications for Typical Product and 
Process Inventions 
(as percentage of respondents assigning each category) 
Number of follow-ups 
From 1 to 2 
From 3 to 4 
From 5 to 6 
From 7 to 8 
From 9 to 10 
More than 10 
Type of invention 
product process 
65 67 
26 27 
40 
00 
47 
00 
Regarding follow-up patent applications, our survey detected i) how 
many of them are filed per priority filing190 (Q. B16), and ii) how far from the 
priority filing date they are applied for (Q. B18). Firms reported how many 
follow-up applications are filed with respect to both product and process 
inventions. Six options were given, and the overall percentage responding to 
each category is shown in Table 34. The findings suggest that, on average, not 
many follow-ups are filed per priority application. 
Table 35 - Number of Follow-ups Used by Complex and Discrete Firms for 
Their Typical and Most Valuable Product Inventions 
(as percentage of respondents assigning each category) 
Product invention 
Number of follow-ups Complex Discrete 
Typical Most valuable Typical Most valuable 
From 1 to 2 82 33 50 30 
From 3 to 49 56 42 40 
From 5 to 69 11 00 
From 7 to 8000 10 
From 9 to 10 008 10 
More than 10 000 10 
190 The first application claiming priority on the invention. 
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A further investigation (Table 35 and Table 36) by industry suggests that 
firms in the complex industry use fewer follow-ups than firms in the discrete 
industry, which might be a result of the shorter innovation development time in 
the former. The results also point out that the most valuable inventions tend to 
have more follow-ups than typical inventions. 
Table 36 - Number of Follow-ups Used by Complex and Discrete Firms for 
Their Typical and Most Valuable Process Inventions 
(as percentage of respondents assigning each category) 
Process invention 
Number of follow-ups Complex Discrete 
Typical Most valuable Typical Most valuable 
From 1 to 2 80 50 60 11 
From 3 to 4 20 50 30 44 
From 5 to 6000 11 
From7to8 000 22 
From 9 to 10 00 10 0 
More than 10 000 11 
Follow-ups were detected to be filed mostly no later than 12 months 
from the date of the priority filing, though a considerable amount of follow-ups 
are still applied for between 12 and 18 months from the priority filing (Table 37). 
As this is a period when the invention is approaching its launch on the market, 
based upon the average innovation development time reported earlier, it is 
unlikely that improvements at that time are out of the scope of previous 
applications. However, if further improvements are patentable, firms may 
decide to follow up. 
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Table 37 - Average Percentage of Follow-ups by Timing of Application 
Timing of follow-ups application mean s. e. 
Within 12 months from priority filing 44.52 7.08 
Between 12 and 18 months from priority filing 21.19 4.12 
Between 18 months and the issuance of the patent 
corresponding the priority filing 
9.52 1.82 
After the issuance of the patent 10.71 3.03 
corresponding to the priority filing 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss the findings above and link, whenever possible, our 
results to the existing literature. We begin by highlighting some characteristics 
of our survey sample that should be borne in mind. Then, we compare patents 
z'is-a-vis other methods of appropriation, and discuss why (or not) firms apply 
for patents. The third point addressed regards the decision-making process of 
the construction of patent portfolios. At last, we analyse the results concerned 
with firms' patent policies. 
7.3.1 INITIAL REMARKS 
The results produced from responses to our survey come from a population 
that consisted of the largest R&D spenders in UK manufacturing. Another 
important point that should be considered when interpreting the results is the 
distribution of R&D expenses. Although the share of R&D expenses allocated to 
applied research191 and design/ development192 are (statistically) about the 
same (40%), there is a variation across industries. Discrete firms said they 
191 Defined as scientific or engineering research with a specific commercial objective. 
192 Defined as technical activity translating research findings into products or processes. 
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allocate more resources to applied research whereas complex firms reported 
that they spend more on development (or design) activities. The variability in 
that distribution may reflect their patenting behaviour. 
7.3.2 APPROPRIABILITY 
Previous survey-based studies have attempted to capture the relative 
importance of patents by asking either how effective patents are, or for what 
share of innovations patents are effective in protecting competitive advantage. 
The findings suggest that there exist differences across countries, and also that 
inter-temporal changes may happen. 
Our survey asks about the proportion of innovations for which returns 
are increased due to different methods of appropriation. As in previous studies 
(e. g., Cohen et al. 2002), such measures allow one to detect the frequency with 
which a method is employed, and to also identify the usefulness of that method 
in helping firms appropriate rents from their innovations. In addition, there is 
an advantage of not restricting responses on how an appropriability mechanism 
can increase returns. We have addressed elsewhere in this thesis what makes 
firms perceive patents as more (or less) important for protective purposes. The 
results from our survey, however, focus on the importance of patents as a 
means of increasing the returns193 from innovation, which may not necessarily 
rest with protection. This is particularly useful in the case of patents, which can 
193 Returns not achieved in the absence of a particular method of protection. 
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be used, for example, as a means of facilitating licensing-out or a means of 
attracting contracting partners. 
Table 38 compares our results to previous findings by showing the rank- 
order of each mechanism by each study. Not all mechanisms are reported 
because the lists were not always the same nor were the lists formulated in the 
same way or the response scale employed the same across the studies 
summarized in Table 38. The results are presented in rank order to facilitate 
interpretation. 
Table 38 - Rank Order of Importance of Mechanisms of Appropriability for 
Product Innovations 
Period 
Current 
Current 
Levin 
Harabi Granstrand Cohen based based 
et al. et al. upon upo (1987) 
(1995) (1999) 
(2002) 
CISn patent 
survey 
Early 
Late 1980's Early 1990's Mid 1990's 
Late Early 
1980's 1990's 2000's 
Country US Switzerland Japan Sweden US Japan UK UK 
Response scale 1-7 1-7 0-4 0-4 %% 0-3 % 
Sample (n) 650 358 24 24 797 567 3440 46 
Learning 
3rd Curve 
Lead-time 2nd 
Patents 4th 
Secrecy 5th 
Superior 
1st 
marketing 
Switch costs n. m. 
Full sample. 
n. m.: not measured. 
3rd 2nd 2nd 3rd 3rd n. m. 4th 
ist 3rd 3rd Ist ist ist 2nd 
5th ist 5th 5th 2nd 4th ist 
4th 5th 4th 2nd 5th 2nd 5th 
2nd 3rd ist 4th 41h 3rd 3rd 
n. m. 6th 6th n. m. n. m. n. m. 6th 
It seems that patents are most valued in Japan, although our patent 
survey (UK) has indicated a higher importance of patents in comparison to 
others mechanisms. It might be that the results are not totally unexpected given 
the nature of our sample (mostly firms that use patents) and respondents 
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(personnel in charge of patents), which may have biased our results towards 
those to whom patents are more important. As shown in Table 4 the results on 
the importance of patents change drastically when the sample from the 
Community Innovation Survey is restricted to those firms that use this type of 
method of appropriation. 
Similar to the sample of the patent survey, patents play a more 
prominent role for those firms in the CIS sample who made use of them. 
Although at first glance it seems obvious that patents are valued more by those 
who use them, it does not mean that patents have to be more important than 
other methods. It might be that it is a result of respondents 'relativising' when 
answering the questions. That is, as patents are deemed of higher importance, 
this has to be at the expenses of other methods being of lower importance. 
However, we have found in the patent survey that the contribution of patents 
with respect to product innovations is not statistically different from that given 
by lead-time and superior marketing/ sales effort. This suggests the crude rank- 
order used in Table 38 may not be appropriate if one wants to address a more 
robust cross-country comparison. A more sophisticated analysis is needed 
before conclusions, which with the data available is not possible. 
Although previous surveys (e. g., Cohen et al. 2000; Harabi 1995; Levin et 
al. 1987) have addressed comparisons between patents and other mechanisms 
of appropriability, they have not drawn attention to the skewness in the 
distribution of the value of innovations. At most, they have contrasted the 
importance of patents for product and process innovations. Our survey has 
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moved forward by approaching that issue in both ways. We have detected that 
the use of patents seems to be less extensive in reaping the benefits of process 
innovations than product innovations, which is in line with previous studies 
(e. g., Cohen et al. 2000; Levin et al. 1987). In addition, our results suggest that 
the returns from process innovations are perhaps higher when firms are able to 
control manufacturing capabilities and secrecy. Moreover, in showing that 
patents can be as important as lead-time and sales and service effort the results 
for patent survey indicate that patents can add sufficient value at the margin to 
the strengthening of firms' overall appropriability condition, at least with 
respect to product innovations. 
In addition, our survey has also detected that firms perceive the share of 
the most valuable patented product and process innovations to not statistically 
differ. This suggests that although product innovations can be patented more 
often than process innovations, patents might not be more important to product 
than to process innovations. This new finding contrasts with current knowledge. 
It might be that the specific question of our survey instrument was not able to 
portray that phenomenon properly, but we conjecture that the results from 
Table 25 give support to this finding. That table reveals that the difficulty in 
detecting infringement is, if not the most, then at least one of the most 
important reasons for firms not to patent process inventions. This can generate 
different patents (products/ processes) distributions and hence can mask the 
real importance of patents to both types of innovations. 
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We have also found that patents are equally important in increasing the 
returns from innovations of complex and discrete industries. However, the 
most valuable innovations of the discrete industry appear to rely more on 
patents than the most valuable innovations of the complex industry. Because of 
mutual dependence, firms in the complex industry may judge that the benefits 
accruing from patents are mostly indirect. That is, their patent portfolios might 
improve their position in negotiations with other firms, but do not give them 
complete autonomy. This could partly explain why, although they have an 
equal proportion of their innovations protected by patents, compared to the 
firms in the discrete industry, firms in the complex industry perceive that 
patents have a lower impact on the returns to the most valuable innovations. 
Nevertheless, we found no evidence that firms in the complex industry use 
their patents more extensively than firms in the discrete industry to access other 
firms' inventions. This casts doubt on that argument. It might be that the 
distribution of R&D expenses justifies this phenomenon. We observed earlier 
that discrete firms in our survey sample spend more on applied research than 
on development activities. Complex firms, in turn, follow the opposite way. It 
might be therefore that the longer term, and perhaps larger, R&D investments 
that generate the most valuable innovations in the discrete industry (compared 
to the complex industry) demand more time to recoup. Thus, the relatively 
longer monopoly power of patents may be more adequate for the most valuable 
innovations of that industry, whose investments in their generation are likely to 
be under higher risks and uncertainties. 
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Although the extensive role played by patents is now recognized in the 
specialized literature, few attempts have been made to explore the motivations 
underlying firms' patent behaviour. Harabi (1995), for instance, studied the 
relevance of a number of motives Swiss firms had to be interested in patenting. 
His results indicate that patents are more relevant to secure licensing revenues, 
to prevent duplication, and to achieve a more favourable position in 
negotiations with other firms. Cohen et al. (2002) asked US and Japanese firms 
their reasons to patent and drew conclusions on the basis of the frequency of 
each motive. The reasons most frequently cited by both US and Japanese firms 
were: to stop copying; to prevent rivals from patenting related inventions; and 
to avoid legal conflicts. But Japanese firms also reported to apply for patents 
driven by their interest in a better bargaining position in technology 
negotiations. Although this was the fourth incentive most frequently cited by 
Japanese firms to pursue patents, this was cited more often than the second 
most cited reason by US firms (i. e., patenting of related inventions by rivals). 
We took a slightly different approach and asked the proportion of patent 
applications that were filed according to a number (larger than earlier studies) 
of factors. This would give a better visibility of the relevance of the reason and 
the extent they induce patenting. Our findings match the results found for the 
US and Japan, i. e. firms' major concern is with copying of their inventions. 
Other reasons our sample reported to seek patents were: to avoid copying of 
similar invention; to prevent other firms from patenting variations of the 
invention; and to increase inventing around costs. Similar to American firms 
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and different from Japanese and Swiss firms, the interest of our sample in 
holding patents to have access to other technologies seems to be low in 
comparison to the chief motivation (i. e., to stop copying). 
Cohen et at. (2002) also investigated how the reasons vary by industry 
type. They found Japanese firms behave more similarly across industries than 
US firms. Despite our initial evidence suggesting similarities between our 
sample and US firms, we found that our sample firms are equally likely to 
patent for most reasons across industries. The only (robust) statistically 
significant difference between complex and discrete firms regards the 
proportion of patent applications filed with the purpose of increasing 
competitors' inventing around costs, which our findings indicate to motivate 
more complex firms than discrete firms. 
Granstrand (1999) observed that large Japanese corporations are more 
constrained by the costs of patenting than by the disclosure of information in a 
patent grant. Harabi (1995) gave more alternatives to his sample of Swiss firms 
and also addressed a comparison between types of innovation (i. e., product rs. 
process). He found that for both product and process innovations the possibility 
of rival firms inventing around patents is the major concern of Swiss firms 
followed by the excessive information disclosed in a patent document, though 
no option of patenting costs was offered. Cohen et al. (2000) observed that, like 
Swiss firms, patenting by US firms is hampered mainly by the ease with which 
patents are invented around. The authors also found that the difficulty in 
showing the novelty of the invention was reported to be the second most 
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important reason for US firms not to apply for a patent, followed by 
information disclosure, and costs of patenting. They extended that analysis to 
Japanese firms and a cross-country comparison identified that patents serve the 
technical information diffusion function more effectively in Japan than in the 
US since Japanese firms deem information disclosure to affect their patenting 
more seriously than US firms judge (Cohen et al. 2002). 
Our survey adds to the above by not only providing new evidence for 
another country but also by providing new findings of factors hampering 
patenting across innovation type and, especially, across industries. Our results 
(Table 25) for the UK confirm to a large extent the Swiss and US findings that 
the ease with which a patent is circumvented is the chief factor firms perceive 
for not pursuing patents, especially if the innovation is a product. Process 
innovations have shown a different pattern and, as reported earlier, non- 
applications are mainly driven by the difficulty in detecting infringement. 
Complex and discrete firms were found to differ in, at least, three aspects with 
respect to the reasons for not filing patent applications. A larger proportion of 
complex firms (compared to discrete ones) is affected by 'the ease of inventing 
around' and 'the uncertainty as to the validity of the patent'. Discrete firms, in 
turn, are more affected by disclosure of information, especially when the 
innovation is a product. 
Although information disclosure appears to affect more one industry 
than another, in both industries the information from patents is obtained with 
equal purposes in mind. Our findings indicate that patent information is mainly 
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used to check whether an invention was already patented. The use of patents as 
a source of technical information was detected to be one of the least important 
reasons. Although it seems paradoxical the evidence that information 
disclosure is to a certain degree a factor that hampers patenting but at the same 
time firms do not make much use of that information, one should remember 
that this evidence derives from large R&D spenders. That is, our sample firms 
are likely to be at the frontier of knowledge and the technical information 
disclosed by patents might be outdated to them. This means that although the 
role played by patents in diffusing information across rivals is apparently 
limited, which would be of concern to policy makers, this might not be a 
problem as serious as it seems to be; but certainly more investigation in that 
direction is needed. 
The fact that complex firms are more influenced by the risks of their 
patent being invalid may have to do with either the technology life cycle (where 
mature technologies are perhaps more difficult to prove valid if contested due 
to the extent of the prior art) or the higher risks of litigation in this industry as 
compared to the discrete one. It could be that, overall, the UK complex industry 
deals with a more mature technology. However, no inter-industry 
difference 
was found as to the fulfilment of the patentability criteria 
during the 
prosecution of a patent application, which casts some doubt on the 
life cycle 
hypothesis. Moreover, the costs of defending patents in court was not found to 
influence differently complex and discrete firms, and thus the higher risks of 
litigation hypothesis is unlikely. 
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Perhaps the justification why complex firms are more (negatively) 
influenced by the risks of their patent being invalid and the ease of inventing 
around rests with the distribution of R&D expenses across industries. Complex 
firms rely more on development activities than on applied research; the 
opposite applies to discrete firms. It is likely therefore that the technological 
content of the innovations created by discrete firms is higher, and thus their 
corresponding patents are perhaps more difficult to invent around (due to 
higher costs) and easier to prove validity. This may also justify why complex 
firms reported to file a larger share of patent applications in order to increase 
rivals' inventing around costs. In parallel, as the information obtained from 
applied research is likely to be more valuable than the one derived from 
development, information disclosed by patents of the output of the former 
activity is likely to affect more seriously those who spend more on that activity, 
i. e. discrete firms. 
7.3.3 CONSTRUCTION OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
Empirical studies on patents have drawn attention to appropriability conditions, 
why (or not) firms patent, and what firms do patent (i. e., product or process 
inventions). However, patent portfolios are not produced only on the basis of 
the decision to patent a particular invention. Several decisions are taken, 
amongst them at what time a patent will be applied for; and where a patent will 
be taken out (if the application is successful). The decision as to when to file a 
patent also influences to a certain degree what will be patented due to the 
information available at that time. Despite the scant attention given to those 
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decisions by the academic literature, they are central to firms' proprietary- 
control of their knowledge assets and thus we have explored them in our 
survey. 
Decisions on where to patent are likely to be taken with several factors in 
mind, such as the legal environment, the nature of technology, the market 
structure, the application costs, to name but a few. Bertin & Wyatt (1988) found 
that the main reason driving the choice of the country by multinationals was the 
existing or the prospect of business in the country. Firms in their survey 
reported to apply for patents mainly in the US, Japan, Germany, UK, and 
France. Grupp & Schmoch (1999) used patent statistics to evaluate the main 
countries where patents were applied for. They also found those countries as 
the largest recipients of patent applications. Our survey results on where firms 
patent seem to be in line with those studies. 
Although the UK was reported to be the country where most patent 
applications are filed, this is not unsurprising. Grupp & Schmoch (1999), for 
example, also detected on the basis of a case study of a German company that 
most of its patents were filed in its home country. Although our survey does 
not investigate why the home country is the largest recipient, we suspect this is 
intuitive. Moreover, the legislation may influence that phenomenon; as the UK 
law demands inventions created in its territorial domains to be first filed in the 
UK Patent Office it is likely that our sample firms apply first to the UKPO and 
then decide later in which countries the application will progress; especially 
because our sample firms carry out R&D activities in the UK. In addition, most 
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countries are signatories of the Paris Convention and thus the priority 
application filed in the UK Patent Office can be filed in those countries within 
12 months from the priority date. By that time they may have a better idea 
whether the invention will be commercialized in other countries or just in the 
UK. Our interviews within pharmaceuticals (chapter 3) suggest that when 
speed of the prosecution of the application is also needed firms may focus on 
the UKPO only. It might be that specific characteristics of the market and/ or a 
quicker publication also drive applications to the UKPO only. Quicker 
publication is sought to avoid anyone else securing property rights on a similar 
invention (i. e., novelty requirement will not be met). Although firms can use 
other means of disclosing their inventions, in choosing to apply for a patent 
they can assure that, assuming that the application is successful, they will be 
able to enforce property rights if they realise later that the corresponding 
invention is valuable. 
Our findings indicate that applications were reported to be motivated 
mainly by the economic prospects of the invention, which corroborates what 
Bertin & Wyatt (1988) found for multinationals. This suggests that patents taken 
out in countries where firms operate, or foresee participating (e. g., producing, 
exporting, licensing) in the near future, are likely the most valuable patents. If 
firms do not envisage doing business in the near future in a particular country, 
it is likely that they will apply for a patent in that country if the size of the 
market justifies patenting expenses because, even if they do not think of a 
participation there in the near future, it might be a market of interest. Our 
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results also suggest that a relatively large proportion of filings abroad happens 
because of the presence of main competitors in the market. Perhaps even if the 
market is not very large and the firm does not operate there the presence of the 
main competitors means the existence of a market that can be explored and, at 
least, it is an option that should be kept available. It is likely therefore that a 
vast patent family covers at least those three elements. This means that the size 
of a patent family might be related to the value of a patent, even if this 
relationship is not linear as observed by Guellec & van Pottelsberghe (2000). In 
fact, the authors found that patenting in a large number of countries is not 
needed; protection in the largest markets and economies of scale might suffice. 
We also detected that the enforcement climate of the country plays a 
more important role for discrete firms than for complex firms. As discrete firms 
in our sample place more value on using patents to have access to foreign 
markets than complex firms do, that result is not surprising. Interesting perhaps 
is that although our sample firms reported that the costs of application are one 
of the most important reasons they do not apply for patents, the percentage of 
foreign applications motivated by lower costs is relatively small. Interviews 
with pharmaceutical firms suggest that the PCT and the EPO routes are used 
very often and thus, although costly, they are on many occasions cheaper than 
choosing individual countries, especially because the pharmaceutical firms we 
interviewed reported that they tend to choose a number of countries that make 
those routes economically favourable. 
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Territorial coverage is one dimension of patent scope, which also 
embraces the breadth of the intellectual property rights. The scope of protection 
is therefore an instrument of concern for policy makers (Klemperer 1990). 
Although patent offices rule the extent to which intellectual property rights are 
granted, the scope of a patent is also determined by the inventors own actions. 
Lerner (1994) identified that scope is positively related to market value. We 
have seen that portfolios are pursued with broader protection in mind, though 
we have noticed that valuable innovations can also be under proprietary control 
by the means of a narrow patent. This contrasts to a certain degree to the 
findings of Lerner (1994). We conjecture that one possible explanation for such 
different results rests with technology life cycle. Lerner (1994) concentrated 
upon the biotechnology industry, which is still an emerging industry and the 
focus is mainly on product innovations. More mature industries may value 
process innovations more than newer industries. In this case, even if narrow, a 
patent of the low cost production process is valuable. As we found that complex 
firms value narrow patents more than discrete firms do, does it mean that the 
complex industry is more mature than the discrete industry? Our ability to 
empirically probe this argument is void. However, if technology life cycle is not 
the chief reason, perhaps there is, again, a role to be played by the distribution 
of R&D expenses. If the technology in the complex industry is not more mature 
than the technology in the discrete industry, one would expect firms in both 
industries to pursue equally broad patents. As this was not observed, it might 
be that firms in the discrete industry, by relying more on applied research, are 
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more capable of broadening the scope of their patents due to the nature of the 
output of their R&D effort. One could argue that size effects lead to inter- 
industry variability since the size distribution in complex industry is biased 
towards smaller firms. However, we have examined statistically that size and 
industry are independent (Table 19). 
Another possibility for complex and discrete firms to differ with respect 
to the scope of their most valuable patents could be the time at which they file 
patent applications. If discrete firms apply for patents later than complex firms, 
they might carry out more experimentation and hence have more information 
available to substantiate the claims in their applications. Nevertheless, our 
results do not support this idea. Our survey results indicate that firms in 
complex and discrete industries tend to apply for patents, on average, at about 
the same moment along the innovation process, that is, around one third of its 
total length. Thus the only explanation available for inter-industry differences 
in scope of most valuable innovations resorts to the distribution of R&D. Our 
results also suggests that although the distribution of R&D expenses may 
influence the (average) length an innovation takes to be created and 
commercialized (shorter in the complex industry), it does not seem to affect the 
moment the priority application is filed (proportionately). 
Despite previous evidence (e. g., Pakes 1985) indicating that patents are 
applied for early in the innovation process, there is no empirical evidence, at 
least to the best of our knowledge, showing what 'early' means. Our survey fills 
this gap by finding that the first patent application is filed after one third of that 
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process has come to an end. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that we 
should be careful when announcing the 'early-bird' nature of patents. We found 
that follow-up applications can be filed and they may not necessarily be just 
after the priority application. Although most of the follow-ups are filed within 
12 months from the priority filing, a residual is applied for later. We also 
detected that the number of follow-ups does not seem to vary according to the 
type of innovation. However, inter-industry differences were observed. The 
complex industry was found to account for a smaller number of follow-ups 
when compared to the discrete industry, perhaps as a result of the shorter 
length of its innovation process. Nevertheless, in both industries the most 
valuable patents seem to have more follow-ups than typical patents. Our 
interviews within pharmaceuticals revealed that follow-ups not only help in 
broadening the scope of the innovation launched on the market but also help in 
'extending' the life of the priority patent. Follow-up applications, however, 
were not found to be the norm194 in UK manufacturing, but our empirical work 
could not go further in identifying exactly why, though we suspect that the 
degree of innovativeness as well as firms' patent policies can partly explain. 
7.3.4 PATENT POLICIES 
Although the categories of patent policy (Table 24) used in our survey 
instrument are not mutually exclusive, they may reveal the extent to which 
patents are pursued. The findings confirm that process innovations are less 
likely to be patented than product innovations. Moreover, according to our 
194 Due to the number of respondents that left the question blank. 
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findings, there seems to be a threshold beyond which firms are less likely to 
devote resources to patenting. 
Thumm (2001) observed that European biotechnology firms patent 
intensively. Our survey has identified high-tech firms as those whose patent 
policies are oriented towards patenting as much as possible, and thus seems to 
support Thumm's findings. This type of patent 'strategy' is referred to in the 
literature (e. g., Granstrand 1999; Knight 1996) as 'flooding' or 'blanketing' and 
is suggested to be more commonly used by firms in R&D-intensive technology 
fields. What is yet to be learnt is the effects of this strategy on welfare. Heller & 
Eisenberg (1998) have already drawn attention to what they call the 'tragedy of 
the anticommons'. Their concern is that excessive patenting may lead to 
underused resources, and hence not to be welfare enhancing. Kitch (1977), in 
turn, argues that patents on early prospects may save resources from being 
wasted and may guide future developments. This 'excessive' patenting may be 
a result of an emerging technology field where firms seek not only to hold a 
higher stake but also to avoid being locked out. It is difficult to predict from the 
information collected by our survey instrument whether or not that practice is 
welfare damaging. 
We found, at least on the basis of the studied sample, that firms pursue 
patents mainly with exclusionary purposes in mind (Table 26). Our results 
indicate that about 30% of the innovations are patented motivated by the 
possibility of creating a source of revenue by licensing-out in contrast to the 
nearly 70% of innovations patented to preclude others from copying them. If 
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the exclusionary behaviour prevails to the extent that innovations are 
unexploited when they could be, welfare losses may indeed be higher. 
However, most firms reported to be prone to patent what might not be in their 
direct interest but rather in other firms'. So, excessive patenting may not be so 
harmful to welfare, but it would be too premature to say so on the basis of these 
findings. 
What perhaps can give rise to concerns about the effects of the patent 
system is that patents do not seem to be an appropriate channel of knowledge 
spillovers. Firms did not rank patents highly with regard to the usefulness of 
the technical information disclosed (Table 27). As the objective of exerting 
monopoly power seems to be the driving force underpinning patent filings, and 
if the role of patents in the diffusion of information is somewhat limited, 
welfare might be compromised. We have argued earlier that the limited 
usefulness of the technical information disclosed by patents might be because 
these firms are the ones that are at the frontier of knowledge in their technology 
fields for which patent information can be, in fact, less useful since it is 
disclosed only 18 months after the priority date. Moreover, as patents tend to 
correspond to firms' technology paths195 the information can be more useful for 
those lagging behind. We observed that complex firms spend more on 
development activities than on applied research and the opposite for discrete 
firms. However, we found no inter-industry differences in the usefulness of 
195 Only a marginal share of innovations were said to be patented to disguise firms' real interests. 
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patent information. This leaves the answer to that phenomenon obscure and 
demanding further research. 
It is more likely that negotiations will arise when there are 
complementary patents. The firms studied reported that they hardly ever 
pursue inventive activities with the purpose of overlapping someone else's 
patents to force negotiation. Only a marginal proportion of applications was 
said to be consciously designed to surround other firms' patents in order to 
induce them to a deal. Perhaps because of the 'absence' of this patent strategy 
that firms reported the ease of being induced to cross-license as the least 
important factor hampering their patent applications. Firms also reported that 
the filing of patent applications with the objective of avoiding infringement 
trials is not a common practice, and that the costs of legal disputes are the 
second least important factor affecting their decision not to apply for patents. 
Although these may suggest that firms are keen on going to court, earlier 
evidence (i. e., no overlapping patents) suggests the contrary. In fact, in 
describing what they use patent information for, firms revealed their main 
interests in checking if an invention has already been patented and if they are 
not infringing someone else's patents. 
Their concern about infringing other firms' patents parallels the 
exclusionary purpose underlying their patenting behaviour. Similar to US firms 
and contrary to Japanese ones (Cohen et al. 2002), firms in the UK seem to place 
more value on exclusion than on reciprocity, although Collinson et al. (2005) 
have identified Japanese firms to be moving away from reciprocal market 
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mechanisms. However, firms in the US complex industry seem to use patents to 
negotiate with other patent holders than firms in the US discrete industry do 
(Cohen et al. 2002; Hall & Ziedonis 2001). Thus, the exclusionary intent reported 
by firms in the complex industry could be thought surprising as there is no 
difference (statistically) from the firms in the discrete industry. We conjecture 
that firms are only able to use patents as bargaining chips if the corresponding 
patent is strong enough to persuade other agents not to either circumvent it or 
challenge it. Thus, regardless of their industry firms need to build a strong 
patent position (in exclusionary terms) to exploit further uses of patents. 
However, it is surprising that the composition of firms' patent portfolios do not 
statistically differ (Table 33). 
Reitzig (2004b) has observed that patent thickets can be found in both 
complex and discrete industries, which our findings seem to support (even if 
the size of the thickets are small). However, firms' patent portfolios seem to be 
more characterized by fences than thickets. This is based not only on the 
proportion of patents that surround patents held by other competitors, which 
seems to be small, but also by firms' court-averse' behaviour. What might be 
I 
interesting is that, according to our sample of UK manufacturing firms, despite 
the US being the largest market of interest, after the UK, firms do not seem to 
pay attention to that practice, which seems to be relatively common there 
(Cohen et al. 2002). 
Most respondents said that despite being keener on a broad patent, the 
majority of their patent portfolios consist of patents surrounding their own 
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patents and patents covering an array of technical solutions. Both the former 
('surrounding') and the latter ('fencing') strategies are to some extent a result of 
continuous patenting, where follow-ups are filed mainly within 18 months from 
the priority date in order to take advantage of no prior art that is vet to be 
disclosed by the first application (priority application). As observed by 
Granstrand (1999) this is a practice that may enable firms to 'extend' the patent 
life and hence increase the returns from the innovation, but that may not be of 
interest for those whose innovation life cycle is too short. Although we cannot 
assert that innovations from the UK complex industry have, on average, a 
shorter life cycle than innovations from the UK discrete industry, we suspect 
this might happen, at least for our sample firms. The shorter period to launch 
an innovation on the market and the main innovation activity developed by 
complex firms (i. e., development or design) are reasonable indicators to support 
our suspicion. Moreover, as the period of the patent life up to which complex 
firms are inclined to defend against infringements is shorter than the one 
reported by discrete firms, it is likely that innovations in the former industry 
become obsolete faster than in the latter. These findings contrast with the belief 
that patent renewals can indicate the value of a patent, that is, the longer the life 
of a patent, the more valuable that patent is. There seems to be an optimum 
patent life after which the costs of defending the patent in court are not justified. 
Our conversation with personnel in pharmaceuticals revealed that firms may 
realise that it might be more advantageous to invest in other activities than to 
incur legal costs. 
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The exclusionary approach of UK firms is supported by the way their 
patent portfolios are designed. Despite the 'surrounding' strategy being the 
most used, according to our results, there seems to be a relatively flat 
distribution of patent 'strategies'. Moreover, our findings do not indicate any 
variability across industries or across policies. Our results suggest that complex 
firms are keener on prohibitive inventing around patents (i. e., 'strategic' patents) 
but the proportion of this type of patent that they hold is not different 
(statistically) from the proportion held by discrete firms. The greater interest by 
complex firms in that type of patent might be a consequence of designing 
around patents being easier in that industry, as our findings suggest. All in al I 
our results indicate that it is very unlikely that firms' patent portfolios are 
structured in a single way; a combination of designs exists. Moreover, as firms 
perceive the costs of patenting being high they do not seem to be interested in 
keeping patents in force to mask their real technological interest. Perhaps the 
benefits of showing their true technological competency (e. g., licensing, 
partnering, merger) outweigh the benefits of not revealing it (e. g., competitors 
investing in low value technological areas). 
As mentioned earlier our results suggest that the distribution of R&D 
expenses may influence the degree of appropriability achieved. This means that 
the effectiveness of patents as a means of protecting value is perhaps 
proportional to the effort devoted to the creation and capture of that value. Our 
results also suggest that the use of patents strategically with respect to 
information manipulation is hardly ever employed with the purpose of 
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dissuading competitors. It might be that the benefits of doing so are so small 
they do not compensate for the costs or risks involved, despite firms reporting 
that patents are relatively high important in their analysis of rivals' 
technological competence. On the one hand, the more frequent use of patents as 
a tool for competitive analysis may be a result of recent developments of media 
and software services in that area. Although firms may have perceived that the 
use of patents for that purpose has grown, they may have not perceived how to 
use that practice to influence other firms' behaviour. On the other hand, R&D 
activities are increasingly costly, which has made firms more selective with 
their projects and upon which they will employ their budgets. As a result, it is 
unlikely that they will devote resources and time to patenting inventions to 
dissuade competitors when they could be patenting inventions that are more 
likely to bring tangible returns. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This study empirically explores appropriability conditions in UK 
manufacturing and how patent portfolios are produced on the basis of firms' 
decision making re why, when and where they patent. Our findings derive 
from responses to a new questionnaire sent to manufacturing firms listed on the 
UK R&D Scoreboard. The 12% response rate achieved generated 46 usable 
questionnaires. Our sample, despite being small, has a high degree of match 
with the survey population and thus can be considered representative. 
Although our investigation on the appropriability conditions in the UK 
reveals that patents play an important role we suspect that this is a consequence 
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of the sample which was purposefully selected to comprise only firms that use 
patents. Our earlier findings (chapter 4) are perhaps more appropriate to detect 
how important patents are in UK manufacturing. However, our survey 
provides several insights on how patents are produced and some surprising 
results. 
One of the salient results regards the importance of patents to protect 
product and process innovations. Our results confirm previous studies which 
show that product innovations are more often patented than process 
innovations. Nevertheless, we have also found that the most important 
innovations are equally patented regardless of their type (product or process). 
Moreover, one of the most important factors that hampers firms from patenting 
process innovations was found to be the difficulty in detecting infringements. 
Although it is intuitive that process innovations are more difficult for rivals to 
have access, and hence to imitate, our results suggest that not all valuable 
process innovations are kept secret. If the process innovation is perceived to be 
valuable, it can be patented as much as the most valuable product innovations. 
This, contrary to our existing knowledge, indicates that patents might be as 
important to process innovations as they are to product innovations. 
One immediate implication of the above result is that certain process 
innovations, by not being patented, are less likely to be publicly disclosed and 
hence have their diffusion restricted. One the one hand, despite the recent 
change in the onus of the proof (now requiring potential infringers to prove 
they are not infringing third parties patents), this does not seem to be enough to 
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persuade inventors to patent more frequently process innovations, and thus 
changes to patent policy might be necessary. On the other hand, as the non- 
patented process innovations are not the most valuable innovations, perhaps 
what is kept secret does not seriously affect welfare. But this needs more 
research. 
Our results also show that concerns about R&D spillovers produced by 
patents should not be restricted to process innovations. We found that patent 
information for competitive analysis is rated comparably higher than patent 
information for (technical) problem-solving; the latter is expected to help in the 
diffusion of knowledge. Our ability to empirically support that more attention 
should be given to the role played by patents in diffusing knowledge is limited. 
We have not observed how important patents are, in comparison to other ways 
(e. g., conferences, trade associations), as a channel of information flow. But we 
could observe that despite being keen on licensing-out, the proportion of 
patents applied for motivated by partnering (e. g., standard-setting, R&D co- 
operation) is relatively low. As these are also ways of promoting information 
sharing across firms, perhaps the ability of patents in diffusing knowledge is, in 
fact, limited. But then, again, more research is needed. 
Our findings revealed that the patent system in the UK is mainly used 
for exclusionary purposes. This is similar to what Cohen et al. (2002) found for 
the US and Japan. However, the authors detected that Japanese firms, contrary 
to US firms, also use patents extensively in negotiations. Our results, at least for 
the sample firms, indicate that UK firms behave in this respect closer to US 
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firms than to Japanese ones. However, different from US firms and similar to 
Japanese ones, our results revealed that UK firms when split into two industries 
(complex and discrete), on the basis of the number of patentable elements of the 
final innovation, do not show inter-industry variability regarding the extent 
they use patents for negotiations. And our findings also suggest that the extent 
to which UK firms use patents in negotiations seems to be lower than US and 
Japanese firms do. This may reinforce earlier evidence that perhaps more 
attention should be paid to increase the UK patent system's capacity to promote 
knowledge sharing. Whether or not the UK patent system is less socially 
desirable than the US and the Japanese patent systems is not clear from the 
results available; this requires further and more extensive empirical 
investigations. As suggested by Cohen (2002) there might be cross-national 
differences in, for example, managerial practices, market structure, and 
technological content that may explain these differences (or similarities), which 
with the data available is difficult to conclude. 
In addition to the above our results indicate that the distribution of R&D 
expenses may affect firms' patenting behaviour. Firms that work in industries 
where the final innovation comprises several patentable parts (complex 
industry) were observed to spend more on development activities than on 
applied research. These firms were found to seek patents with high inventing 
around costs more often than firms whose final innovations consist of a 
relatively smaller number of patentable parts (discrete industry). Nevertheless, 
according to our results, the former does not seem to achieve that purpose more 
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frequently than the latter. Complex firms also reported that a larger proportion 
of inventions, in comparison to discrete firms, were not patented because of the 
risks of the patent not being valid or being invented around. Moreover, 
compared to discrete firms, complex firms reported that a larger proportion of 
their most valuable innovations are protected by narrow patents. We conjecture 
that this behaviour mirrors the output of R&D. In spending more on 
development activities than on applied research, firms in the complex industry 
are perhaps more likely to generate innovations of lower technological content, 
and thus, if patented, easier to be circumvented or invalidated, and whose 
scope is narrower than patents generated from innovations derived from 
applied research. Consistent with this observation, we detected that the 
innovation process in the complex industry is shorter than it is in the discrete 
industry. As approximately 90% of our sample firms reported to have their 
head office in the UK, these findings perhaps give rise to concerns about the 
competitiveness of the UK complex industry, an issue upon which policy 
makers should draw more attention. In particular, because firms in both 
industries reported that patents are central to increase their returns from 
innovation. 
The results from our survey suggest that the chief reason leading firms to 
patent abroad is the economic one, and the first option is for markets where 
they already participate or predict to join. This extends the findings previously 
observed for multinationals (e. g., Bertin & Wyatt 1988). The findings also 
revealed that, on average, firms apply for a priority application after one third 
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of the innovation process has come to an end, regardless of the industry. On the 
one hand, this result supports existing knowledge that patents are applied early 
in the innovation process (e. g., Pakes 1985). On the other hand, it does not stand 
alone because follow-ups can be filed and, even if not vastly used, they may be 
applied for later in that process. 
A few academic implications are in order. On the empirical side, studies 
have attempted to validate patent indicators in many ways. For example, 
Lerner (1994) observed that in biotechnology patent scope and firm's market 
value are positively correlated. Our results indicate that broader patents seem 
to be more valuable than narrow ones, but that narrow patents can be valuable 
as well. As Lerner's (1994) analysis comes from a single and emerging industry 
and our evidence is based upon an inter-industry comparison, we think this 
difference may rest with technology life cycle. Perhaps industries governed by 
more mature technologies have extensive prior art, which makes more difficult 
to obtain a broad patent. In parallel, more mature industries may value process 
innovations more than emerging industries, especially cost-reducing processes. 
Another reason might be that a broader patent scope increases the likelihood of 
a patent being challenged. Patent scope therefore might not be unambiguous 
and thus should be dealt with more carefully for patent valuation purposes. 
Another indicator assumed to be positively related to the economic value 
of a patent is the patent family. Supra national routes (e. g., PCT) have provided 
patenting procedures to allow for later decisions as to whether the application 
will progress in a certain country. This makes it difficult to foretell the extent 
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the application is valuable, especially if this is a priority application applied 
earlier in the innovation process, as suggested by our results. However, if one 
employs patent grants, as opposed to patent applications, when using patent 
families to measure the value of patents that rationale might not be incorrect. 
As the driving force guiding foreign patenting is the economic one, it is likely 
that the larger the patent family the more valuable a patent is. However, there is 
still some noise in that analysis because patents, even if from the same family, 
are granted at different points in time, according to the patent systems' work 
load. 
In addition, our findings indicate that firms are interested in defending 
their patents for most of their possible life. Although this suggests that the 
payment of renewal fees is a good proxy for the value of a patent, a degree of 
caution should also be exercised. There might be variability (at least we found 
inter-industry differences) in how long the enforcement of a patent is justified. 
Moreover, there seems to be an optimum patent life after which the costs of 
defending the patent in court are not justified, though the patent can be kept in 
force. Furthermore, the use of follow-ups may overshadow which patent is 
really the most valuable. Although the priority patent will be older than the 
follow-up patent, the latter may become the real protection of the final 
innovation, and the former only a supplementary protection that will help in 
making things more difficult for late comers. 
On the theoretical side, our results indicate that the usefulness of the 
patent system seems to depend, amongst other things, on the degree of 
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innovativeness. The distribution of R&D expenses may affect this degree to a 
certain extent. For economic theory, our findings touch at various levels the 
theories on the patent system summarized by Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998a, b). 
But perhaps the most prominent result is the one that indicates that even 
devoting more effort to the development stage firms are able to patent. This 
seems to be contrary to the second theory described by those authors, which 
assumes that follow-on work is not patentable. However, firms' ability to 
leverage their competitiveness seems to be more limited for those who rely on 
those patents. Another point is that, contrary to what we expected, our results 
are not conclusive as to which element of patent design is the most important 
one. Patent scope and length seem to work hand in hand when firms take their 
decisions, and thus we cannot, on the basis of our study, suggest academics and 
policy-makers to devote more time and effort to a particular element. A final 
point regarding economic theory is that our findings indicate that patent 
information is rarely used to dissuade rivals, and thus it is unlikely that firms 
will not pay renewal fees in a strategic context (i. e., not to call attention of 
competitors for a particular market), even if it happens it seems to be a very 
rare event, at least in a competitive market like the UK's. 
For strategic management theory, the results suggest that the ability of a 
patent to influence other firms is concentrated more on what it really is, i. e. a 
delimitation of the boundaries of the technological space (by holding property 
rights), rather than on what it could be, i. e. a mechanism to mislead competitors 
as to the true technological trajectory of the innovator or his/ her real interest in 
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a market (by holding patents on inventions that will not be explored and by 
stopping paying renewal fees, respectively). Our findings suggest that the 
effectiveness of patents as an isolating mechanism depends to some extent on 
the degree of innovativeness, that is, it depends on the nature of the knowledge. 
Thus, the capacity of patents in supporting the capture and protection of value 
seems to be dependent on the value added by the new knowledge. 
The managerial implication starts from the last point left off by the 
academic implication. It seems that, overall, the value of patents is related to the 
technical value of the invention. So, patenting of more ordinary inventions may 
not necessarily be fruitful due to the ease with which rivals can invent around 
innovator's patents. Patenting is justified not only because of the risks of 
loosing proprietary control of valuable innovations but also because the degree 
of protection might be higher when the degree of innovativeness is higher. 
Although we conjecture that the distribution of R&D expenses might 
cause different patenting behaviours across industries, we could not formally 
test this. This might be one limitation of this research that deserves further 
investigation, especially because that distribution might not be officially 
detailed in firms' accounts and respondents might perceive differently what is 
meant by each activity, even if definitions are provided (as we did). 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes this thesis, which is an investigation of the perceived 
importance and use of patents in UK manufacturing. The data analysed come 
from three different sources: interviews with personnel dealing with patenting 
issues; responses to a postal survey undertaken by the UK Office for National 
Statistics; and responses to a postal survey carried out by the researcher. The 
interviews served as the starting point of this research, providing information 
on patent-related issues that formed the foundation upon which a survey, with 
similar content, was designed and undertaken. The other survey, carried out by 
the government, is known as the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and 
provided information about innovative activities of UK firms. The two surveys 
differ in scope; one (i. e., CIS) focuses on various aspects of innovation, paying 
little attention to patenting, and the other focuses mainly on firms' patenting 
behaviour. 
The findings contribute to the understanding of what makes firms 
perceive patents as more or less important; how patents (if at all) interact with 
other appropriability mechanisms; and how firms act with respect to four basic 
questions - why patent?, where to patent?, what to patent?, and when to 
patent?. The results are summarised in the next section. In the third section, 
implications at different levels are drawn from the results. The fourth section 
addresses some of the limitations associated with this investigation. Finally, the 
last section raises issues that can be explored in future research. 
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8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In reviewing the literature on patents some issues emerged as not vet explored 
or partly explored. We concentrated on several which were transformed into 
three general research questions: 
i) To whom are patents important? 
ii) Do patents complement or substitute for other appropriability 
mechanisms? 
iii) How do firms produce their own patent portfolios? 
Each research question was translated into an operational question and 
was tackled using a research technique accordingly. They are presented next 
along with the main findings. 
8.2.1 WHAT MAKES FIRMS PERCEIVE PATENTS MORE (OR LESS) IMPORTANT TO 
PROTECT THE RETURNS FROM INNOVATION? 
This question was answered by an econometric analysis of firms in UK 
manufacturing that responded to the questionnaire in the third round of the UK 
Community Innovation Survey. The analysis was based upon the ordered logit 
model framework, which consists of a non-linear regression technique that 
accounts for the qualitative and ordered nature of the response variable (i. e., the 
importance of patents). 
Generally speaking, our findings are that i) the importance of patents 
varies across industrial sectors and by firm size, ii) patents are more important 
for firms with greater innovative capacity, iii) competition is to a certain extent 
conducive to a greater importance for patents, iv) innovation collaboration and 
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government support may increase the importance of patents depending on the 
agents engaged in these activities, and v) the importance of patents is also 
dependent on firms' appropriation intent. 
More specifically, our results suggest that the industrial sectors in the UK 
that value patents most to protect their innovations are: pharmaceuticals; 
chemicals; medical and precision instruments; machinery; and communication 
equipments. In turn, patents are least important to: printing and publishing; 
fabricated metals; food, beverage and tobacco; and textiles and clothing. 
The results also indicate that larger firms are more likely to perceive 
patents as more important than are smaller firms. Firms with larger innovative 
effort place more value on patents than do less innovative firms. Firms 
operating in more competitive environments are more likely to perceive patents 
as of high importance compared to those operating in less competitive 
surroundings. Firms that establish innovation partnerships with universities are 
driven to perceive patents as more important than are firms not involved in that 
type of collaboration. However, joint-innovation projects with suppliers, clients 
or competitors do not make firms perceive patents as more important than 
those firms that do not take part in these partnerships. Support given by the 
government may increase the perceived importance of patents to smaller firms, 
but it is unlikely to do so to larger firms that may even perceive patents as less 
important. Last, the results suggest that firms that are more concerned about 
appropriating the returns of their innovation are more likely to put more 
emphasis on the importance of patents. 
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8.2.2 HOW DO FIRMS' PERCEPTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER 
APPROPRIABILITY MECHANISMS IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO PATENT Asti D ON 
THE LEVEL OF PATENTING? 
Just as the previous question, the answer to this question comes from responses 
to the Community Innovation Survey. Again, an econometric-based technique 
was employed. At this time, the regression analyses derive from zero-inflated 
negative binomial models. This framework accounts for the non-negative and 
integer nature of the dependent variable (i. e., number of patents applied for). 
Moreover, this technique allows for a large number of zeros in the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, the zeros are treated as coming from different decision- 
making processes (one where there is no invention available, and another 
where, even if available, the invention was chosen not to be patented). 
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the substitutability hypothesis 
should be refuted. In other words, patents seem to work as a complement, 
rather than a substitute, to other mechanisms employed to appropriate the 
results from innovation. The results point out that the more importance firms 
place on confidentiality agreements, secrecy, complexity of the design, 
trademarks, copyright, registration of design, or lead-time, the more likely they 
are to apply for a patent. However, given that a decision is made, a higher 
perceived importance of a mechanism does not necessarily mean that more 
patents are applied for, especially for confidentiality agreements and lead-time. 
But even in these cases, our findings do not show a negative and significant 
relationship that could support the idea that the mechanisms work as 
substitutes. 
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The results indicate that, in the cases of secrecy, copyright, trademarks, 
and complexity of the design, there seems to be an inverted-U relationship 
between the degree of importance of these mechanisms and the number of 
patents applied for. Thus, there seems to be a threshold after which the number 
of patents starts to decline. But, still, the degree of importance impacts 
positively on the number of patents (other things constant). For secrecy and 
copyright, firms that place most importance on one of these mechanisms still 
use patents more often than those firms that do not place value at all on those 
mechanisms. With respect to trademarks and complexity of the design of the 
innovation, firms that attach most importance to these mechanisms and firms 
that judge these mechanisms worthless apply equally for patents. 
Our findings also show that not only the decision to patent but also the 
level of patenting are determined by the emphasis firms place on appropriation. 
Thus, according to our metrics, appropriation intent seems to be correlated to 
firms' patenting behaviour, and those more concerned about appropriation are 
those who apply most for patents (ceteris paribus). 
We also find that changes in strategy have apparently made firms more 
prone to patenting. As we observed that the level of patenting seems to have 
more to do with firms' innovative capacity than with their strategic behaviour, 
this higher inclination to patent is likely to be because innovativeness is not 
concentrated only on technology-related issues; it spans the various functions of 
an organisation, including strategy. Thus, the increase in the number of patents 
is more likely to be a result of innovation contagion than of strategy per se. 
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8.2.3 HOW DO FIRMS ACT WITH RESPECT TO FOUR BASIC QUESTIONS - WHY PATENT? 
WHERE TO PATENT? WHAT TO PATENT? AND WHEN TO PATENT? 
Unlike previous questions, this set of questions is answered by the anal-ses of 
responses to a different survey. A new survey of UK R&D-based firms (derived 
from the UK R&D Scoreboard 2001) was designed and administered. But before 
designing the survey, a series of interviews with personnel in charge of patents 
within the pharmaceutical industry was run. The interviews were used as a 
foundation for the design of the survey instrument as well as a supplementary 
source of information to the responses of that questionnaire. 
Overall, the results indicate that firms' patenting is motivated mainly by 
exclusionary purposes. The countries where applications are filed most are 
those where firms already operate or will operate in the near future. Product 
innovations are more likely to be patented than process innovations. Although 
sometimes a narrow scope can be more valuable than a broad scope, firms are 
in general keener to achieve a broader protection by either holding a broad 
patent with high inventing around costs or by securing a series of patents on 
variations of the invention or on its various aspects. This is apparently achieved 
by filing the first patent application (the priority application) early in the 
innovation process, that is, after one third of the time used to generate and 
market an innovation runs out. However, this is not the full story because, 
despite applying early in that process, follow-up applications can be filed. 
An unexpected finding to emerge from the results was that patents 
might be as important to process innovations as they are to product innovations. 
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Our existing knowledge suggests that product innovations are patented more 
often than process innovations, and thus patents are thought to be more 
important to product innovations. Although we did not find the contrary with 
respect to the frequency with which each type of innovation is patented, in 
exploring the skewness in the distribution of the value of innovations we 
detected that the share of the most valuable patented product and process 
innovations do not statistically differ. 
Our results also detected some different patenting behaviour between 
the industry where the final innovation comprises several patentable parts 
(complex industry) and the industry where the final innovation consist of 
relatively less patentable parts (discrete industry). Most notably, firms in the 
former industry perceive that a larger proportion of inventions, in comparison 
to firms in the latter industry, were not patented because of the risks of the 
patent not being valid or being invented around. This is consistent with another 
finding that indicates that firms in the complex industry rely more on narrow 
patents than firms in the discrete industry to protect their most valuable 
innovations. As a result, complex firms reported to seek patents with high 
inventing around costs more often than discrete firms do, though, according to 
our results, they do not seem to achieve that purpose. One could argue that 
such differences are explained by the very nature of the final innovation (i. e., 
the number of patentable parts of the final innovation). As in the complex 
industry overlapping patents ('patent thickets') are expected to happen more 
often, it might be easier for patent disputes to happen, and more difficult to 
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hold a broad patent without infringing someone else's patents. However, we 
did not find that the costs of patent disputes affect one industry more than the 
other. Neither did we find that the risks of an induced deal due to overlapping 
patents differ between discrete and complex industries. We conjecture therefore 
that such differences rest with the distribution of R&D expenses in either 
industry. Contrary to firms in the discrete industry, firms in the complex 
industry spend more on development activities than on applied research. Thus, 
the innovations of the former industry are more likely to be of lower 
technological content. As a consequence, they might be, if patented, easier to 
circumvent or invalidated, and also of narrower scope than patents generated 
from innovations reliant on applied research. 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
8.3.1 ACADEMIC IMPLICATIONS 
One immediate academic implication of this research is that it reinforces the 
idea that the usefulness of patent statistics as an indicator of inventive 
performance is limited. Although the most innovative firms were found to 
place more value on patents, firms' other attributes (e. g., size, industrial sector) 
should be taken into account for a proper comparison. 
This research also shows that although decisions as to when firms apply 
(or not) for patents may be taken strategically, the number of patents seems to 
be governed mainly by firms' innovative capacity and their interest in stopping 
others from copying. Thus, the noisiness in the patents-R&D relationship due to 
the manifold use of patents seems to be only marginal and have only limited 
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impact on the estimation of propensities to patent when the number of patents 
is the response variable. Nevertheless, there remains interference of other 
factors difficult to control such as the efficiency of R&D. 
Regarding valuation purposes our results suggest that patent statistics 
should also be used and interpreted cautiously. For example, the rationale that 
in general broader patents are more valuable than narrow patents might be 
correct. But a broader patent scope also increases the risks of a patent being 
challenged. Moreover, national patent systems may not favour broader patents 
(in case of a cross-country comparison). Thus, patent scope might not be 
unambiguous and should be dealt with care. Our results indicate that, in fact, 
narrow patents can be valuable, even if to a lesser extent than broad ones. 
Our findings also point that another indicator that deserves attention is 
the size of the patent family. We observed that the driving force guiding 
patenting abroad is the economic one. So, it is likely that the larger the size of 
the patent family the more valuable a patent is. But this is more reasonable to 
accept when the indicator used is granted patents rather than patent 
applications due to practicalities of supra-national routes that allow delays in 
the decisions about which countries the application will progress. It is also fair 
to say that patents are granted at different points in time, according to the 
patent systems' work load. So, it might be that patent grants in the triad (i. e., 
EU, US, and Japan) might suffice. 
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Again, for patent valuation purposes, the payment of renewal fees may 
be a good proxy for the most valuable patents. However, the extent to which 
renewal fees are paid may not correspond necessarily with whether a patent 
will be enforced if infringed; there seems to exist an optimum patent life after 
which the costs of defending a patent in court are not (strategically) justified. 
Inter-industry differences in how long firms are interested in enforcing 
intellectual property rights could be observed. 
One theoretical implication is that the results point in an opposite 
direction to one theory in the economics of the patent system that assumes that 
follow-on work is not patentable. We observed that firms may apply for follow- 
ups and also that patents are taken out by firms that concentrate their R&D 
expenses on development activities. Follow-ups also mean that firms may never 
be sure about the extent their patents are valid, and this supports the 
probabilistic patents' theory. In following up, firms attempt to stack the odds in 
their favour if the priority patent is challenged by someone else because they 
will have other related patents either covering other particularities of the 
original invention or providing more evidence of the originality of the 
invention. 
Our research also reiterates how difficult it is to coordinate patent 
breadth and length to correct for market imperfections on the basis of a 'one 
size fits all system'. Both dimensions were found relevant to patent holders. The 
overall picture is that other benefits brought by patents are dependent to a large 
extent on the degree of excludability achieved (i. e., the strength of monopoly 
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power). Thus, the strategic role they play is mainly in demarcating the contours 
of technological boundaries, allowing firms to have freedom of operation 
within a particular space and controlling who can step into that domain. 
Contrary to what a few economic models assume there is, according to our 
research, little space (and perhaps time) for innovators to produce non-trustful 
signals. Innovators concentrate on managing the disclosure of valuable 
information instead. However, assuming that the knowledge that is patented is 
the same that is kept secret does not take into account the various dimensions of 
knowledge. Thus, under that assumption, different methods cannot be used 
simultaneously, but this does not fit the facts (at least at firm level). 
Appropriability conditions seem to be enhanced when patents and other 
appropriation mechanisms are used concurrently. Thus, in examining 
appropriability conditions the degree that the knowledge can be appropriated 
by various, or at least a few, methods should be incorporated in economic 
models. 
A final implication for theory is that the effectiveness of patents as an 
isolating mechanism depends to a certain degree on the type of knowledge that 
is translated into inventions. Our results indicate that patents are more effective 
when encompassing knowledge created under riskier and more uncertain 
conditions, that is, knowledge that is more likely to be valuable and sought to 
be captured by rival firms. 
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8.3.2 PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our findings revealed that smaller firms pay less attention to patents than do 
larger firms (other things equal). This however should not alarm policy makers 
because the most innovative firms, even if of reduced size, place more 
importance on patents than their less innovative counterparts. This means that 
small high-tech firms do not need any special policy to be stimulated to patent. 
The same cannot be said to other smaller and less innovative firms. Perhaps 
they need more stimuli to use patents to the same extent that their larger 
counterparts. In general, the literature (e. g., Kingston 2001) reports that some 
aspects of the post-patenting phase should be further elaborated or improved 
such as the renewal scheme, out-licensing conditions, and especially litigation. 
These are claimed to benefit a broader spectrum of firms, though the effects are 
unlikely to be the same across industrial sectors. 
Our analyses also indicate that government support may affect the 
importance firms place on patents, depending on their size. If the support is 
given to larger firms, patents become less important (compared to those who do 
not receive any support). If smaller firms are the ones who receive government 
support, patents are perceived of higher importance. This might be desirable if 
this policy is not weakening the competitiveness of those firms most likely to 
compete abroad (i. e., larger firms) because as our results indicate for those 
whose major market is the international one, patents are very important. 
It was possible to discriminate, from a sample of the largest R&D 
spenders in the UK, between firms that operate in industries where the final 
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innovation is a result of several patentable parts (complex) and firms that 
operate in industries where the final innovation consists of relatively few 
patentable parts (discrete). Complex firms perceive it to be more difficult to 
hold patents that are difficult to circumvent than discrete firms perceive. This 
indicates a more fragile position of complex firms, compared to discrete ones, in 
competing on the basis of controlling intellectual property rights. Complex 
firms also reported to concentrate mainly on development/ design activities 
while discrete firms concentrated on applied research. This may explain why it 
is more difficult to secure stronger patents in the complex industry than in the 
discrete industry. Perhaps this suggests to policy makers that it is not only the 
total R&D costs that matter but also what these costs are used for (i. e., the 
distribution of R&D outlays). 
Comparing our UK findings and the findings of another survey 
administered in the US and Japan (Cohen et al. 2002), one can observe that the 
way in which the UK patent system is used presents some similarities with the 
way the US and the Japanese systems are used. All of them are exploited 
mainly for exclusion of third parties. While in Japan patents are largely used for 
negotiations as well, in the UK and in the US this use is more limited. In the US 
the use of patents in negotiations is common within the complex industry. In 
the UK that use is limited in either industry. Despite the benefits of those 
negotiations of sharing intellectual property rights they have costs (e. g., firms 
have less autonomy) that may outweigh the benefits. With the data available it 
is not possible to assess whether the UK patent system is less socially desirable 
358 
than the US and the Japanese patent systems. But it seems that the findings are 
signalling that attention should be paid to increasing the capacity of the UK 
patent system to promote knowledge sharing. This is perhaps reinforced by the 
evidence that the use of patent information for technical problem-solving is not 
amongst the most important reasons why firms seek patent information for; 
they concentrate mainly on the use of patents for competitive analysis. As the 
former type of information is expected to help in the diffusion of knowledge, 
the UK patent system may not be properly playing one of its roles, i. e. 
promoting R&D spillovers. 
Although we found that the use of patents as bargaining chips is not 
widespread in the UK, this does not mean that knowledge sharing as a whole is 
a rare event. Moreover, despite the results indicating that to a large extent 
patents do not work as a catalyst to promote negotiations, we detected that 
under certain circumstances it can be the other way round (i. e., partnerships 
fostering patenting). This was the particular case of joint-innovation projects 
between universities and firms. Firms involved in this type of collaboration are 
more likely to judge patents highly important compared to their counterparts 
not involved. This brings up another area where government should pay 
careful attention due to the difficulty in detecting the extent that public 
resources should become private. 
8.3.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Several managerial implications can be drawn from this research. One of them 
is that patents should not be thought of in isolation from other mechanisms of 
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appropriability. As no method of appropriation is perfect, appropriability 
conditions are likely to be enhanced if firms know which mechanisms should be 
used and when. Our results suggest that firms employ these mechanisms 
collectively in order to strengthen the extent that they can appropriate the 
returns from their innovative effort, although this does not mean that all of 
them have to, or can, be used. The effort devoted to each of the mechanisms has 
to be in line with the degree of appropriability sought and with the degree of 
appropriability that is feasible (depending on the regimes of appropriabilittiv 
peculiar to each industry). What seems clear from our results is that patents are 
paramount, and even more effective, for the innovative activity of higher value 
added. 
In choosing to patent an invention innovators should master the 
patenting process. If not fully aware of the legislation, support should be sought 
because, as we observed, the strength of a patent lies in its capacity to hinder 
competition, and this is achieved by, amongst other things, the decisions taken 
during the patenting process; decisions as to why, what, when and where to 
patent. Moreover, firms do not have to enforce their patents for the full patent 
life, even if a patent is infringed. At some point in the patent term it might be 
better to devote time and effort to the creation of new value than to the 
forestalling of the dissipation of the existing value. 
We also observed that the ability of firms in using patents to signal to the 
market (either in the form of an application or by stopping paying renewal fees) 
with the purpose of influencing competitors is quite limited. Although we do 
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not know the costs of doing that (and we do not claim this is costless), perhaps 
the returns from patents could be higher, even if not detected, than the returns 
brought mainly by delimitating the boundaries of the technological space, 
especially because firms reported to use patent information mainly as a tool to 
support competitive analysis. 
One final comment regards the simplistic view that holding a single 
patent will generate adequate excludability. Although a strategic patent may be 
rather effective it is mainly by managing a whole portfolio of patents that firms 
will generate the full benefits of patents and limit the operations of (potential) 
competitors. In particular, if the decisions taken along the patenting process 
match the business purpose. One of our interviewees mentioned that working 
with patents is the same as playing a 3D-chess. It is complex and players cannot 
neglect the strategic character of the 'game` that demands both defensive and 
aggressive movements. 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research, as any other, has its limitations and one of them is rather obvious: 
its territorial coverage. Although the results are valid for firms in UK 
manufacturing, it is difficult to extrapolate all of our findings across-borders. In 
fact, addressing a comparison between our results and an earlier study for the 
US and Japan, we noticed different appropriability conditions. This might 
reflect on the extent to which our conclusions can be generalised. 
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Another limitation is the level of analysis which is mainly at the 
(aggregate) firm level. While this gives a better visibility of the overall picture, 
the results do not match all cases, and perhaps interesting exceptions have been 
missed. Furthermore, analysis at the innovation level may reveal important 
aspects of knowledge creation and decisions about its appropriability that our 
level of analysis was not able to portray. 
Inter-temporal changes are likely to be observed in some aspects of 
patenting activity (e. g., importance of patents). As our analyses derive from 
cross-sectional data, such results are not observed. 
Other rather important limitations regard the interaction of patents and 
other mechanisms of appropriability. Our analyses do not take into account the 
variability in their importance at the various stages of the innovation process. 
This could further reveal whether they, in fact, work as complements or 
substitutes. 
8.5 FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
Starting from the point at which we finished the last section, this research and 
earlier research have focused on the interaction between patents and other 
appropriability mechanisms but it has not taken into account when this 
interaction happens or when it is stronger (or weaker). This is a fertile area of 
research that should be explored. 
One question that should be answered is whether appropriation 
strategies do indeed exist, or are consciously formulated and deployed. 
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Although the interaction of appropriability mechanisms may suggest so, the 
way patent information is used for may suggest the contrary. Therefore, more 
sophisticated analytical approaches from the strategic management literature 
could be used in pursuing an answer to that question. 
Other questions also remain unanswered and merit further investigation. 
For example, is the role of patents as a channel of information flow really 
limited in the UK? Why do firms in the UK apparently use patents in 
negotiations less often than firms in the US and Japan? 
Further research could examine the effects of market structure on 
decisions taken to produce patent portfolios. Or could explore the conditions 
within which follow-up patent applications are pursued. 
And finally, another area of research that deserves a special study is that 
regarding why university partnerships make firms perceive patents as more 
important. 
These are all promising areas of research which will help us in 
expanding the boundaries of our current knowledge on the role patents play in 
strengthening firms' competitiveness and in welfare creation. Although we 
recognise the operational difficulties in approaching those issues we believe 
that enterprise is worth it because in the end "[w]e should not be cursing the 
darkness, but rather, we should keep on lighting candles" (Griliches 1990: 1703). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
The Community Innovation Survey 
The 'Community Innovation Survey' (CIS) is a pan-European effort to gather 
information on the extent and level of technological innovation activity at the 
firm-level196. Information on firms' innovative activities was collected by means 
of a survey instrument designed by all EU Member States. As a result, 
indicators of innovative output and qualitative information on several 
innovation related issues (e. g., industry, turnover, employment, R&D expenses, 
sources of information, patenting) are produced. 
The data set used in this thesis relates only to the UK responses to the 
third round of the 'Community Innovation Survey' (CIS 3). The CIS 3 was 
administered in 2001 in the UK by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 
behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The survey encompasses 
innovative activities during the period 1998-2000, but this is no time series. This 
period was used just as a reference for several questions. Therefore, we shall be 
working with a cross-section197 of firms. 
In the UK it was a voluntary survey addressed to firms with more than 
10 employees in both manufacturing and services industries, that is, those 
classified in the sections C-K of the UK Standard Industrial Classification of 
196 In fact, the unit of analysis is the enterprise, which is defined as the smallest combination of legal units 
with a certain degree of autonomy within an enterprise group (a number of enterprises under common 
ownership). 
197 A panel of at most 800 firms which responded to both CIS 2 and CIS 3 could be used but we could not 
see any benefit in reducing our sample size to work with a short time span without any relevant event 
for our study. 
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Economic Activities (UK SIC92). For the purposes of this thesis we will focus 
only on the manufacturing industry (section D). 
Access to individual returns was kindly provided by the DTI but in 
order to preserve confidentiality no identification of the respondents was 
disclosed. The achieved sample was 8,172 enterprises, drawn from a sample 
frame of 19,602. This sample frame derives from the population of 126,775 
records of the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). Our sample, 
however, by focusing on manufacturing consists of, at most, 3440 firms, which 
is about 42% of the total sample and 7.5% of the whole population of UK 
manufacturing firms registered in the IDBR198. 
198 The real figures are smaller since we only use valid responses in our analyses. 
395 
Appendix 2 
Interview Guide 
1. Could you briefly describe your company's profile? 
  Ownership   Market   Technology 
In. case of being a parent conlpan 
1. a. Does your company have R&D units abroad? 
1. b. If so, Where do the overseas R&D units first apply for a patent? 
  Country where subsidiary operates?   Parent company home 
country? 
In case of being a subsidiary: 
i. c. Does your company first apply for a patent in the UK or in its 
parent company home country? 
In case of being neither a parent company nor a subsidiary: Next question 
1. d. Has your company taken out patents in a country non-signatory 
of the Paris Convention? 
1. e. If so, How has your company avoided forfeiting a patent due to 
public disclosure? 
2. What determines the selection of the country where your company applies for a 
patent? 
  Competitive Type of patents   Potential market   Legal 
Environment Framework 
2. a. To what extent does your company make use of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty? 
2. b. What are the advantages of the PCT? 
1c. And the disadvantages? 
2. d. Does you company apply for a patent to the European Patent 
Office? 
2. e. Is there any time that your company applies for a patent just to 
the United Kingdom Patent Office as opposed to the European 
Patent Office? 
2. f. If so, When? 
2. g. If not, Why? 
2. h. When is it interesting to delay the substantive examination of a 
patent application? 
2. i. And when is it interesting to have a patent granted sooner? 
2. j. In the UK the pharmaceutical industry is regulated by a price 
scheme, does it has any impact on the way your company applies 
for a patent? 
2. k. Does your company file patent applications in countries where it 
does not operate? 
2.1. If so, What are the reasons to do that? 
3. What categories of invention does your company patent most frequently? 
  Process   New use 
  Product (Which one? - chemical entity, pharmaceutical composition, ... 
} 
3. a. What category of patented invention gives more protection 
against competitors? 
3. b. Why? 
3. c. What determines a higher or a lower protection obtained in a 
patent? 
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  Nature of invention " Technology path 
  Decisions during development of Action taken to enforce patent 
invention rights 
3. d. How can one identify whether a patent application does seek a 
strong protection? 
  Number of claims Number of citations Number of 
examples 
4. How does your company distinguish between what is and what is not worth 
patenting? 
4. a. To what extent does your company analyse the patentability of 
inventions that are not within its core business? 
4. b. What about those inventions that emerge as a result of non- 
routine activities? 
5. What issues should be analysed before deciding that an invention will be 
publicly disclosed as opposed to keeping it secret? 
5. a. To what extent is it necessary to disclose the real invention? 
5. b. Does your company think on the reasons for disclosing 
information in each patent application? 
5. c. Does your company make use of both trade secrets and secrecy? 
5. d. When does your company use trade secrets? 
5. e. When does your company use secrecy? 
6. When does your company start to realise what is going to be claimed in a patent 
application? 
6. a. Could you describe your company's typical route of drug 
discovery? 
6. b. At what stage of that route does your company decide that a 
patent application must be filed? (explorat'; target identificat'; 
screening; lead comp'd; scale up) 
6. c. How much of the total R&D budget is still available after a patent 
application is filed? 
6. d. Does your company establish deadlines for a patent application to 
be filed? 
6. e. How does it impact on the protection obtained? 
6. f. Do softwares to model molecules impact on the timing of applying 
for a patent? 
6. g. What about the degree of protection sought in a patent 
application? 
6. h. Can you file other applications covering slightly different 
variations of an invention before the first one is published? 
6. i. When do you do that: after or before the first year of the priority 
date? 
6. j. Why do you do that? 
6. k. Can you file several applications at the same time covering 
variations of an invention? 
6.1. What is the advantage of doing that? 
7. To what extent does your company aim at claiming not only an invention itself 
(underclaiming) but also its variations (overclaiming)? 
7. a. What are the benefits of doing so? 
7. b. And the risks? 
7. c. What determines such overclaiming (or underclaiming)? 
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8. To what extent do your company's inventors make additional experimentation 
to define the boundaries of an invention? 
8. a. Even when the invention is not crucial to your company's core 
business? 
8. b. Does your company come across new inventions when 
performing further experimentation? 
8. c. What kind of unexpected results may change the patenting 
objective? 
8. d. Is that additional experimentation likely to extend a patent 
protection? 
8. e. If so, in which way? 
8. f. If not, why is it performed? 
8. g. How much effort should be put in this phase? 
9. How does your company use the time between a first patent application and its 
publication? 
9. a. Does your company improve the primary invention? 
9. b. If so, How do the outcomes of that additional work benefit your 
company? 
9. c. Does your company search for prior art? 
9. d. If so, In this case is the use of the Patent Cooperation Treaty an 
advantage? 
9. e. How can either improvements on the primary invention or search 
for prior art affect the previous patent application? 
9. f. Does your company abandon the former application or continues 
with it? 
9. g. How similar is an invention claimed in a patent application to the 
one that in fact is launched on the market? 
10. How effective are patents as a mean of gaining competitive advantage? 
10. a. To what extent can patents block competitors' movement? 
10. b. What actions can be taken to more effectively block competitors' 
movement? 
10. c. How easy is it to invent around a patent? 
10. d. What makes it easier or more difficult? 
10. e. Does the ease of duplicating the function of the invention affect 
your company's decisions of whether or not apply for a patent? 
10. f. When is it necessary to invent around a patent? 
10. g. Does your company use patent as an indicator of inventive 
performance of your researchers? 
10. h. Are patents used as part of incentive structures for your 
company's research workers? 
10. i. Does your company use its competitors' patents to extract 
information from them? 
10. j. If so, What kind of information is sought? 
11. What determines the value of a patent? 
  Possible users   Countries where granted 
" Competitors action   Technological impact 
  Degree of protection 
11. a. To what extent are your company's patents individually 
significant? 
11. b. How does your company detect its patents technological impact? 
398 
11. c. How can your company detect other companies' most valuable 
patents? 
11. d. To what extent is the degree of protection conferred by a patent 
related to its technological impact? 
11. e. How do both underclaimed and overclaimed patents add value 
to your company? 
11. f. To what extent is the technological impact of a patent related to 
the success of marketing an invention? 
12. What does your company take into account to decide to stop paying renewal 
fees? 
12. a. Have those patents lost their value? 
12. b. If so, What is likely to have happened to make those patents 
devalue? 
12. c. If not, Why has your company decided to stop paying their fees? 
13. What are the advantages of having a patent portfolio? 
13. a. Has your company licensed out technology protected by 
patents? 
13. b. If not, Do you foresee any possibility of licensing out in the 
future? 
13. c. Has your company used patents in cross-license agreements? 
13. d. If not, Would your company take the opportunity of that if it has 
the choice? 
13. e. To what extent do patents likely to be used to license out 
technology differ from those likely to be used in cross-license 
agreements? 
13. f. How can your company's patent portfolio be used to build up a 
relationship with its customers? 
14. What are the weaknesses of patent protection? 
  Costly to maintain   Costly to defend 
  Does not prevent imitation   Too much disclosure 
  If challenged, it is difficult to defend 
15. What enables your company to more effectively appropriate returns from 
R&D? 
  To exploit lead time   To learn quicker than 
competitors 
  To use sales and services capabilities   To keep secret 
  To have strong patent protection 
15. a Do patents and those (or that) other mechanism(s) have synergy? 
15. b. How do they complement each other? 
16. What action would your company take if another company infringes its 
patents? 
16. a Does that action vary according to the patent infringed? 
16. b. What can affect such action? 
17. Could you describe how patenting activities are organised within your 
company? 
17. a. Does your company have a formal unit to handle just intellectual 
property issues? 
17. b. What are the main tasks of those who deal with patent issues? 
" Search for prior art " Prepare patent applications 
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17. c. Does your company have an external patent agent (or attorney) 
or does it apply for a patent by itself? 
17. d Why (or not) are they necessary? 
17. e. How do your company's inventors participate throughout the 
patenting process? 
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Appendix 3 
Correlation Matrix of Coefficients of Models (3) and (4) 
Model 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (`ý) (y) 
(1) R&D intensity 1.0000 
(2) Sales 0.4149 1.0000 
(3) Novel Prod. -0.0151 -0.0877 1.0000 
(4) Gov. Support -0.1327 -0.0928 -0.1039 1.0000 
(5) Univ. Partnership -0.1921 -0.1062 -0.0960 -0.1757 1.0000 
(6) Local Mkt. 0.1660 0.0835 0.0461 -0.0305 0.0031 1.0000 
(7) Regional Mkt. -0.0013 -0.1124 0.0875 -0.0187 -0.0458 0.1342 1.0000 (8) International Mkt. -0.0847 -0.1030 -0.1647 0.0270 -0.1039 0.1447 0.1924 1.0000 
(9) SAI index -0.1788 -0.1131 -0.2425 0.0489 0.1273 0.0557 -0.0536 0.1492 1.0000 
Model 4 
(1) °/o Sci. J Eng. Staff 
(2) Sales 
(3) Novel Prod. 
(4) Gov. Support 
(5) Univ. Partnership 
(6) Local Mkt. 
(7) Regional Mkt. 
(8) International Mkt. 
(9) SAI index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1.0000 
0.0966 1.0000 
-0.0986 -0.0763 1.0000 
0.0694 0.0057 -0.0760 1.0000 
-0.1371 -0.1493 -0.1110 -0.1989 1.0000 
0.0545 0.0758 -0.0423 0.0455 -0.0216 1.0000 
0.0192 0.0700 0.0086 -0.1262 0.0176 0.0977 1.0000 
-0.1668 -0.0790 -0.0975 0.0317 -0.0253 0.1571 0.1899 1.0000 
-0.1387 -0.0962 -0.1604 -0.0897 -0.0046 0.0061 0.0900 0.0438 1.0000 
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Appendix 4 
Industrial Sector Estimates of Ordered Logit Models from Table 5a, b 
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic Metals 0.556 1.240** 4.803*** 3.998*** 
(1.021) (0.503) (1.289) (0.772) 
Chemicals, except drugs 0.852 1.780*** 6.350*** 5.450*** 
(0.811) (0.418) (1.316) (0.743) 
Communication equip. 1.026 1.688*** 6.145*** 4.968*** 
(0.822) (0.410) (1.272) (0.745) 
Electrical equip. 0.904 1.720*** 5.696*** 4.776*** 
(0.792) (0.380) (1.243) (0.721) 
Fabricated metal 1.349 1.530*** 2.451** 2.213*** 
(0.835) (0.381) (1.204) (0.755) 
Food, beverages and tobacco -0.390 0.390 2.689** 2.437*** 
(0.763) (0.401) (1.151) (0.732) 
Glass, clay and ceramics 0.584 1.504*** 4.425*** 3.834*** 
(0.981) (0.451) (1.352) (0.774) 
Machinery, except office 1.495* 1.994*** 6.344*** 5.125*** 
(0.794) (0.378) (1.263) (0.726) 
Medical and precision instr. 1.243 1.841*** 6.480**-k 5.138*** 
(0.818) (0.393) (1.275) (0.733) 
Motor vehicles 0.841 1.750*** 5.439*** 4.796*** 
(0.834) (0.377) (1.263) (0.723) 
Office and computing equip. 0.949 1.027* 5.691*** 4.263*** 
(1.052) (0.541) (1.354) (0.787) 
Other manufacturing 0.940 1.502*** 4.634*** 3.554*** 
(0.786) (0.368) (1.184) (0.710) 
Other transport equip. 0.395 0.671 4.089*** 3.198*** 
(0.958) (0.439) (1.328) (0.778) 
Pharmaceuticals 1.522 1.749*** 7.578*** 6.026*** 
(0.997) (0.647) (1.380) (0.835) 
Refined petroleum products 0.136 1.206 4.030** 4.487*** 
(1.207) (0.982) (1.892) (0.980) 
Rubber and plastic products 1.362* 1.848*** 5.695*** 4.682*** 
(0.820) (0.404) (1.236) (0.738) 
Textiles and clothing 0.826 0.964** 3.718*** 2.514*** 
(0.901) (0.400) (1.179) (0.753) 
Wood and paper 0.646 1.533*** 4.164*** 3.805*** 
(0.849) (0.400) (1.195) (0.737) 
The comparison industry is Printing and Publishing. 
h* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 5 
Profile of the 'Complex` and 'Discrete' Industries 
(i) Discrete industry - sectors with UK SIC 92 codes less than 29 (e. g., food, 
beverages, and tobacco, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metals); 
Complex industry - sectors with UK SIC 92 codes 29 or above (e. g., 
machinery, communication equipments, medical, precision and optical 
instruments, office and computing equipments). 
Industry Variable N mean sd min max 
Discrete % Sci. /Eng. Staff 1288 3.814 9.375 0 100 
Sales (£'000s) 1288 23096 136687 7 3447748 
# Patents 1288 1.06 10.58 0 300 
Complex % Sci. /Eng. Staff 1126 6.551 12.419 0 100 
Sales (£' 0ß0s) 1126 16321 51406 13 1170824 
# Patents 1126 1.53 7.77 0 100 
Discrete Complex N 
(%) (%) (row total=100%) 
Introduced a product innovation 
No 54.05 45.95 2063 
Yes 49.29 50.71 351 
Total 53.36 46.64 2414 
Market 
Local 70.21 29.79 329 
Regional 70.75 29.25 318 
National 50.98 49.02 1330 
International 35.24 64.76 437 
Total 53.36 46.64 2414 
Government support 
No 54.80 45.20 2106 
Yes 43.51 56.49 308 
Total 53.36 46.64 2414 
University partnership 
No 53.85 46.15 2258 
Yes 46.15 53.85 156 
Total 53.36 46.64 2414 
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Appendix 6 
Exploratory Models of the Determinants of Patent Applieationsd, b 
Covariates 
R&D intensity (Log) 
% Sci. /Eng. Staff 
Sales (Log) 
Novel Product 
Local market 
Regional market 
Intl. market 
Gov. Support 
Univ. Partners. 
Complex 
Constant 
Industry Dummies 
N 
Non-zero obs. 
Ln a 
Log-Likelihood 
Model Chi-square 
Pseudo R2 
BIC 
AIC 
Vuong test 
LR test 
(A) 
Decision Count 
(B) 
Decision Count 
-0.216 0.205*** 
(0.194) (0.074) 
0.017 0.702*** 
(0.353) (0.107) 
-1.090 0.331 
(0.828) (0.248) 
0.523 -0.534 
(5.730) (3.603) 
2.189 1.195 
(1.880) (1.208) 
0.198 0.428* 
(0.802) (0.234) 
0.326 -0.347 
(3.088) (0.592) 
-2.626 0.314 
(2.310) (0.329) 
-0.008 0.020* 
(0.014) (0.012) 
-0.292** 0.473*** 
(0.127) (0.092) 
-1.783*** 0.671*** 
(0.396) (0.243) 
2.147*** 0.594 
(0.679) (0.777) 
1.094 -0.574 
(0.894) (0.866) 
-0.321 0.700*** 
(0.338) (0.247) 
-0.521 -0.379 
(0.489) (0.275) 
-2.562*** 0.201 
(0.971) (0.304) 
0.358 -2.913*** 
(3.380) (0.957) 
Yes 
484 
175 
0.598 
-742.35 
418.08*** 
0.144 
-1167.41 
3.295 
3.33*** 
1156.43*** 
5.595*** -2.447*** 
(1.326) (0.877) 
Yes 
2414 
316 
1.159*** 
-1509.61 
280.46*** 
0.172 
-15355.13 
1.296 
5.84*** 
2522.70*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. 
The reference market is the national market. 
P (D) 
Decision Count Decision Count 
-0.054 0.370' 
(0.127) (0.075) 
-0.006 0.025** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
-0.028 0.582*** -0.335*** 0.375*** 
(0.156) (0.074) (0.122) (0.065) 
-0.756 0.304 -2.191*** 0.394 
(0.495) (0.263) {0.645) (0.320) 
-10.271 -2.396*** 1.534* -0.519 
(6.779) (0.848) (0.916) (0.712) 
-18.31*** -1.449** -0.426 -2.136*** 
(1.273) (0.704) (0.814) (0.496) 
0.423 0.724*** -0.208 0.935*** 
(0.547) (0.246) (0.360) (0.261) 
0.617 -0.187 -0.126 -0.146 
(0.552) (0.314) (0.666) (0.326) 
-22.70*** 0.281 -6.431 0.204 
(7.916) (0.317) (69.954) (0.360) 
-1.046* -0.175 -0.727** -0.241 
(0.628) (0.286) (0.365) (0.34-4) 
0.112 -2.917*** 4.444*** -3.060*** 
(1.727) (0.806) (0.895) (0.819) 
No No 
484 2414 
175 316 
0.929*** 1.464*** 
-771.31 -1559.08 
165.42*** 160.17*** 
0.111 0.145 
-1319.68 -15521.02 
3.274 1.309 
2.46*** 4.77*** 
1580.43*** 3017.53*** 
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he objectivc of this study is to examine in "'hich ways nmiizifacturing firms in the UK use the patent 
stem, and the extent that this system 
helps those firms to recoup their investments in innovative 
, tivities. It 
is being curried out within the Marketing and Strategic Management Group of the War1t'ick 
USI11ess 
School, Unitiversity of Warwick. All information provided will be held in the strictest confidence. 
!e},, ill neither publish, release, nor disclose any information on, or identifchle tt'ith individual 
anies o -business 
units. gm 
m ý m 
DIRECTIONS 
he survey is designed to be responded to by the person most aware of the patenting activities within your- 
ompany (e. g. patent managers/ administrators/ directors, intellectual property rights managers/ directors. R&D 
gnagers/ directors). In cases of subsidiaries of foreign companies, the questionnaire is to be responded to by the 
trson most aware of the decision-making process regarding patenting activities in the UK. 
fequestionnaire consists mostly of closed questions, that is, questions to be answered either by ticking (e. g. Z) or 
cling (e. g. 1204 5) the appropriate option. Note that for some questions which refer to proportion/ 
rcentage, the sum does not have to round to 100`%, since options may work simultaneously. The remainder of the 
estionnaire consists of open questions, which we expect you to answer based on your best estimate. You do 
T need to search your files or consult with colleagues to provide more detailed answers. In order to avoid 
sunderstandings, please use BLOCK CAPITALS whenever necessary. Please answer to the best of your ability 
ed on your understanding of your company's business and its activities. If any question does not apply to your 
mpany, please write N/A beside its index (e. g. Al, a, i, II). If you do not know the answer, please leave the 
scion/ item blank. 
I free to add comments to clarify your answers, to add supplementary answer categories, or to make other 
ments on the questions. 
UR CO-OPERATION IS OF GREAT VALUE. 
ýn finished, please return the completed questionnaire in the addressed postage paid envelope. 
e can assist you in any way, or if you have 
karch officer in charge of this study: 
pHENRIQUE BARROS 
keting and Strategic Management Group 
Qk Business School 
'ersity of Warwick 
entry 
4 7AL 
024 7652 2087 
il: H. M, Barros(&,, warwick. ac. uk 
any queries or comments, please do not hesitate to contact the 
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11. Is this 
business unit: (Tick one box) 
, 
The Head Office L (go to A4) 
,, A Subsidiary E: l (go to A2) 
Section A 
About Your Company 
A4 - In order of sales volume, please indicate your 5 
major country markets (including the UK. if 
applicable): 
1 Where is your company's Corporate Head 
6ffice located'? 
, UK 
Abroad 
(go to A4) 
(go to A3) 
-Is your company's 
business unit(s) operating in 
UK responsible for its own patenting`? 
Yes 
No 
Country 
1st 
2ý, ýý 
3rd 
4rn 
5 rn 
0I 
0 
o/o 
U/1 
Iv1 
; -What option below best describes the industry to which your R&D activities MOST apply" (circle number) 
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 
'Textiles and textile products 
Leather and leather products 
Wood and wood products 
Pulp and paper 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
Chemicals (excl. pharmaceuticals), chemical 
products, and man-made fibers 
Medical instruments 
Pharmaceuticals 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
Rubber and plastic products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
13. Basic metals and fabricated metal artefacts 
(excl. machinery and equipment) 
14. Transport vehicles and equipments 
15. Radio, television and applied apparatus 
16. Telecommunication equipments and artefacts 
17. Precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
18. IT hardware 
19. Office machinery 
20. Electrical machinery and equipment 
21. Electronic machinery and equipment 
22. Other machinery and equipment 
23. Other (please specify) 
Throughout this questionnaire this is going to be referred to as your FOCUS industry. 
-Could you please provide some examples of the output of your R&D activities? (Use BLOCK CAPITALS) 
ý 
'Considering your FOCUS industry, please give the approximate figures for your operations in the UK: 
Market share b. Proportion of total sales c. Share of total sales based upon inventions protected by 
% 
a. patents belonging to you a. 
Approximate 
% Total Sales 
% 
407 
for the purposes of this study product inventions are both i) improved products whose TECHNOLOGICAL 
performances 
have been significantly enhanced and ii) new products (either to the company or to the industry) 
}, hose TECHNOLOGICAL characteristics make them differ completely from the existing or previously 
produced ones. 
Process inventions are both new and significantly improved production or delivery methods. 
ºnnoN'ations are inventions that have useful and commercially viable applications. 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
Less than 10`% 
S. bi your FOCUS 
ýustry, for what proportion 
your PRODUCT 
ovations has each of the 
Ilowing been a key element 
increasing your returns 
mthose innovations'? 
ircle for each option) 
Exercising secrecy 
Taking out patents 
Securing other IPRs 
Being first to market 
Being able to secure other 
mpiementary technological 
imponents 
Providing complementary 
es! service 
Controlling specialised 
Nnulacturing facilities/ 
abilities 
Creating costs for clients 
lehing to another 
pany 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
For your PRODUCT innovations which patents 
V n' a key role, what share corresponds to your most ýLUABLE innovations? 
a. 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Section B 
About Your Internal Patent Policy 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
You have any annual numerical target for 
Tit filings last year`? 
es How many? _ 
0 ý 
_ 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
M10 - In your FOCUS 
industry, for what proportion 
of your PROCESS 
innovations has each of the 
following been a key element 
in increasing your returns 
from those innovations? 
(circle for each option) 
a. Exercising secrecy 
b. Taking out patents 
c. Securing other IPRs 
d. Being first to market 
e. Being able to secure other 
complementary technological 
components 
f. Providing complementary 
sales/ service 
g. Controlling specialised 
manufacturing facilities/ 
capabilities 
h. Creating costs for clients 
switching to another 
company 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
All - For your PROCESS innovations which patents 
play a key role, what share corresponds to your most 
VALUABLE innovations? 
a. % 
B2 - Please indicate your (UK and abroad) number of 
INTERNAL patent attorneys/ agents last calendar 
year: 
a. 
B3 - What percentage of the above were 
located in 
the UK? 
a. % 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
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N. WWhich one of the following best describes your 
ptude with respect 
to the patenting of your product 
pdprocess inventions? 
'Do not 
patent anything 
ep things secret) 
patent inventions that may 
used or marketed by your 
mpany 
patent inventions that may 
used or marketed either by 
urcompany or by its main ýmpetitors 
Patent nearly everything that 
patentable 
Product Process 
B5 - What action are you more likely to take when 
you come across a patent (or a series of patents) 
which it is very difficult costly to invent around? 
Very a 10 
Very 
Unlikely Likely 
a. Ignore or infringe 123456 
b. Challenge the 
corresponding patent(s) in 123456 
court 
c. Pursue related patents in 
order to induce patent holders 123456 
to a deal 
d. Bargain with patent holders 123456 
e. Pursue other technological 
activities 
f. Try to obtain the technology 
123ý ti 6 
through licensing, joint- 123456 
venture or acquisition 
g. Wait until patent expires 123456 
51-70 
- Considering those patentable PRODUCT/ PROCESS inventions for which you have NOT filed a patent 
placation during the last three years, what proportion of these were motivated by: 
PRODUCT 11. PROCESS 
More than 90% 
71-90 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
The difficulty in 
monstrating the patentability 
ilena to patent examiners 
The amount of information 
bclosed 
The costs of applying for a 
ent 
'cease of legally 
enting around a patent 
Re difficulty for other 
to copy the invention 
he difficulty in detecting 
Bement 
ne Possibility of a patent being valid if contested 
e Costs of defending a 
¢I in court 
cease of someone else 
Ong you to cross- 
ing 
rate of technological 
ss 
F-I 
31-S0 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
More than 90% 
71-90 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
a. The difficulty in 
demonstrating the patentability 
criteria to patent examiners 
b. The amount of information 
disclosed 
c. The costs of applying for a 
patent 
d. The ease of legally 
inventing around a patent 
e. The difficulty for other 
firms to copy the invention 
f. The difficulty in detecting 
infringement 
g. The possibility of a patent 
not being valid if contested 
h. The costs of defending a 
patent in court 
i. The ease of someone else 
inducing you to cross- 
licensing 
j. The rate of technological 
progress 
I 
51-70 
31-50 
2 
I 
1 2 
I 2 
2 
1 
2 1 
2 
1 
1 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
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1-Int 
at per 
RODU 
ELIBE 
utby c 
omeonf 
- In t 
at pei 
OCE 
ELIBI 
I by c 
meon 
-ON ars, v 
lent 1 
iu wa: 
Igno 
Reso 
Ri6ea 
Reso 
hlem 
Res 
vati 
I 
ss p 
Ale( 
Sell 
row 
Is 
ý 
plc 
si 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51 -70 
31 -50 
10 -30 
Less than 10% 
he last three years, 
centage of your 
CT inventions was 1 2 3 4 5 
RATELY carried 
rcumventing 
C else's patents? 
he last three years, 
rcentage of your 
SS inventions was 1 2 3 4 5 
IRATELY carried 
ircumventing 
e else's patents? 
er the last three 
chat proportion of the 
nfringements against 
ed 1 2 3 4 5 
Ived by simple 1 2 3 4 5 
tion 
Ived by out of court 1 2 3 4 5 
ent 
ved by court 1 2 3 4 5 
m 
B the last three years, 
reentage of your 
patents had been 
usly designed to 1 2 3 4 5 
id someone else's 
in order to lead to a 
!n average, up to what 
Of a patent LIFE are 
ne to defend yourself 
1 2 3 4 5 
infringements? 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51 -70 
31- 50 
10-3 0 
Less than 10% 
B12 - What proportion of your 
patent applications were filed 
motivated by the possibility 
of: 
a. Boosting your researchers' 1 2 3 4 5 6 
morale 
b. Showing the productivity of 1 2 3 4 5 6 R&D 
c. Obtaining revenue through 1 2 3 4 5 6 licensing-OUT 
d. Getting a bargaining 
position to have access to 1 2 3 4 5 6 
another patent/ technology 
e. Facilitating R&D co- 1 2 3 4 5 6 
operation with other inventors 
f. Precluding others from 1 2 3 4 5 6 freely copying your inventions 
g. Avoiding others from 1 2 3 4 5 6 
patenting a similar invention 
h. Preventing others from 
patenting variations of your 1 2 3 4 5 6 
invention 
i. Increasing competitors' 
costs to invent around your 1 2 3 4 5 6 
patents 
j. Avoiding infringement trials 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Enhancing the reputation of 1 2 3 4 5 6 
your company 
1. Signalling interest to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. Getting a better bargaining 1 2 3 4 5 6 
position in standard-setting 
n. Misleading competitors as 1 2 3 4 5 6 
to your true technological path 
o. Having access to a foreign 1 2 3 4 5 6 
market 
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13. What percentage of 
, ur effort relating to patents 
re devoted to: 
ýpetecting patentable 
ýventions 
Preparing patent 
plications to be filed 
Gathering information 
om the company's 
ientists/ engineers 
Searching prior art 
Less than 10`% 
Monitoring the prosecution 
your company's patent 
ýhcations in patent offices 
Mapping other company's 
lent activities 
Detecting infringement 
ainst your company 
Defending your company 
Inst infringement 
aling with licensing 
s 
; real encouragement 
ýntten 
encouragement 
ýoportionate 
financial 
kd 
10-30 
More than 901%, 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
El 
u 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
El 
I 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4-What incentives do you give to your 
earchers in order to encourage them to perform 
1entions which will generate patent applications? 
divvidual assessment 
enced by number of Q Yes Q No 
nt applications filed 
NO 
No 
No 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
B 15 - Overall, what 
proportion of your patent 
portfolio is characterized by: 
a. Patents with narrow scope 
b. Patents with broad scope 
c. Patents that surround 
someone else's patents 
d. Patents that surround your 
own patents 
e. Patents with prohibitive 
invent-around costs 
f. Patents taken out in a less 
structured way due to 
uncertainties as to R& D 
direction or economic 
importance 
g. Patents ordered in some 
way aimed to cover an array 
of technical solutions for 
achieving a similar 
functional result 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
I 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
I 
J 
5 
5 
5 
ý 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
The remainder of this Section concerns follow-up 
patent applications. Do NOT count as follow-ups 
those applications relating to the same invention 
filed later in other countries. Count as follow-ups 
only those filings which incorporate improvements 
on the initial conceptual idea, and which may lead 
to a broader protection of your final product/ 
process before it is launched/ used. If you do NOT 
file follow-up applications, please go to 
SECTION C. 
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116. On average, 
for each one of your priority filing 
many follow-up applications are filed? 
Product Process 
Inventions Inventions 
More than 90% 
Less than 10% 
From l to 2 
from 3 to 4 
}From 5 to 6 
From 7 to 8 
From8to9 
More than 9 
1: 1 
C 
B18 - Regarding your follow- 
up applications. what share is 
filed: 
a. Within 12 months from 
priority filing 
b. Between 12 and 18 
months from priority filing 
c. Between 18 months from 
priority filing and the 
issuance of the patent 
corresponding to the priority 
filing 
d. After the issuance of the 
patent corresponding to the 
priority filing 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
17-Which of the above applies to your most 
3luable inventions`? 
Product b. Process 
(Enter corresponding letter) 
I 2 
3 
3 
ý 
3 
4 
4 ti 
6 
6 
4 
4 5 
6 
6 
Section C 
About Your Patenting Activity 
I- Approximately, what was your total cost of 
'tenting activities and purchased services last year`? 
UK (£'OOOs) 
Abroad (£'OOOs) 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
"Approximate ly, what 
Portion of the total above 
responds to: 
atent office fees 
alaries of employees 
, ed in this work 
avi»ent to outside patent 
eVs (excluding litigation 
ers3 
aYment to specialised 
lion lawyers 
2 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
C3 - What percentage of your 
UK patents are going to have 
their term expired in: 
a. Less than 2 years 
b. Between 2 and 5 years 
c. Between 5 and 10 years 
d. Between 10 and 15 years 
e. More than 15 years 
2 
1 2 
I 2 
2 1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3i 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
S 
5 
5 
5 
5 
C4 - On average, for what percentage of your 
filings 
in the UK Patent Office is a patent granted? 
a. 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
i 
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;. Compared to the average in your FOCUS 
dustry, the scope of most of your patents is: 
Substantially broader 
Slightly broader 
No difference 
51ightly narrower 
Substantially narrower 
Fý 
, ý6-Which one of these possibilities (a to e) best 
plies to your most valuable patents? 
(Letter) 
C7 - With your FOCUS industry in mind. how-, - many 
dependent claims are drafted on average for each 
independent claim in your typical patents? 
a. Less than 5 
b. From 5 to 10 
c. From 11 to 15 
d. From 16 to 20 
e. From 21 to 25 
f. More than 25 
C8 - Which one of the above best applies to your 
most valuable patents? 
(Enter letter) 
9 Based upon the last calendar year, please give the approximate figures regarding your paten t 
Kations in the UK Patent Office (UKPO): 
Total number of filings in the UKPO (including those, if any, coming from the Patent Co- 
eration Treaty route -PCT, European Patent Office -EPO, etc) 
Proportion of "a" first filed in the UKPO before anywhere else (priority filings) 
Proportion of "a" corresponding to your company's FOCUS industry in the UK 
Percentage of "a" relating to inventions generated in the UK 
Number of patents pending in the UKPO 
10-During the last three years, in which 5 
UNTRIES (the UK inclusive, if applicable) did 
u file or designate (if using a supra-national route) 
st of your patent applications? 
Country 
1S` 
2nd 
3rd 
4`ý' 
5th 
YOU listed more than one country, please go to 
enext question, otherwise go to question C12. 
°/0 
ýýO 
0/ 
/1 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
31-50 
10-30 
Less than 10% 
C11 - During the last three 
years, for what proportion of 
the filings in other countries 
did the following contribute 
most in motivating you to seek 
patent protection? 
a. Your company's current or 
foreseeable participation in the 
market 
b. The closeness of the market 
c. The size of the market 
d. The presence of your main 
competitors 
e. The local presence of world- 
class technical/ scientific 
competence 
f. The strong enforcement 
climate 
g. The lower costs associated 
with the patenting process 
(e. g. no translation costs) 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
I 2 
2 1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2002 
4 5 6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
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12-Regarding your patent applications worldwide (excluding the UK). please give the 
allowing 
figures for the last calendar year: 
Total number of filings which started their international phase via the PCT 
average number of countries designated through the PCT route 
Total number of filings which started their international phase via the EPO 
G ý%, erage number of countries designated when using the EPO route 
Total number of filings worldwide (excluding the UK) 
proportion of "e" corresponding to your FOCUS industry 
Number of patents pending worldwide (excluding the UK) 
C13 - Please indicate the extent that you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following, statements 
relating to patent activities in your FOCUS industry: 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
a. Information disclosed by other inventors' patents are 
essential to our R&D activities 
b. Patents are decisive in increasing the returns from our 
innovative effort 
c. The potential returns from a market is decisive for 
whether or not we will seek a patent 
d. Our most valuable patents are those most frequently 
cited by our subsequent patents 
123456 
123456 
123456 
123456 
e. We file patent applications early in the R&D process 123456 
f. Information disclosed by our patent applications 
harms our prospects of higher returns from the 123456 
corresponding inventions 
g. Our most valuable innovations would NOT bring high 123456 
returns if they were NOT patented 
h. Patents play a key role in reaping the returns from 
innovation when we are able to protect as many 123456 
variations as possible of the invention 
i. Securing patents is paramount if we want to have 123456 
access to third parties' patented inventions 
j. Our patents with broad scope are more valuable than 123456 
our patents with narrow scope 
k. Patents taken out early in the R&D process, increase 123456 
our prospects of financing further development 
I. The presence of very broad patents held by other 
inventors discourage us from seeking inventions in the 123456 
same technology field 
M. The more valuable a patent, the more it will be cited 123456 by other inventors 
2002 
% 
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4. With all your patent portfolio in mind, please give the following figures for the last calendar 
3r: 
Number of patent families (patents in force in different countries for the same original invention ) 
Total number of patents in force (UK and abroad) 
Percentage of "b" relating to your FOCUS industry 
Percentage of "b" issued in the last calendar year 
Number of patents in force in the UK 
Percentage of "e" relating to your FOCUS industry 
percentage of "e" issued in the last calendar year 
Section D 
About Your R&D Activity 
I-Over the past three years, approximately what 
rcentage of your R&D expenditures was: 
Basic Research (scientific research 
Ih NO specific commercial 
9ectives) 
Applied Research (scientific or 
gineering research with a specific 
ýmmercial objective) 
Design and/or Development 
hnical activity translating research 
dings into products or processes) 
Technical Service (e. g. providing 
nuiacturing support, etc) 
°/0 
% 
2002 
°ýn 
`%0 
(v0 
°/, 
D3 - Approximately, what percentage of your total 
R&D expenditure applies to your FOCUS industry? 
11/0 Total R&D 
D4 - During the last three years, how useful was the 
information disclosed by other inventors' patents/ 
patent applications to guide your R&D activities? 
Not at all Very 
Useful Useful 
% 
123456 
oýa 
100% 
I-Please RANK the countries (including the UK) 
le re most of your R&D expenditures were spent 
Year: (list at most 5, if applicable) 
Country % Total R&D 
i I 
)lid 
; rd 
4ih 
ýý6 
% 
% 
% 
% 
D5 - Please RANK (starting with 1 for the MOST 
important) the reasons you had for using patent 
information: 
a. To keep abreast of technological changes 
b. To find information relating to a specific 
technological problem 
c. To keep track of competitors 
d. To check if an invention was already 
patented 
e. To check on potential patent infringement 
L To obtain market information 
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D6 - Since the 1980's, at what rate have innovations been introduced by other firms in your 
FOCUS industry in the UK? 
Very 
` 
Verf 
Slow Fast 
a. Breakthrough product innovations 
b. Incremental product innovations 
c. Breakthrough process innovations 
d. Incremental process innovations 
More than 15 years 
10-15 nears 
5-10 years 
2-5 ears 
6 months-2 ears 
Less than 6 months 
7-Iin your FOCUS industry I 
the UK, how long does it II 
on average for someone 
to introduce a competing 
mative to your: IIIII 
(PATENTED product 
ovations 
NON PATENTED product 
ovations 
PATENTED production 
ss innovations 
NON PATENTED 
duction process 
ovations 
1 
I 
2 
2 
2 
I 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
-Ihith your FOCUS industry in mind, how long do 
take on average to come out with a NEW product 
process, if this is the main output of R&D) and to 
it ready to be commercialized? 
ýfl°we) 
Years / Months 
(circle as appropriate) 
1--When is a corresponding patent application first 
Before / After Market introduction 
'fie 3s aPPropriate) 
" How far from market introduction does it 
Beet? 
(figure) 
Years / Months 
(circle as appropriate) 
6 
6 
6 
6 
123456 
123456 
123456 
123456 
More than 90% 
71-90 
51-70 
Less than 10% 
D11 - In the last three years, 
for what proportion of your 
inventions were their 
foreseeable high returns 
decisive in seeking patent 
protection? 
D12 - In the last three years, 
for what percentage of your 
R&D activities was the 
likelihood of securing a patent 
central in deciding whether or 
not to go ahead with a 
particular project'? 
D13 - During the last three 
years, approximately what 
proportion of your R&D 
activities were stopped or 
diverted because of the 
perceived weak patent 
protection that would be 
achieved? 
31-50 
10-30 
I 
I 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
S 
5 
5 
D14 - Over the last three years, in order 
for you to 
move forward and be able to market your products/ 
processes how important to your operations was 
securing property rights over inventions linked to other 
firms' patented inventions? 
Not at all 
Important 
12 
.4 
3 
3 
3 
Very 
Important 
456 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH INDEED FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION!!! 
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6 
6 
6 
COMMENTS 
Li% i/9 ., /G l it v/h /M"i,: __... ; Y:: n :. >. i°ýsn. ",. '. ___ < 
lease use the space below if there is anything else you v, 'ould like to mention about patent activities 
therwithin your company or within the industry your company operates. 
spondent details 
, years working on patents: 
Title: 
Thank you for your time and assistance in completing this questionnaire. 
Tick here if you would like a custom report, and please provide the following details: 
e: 
pany: 
Tess: 
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Appendix 8 
Introductory Letter to the Patent Survey 
A) 
ý ii 
Marketing and Strategic Management Group 
Date 
Addressee 
Dear 
Patent activity in the UK 
ý'niversitv of Warwick 
ý entry CV4 7AL 
Tel. 024 7652 2087 
Fax. 024 7652 4650 
h. nl. hýurosýa ýýam ick. ac. uk 
I hope that you will excuse a direct approach such as this but according to the 
Department of Trade and Industry R&D Scoreboard your company is one of the most 
innovative in the UK. I am carrying out a survey relating to the use and management of 
patents in UK industry and I would very much appreciate if your company could 
collaborate with this research. 
A key element of my research involves the collection of information regarding patent 
activities from those people most closely involved with decision making on patenting. 
Within the next few days you will receive a request to complete a brief questionnaire 
relating to such decisions. If such decision making is not within the remit of your 
responsibilities I would be grateful if you could pass it to whoever does carry these 
responsibilities in your company or, in the case of a group of companies, within the 
company where most of the Research & Development expenses are incurred. 
The survey is being conducted in an effort to better inform policy makers, academics, 
and others who must make decisions related to patents. Confidentiality can be assured in 
that no source of material will be explicitly named in the research output. 
With many thanks in anticipation of your help. If you would like any further 
information about this research, you may contact me on the address/ telephone above or 
by E-mail at H. M. Barros@warwick. ac. uk. 
Yours sincerely, 
Henrique Barros 
Principal Research Officer 
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Appendix 9 
Cover Letter to the Patent Survey 
Al 
ý "" 
Marketing and Strategic Management Group 
Date 
Addressee 
Dear 
Patent activity in the UK 
University of Warwick 
C oý entry CV4 7AL 
Tel. 024 7652 2087 
Fax. 024 7652 4650 
h. m. barros(2i warwick. ac. uk 
A week or so ago you will have received a letter giving a brief introduction to a survey 
on patent activity that is being carried out amongst the most innovative companies 
operating in the UK. Knowing how companies view the importance of patents - and 
how patents are used - is vital not only to policy makers but also to those who make 
decisions about patents within their own companies in order to benchmark with others. 
Naturally, it is important to collect information from those people most closely involved 
with decision making on patenting, and the questionnaire was designed following 
consultation with other UK companies. I am requesting your collaboration with this 
project by asking you to take the few minutes necessary to complete the brief 
questionnaire appended to this letter, and by returning it in the postage paid envelope 
provided. If decision making on patents is not within the remit of your responsibilities I 
would be grateful if you could pass it to whoever does carry these responsibilities in 
your company or, in the case of a group of companies, within the company where most 
of the Research & Development expenses are incurred. 
You may be assured confidentiality in that no source of material will be explicitly 
named in the published results. 
Should you wish to make further enquiries about this survey, you may contact me on the 
address/ telephone above or by E-mail at H. M. Barros@warwick. ac. uk. 
I very much hope that you will be able to accede to this request and would like to 
express my gratitude in advance for your time and assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Henrique Barros 
Principal Research Officer 
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Appendix 10 
Follow-up Letter to the Patent Survey 
ýý 
ý "" 
Marketing and Strategic Management Group 
Date 
Addressee 
Dear 
Patent activity in the UK 
University of \Varýw-ick 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
Tel. 024 7652 2087 
Fax. 024 7652 4650 
h. m. barros/u <var« ick. ac. uk 
Please accept our apologies for disturbing you. A questionnaire on patent activity was 
mailed to you the week before last week. We are therefore contacting you again to ask 
for your cooperation. If you, or someone else within your company, have already 
completed and returned the questionnaire, please accept our sincere thanks. If not, 
could you please do so as soon as possible? It is important that we receive back as 
many completed questionnaire as possible so that the results of the survey will be fully 
representative of firms operating in the UK. 
We are especially grateful for your help because we believe that what we learn in 
response to the questionnaire will be very useful to both policy makers and those who 
make decisions about patents. However, if you did not receive a questionnaire, or if it 
was misplaced, please do not hesitate to contact us on the above telephone/ email and 
we will get another one in the mail to you shortly. 
Yours sincerely, 
Henrique Barros 
Research Officer 
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Appendix 11 
Analysis of Variance of a Series of Attributes of Respondents and 
Non-Respondents to the Patent Survey 
R&D expenses in 2000 (£ M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 275.822 1 275.822 0.01 0.9267 
Within groups 12793301.0 393 32552.93 
Total 12793576.9 394 32471.01 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 32.1765 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Sales in 2000 (£ M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 222654746 1 222654746 4.03 0.0454 
Within groups 2.1442e+10 388 55263536.7 
Total 2.1665e+10 389 55693848.3 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 114.3320 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Profits in 2000 (£ M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 1565162.36 1 1565162.36 1.24 0.2668 
Within groups 487348306 385 1265839.75 
Total 488913468 386 1266615.20 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 50.0782 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
R&D per employee (£ 000's) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 2557.19 1 2557.19 2.13 0.1448 
Within groups 460070.32 384 1198.10 
Total 462627.51 385 1201.63 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 10.0210 Prob>chi2 = 0.002 
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Appendix 12 
Analysis of Variance of a Series of Attributes of Respondents to Different 
Waves of the Patent Survey 
R&D expenses in 2000 (£M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 635.62 1 635.62 0.10 0.7569 
Within groups 228617.51 35 6531.93 
Total 229253.13 36 6368.14 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 9.2108 Prob>chi2 = 0.002 
Sales in 2000 (£ M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 66596241.2 1 66596241.2 0.25 0.6234 
Within groups 9.4966e+09 35 271332674 
Total 9.5632e+09 36 265645551 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 27.8427 Prob>ch12 = 0.000 
Profits in 2000 (£ M) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 2572668.06 1 2572668.06 0.60 0.4449 
Within groups 146437538 34 4306986.42 
Total 149010206 35 4257434.47 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 28.4897 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
R&D per employee (£ 000's) 
Source SS df MS F Prob >F 
Between groups 4826.53 1 4826.53 2.19 0.1484 
Within groups 75031.44 34 2206.81 
Total 79857.97 35 2281.66 
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 28.2184 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
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Appendix 13 
Proportion of Firms' Patent Policies by Firm Size band 
Product innovations 
Size band 
Do not 
patent 
Patent 
inventions 
of own interest 
Patent inventions 
of own interest 
or of others' 
< 50 0.00 0.00 18.18 50.00 
50-249 14.29 10.00 18.18 25.00 
250-499 28.57 10.00 18.18 0.00 
500-999 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1000-4999 28.57 60.00 0.00 0.00 
5000-19999 14.29 10.00 27.27 25.00 
> 19999 0.00 10.00 18.18 0.00 
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Process innovations 
Size band 
Do not 
patent 
Patent 
inventions 
of own interest 
< 50 0.00 0.00 
50-249 33.33 11.11 
250-499 33.33 33.33 
500-999 0.00 0.00 
1000-4999 33.33 55.56 
5000-19999 0.00 0.00 
> 19999 0.00 0.00 
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 
Patent inventions 
of own interest 
or of others' 
Patent 
everything 
Patent 
everything 
5.26 50.00 
15.79 16.67 
10.53 0.00 
0.00 16.67 
26.32 0.00 
26.32 16.67 
15.79 0.00 
100.00 100.00 
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Appendix 14 
Average R&D Intensity (%) by Patent Policy 
Product Innovations 
Folic mean sd min max 
Do not patent 3.20 3.34 0.26 6.83 
Patent inventions of own interest 7.98 7.22 1.56 22.80 
Patent inventions of own interest or of others' 54.64 151.09 0.29 620.00 
Patent everything 124.08 216.89 0.90 503.00 
Process Innovations 
Policy mean sd min max 
Do not patent 3.26 2.24 0.26 6.83 
Patent inventions of own interest 7.20 7.09 0.91 22.86 
Patent inventions of own interest or of others' 84.74 191.66 0.29 620.00 
Patent everything 204.94 263.74 1.81 503.00 
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